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Abstract:		Recent	 movements	 in	 literature	 and	 the	 humanities	 have	 drawn	 upon	 insights	gleaned	from	cognitive	science.	For	some	scholars	this	is	viewed	as	a	renaissance	while	 for	 others	 it	 represents	 a	 dangerous	 trend	 towards	 reductionism.	 This	project	 offers	 to	mediate	 between	 these	 two	 perspectives,	 showing	 the	 promise	and	 the	pitfalls	of	 this	new	 interdisciplinary	engagement.	This	 thesis	 argues	 that	the	role	of	perceptual	processes	in	relation	to	aesthetic	engagement	with	literature	is	ripe	for	further	study.	The	 first	 two	 chapters	 present	 a	 combined	 literature	 review	 and	 methodology	study.	A	detailed	comparison	of	‘cognitive	poetics’	theorists	Tsur	and	Stockwell	in	Chapter	 One	 is	 used	 to	 establish	 how	 cognitive	 science	 expands	 and	 revises	literary	 criticism’s	 critical	 toolbox.	 Chapter	 Two	 focuses	 on	 the	 ‘neuroaesthetic’	theories	of	Ramachandran,	Zeki	and	Barry,	and	from	this	develops	a	framework	to	discuss	perceptual	tension	in	literature.	Following	 this,	 the	 thesis	 offers	 three	 case	 studies	 of	 modern	 authors	 whose	literary	 style	 invites	 comparison	with	 the	 current	 neurological	 understanding	 of	perceptual	 and	 sensory	 processes.	 Chapter	 Three	 explores	 the	 notion	 that	 Jack	Kerouac’s	prose	style	in	On	the	Road	is	musically	inspired,	and	conducts	a	detailed	comparison	 of	 the	 key	 features	 common	 to	 both	 language	 and	music,	 including	rhythm	 and	 tension.	 Chapter	 Four	 re-examines	 the	 idea	 of	 Impressionism	influencing	Virginia	Woolf’s	Mrs	Dalloway,	using	evidence	from	cognitive	science	to	fully	articulate	the	connection	between	literary	and	visual	Impressionism.	Chapter	Five	is	a	study	of	Vladimir	Nabokov’s	prose,	framed	around	a	critical	investigation	of	 the	 significance	 of	 his	 synaesthesia	 to	 his	 writing.	 By	 exploring	 the	 broader	
 vi 
nature	of	 cross-modality	and	what	 it	 can	 inform	us	of	 the	workings	of	 the	mind,	this	chapter	shows	how	distinctive	stylistic	features	influenced	by	cross-modality	recur	 throughout	 Nabokov’s	 writing,	 and	 how	 he	 exploits	 cross-modality	 for	aesthetic	effect.	Collectively	 these	 studies	 offer	 an	 account	 of	 how	 literary	 criticism	 infused	with	cognitive	 science	 can	 illuminate	new	understandings	of	 aesthetic	 and	perceptual	engagement	with	literature.						 	
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Introduction:	The	Meeting	of	the	Minds		 “It	seems	to	me	that	a	good	formula	to	test	the	quality	of	a	novel	is,	 in	the	long	run,	a	merging	of	the	precision	of	poetry	and	the	intuition	of	science.”	(Nabokov,	LL,	p.	6)		In	 his	 introductory	 lecture	 to	 students	 taking	 his	 university	 course	 “Literature	311-312:	 Masters	 of	 European	 Fiction,”	 Vladimir	 Nabokov	 drew	 an	 intriguing	comparison	between	science	and	poetry.	Rather	wittily,	where	we	might	normally	associate	precision	with	science	and	intuition	with	poetry,	he	inverts	these	notions	and	suggests	that	an	ideal	critical	style	draws	on	both.	Yet	this	inversion	is	actually	quite	 astute	 because	 while	 literary	 criticism	 has	 a	 well-developed	 analytical	precision,	particularly	for	poetry,	much	of	this	precision	is	based	on	intuitions	that	are	capable	of	being	further	clarified	by	science.	This	is	precisely	the	territory	that	will	be	charted	by	this	thesis.		The	recent	and	rapid	rise	of	cognitive	science	as	an	interdisciplinary	tool	to	expand	the	boundaries	and	explanatory	scope	of	traditional	academic	disciplines	has	been	dubbed	‘the	cognitive	turn’.	A	common	nomenclature	to	designate	this	trend	is	the	prefix	 ‘neuro’	 –	 ‘neuroeconomics’,	 ‘neuropolitics’,	 ‘neuroaesthetics’,	 and	 so	 on.	What	this	paradigm	essentially	offers	is	to	connect	a	cultural	theory,	phenomenon	or	 artefact	 with	 a	 neurological	 mechanism,	 which	 can	 supplement	 or	 expand	knowledge	 of	 the	 former	 by	 articulation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 latter.	 It	 purports	 to	understand	the	human	world	by	understanding	the	human	mind.		
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Literary	 criticism	 is	 just	 one	 of	 the	 proverbial	 moths	 drawn	 to	 the	 flame	 of	cognitive	 science;	 and,	 as	with	 other	 disciplines,	 this	 shift	 has	 provoked	 internal	reactions	 of	 both	 excitement	 and	 scepticism.	 The	 stakes	 for	 literary	 engagement	with	cognitive	methods	are	particularly	high:	with	the	perpetual	concern	that	the	humanities	 are	 in	 crisis,	 the	 ‘neuro’	 version	 of	 literary	 study	 has	 the	 potential	either	 to	 reinvigorate	 an	 older	 discipline	with	 new	methods,	 or	 to	 unmake	 it	 by	reducing	all	its	mysteries	to	a	matter	of	synapses.			Yet	as	this	thesis	will	argue,	the	pivot	towards	the	brain	as	a	site	of	 investigation	for	understanding	literature	is	not	without	precedent.	Some	of	the	insights	offered	by	 both	 literary	 critics	 and	 authors	 into	 how	 novels	 and	 poetry	 connect	 with	readers	 not	 only	 become	 more	 convincing	 when	 connected	 with	 contemporary	science,	 but	 also	 show	 a	 kind	 of	 rudimentary	 understanding	 of	 some	 principles	behind	 cognitive	 science.	 This	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 modern	 fiction	 of	 Kerouac,	Woolf	 and	Nabokov;	 but	 examples	of	 literary	 criticism’s	 analytical	 precision	 that	can	be	 validated	by	 cognitive	 science	 go	back	 even	 further.	One	 can	be	 found	as	early	as	Samuel	Taylor	Coleridge’s	‘Lectures	on	Shakespeare’:		 And	lastly,	which	belongs	only	to	a	great	poet,	the	power	of	so	carrying	on	the	eye	of	the	reader	as	to	make	him	almost	lose	the	consciousness	of	words	–	 to	make	 him	 see	 everything	 –	 and	 this	 without	 exciting	 any	 painful	 or	laborious	 attention,	 without	 any	 anatomy	 of	 description	 (a	 fault	 not	uncommon	 in	 descriptive	 poetry)	 but	 with	 the	 sweetness	 and	 easy	movement	of	nature.	(2006,	p.	486-7)		
 7 
Coleridge	 links	the	reader’s	mind	and	the	author’s	mind	through	the	workings	of	the	 literary	 imagination,	extolling	 the	power	of	 imagery	and	 feeling;	and	he	even	talks	 of	 the	 effect	 whereby	 the	 reader	 will	 almost	 “lose	 the	 consciousness	 of	words”.	 Contrasting	 this	 effect	 with	 a	 form	 of	 poetry	 where	 the	 ‘anatomy	 of	description’	 becomes	 laborious,	 Coleridge	 implies	 that	 being	 able	 to	 ‘see	everything’	 in	 literature	 involves	 not	 making	 everything	 available	 to	consciousness;	but	 instead	to	 ‘carry	on	the	eye’	of	 the	reader.	 In	effect,	Coleridge	argues	that	a	poet	such	as	Shakespeare	not	only	draws	on	the	heightened	faculties	of	his	own	mind,	but	on	the	ability	to	fully	involve	the	faculties	of	the	reader’s	mind	in	 the	 act	 of	 perceiving	 the	 poem:	 to	 encourage	 full	 use	 of	 the	 sensory	 faculties	without	resorting	to	‘painful	attention’:	to	sense	rather	than	be	told.			Nabokov	 put	 a	 similar	 sentiment	 forward	 a	 century	 and	 a	 half	 later	 in	 those	lectures	at	Cornell	University.	“The	mind,	the	brain,	the	top	of	the	tingling	spine,	is,	or	should	be,	the	only	instrument	used	upon	a	book,”	he	told	his	students	(LL,	p.	4).	Like	 Coleridge,	 Nabokov	 finds	 fascination	 with	 the	 senses	 and	 the	 engagement	between	the	reader’s	mind	and	the	author’s	mind:		 So	 what	 is	 this	 authentic	 instrument	 to	 be	 used	 by	 the	 reader?	 It	 is	impersonal	 imagination	and	artistic	delight.	What	 should	be	established,	 I	think,	is	an	artistic	harmonious	balance	between	the	reader’s	mind	and	the	author’s	mind.	We	ought	 to	 remain	a	 little	 aloof	 and	 take	pleasure	 in	 this	aloofness	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 we	 keenly	 enjoy	 -	 passionately	 enjoy,	enjoy	with	tears	and	shivers,	the	inner	weave	of	a	given	masterpiece…		
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In	order	 to	bask	 in	 that	magic	a	wise	reader	reads	 the	book	of	genius	not	with	his	heart,	not	so	much	with	his	brain,	but	with	his	spine.	It	is	there	that	occurs	 the	 telltale	 tingle	 even	 though	we	must	 keep	 a	 little	 aloof,	 a	 little	detached	when	reading.	(LL,	p.	4-6)		For	Nabokov,	the	meeting	of	the	author’s	mind	and	the	reader’s	mind	is	important,	but	 he	 further	distinguishes	between	 the	brain	 (which	 in	his	 critique	 represents	the	source	of	 ‘intellectual’	 readings	of	a	book	and	obsession	with	socio-economic	angles	in	criticism)	and	the	spine,	by	which	one	can	surmise	he	means	the	nervous	system.	He	 refers	 to	 ‘tingling’,	 ‘tears’	 and	 ‘shivers’	 –	 all	 physiological	 sensations,	implying	that	the	reader	should	be	able	to	feel	the	impact	of	the	book	through	this	bodily	 feedback.	 Tingles	 and	 shivers	might	 even	 be	 taken	 as	 an	 effect	 similar	 to	that	of	 ‘chills’	 in	music	–	 the	body’s	 reaction	 to	heightened	patterns	of	harmonic	tension.		The	mind	 and	 its	 reach	 throughout	 the	 body	 via	 the	 nervous	 system	may	 have	been	an	object	of	fascination	to	critics,	but	for	a	long	time	the	study	of	the	mind	in	literature	 was	most	 commonly	 exercised	 through	 psychoanalysis.	 This	 Freudian	mode	of	criticism	 is	not	without	detractors:	Nabokov	 in	particular	was	hostile	 to	this	kind	of	criticism,	writing	very	early	in	his	autobiography	Speak,	Memory:	“Let	me	say	at	once	that	I	reject	completely	the	vulgar,	shabby,	fundamentally	medieval	world	 of	 Freud,	 with	 its	 crankish	 quest	 for	 sexual	 symbols	 (something	 like	searching	 for	Baconian	 acrostics	 in	 Shakespeare’s	works)”	 (S,M,	 p.	 6).	 In	 spite	 of	Nabokov’s	 distaste,	 psychoanalysis	 was	 one	 of	 the	 dominant	 approaches	 to	 the	mind	 for	 much	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 along	 with	 behaviourism.	 As	 cognitive	
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science	 has	 developed,	 matured	 and	 progressed	 to	 the	 point	 where	 it	 can	 offer	tremendous	 insights	 into	 the	mind,	 it	has	become	 the	most	enticing	prospect	 for	cross-disciplinary	 study.	 Paul	 Stagard,	 writing	 in	 The	 Stanford	 Encyclopaedia	 of	
Philosophy,	offers	this	definition	of	cognitive	science:		 Cognitive	 science	 is	 the	 interdisciplinary	 study	 of	 mind	 and	 intelligence,	embracing	 philosophy,	 psychology,	 artificial	 intelligence,	 neuroscience,	linguistics,	 and	 anthropology.	 Its	 intellectual	 origins	 are	 in	 the	mid-1950s	when	researchers	in	several	fields	began	to	develop	theories	of	mind	based	on	 complex	 representations	 and	 computational	 procedures.	 Its	organizational	 origins	 are	 in	 the	 mid-1970s	 when	 the	 Cognitive	 Science	Society	was	formed	and	the	journal	Cognitive	Science	began.	(2014)		The	potential	to	understand	literature	and	its	impact	on	the	mind	in	terms	of	these	additional	disciplines,	particularly	with	insights	from	neuroscience	and	linguistics,	has	attracted	a	small	but	growing	body	of	literary	scholars	to	this	new	paradigm.	The	appeal	of	this	interdisciplinary	approach,	not	only	to	literature	but	also	other	fields	of	humanities,	particularly	music	and	art	history,	has	been	described	as	the	‘cognitive	turn’	by	Mark	Turner	(2002,	p.	9).	Cognitive	science	has	the	potential	to	provide	new	 insights	 into	 the	 relationship	between	 literature	 and	 the	mind,	 and	even	 to	 provide	 some	 reinvigoration	 of	 the	 discipline,	 as	 Turner	 and	 others	suggest.		In	 broad	 strokes,	 this	 thesis	 is	 both	 an	 exploration	 of	 this	 ‘cognitive	 turn’	 in	 the	humanities,	examining	the	scope	of	critical	insight	offered	by	significant	theorists	
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engaged	 in	 this	 interdisciplinary	 research;	 and	 a	 re-examination	 of	 key	 prose	works	 by	 three	 major	 twentieth	 century	 authors—Jack	 Kerouac’s	 On	 The	 Road	(1957),	 Virginia	 Woolf’s	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 (1925),	 and	 Vladimir	 Nabokov’s	 Lolita	(1955)—using	 the	 methods	 and	 insights	 from	 this	 new	 scientific	 approach	 to	literature	to	articulate	fully	their	aesthetic	impact.	With	each	of	the	writers	under	discussion,	 readers	 and	 critics	 have	 made	 intuitive	 judgements	 concerning	 the	sensory	effects	of	their	prose	styles:	bebop	jazz	rhythms	in	Kerouac,	impressionist	art	 in	Woolf,	 a	 kind	 of	multisensory	 hyperaesthesia	 in	Nabokov.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	thesis	 is	 to	draw	on	 the	 resources	offered	by	 the	 cognitive	 turn	 to	explore	 these	critical	intuitions	in	greater	detail.		
The	Critic’s	Toolbox		In	scientific	 terms,	reading	 is	an	act	 that	 involves	both	sensation	and	perception.	Sensation	is	the	detection	of	stimuli	by	our	sensory	systems,	and	perception	is	the	process	 by	 which	 our	 brains	 organise	 and	 interpret	 this	 sensory	 information.	Literary	criticism	as	it	is	generally	practised	is	mostly	concerned	with	perception,	with	 interpreting	 a	 text	 after	 its	words	have	been	perceptually	 organised	by	 the	mind	 and	 initial	 impressions	 have	 been	 made.	 The	 transmission	 of	 sensory	information	 that	 is	 eventually	 perceptually	 processed	 as	 language	 is	 normally	 of	most	 interest	 to	 science;	 but	 the	 cognitive	 turn	 in	 literary	 study	 makes	 the	processes	of	sensation	as	significant	as	the	organisation	and	interpretation	of	the	text.	 Emerging	 insights	 from	 the	 field	 of	 cognitive	 science	 allow	 us	 to	 articulate	interpretations	 that	 until	 now	 have	 mostly	 been	 put	 down	 to	 intuition.	 It	 also	
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allows	us	to	better	understand	how	mechanisms	of	the	mind	that	are	not	available	directly	to	consciousness	have	an	impact	on	our	aesthetic	appreciation	of	a	novel.		Having	 said	 this,	 where	 scientific	 approaches	 are	 introduced	 to	 the	 humanities	there	 exists	 the	potential	 pitfall	 of	 reductionism	 in	 the	 application	of	 theory	 and	the	subsequent	analysis.	By	reductionism	what	is	meant	specifically	is	the	habit	of	discussing	a	complex	phenomenon	entirely	in	terms	of	the	simplest	elements	it	can	be	distilled	down	to:	for	instance,	while	describing	sexual	attraction	as	‘chemistry’	is	merely	shorthand,	to	discuss	the	phenomenon	of	sexual	attraction	in	its	entirety	as	 a	 product	 merely	 of	 chemical	 processes	 within	 the	 brain	 is	 a	 reductionist	approach.	 Chapters	 One	 and	 Two	 offer	 some	more	 direct	 examples	 of	 how	 this	narrow	 approach	 yields	 some	 almost	 farcically	 simplistic	 explanations	 for	 the	appeal	 of	 the	 arts.	 The	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis,	 however,	 is	 not	 to	 reduce	 the	appreciation	of	 literature	 to	 a	psychological	 or	neurological	phenomenon,	nor	 to	directly	 substitute	 science	 for	 literary	 theory.	 It	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 an	interdisciplinary	method	of	inquiry	aimed	extending	the	literary	critic’s	toolbox	by	borrowing	 from	 cognitive	 science.	 This	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 unlock	 new	interpretations	 in	 literary	 criticism,	 and	 to	 give	 older	 and	more	 intuitive	 ones	 a	newfound	 clarity.	 Most	 importantly,	 it	 is	 aimed	 at	 empowering	 the	 reader	 by	giving	them	the	tools	to	explain	and	articulate	their	aesthetic	reactions	to	a	text.		This	is	most	pertinent	among	literary	effects	that	occur	in	the	most	basic	features	of	the	text,	as	simple	as	the	repetition	of	sounds	or	the	arrangement	of	words.	It	is	most	 intriguing	when	 such	 an	 apparently	basic	part	 of	 the	 text	 generates	 strong	and	consistent	aesthetic	or	emotional	reactions.	Here	is	one	example	of	a	literary	
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technique	with	 such	 a	 consequence,	 taken	 from	 the	Dictionary	of	Literary	Terms	
and	Literary	Theory:		
Cacophony	(Gk	‘dissonance’)	The	opposite	of	euphony	(q.v.).	Harsh	sounds	are	 sometimes	deliberately	used	by	writers,	 especially	poets,	 to	 achieve	 a	particular	 effect.	 A	 well	 known	 example	 occurs	 in	 Tennyson’s	 Morte	
D’Arthur:			 Dry	clashed	his	harness	in	the	icy	caves		 And	barren	chasms,	and	all	to	left	and	right		 The	bare	black	cliff	clanged	round	him,	as	he	based		 His	feet	on	juts	of	slippery	crag	that	rang		 Sharp-smitten	with	the	dint	of	armed	heels	–		 And	on	a	sudden,	lo!	the	level	lake,		 And	the	long	glories	of	the	winter	moon.		The	alliteration	and	assonance	(qq.v.)	of	the	first	five	lines	are	self-evidently	rough;	 the	 last	 two	 lines,	 containing	 the	 same	 devices,	 are	 mellifluously	smooth	and	euphonious.	(Cuddon	(ed.),	1998,	p.	103)		To	 elucidate	 the	 concept	 of	 cacophony,	 this	 extract	 draws	 comparison	 between	two	 different	 instances	 of	 a	 poetic	 device.	 However,	 the	 effect	 of	 roughness	 is	contained	 within	 the	 sounds	 of	 the	 words	 themselves:	 the	 alliteration	 merely	draws	attention	to	it.	What	is	not	explained	is	why	the	sounds	alliterated	upon	–	in	this	 case,	b	 and	k	 –	would	be	perceived	as	harsh.	This	 is	where	 the	 analysis	 can	
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only	 state	 that	 it	 is	 “self-evident”,	 reiterating	 the	 critic’s	 intuition	 that	 the	 sound	has	a	particular	quality.	This	is	is	not	to	deny	the	existence	of	a	‘rough’	sound	to	the	Tennyson	lines,	but	rather	to	point	out	that	literary	criticism	runs	into	difficulties	attributing	perceptual	qualities	to	the	use	of	sound	in	literature.	To	articulate	this	observation:	these	literary	effects	are	conscious	perceptions,	but	the	process	that	gives	rise	to	them	is	one	that	 frequently	occurs	below	the	 level	of	consciousness.	The	parsing	of	 both	 textual	 signs	 and	phonetic	 sounds	 into	meaningful	 semantic	units	happens	so	automatically	we	might	call	it	‘non-conscious’,	and	if	the	source	of	the	aesthetic	effect	 lies	 in	 this	 lower	 level	of	mental	processing	we	are	unable	 to	articulate	the	effect	rationally.	It	is	as	if	it	simply	happens,	and	our	only	recourse	is	to	 our	 intuitive	 judgement	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 more	 basic	 element	 of	sensory	detail.		What	 is	 required	 then,	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 literary	 theory	 that	 uses	 the	 scientific	understanding	of	the	mind	and	the	mechanisms	of	perception	to	fill	in	this	gap	in	traditional	 analysis.	 Such	 an	 approach	 would	 largely	 be	 aimed	 at	 articulating	intuitions	about	aesthetic	sensations	in	scientific	terms,	and	in	doing	so	expanding	the	 ability	 to	 explain	 literary	 techniques	 such	 as	 cacophony.	 Two	 distinct	 but	related	approaches	 from	 this	 cognitive	 turn	offer	 some	promise	 to	achieve	 these	objectives:	 they	 are	 known	 as	 ‘cognitive	 poetics’	 and	 ‘neuroaesthetics’.	 Each	 of	these	approaches	has	a	dedicated	chapter	in	this	work	to	surveying	and	critiquing	its	methods	and	achievements.	Let	us	take	a	brief	look	at	each	of	them	in	turn.			
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Cognitive	Poetics		Cognitive	poetics	is	a	term	used	broadly	to	describe	analysis	that	fits	 in	with	this	new	‘cognitive	turn’	in	literature.	To	be	more	specific,	it	represents	the	application	of	 cognitive	 science	 to	 the	 study	 of	 literary	 criticism.	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 cognitive	science	itself	is	an	interdisciplinary	grouping	of	subjects	related	by	their	interest	in	the	human	mind;	so	the	theoretical	approach	behind	cognitive	poetics	has	scope	to	vary	rather	dramatically	between	different	theorists.	One	kind	of	cognitive	poetics	may	be	more	heavily	 influenced	by	 linguistics,	 and	dwell	 on	 the	workings	of	 the	very	 basic	 levels	 of	 language	 and	 how	 they	 influence	 our	 perception	 of	 literary	texts.	Another	kind	may	be	so	deeply	entrenched	in	biological	science	that	it	feels	compelled	 to	 create	 narratives	 explaining	 the	 purpose	 of	 literature	 in	 human	evolution	–	this	 latter	 trend	has	been	called	 ‘Literary	Darwinism.’	Then	there	are	theoretical	approaches	 influenced	by	cognitive	psychology	and	neuroscience	 that	aim	 to	 provide	 new	 frameworks	 for	 textual	 analysis,	 and	 new	windows	 into	 the	relationship	between	reader	and	author.		Bringing	 all	 these	 disparate	 directions	 into	 a	 unified	 theoretical	 framework	 is	 a	difficult	 task,	 but	 it	 is	 one	 that	 Peter	 Stockwell	 attempts	 in	Cognitive	Poetics:	An	
Introduction	 (2002).	 Stockwell’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term	 ‘poetics’	 is	 to	 be	understood	 as	 an	 Aristotelian	 system	 rather	 than	 focusing	 particularly	 on	 the	poetic	or	the	examples	of	poetry.	Cognitive	poetics	for	Stockwell	is	essentially	any	system	of	 reading	 literature	 that	attempts	 to	 retrofit	 the	discipline	with	 the	new	findings	 of	 cognitive	 science.	 Whether	 or	 not	 this	 definition	 is	 so	 broad	 as	 to	become	unwieldy	is	one	of	the	topics	to	be	investigated	in	Chapter	One.	
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	Since	this	thesis	addresses	itself	towards	novels	rather	than	poetry,	it	is	important	to	discuss	the	term	 ‘poetics’	 in	greater	depth,	which	 is	here	taken	to	refer	 to	any	literary	discussion	of	the	importance	of	sound	in	great	detail.	Sound	based	effects	are	normally	 the	domain	of	verse,	with	rhyme,	alliteration	and	rhythm	being	not	only	essential	tools	of	the	poet,	but	as	literary	devices	they	are	more	obvious	in	the	confined	space	of	poetry	than	in	the	novel.	What	this	thesis	aims	to	demonstrate	is	that	 effects	 traditionally	 considered	 ‘poetic’	 could	 also	 heavily	 influence	 the	creation	and	perception	of	prose.		As	 a	 consequence	 of	 this	 analysis,	 what	 will	 emerge	 is	 that	 the	 truly	 defining	feature	of	a	‘poetic’	work	consists	in	the	extent	to	which	the	text	works	on	a	level	that	is	not	available	to	our	direct	consciousness;	and	that	what	we	call	the	‘poetic’	is	our	best	attempt	to	grapple	with	this	ineffable	quality	of	a	text.	This	is	something	that	 has	 begun	 already	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 Reuven	 Tsur,	 a	 major	 theorist	 in	cognitive	poetics.	Tsur	writes:		 One	 major	 assumption	 of	 cognitive	 poetics	 is	 that	 poetry	 exploits,	 for	aesthetic	 purposes,	 cognitive	 (including	 linguistic)	 processes	 that	 were	initially	 evolved	 for	 nonaesthetic	 purposes,	 just	 as	 in	 evolving	 linguistic	ability,	 old	 cognitive	 and	 physiological	 mechanisms	 were	 turned	 to	 new	ends…	 As	 will	 be	 emphasised	 time	 and	 time	 again	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	present	study,	quite	a	 few	(but	by	no	means	all)	 central	poetic	effects	are	the	result	of	some	drastic	interference	with,	or	at	least	delay	of,	the	regular	
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course	of	cognitive	processes,	and	the	exploitation	of	its	effects	for	aesthetic	purposes.	(2008,	p.	4)		Tsur	specifically	uses	‘poetry’	here	since	his	study	in	Towards	a	Theory	of	Cognitive	
Poetics	 takes	most	 of	 its	 examples	 from	English,	 French,	Hungarian	 and	Hebrew	verse.	Tsur’s	hypothesis	offers	two	key	ideas	of	what	it	means	to	be	poetic.	First,	a	delay	 of	 the	 normal	 cognitive	 processes	 that	 produces	 some	 aesthetic	 effect;	second,	an	exploitation	of	cognitive	processes	that	would	normally	fill	other	roles.	These	traits	may	occur	either	together	or	independently	of	one	another:	a	succinct	summary	of	both	would	be	that	they	function	by	subverting	the	normal	course	of	language	 processing	 –	 moving	 quickly	 from	 signifiant	 to	 signifié	 (signifier	 to	signified)	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 expressive	 qualities	 of	 phonetics,	 for	 example.	 But	essentially	what	Tsur	suggests	here	is	that	poetry	either	delays	or	interferes	with	the	normal	operation	of	the	mind.		The	model	of	the	poetic	in	cognitive	poetics	is	not	altogether	new;	in	fact	it	rather	neatly	aligns	with	some	older	traditions	such	as	Russian	Formalism.	Consider	what	Viktor	Shklovsky	writes	of	poetic	perception	in	his	essay	‘Art	as	Technique’:		 In	studying	poetic	speech	in	its	phonetic	and	lexical	structure	as	well	as	in	its	 characteristic	 distribution	 of	 words,	 and	 in	 the	 characteristic	 thought	structures	 compounded	 from	 the	 words,	 we	 find	 everywhere	 the	 artistic	trademark	 -	 that	 is,	 we	 find	 material	 obviously	 created	 to	 remove	 the	automatism	 of	 perception;	 the	 author's	 purpose	 is	 to	 create	 the	 vision	which	 results	 from	 that	 deautomatized	 perception.	 A	 work	 is	 created	
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"artistically"	 so	 that	 its	 perception	 is	 impeded	 and	 the	 greatest	 possible	effect	is	produced	through	the	slowness	of	the	perception.	As	a	result	of	this	lingering,	 the	 object	 is	 perceived	 not	 in	 its	 extension	 in	 space,	 but,	 so	 to	speak,	in	its	continuity.	Thus	"poetic	language"	gives	satisfaction.	(1965,	p.	33)	1		This	of	course	is	the	same	principle	as	Tsur’s	notion	of	cognitive	processes	being	‘delayed’	 for	 some	 aesthetic	 effect.	 ‘De-automatised’	 perception	 is	 an	 important	concept	 to	 this	 thesis	 because	 it	 accounts	 for	 the	manner	 in	which	material	 that	would	normally	 be	processed	 automatically	 is,	 through	 compositional	 technique,	made	 to	 delay	 the	 cognitive	 process	 and	 create	 a	 heightened	 awareness	 of	 that	process.	 In	 doing	 so,	what	 is	 normally	 perceived	 ‘unconsciously’2	becomes	more	directly	 available	 to	 consciousness.	 This	 effect	 is	 most	 notably	 paralleled	 by	Impressionist	 art,	 where	 rather	 than	 being	 presented	 with	 a	 clear	 picture,	 the	viewer	is	presented	with	the	elements	that	they	will	then	themselves	use	to	create	a	clear	picture.	‘Impressionistic’	is	of	course	a	term	that	has	been	used	to	describe	the	works	of	modernists	such	as	Virginia	Woolf	who	report	individual	sensations	or	perceptions	as	they	happen,	rather	than	interpreting	them	for	the	reader.	This	point	will	be	revisited	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	Four.		The	 other	 facet	 that	 Tsur	 identifies,	 exploitation	 of	 cognitive	 processes	 that	normally	fill	other	roles	in	the	mind,	has	some	correlations	in	poetic	theory:	most	notably	with	the	idea	that	poetry	bears	important	links	with	music.	Ezra	Pound,	for	
                                                
1 Tsur (2008) also refers to this essay in his explanation of what constitutes poetry and poetic technique, 
and ties it to the general Russian formalist notion of cognitive processes being ‘violated’ by art. (p. 3-6) 
2 Wherever possible I have tried to avoid the term ‘unconscious’ so as to explicitly rule out any link to 
Freudian psychology: the preferred term will instead be non-conscious. 
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instance,	expressed	the	sentiment	in	ABC	of	Reading	that	“poetry	begins	to	atrophy	when	it	gets	too	far	from	music”	(1934,	p.	14).	Modern	neuroscience	has	debated	the	 extent	 to	 which	 music	 and	 language	 share	 the	 same	 cognitive	 mechanisms;	Patel	 (2008)	 offers	 a	 definitive	 outline	 of	 some	 of	 the	 correlations	 between	 the	two,	generally	concluding	that	they	are	at	least	closely	related.3	Assuming	then	that	they	 are	 not	 the	 same	direct	 process,	 to	 use	 language	 in	 a	way	 that	 exploits	 the	perceptual	mechanism	 that	 handles	music	 would	 fit	 this	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘poetic’.	Pound	refers	to	 ‘melopoeia’	as	the	poetic	act	of	using	sound	to	suggest	or	convey	meaning	(1934,	p.	37-43).	Where	novels	are	concerned,	the	style	of	 Jack	Kerouac	has	 borne	 out	 frequent	 comparisons	 with	 jazz.	 In	 most	 critical	 discussions	 of	Kerouac	this	link	is	treated	as	largely	symbolic,	but	given	the	insights	of	cognitive	science	 it	 seems	possible	 to	explain	how	his	 style	may,	 in	 certain	passages,	have	direct	 recourse	 to	 the	mechanisms	used	 to	process	music.	Consider	 this	example	from	Desolation	Angels,	where	he	describes	a	scene	in	a	San	Francisco	jazz	bar:		 The	 bartenders	 are	 the	 regular	 band	 of	 Jack,	 and	 the	 heavenly	 drummer	who	looks	up	in	the	sky	with	blue	eyes,	with	a	beard,	is	wailing	beer-caps	of	bottles	and	jamming	on	the	cash	register	and	everything	is	going	to	the	beat	–	It’s	the	beat	generation,	it’s	béat,	 it’s	the	beat	to	keep,	it’s	the	beat	of	the	heart,	it’s	being	beat	and	down	in	the	world	and	like	old	time	lowdown	and	like	in	ancient	civilisations	the	slave	boatmen	rowing	galleys	to	a	beat	and	servants	spinning	pottery	to	a	beat.	(1965,	p.	137)		
                                                
3 See also Koelsch (2005) and Schnupp et al (2011) for discussion of the links between the two. 
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The	word	 ‘beat’	 is	 significant	 throughout	 Kerouac’s	 fiction,	 but	 this	 is	 one	 of	 its	most	concentrated	appearances.	The	effect	is	most	noticeable	when	the	passage	is	read	aloud	with	emphasis	on	the	word	‘beat’.4	If	the	consonants	b	and	t	of	the	word	are	isolated,	they	produce	a	pair	of	percussive	sounds	that	can	be	likened	to	a	bass	drum,	b,	and	a	snare	drum,	t,	in	terms	of	their	timbre.	As	such,	the	passage	imitates	music	by	drawing	attention	to	those	features	of	the	sounds	that	in	western	music	are	 used	 for	 rhythmic	 purposes,	 and	 using	 this	 to	 supplement	 the	 rhythmic	recurrence	 of	 the	 word	 ‘beat’.	 Just	 as	 Tennyson’s	 repetition	 of	 sounds	 draws	attention	 to	 the	 expressive	 qualities	 of	 those	 sounds	 themselves;	 so	 too	 does	Kerouac	augment	his	prose	by	drawing	attention	to	a	feature	of	the	language	that	would	 not	 ordinarily	 enter	 direct	 consciousness.	 By	 repeating	 the	 word	 ‘beat’,	Kerouac	 draws	 out	 the	 percussive	 qualities	 of	 the	 sound	 and	 the	 reader	 may	experience	a	sense	that	his	writing	imitates	music.	This	hypothesis,	along	with	the	theory	behind	the	way	those	sounds	take	on	a	particular	quality,	will	be	tested	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	Three.		One	 of	 the	major	 aims	 of	 the	 present	 study	 is	 to	 use	 Tsur’s	 theory	 of	 cognitive	poetics	to	explain	how	these	traditional	notions	of	particular	qualities	attributed	to	novelists	–	particularly	‘musical’	and	‘impressionistic’	–	can	be	articulated	in	terms	of	how	the	reader	might	actually	perceive	 them,	and	 in	particular,	how	the	basic	aspects	of	the	text	play	a	particularly	strong	part	in	creating	these	effects.	Coupled	with	this	is	the	ambition	to	articulate	what	is	meant	by	the	claim	that	a	novel	has	a	‘poetic’	quality,	as	Steve	Allen	once	specifically	lauded	Kerouac’s	prose	(along	with	that	of	Thomas	Wolfe)	when	he	appeared	on	his	show	in	1959	to	promote	On	the	
                                                
4 A recording of Kerouac reading this extract, with very obvious emphasis of the word ‘beat’, can be 
found on the disc On the Beat Generation: Readings by Jack Kerouac, Rhino, 1990 
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Road	 (What	 Happened	 to	 Kerouac:	 1986).	 My	 aim	 is	 to	 show	 that	 in	 general	 a	‘poetic’	 novel	 or	 one	 with	 a	 particularly	 aesthetically	minded	 style	 functions	 by	exploiting	the	neurological	processes	that	normally	occur	automatically	and	non-consciously.	This	may	be	achieved	by	exposing	that	process	to	consciousness,	or	by	producing	a	conscious	effect	for	the	reader	that	has	its	origins	in	a	non-conscious	mechanism.		Cognitive	poetics	as	a	method	 for	 literary	analysis	 is	not	without	 limitations	and	pitfalls,	particularly	with	different	scholars	taking	it	in	disparate	directions.	Having	relied	heavily	on	Tsur	for	this	introduction,	Chapter	One	will	pit	him	more	closely	against	 Stockwell	 to	 consider	 competing	 examples	 of	 the	 contribution	 cognitive	poetics	 can	 offer.	 This	 is	 not	 purely	 to	 establish	who	 has	 the	more	 thorough	 or	effective	approach,	but	more	importantly	to	set	a	framework	for	my	own	diverging	analysis	of	novels	in	terms	of	cognitive	science.		
Neuroaesthetics	
	Closely	 entwined	 with	 this	 thesis	 taking	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 ‘poetic’	 mode	 of	expression	in	the	novel	lies	an	additional	interest	in	aesthetics.	Here	it	must	also	be	immediately	 clarified	 that	 by	 ‘aesthetics’	 we	 do	 not	 mean	 the	 notions	 of	 ‘good	taste’.	 Nor	 are	 we	 talking	 specifically	 of	 what	 might	 be	 considered	 beautiful	 or	pleasant.	Instead	it	attempts	to	advance	the	idea	of	aesthetics	as	a	series	of	artistic	techniques	and	mechanisms	that	are	responsible	for	human	engagement	with	art,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	the	reaction	they	have	is	entirely	pleasurable.	Having	acknowledged	that	aesthetics	is	a	term	with	multiple	meanings,	it	is	important	to	
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settle	on	a	more	definite	set	of	boundaries	to	work	within.	As	Helen	Grace	explains	in	 the	 introduction	 to	Aesthesia	and	the	Economy	of	 the	Senses,	 aesthetics	 can	 be	thought	of	as	many	disparate	fields	with	a	singular	purpose:		 ‘Aesthetics’	refers	to	a	disciplinary	field	whose	borders	are	determined	by	the	 necessity	 to	 define	 a	 problem	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 a	 formal	 or	professional	pursuit	of	knowledge,	one	directed	towards	the	understanding	of	 the	 sensual	 in	order	perhaps	 to	 capture	 this	 field	 for	 logic	–	 to	make	 it	knowable.	(1996,	p.	1)		The	key	term	in	 this	definition	 is	 ‘the	sensual’,	which	we	might	 take	to	mean	the	aspects	 of	 sensory	 processing	 that	 are	 normally	 not	 available	 to	 direct	consciousness,	 but	whose	 effects	 are	 nonetheless	 felt	 as	 intuition	 by	 the	 critical	faculties	of	the	mind.	These	include	perceptions	of	beauty	and	pleasure,	but	also	of	negative	 emotions	 or	 sensations,	 and	 most	 importantly	 feelings	 of	 tension	 in	multiple	forms	–	narrative,	semantic,	rhythmic.	Access	to	this	sensory	realm,	long	the	interest	of	writers	and	poets,	is	now	increasingly	possible	with	the	insights	of	cognitive	science.			From	this	collision	of	interests	we	can	derive	the	emerging	critical	approach	which	has	 been	 named	 differently	 by	 individual	 scholars,	 but	 in	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	consistently	referred	to	as	‘neuroaesthetics.’	Here	is	what	one	of	its	theorists,	Ann	Marie	Barry,	has	to	say	about	this	idea	of	a	neurological	and	scientific	approach	to	the	study	of	aesthetics:		
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When	 Immanuel	Kant	 (1790)	called	aesthetics	a	 “science	which	 treats	 the	conditions	of	sensuous	perception,”	he	emphasised	three	areas:	science,	the	senses,	 and	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 sublime.	 Present-day	 neuroaesthetics	combines	this	triad	of	interest	in	the	study	of	neural	systems	that	determine	pleasure,	 how	 information	 from	 the	 senses	 becomes	 meaningful	 in	 the	brain,	and	how	emotion	governs	the	experience	of	both	life	and	art.	(2006,	p.	136)		Again,	we	see	the	focus	on	sensory	information	as	being	at	the	heart	of	an	aesthetic	response.	We	also	can	see	some	parallels	with	the	approach	of	cognitive	poetics,	in	drawing	on	information	from	cognitive	science	to	better	elucidate	the	emotive	and	sensual	 experience	 associated	 with	 art.	 We	 can	 distinguish	 between	 cognitive	poetics	 and	 neuroaesthetics	 by	 noting	 two	 general	 (although	 not	 prescriptive)	points	 of	 comparison.	 Firstly,	 cognitive	 poetics	 is	 largely	 restricted	 to	 literary	study,	whereas	neuroaesthetics	has	explored	multiple	artistic	mediums	(although	a	number	of	key	theorists	tend	to	study	the	visual	arts	as	their	primary	source	of	evidence).	 Secondly,	 cognitive	poetics	 is	 frequently	practised	by	 literary	 scholars	looking	 to	 expand	 their	 terms	 of	 reference,	 while	 much	 of	 the	 work	 in	neuroaesthetics	comes	from	theorists	of	a	scientific	background.		Neuroaesthetics	 is	 particularly	 important	 to	 this	 thesis	 because,	 as	 alluded	 to	 in	the	 earlier	 references	 to	 Kerouac	 and	Woolf,	 one	 of	 the	 ambitions	 is	 to	 offer	 a	compelling	critical	account	of	 the	relationships	between	literature	and	its	artistic	counterparts	 of	music	 and	 visual	 art.	 As	 present-day	 neuroaesthetics	 has	 delved	deeply	 into	 cognitive	 accounts	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 music	 and	 art,	 I	 hope	 to	
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demonstrate	 that	 the	 neurological	 and	 artistic	 principles	 behind	 these	 art	 forms	have	 analogous	 principles	 in	 literature	 and	 literary	 criticism.	 Furthermore,	 by	discussing	what	cognitive	science	can	tell	us	of	the	nature	of	connections	between	different	 senses,	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 how	 recourse	 to	 multiple	 sensory	 modalities	becomes	an	important	source	of	aesthetic	engagement	across	these	case	studies.		
Cognitive	Dimensions		In	the	bulk	of	contemporary	literary	scholarship	purporting	to	be	‘cognitive’,	fewer	studies	have	addressed	themselves	to	novels	or	works	of	prose.	This	is	not	exactly	a	 fault:	 poetry	 provides	 some	 exceptionally	 good	 and	 succinct	 case	 studies	 for	 a	new	movement	to	test	itself	against.	In	the	coming	chapter	I	will	examine	the	field	of	 cognitive	 poetics	 in	 greater	 detail;	 for	 the	 moment	 it	 is	 important	 to	demonstrate	 the	 contribution	 that	 cognitive	 science	 can	 make	 to	 this	 field	 of	inquiry.	This	will	become	important	because	several	scholarly	works	identified	as	‘cognitive’	take	an	extremely	lax	approach	to	using	cognitive	science	to	articulate	what	is	not	already	known	and	understood	by	literary	study.	Without	this	crucial	element,	 these	 studies	 fail	 to	 offer	 any	 new	 insights	 that	 could	 not	 simply	 have	been	 achieved	 through	 ordinary	 literary	 criticism.	 A	 truly	 cognitive	 study,	 if	 it	hopes	to	break	any	new	ground,	needs	to	fully	draw	on	the	resources	of	cognitive	science	to	answer	questions	that	literary	criticism	cannot.5			
                                                
5 Tsur concurs on this point: “A discussion becomes cognitive when certain problems are addressed 
which cannot be properly handled without appealing to some cognitive process or mechanism in the 
specific discussion. A critical discussion does not become cognitive by virtue of the amount of past 
research invested in the elements it handles, but by virtue of the cognitive research applied to the solution 
of problems that arise in the text under discussion. Being able to push an electric switch does not mean 
that we are doing physics, even though much physical research went in the past into its invention.” (2008, 
p. 600) 
 24 
It	is	important	to	reiterate	that	this	study	is	not	seeking	to	reconceive	of	literature	and	 reading	 entirely	 as	 psychological	 phenomena.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	understand	how	various	cognitive	mechanisms	produce	the	effects	we	are	seeking	to	articulate,	it	is	helpful	to	understand	how	reading	is	an	example	of	information	processing	within	 the	mind	–	since	 this	act	of	processing	and	perception	 is	what	the	poetic	effect	draws	attention	to.	Tsur	cites	a	study	by	Liberman,	Mattingly	and	Turvey	 (1972)	 which	 measures	 in	 bits	 the	 difference	 between	 processing	 an	acoustic	 signal	 (meaning	 a	 soundwave	with	 a	 particular	 spectral	 pattern)	 and	 a	phonetic	 symbol	 (meaning	 in	 this	 case	 the	mental	 representation	 of	 that	 speech	sound),	 finding	 that	 the	 phonetic	 symbol	 represents	 a	 saving	 of	 one	 thousand	percent	when	measured	in	bits	per	second	(Tsur,	2008,	p.	6).	The	acoustic	signal	is	more	suited	for	transmission	and	reception,	whereas	the	phonetic	symbol	is	more	suited	for	storage	in	our	short	term	memory.		This	is	one	instance	of	recoding:	Tsur’s	idea,	appropriated	from	Polányi	(1967),	is	that	various	levels	of	recoding	occur	throughout	the	cognitive	process	to	form	an	information	 hierarchy	 (2008,	 p.	 3-7).	 In	 considering	 literature	 as	 a	 stream	 of	information,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 this	 principle	 of	 recoding	 for	 long	 term	 memory	creates	 additional	 and	 arbitrary	 levels	 of	 recoding	 that	 become	 focal	 points	 for	literary	 criticism.	 We	 do	 not	 store	 an	 entire	 novel	 in	 our	 memory.	 Instead,	 we	categorise	 and	 distil	 the	 novel	 into	 essential	 components:	 themes,	 plot	 and	character	 arcs,	 symbols	 and	 ideas.	 Mandler	 (1984)	 refers	 to	 this	 concept	specifically	 as	 the	 “levels	 effect”.	 In	 principle,	 these	 basic	 elements	 of	 literary	theory	represent	a	recoding	of	the	novel	for	the	efficiency	of	storage	and	recall.		
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I	 wish	 to	 use	 this	 analogous	 mode	 of	 thinking	 about	 reading	 as	 information	processing	 in	order	 to	explain	 two	of	 the	points	 that	underpin	my	 thesis.	Firstly,	novels	 such	as	On	the	Road	present	a	problem	to	 traditional	 criticism	 in	 the	way	that	 the	 textual	 elements	 we	 normally	 are	 drawn	 to	 remember	 (through	 the	cognitive	 processes)	 are	 highly	 insubstantial.	 The	 novel	 shows	 almost	 no	 regard	for	 a	plot,	 features	only	 sporadic	 and	 inconclusive	 character	development	 and	 is	often	 thematically	 chaotic	 and	 inconsistent.	 Despite	 this,	 it	 has	 sold	 over	 three	million	 copies	 (Tytell,	 1999,	 p.	 57)	 and	 been	 adapted	 as	 a	 feature	 film.	 Noted	Kerouac	 scholar	 Regina	 Weinreich,	 writing	 in	 2009	 about	 the	 imminent	 film	adaptation	stated:	“The	language	cannot	be	filmed,”	as	the	reason	the	production	had	lingered	so	long	at	the	screenplay	phase	of	production	(2009,	p.	187-9).	In	her	view,	 what	 makes	 On	 the	 Road	 significant	 is	 Kerouac’s	 experimental	 use	 of	language.	The	appeal	lies	at	the	most	basic	levels	of	the	novel:	the	expressive	use	of	sound,	the	attention	to	rhythmic	detail	and	the	exploitation	of	syntactic	tension	for	poetic	 effect.	 These	 are	 principally	 literary	 features	 and	 resist	 a	 simple	transposition	to	a	different	medium,	unlike	the	higher	streams	of	information	such	as	the	characters,	plot	and	themes.	As	such,	to	properly	evaluate	the	significance	of	a	 novel	 like	On	 the	 Road,	 it	 is	 beneficial	 to	 assess	 these	 basic	 levels	 of	 the	 text	through	the	methods	of	cognitive	poetics	and	neuroaesthetics.		The	second	point	concerns	novels	that	are	more	traditionally	rich	in	plot,	character	and	motif.	What	is	the	merit	of	scrutinising	their	phonetic,	semantic	and	syntactic	structures?	 In	 the	 normal	 course	 of	 information	 processing,	 we	 quickly	 move	beyond	 these	 elements	 to	 extract	 the	 vital	 information	 –	 an	 instinctive	 survival	
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mechanism.6	Take	for	instance	the	word	‘chasm’.	If	we	see	this	word	printed	on	a	sign,	 the	 phonetic	 elements	 of	 the	 word	 are	 barely	 acknowledged	 by	 our	consciousness	 because	 it	 moves	 very	 quickly	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘deep	 hole’.	However,	if	we	return	to	the	Tennyson	extract	in	the	previously	quoted	example	of	cacophony,	where	the	word	appears	in	verse	as	follows:	“And	barren	chasms,	and	all	to	left	and	right”;	we	may	now	find	the	phonetic	elements	significant	because	of	similarities	between	‘barren’	and	‘chasm’.	The	versification	itself	draws	us	towards	this	similarity,	stressing	the	first	syllable	of	both	words	and	disrupting	the	natural	flow	onto	the	next	word	by	the	placement	of	a	caesura	after	‘chasms’.	The	reason	we	 investigate	 information	 normally	 considered	 redundant	 is	 because	 poetic	devices	direct	us	to	do	so.	Yet	once	again	we	are	without	recourse	to	explain	the	significance	of	 this	 sound.	Because	 the	normally	unconscious	nature	of	 cognitive	processing	masks	 the	production	of	 this	effect,	 it	 is	normally	associated	with	 the	issue	of	‘feeling’	in	literature,	in	the	sense	that	we	are	relying	on	intuition.		For	the	purpose	of	this	debate,	it	is	important	to	iterate	that	we	are	not	necessarily	dealing	 with	 emotional	 responses	 here,	 as	 ‘feeling’	 may	 sometimes	 be	 used	 to	indicate.	There	 is	a	hyponymic	relationship	between	the	two	 in	that	all	emotions	are	 feelings,	 but	 not	 all	 feelings	 are	 emotions:	 they	 may	 also	 be	 sensory	perceptions.	 Distinguishing	 between	 the	 two	 is	 important	 because	 the	 poetic	
                                                
6 There is a theory that the brain actually functions more like a resistor than a central processing unit, 
called the Filter Theory of Consciousness. The notion here is that sensory systems can process vast 
amounts of information, but the brain acts to filter out all but the most important information for survival 
purposes, as cognition would otherwise be quickly overwhelmed with redundant information. This idea 
originated from philosophers such as Henri Bergson and C. D. Broad, and was notably taken up in 
Huxley’s The Doors of Perception, where he used it to validate his experiences on mescaline, claiming 
the brain’s filtration function was dampened by the drug. Regardless of which theory of the mind is 
correct, both support the principle of differentiating the most important information as a survival 
mechanism, and this principle is important to cognitive poetics. For more detail see Tsur, 2008, p. 17-18, 
and also Massumi (2002, p. 144-161), where he talks about how we experience ‘chaos’ as we reach 
sensory overload in vision. 
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quality	 as	 argued	 by	 Shlovsky	 may	 invoke	 emotions	 but	 more	 importantly	 it	evokes	basic	feeling	by	making	us	more	aware	of	our	own	sensory	processes	that	normally	proceed	unconsciously.	In	this	work,	therefore,	basic	sensory	perceptions	are	referred	to	as	sensations,	and	feelings	can	connote	either	sensation	or	emotion.	This	 distinction	 between	 sensation	 and	 emotion	 we	 might	 recall	 is	 one	 already	made	 above	 by	 Nabokov	 during	 his	 lectures	 on	 literature	 at	 Cornell,	 where	 he	distinguishes	between	the	‘heart’	and	the	‘spine’.	In	this	context,	the	‘heart’	can	be	interpreted	as	 it	 is	 traditionally	understood	as	a	symbolic	centre	of	emotion,	and	the	 ‘spine’	 refers	more	 scientifically	 to	 the	 function	 of	 the	 spinal	 cord	 to	 deliver	sensation	throughout	the	body.			Another	 major	 ambition	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 articulate	 these	 readings	 that	 come	from	 the	 “spine”,	 or	 in	 clearer	 terms,	 those	 that	 seek	 to	 achieve	 heightened	awareness	of	sensory	processes.	The	premise	is	that	poetic	or	aesthetic	technique	can	 be	 used	 to	 make	 literature	 an	 experience	 that	 either	 directly	 stimulates	sensory	perceptions	not	normally	triggered	by	language	processing,	or	by	delaying	the	sensory	processing	of	reading	to	make	the	reader	feel	more	involved	in	directly	experiencing	and	processing	what	the	writer	evokes	through	the	text,	both	falling	under	the	conception	of	‘poetic’	as	outlined	by	Tsur.	These	sensations	involve	the	senses	 in	 a	 way	 far	 beyond	 ordinary	 use	 of	 language	 and	 give	 poetic	 texts	 a	captivating	 power	 of	 their	 own.	 To	 quote	 again	 from	 Shklovsky:	 “Art	 exists	 that	one	may	recover	the	sensation	of	life,	it	exists	to	make	one	feel	things,	to	make	the	stone	 stony.	 The	 purpose	 of	 art	 is	 to	 impart	 the	 sensation	 of	 things	 as	 they	 are	perceived	and	not	as	they	are	known.”	(1965,	p.	12)		
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Parameters	of	Investigation		The	 cognitive	 approach	 to	 this	 work	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 descriptive	 rather	 than	prescriptive.	It	does	not	assume	that	all	readers	will	experience	the	same	or	even	any	reaction	 to	a	poetic	 text:	what	 I	am	concerned	with	 is	providing	evidence	 to	corroborate	the	intuitions	of	those	who	feel	that	the	basic	elements	of	a	particular	text	are	especially	significant.	To	this	end,	my	study	will	 focus	 largely	on	authors	for	 whom	 the	 critical	 and/or	 the	 public	 reaction	 is	 indicative	 that	 their	 writing	style	 either	 creates	 intuitive	 responses	masked	 by	 non-conscious	 processing,	 or	makes	 this	basic	processing	more	available	 to	consciousness	and	thus	makes	 the	reader	more	aware	of	 sensory	 information	 they	might	otherwise	discard.	This	 is	particularly	 relevant	when	studying	 the	modernist	novel,	 as	we	might	categorise	the	 work	 done	 in	 the	 Woolf	 and	 Kerouac	 case	 study	 chapters.	 The	 modernist	writers	experimented	with	language	and	drew	upon	the	resources	of	external	art	forms,	 including	 poetry,	 film	 and	music,	 in	 a	 bid	 to	 remake	 literature	 so	 that	 it	more	 appropriately	 reflected	 the	 world	 around	 them.	 Their	 departure	 from	conventional	 forms	of	narrative	and	prose	alienated	 some	critics	 at	 the	 time	but	impressed	others,	and	the	same	divergence	of	opinion	frequently	continues	among	readers	 today.	 This	 thesis	 will	 attempt	 to	 show	 how	 familiarity	 with	 other	 art	forms	may	have	been	a	guiding	influence	behind	these	judgements	of	the	novel.		As	was	outlined	earlier	both	‘cognitive	poetics’	and	‘neuroaesthetics’	are	far	from	a	uniform	system	in	contemporary	practice;	so	to	avoid	confusion	the	 first	chapter	will	set	out,	in	greater	detail,	which	theoretical	approaches	are	most	relevant	to	the	ambitions	of	this	thesis.	As	has	been	iterated	earlier,	this	study	is	primarily	about	
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extending	 the	critical	 toolbox	 to	properly	articulate	certain	effects,	and	clarifying	the	meanings	of	any	terms	that	are	presently	too	vague.	It	is	important	to	establish	this	 boundary	 because	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 some	 of	 the	 cognitive	 poetic	 scholars	 or	neuroscientists	purport	to	offer	a	complete	reconfiguration	of	either	literary	study	or	of	aesthetics	within	the	specific	boundaries	of	cognitive	science.	My	argument	is	that	 this	 is	 unnecessary	 where	 existing	 theory	 does	 the	 job	 well	 enough,	 and	amounts	to	nothing	more	than	a	homogenisation	of	terminology.		There	are	a	number	of	parameters	that	will	be	frequently	referenced	as	the	‘basic	aspects’	of	a	text	during	this	investigation.	These	represent	essential	structures	of	the	 prose	 that	 are	 not	 generally	 of	 significance	 to	 direct	 consciousness,	 but	 are	parsed	quickly	and	automatically	so	as	to	allow	the	reader	to	move	on	to	deriving	meaning	 from	the	 text.	 In	 the	case	studies	 for	 this	 thesis,	 the	prose	will	often	be	constructed	 in	 such	 a	manner	 that	 significant	 aesthetic	 impact	 arises	 from	 these	‘basic	aspects’,	whether	or	not	the	reader	is	aware	of	their	involvement	or	whether	they	 only	 receive	 an	 impression	 or	 intuition.	 I	will	 now	quickly	 discuss	 these	 in	turn.7		Phonetics	 and	 acoustics,	 as	 outlined	 earlier,	 are	 a	 significant	 source	 of	 aesthetic	effect	 in	 the	way	 poetic	 technique	 triggers	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 acoustic	 signal	and	exploits	this	for	particular	effect.	Poetic	devices	such	as	alliteration	direct	us	to	the	particular	sounds	of	the	text,	and	encourage	us	to	draw	out	expressive	qualities	based	on	the	sound	that	carries	the	phoneme	in	oral	transmission.	Tsur’s	research	
                                                
7 If the bulk of references in these next two pages are to Tsur it is because he structures his own theory 
around a similar set of distinctions and it provides for an easy point of comparison with the territory 
charted out by this thesis. 
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on	 the	 expressive	 qualities	 of	 sound	 patterns	 act	 as	 a	 strong	 starting	 point	 for	understanding	their	importance,	since	he	has	used	cognitive	science	to	account	for	decades	of	intuitions	surrounding	the	qualities	of	particular	phonemes.	In	keeping	with	the	notion	that	this	study	is	meant	to	be	descriptive	rather	than	prescriptive,	it	 is	worth	mentioning	 that	Tsur	specifically	accounts	 for	 the	same	sound	having	differing	or	even	opposing	qualities,	a	phenomenon	he	calls	‘dual-edged’.		Additionally	 there	 is	 the	 semantic	 level	 of	 perception,	where	 the	meaning	of	 the	line	is	processed.	This	level	is	significant	because	in	poetic	diction	particular	words	may	seem	more	salient	than	others.	In	Tsur’s	work	he	talks	about	how	semantics	lead	to	the	activation	of	a	mental	‘script’,	and	certain	language	can	disrupt	this	for	particular	effect.	Consider	T.	S.	Eliot’s	famous	line	from	‘The	Love	Song	of	J.	Alfred	Prufrock’:	 “I	 have	measured	out	my	 life	 in	 coffee	 spoons”	 (1954,	 51).	 The	poetic	quality	 of	 the	 line	 is	 reinforced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘measure’	 and	 ‘coffee	 spoons’	activate	a	trivial,	everyday	script,	but	the	word	 ‘life’	confuses	this	and	activates	a	more	serious,	existential	 script.	This	cognitive	process	can	be	exploited	 for	more	than	just	poetic	effect:	consider	a	line	from	the	Woody	Allen	film	Midnight	in	Paris,	where	the	protagonist	encounters	T.	S.	Eliot	in	a	taxi:		 Gil	Pender:	“Listen.	Where	I	come	from,	people	measure	out	their	lives	with	coke	spoons.”		This	joke	serves	as	a	neat	example	of	‘delayed	decoding’.	It	assumes	the	reader	has	some	 understanding	 of	 Eliot’s	 poetry,	 so	 they	 automatically	 activate	 a	 similar	mental	 script,	 interpreting	 ‘coke’	 as	 the	 popular	 beverage.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	 one	
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doesn’t	drink	Coke	 from	a	 spoon	disrupts	 the	automatically	deployed	script,	 and	then	 another,	 more	 illicit	 script	 emerges.	 In	 Pender’s	 experience	 as	 a	 modern	scriptwriter	 for	 Hollywood,	 ‘coke’	 most	 definitely	 is	 meant	 as	 shorthand	 for	 a	lifestyle	 vastly	 different	 from	 that	 of	 Eliot’s	 Prufrock.	 The	 interplay	 between	semantic	 features	 and	 the	mental	 scripts	 they	 activate	 can	be	 exploited	 for	 both	poetic	 and	 grotesque	 purposes;	 this	 study	 is	mostly	 concerned	with	 the	 former,	and	how	the	text	subverts	these	ordinary	cognitive	processes	for	particular	effect.	In	addition,	there	is	a	dictum	observed	by	poets	from	Wordsworth	to	Whitman	and	reiterated	in	Barfield’s	Poetic	Diction	(1952)	that	poetry	favours	concrete	terms	to	abstract	 ones.	 Barfield’s	 theory	 was	 informed	 by	 a	 somewhat	 rudimentary	cognitive	approach,	as	his	study	engages	with	the	theories	of	the	mind	expounded	by	Locke	and	Hume.	This	delayed	decoding	occurs	notably	 in	some	of	Nabokov’s	puns	in	Lolita.		Lastly,	we	can	also	consider	the	importance	of	syntax	in	the	novel,	and	explore	the	idea	that	a	writer	can	produce	certain	poetic	effects	in	the	way	they	construct	and	organise	 their	 writing.	 This	 section	 is	 largely	 an	 articulation	 of	 the	 effects	 of	punctuation	 and	 rhythm	 in	 cognitive	 terms.	Traditional	 prosody	has	 very	 strong	intuitions	about	these	effects;	part	of	this	study	is	to	combine	rhythmic	analysis	of	passages	 from	 the	 novels	 in	 question	 with	 evidence	 from	 cognitive	 science	 to	account	for	those	effects.	Tsur	has	applied	gestalt	theory	to	explain	the	perceptual	effects	of,	amongst	other	things,	the	sonnet	form:	I	intend	to	use	this	as	a	point	of	departure	 and	 apply	 more	 recent	 cognitive	 science	 to	 explain	 the	 perceptual	effects	of	the	syntax	in	novels,	since	gestalt	theory	is	a	somewhat	archaic	method	of	psychology.	
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	Key	 to	 this	 latter	 effect,	 but	 also	 significant	 for	 the	 poetic	 effects	 rooted	 in	 the	sound	 and	 semantic	 dimensions,	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 tension	 and	 the	 subsequent	relaxation	of	tension.	This	is	an	aspect	that	seems	to	be	particularly	pronounced	in	certain	styles	of	writing,	but	at	present	the	critical	terminology	to	discuss	tension	in	a	meaningful	manner	is	somewhat	lacking.	It	is	my	ambition	here	to	use	insights	from	research	on	how	tension	 functions	cognitively	as	an	organising	principle	 to	show	how	poetic	texts	can	exploit	this	for	aesthetic	purposes.	Barry	(2006)	has	put	together	some	important	insights	on	this	subject	already.	The	investigation	of	this	topic	will	further	demonstrate	the	significance	of	the	sound,	semantics	and	syntax	of	prose,	 since	 the	 research	will	demonstrate	 that	 they	 themselves	 can	 create	or	combine	to	create	a	sense	of	tension.		
Case	Studies		We	have	already	met	the	authorial	subjects	of	this	thesis	throughout	the	course	of	this	 introduction:	 they	 are	 Kerouac,	 Woolf	 and	 Nabokov.	 Binding	 these	 three	together	 is	 the	 simple	 familiarity	 that	 they	 are	 all	 twentieth	 century	 writers	 of	prose,	but	I	hope	that	through	an	investigation	of	the	basic	aspects	of	their	texts,	more	similarities	will	emerge	between	them.		With	Kerouac,	there	is	still	a	gap	between	the	critical	scholarship	on	his	work	and	the	apparently	visceral	nature	of	his	writing.	The	sound	stratum	seems	particularly	significant	in	Kerouac’s	work,	and	yet	analysis	of	sound	patterns	in	his	writing	has	so	 far	 tended	 to	 be	 somewhat	ad	hoc.	 It	 is	 also	well	 documented	 that	 Kerouac’s	
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style	was	heavily	influenced	by	the	bebop	form	of	jazz	that	developed	in	the	1940s:	this	thesis	aims	to	demonstrate	just	how	pervasive	this	influence	is	in	terms	of	the	basic	 aspects	 of	 his	 writing.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 On	 the	 Road	 offers	 a	 good	example	 of	 a	 novel	 that	 has	 been	 questioned	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 traditional	 literary	merits	but	remains	pervasively	popular,	and	a	part	of	this	cognitive	investigation	is	to	 further	 explain	 the	 novel’s	 effects,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 trace	 some	 other	 examples	throughout	his	fiction.	Chapter	Three	delves	into	these	musical	inquiries	in	greater	detail.		From	music	we	move	to	visual	art,	where	Chapter	Four	focuses	on	the	relationship	between	Virginia	Woolf	and	the	school	of	painting	known	as	 Impressionism.	 In	a	literary	 context,	 the	 term	 is	 normally	 used	 to	 describe	 the	way	 a	writer	 reports	sensations	 or	 perceptions	 directly,	 and	 lets	 the	 reader	 undergo	 the	 act	 of	interpreting	 them	rather	 than	doing	 it	 for	 them.	This	 chapter,	 focused	 largely	on	Woolf’s	 Mrs	 Dalloway,	 attempts	 to	 challenge	 some	 of	 these	 conventional	explanations	of	the	link	between	Impressionism	and	literature.	It	offers	a	glimpse	into	 some	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 mind	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 appeal	 of	Impressionism	 as	 a	 form	 of	 visual	 art	 and	 builds	 an	 analogous	 mode	 of	understanding	the	function	of	Woolf’s	prose	structure	and	style	in	Mrs	Dalloway.		Finally,	having	built	a	narrative	around	the	link	between	different	sensory	domains	in	the	works	of	Woolf	and	Kerouac,	the	final	chapter	takes	us	deeper	inside	these	connections	 through	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 synaesthesia.	 As	 a	neurological	condition	where	a	perception	in	one	sensory	domain	can	be	triggered	by	 another	 perception	 in	 a	 different	 sensory	 domain,	 synaesthesia	 offers	 a	
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fascinating	window	into	the	function	of	the	mind.	This	chapter	aims	to	pair	these	insights	 with	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 Nabokov,	 one	 of	 literature’s	 most	 famous	synaesthetes.	 This	 case	 study	 is	 not	 offering	 a	 complete	 re-reading	of	Nabokov’s	fiction,	but	rather	argues	that	trace	elements	in	his	works	become	more	significant	in	light	of	our	increased	understanding	of	his	neurological	condition.	As	a	journey	towards	Nabokov’s	mind,	it	concludes	the	thesis	and	brings	it	full	circle	by	showing	the	 importance	 of	 his	 critical	 theory	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 author	 and	reader	in	terms	of	the	mind.			These	case	studies	are	not	purporting	 in	any	way	to	be	complete	readings	of	 the	novels	 in	question.	There	are	 two	basic	 reasons	 for	 this:	 the	 first	 is	 that	 there	 is	already	a	strong	body	of	scholarship	that	can	fill	those	requirements	of	providing	complete	 readings	 where	 necessary.	 Instead,	 this	 thesis	 is	 aiming	 to	 highlight	elements	 of	 the	 novel	 that	 are	 significant	 either	 for	 traditional	 readings	 or	 for	giving	more	credence	to	some	more	radical	 theories,	such	as	the	 idea	of	Kerouac	being	musical	in	his	prose	style.	Secondly,	because	it	deals	so	frequently	with	the	basic	 aspects	 of	 a	 text,	 it	would	 be	 overwhelming	 and	 repetitive	 to	 examine	 the	entire	text	on	the	basis	of	sound,	semantics	or	syntactic	structures.	Instead	it	aims	to	 show	 that	 in	 some	 of	 the	 crucial	 (and	 often	 early)	 passages,	 our	 authors	establish	 these	aesthetic	 effects	 so	 that	 they	will	 linger	 in	 the	 reader’s	mind	and	colour	 their	 overall	 impression	 of	 the	 text	 by	 recourse	 to	 non-conscious	processing.		Essentially,	there	are	three	principal	and	interlinked	aims	of	thesis.	The	first	is	to	demonstrate	 where	 cognitive	 science	 might	 truly	 be	 able	 to	 add	 to	 our	
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understanding	of	literature	by	extending	the	critical	toolbox.	The	second	is	to	show	how	cognitive	science	can	clarify	and	articulate	key	intuitions	about	the	nature	of	literary	texts.	The	third	is	to	re-examine	the	question	of	‘aesthetics’	by	seeking	new	insights	 from	 cognitive	 science	 that	 can	 explain	 the	 significance	 of	 neurological	processes	 that	 are	 not	 immediately	 accessible	 to	 consciousness,	 and	 particularly	by	showing	the	importance	of	different	sensory	modalities	to	aesthetic	effects	and	engagement	with	a	novel.			As	 this	 thesis	 falls	 into	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 distinct	 but	 analogous	 methods	 of	cognitive	 poetics	 and	 neuroaesthetics,	 I	 have	 chosen	 not	 to	 label	 the	 critical	accounts	 on	offer	here	 as	belonging	 explicitly	 to	 either	 camp.	The	 title,	 ‘Nervous	Aesthetics’	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 supplant	 or	 amalgamate	 these	 two	 methods,	 but	rather	encapsulate	the	aspects	I	 find	most	relevant	between	the	two	of	them:	the	science	of	 sensation	 and	perception,	 and	 its	 application	 to	 the	 study	of	 aesthetic	effects	within	the	arts.	
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Chapter	One:	Cognitive	Poetics		 	‘Cognitive	poetics’	was	a	term	coined	by	the	Israeli	academic	Reuven	Tsur	in	1983	to	both	describe	and	categorise	a	trend	within	his	body	of	work.	 	He	published	a	major	treatise	on	the	subject	in	1992:	Towards	a	Theory	of	Cognitive	Poetics,	and	he	has	 continued	 to	 build	 on	 these	 theories	 through	 other	 publications.	Towards	 a	
Theory	 was	 updated	 in	 2008	 to	 include	 revised	 theory	 taking	 advantage	 of	 new	research	technology	in	neuroscience	and	linguistics.	Tsur	is	something	of	a	latter-day	Russian	Formalist	 (and	 indeed	he	makes	 frequent	reference	 to	Shlovsky	and	Jakobson):	much	of	his	work	begins	with	an	interest	in	the	most	basic	aspects	of	a	literary	 text,	 such	 as	 sound	or	 semantics.	 Based	on	 these	 observations	he	 builds	systematic	 and	 formalist	 readings	 of	 poetry	 that	 expand	 upwards	 to	 broader	critical	concepts.	Towards	a	Theory,	for	instance,	first	discusses	the	importance	of	sound	in	terms	of	rhyme,	metre	and	expressive	qualities;	then	moves	to	discussing	“units	of	meaning”	which	constitutes	semantics	and	metaphor.	He	then	builds	on	these	insights	to	categorise	‘poetry	of	orientation	and	disorientation’	and	‘poetry	of	altered	states	of	consciousness’,	where	he	discusses	some	of	the	general	aesthetic	effects	attributed	to	poetry.	A	chief	idea	in	his	theory,	reflected	in	this	structure	of	his	 major	 treatise,	 is	 that	 literature	 replicates	 a	 mental	 process	 of	 ‘recoding’	information	for	the	purpose	of	mental	storage:		 The	principles	of	 literature	may	be	said	to	govern	the	boundary	conditons	of	 a	 cognitive	 system	 –	 a	 set	 of	 conditions	 that	 is	 explicitly	 left	
 38 
undetermined	 by	 the	 laws	 of	 lower	 processes,	 physical,	 cognitive	 and	linguistic.	 If	 one	 knows	 that	 is	 the	 set	 of	 boundary	 conditions	 left	undetermined,	and	by	what	laws	of	what	“lower”	processes,	one	may	get	a	better	 understanding	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 literature	 that	 govern	 those	boundary	conditions.	(2008,	p.	4)		As	 we	 shall	 see,	 Tsur’s	 work	 is	 extremely	 formalist,	 but	 it	 does	 so	 because	 he	attempts	 to	 use	 the	 resources	 of	 cognitive	 science	 to	 account	 for	 the	 otherwise	unaccountable	aesthetic	effects	of	poetry;	hence	his	 choice	of	 the	 term	 ‘cognitive	poetics’.	 However,	 despite	 Tsur’s	 foundational	 work	 in	 the	 field,	 when	 taking	 a	broad	 surveys	 of	 the	 body	 of	 works	 labelled	 under	 or	 referring	 to	 ‘cognitive	poetics’,	 they	 are	 instead	 dominated	 by	 references	 to	 an	 entirely	 different	academic,	 Peter	 Stockwell.	 This	 chapter	 is	 a	 comparison	 of	 their	 distinctive	methods	of	criticism.		Stockwell’s	Cognitive	Poetics:	An	Introduction	(2002)	is	pitched	as	a	textbook-level	entry	into	the	subject	of	cognitive	poetics,	and	has	an	accompanying	volume	called	
Cognitive	Poetics	in	Practice	(Gavins	and	Steen,	2003)	to	demonstrate	its	principles	in	action.	The	choice	of	topics	in	the	two	volumes	includes	the	notions	of	figure	and	ground,	deixis,	cognitive	grammar,	schema	theory,	conceptual	metaphor	and	‘text	world’	theory.	Stockwell	acknowledges	that	all	of	these	topics	are	major	theoretical	features	in	cognitive	linguistics,	and	that	his	treatment	is	intended	to	be	as	broad	as	possible,	compared	to	what	he	describes	as	Tsur’s	“very	precise	and	particular	sense”	 (Stockwell,	 2002,	 p.	 8).	 Another	 highly	 influential	 name	 associated	 with	cognitive	 poetics	 is	 Mark	 Turner,	 whose	 book	 Reading	 Minds	 was	 published	 in	
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1991,	and	 is	described	by	Stockwell	as	a	 ‘manifesto’	 (2008,	p.	165).	Turner	used	this	work	to	broadly	challenge	literary	scholars	in	general	to	relocate	literary	study	in	 general	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 mind,	 and	 his	 approach	 is	 influenced	mostly	by	linguistics	and	stylistics.		Stockwell’s	treatise	on	cognitive	poetics	is	undoubtedly	the	public	face	of	the	field.	Hamilton	 (2005,	 p.	 744)	 credits	 him	with	 the	 following	 accolade:	 “Stockwell	 has	successfully	re-defined	the	field.”	In	An	Introduction,	Tsur	is	mentioned	in	passing	for	 coming	 up	 with	 the	 name,	 and	 during	 In	 Practice	 Tsur’s	 essay	 on	 deixis	 is	accompanied	with	the	following	warning	from	the	editors:	“It	is	best	appreciated	if	it	is	studied	as	one	of	the	last	chapters	of	a	course,	for	its	topic	and	treatment	are	pitched	at	rather	an	advanced	 level	of	discussion”	(2003,	p.	3).	For	his	own	part,	Tsur	 has	 been	 highly	 critical	 of	 Stockwell’s	 book	 (see	 chapter	 24	 of	 the	 revised	edition	of	Towards	a	Theory).			Stockwell	 and	 Tsur	 both	 admit	 to	 having	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 term	‘cognitive	poetics’.	By	his	own	admission,	Stockwell’s	is	the	broader	definition,	and	the	editors	of	In	Practice	support	his	vision	for	cognitive	poetics:			 “[It]	does	not	have	a	precisely	demarcated	borderline	which	would	stamp	other	 variants	 of	 cognitive	 poetics,	 including	 Tsur’s,	 as	 non-canonical.	Indeed,	one	of	the	most	 interesting	things	about	cognitive	poetics	today	is	that	 it	 is	 in	 such	 a	 state	 of	 excitement	 and	 unscripted	 development	 in	 a	multitude	of	directions.”	(2003,	p.	3)		
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Their	suggestion	 that	 this	unscripted	development	 in	a	multitude	of	directions	 is	both	 interesting	 and	 exciting	 must	 be	 tempered	 with	 some	 caution.	 First	 and	foremost,	 cognitive	 poetics,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 Stockwell	 or	 Tsur	 is	 the	principle	 theorist,	 the	defining	 feature	of	 cognitive	poetics	 is	 its	 interdisciplinary	framework.	It	concerns	the	interplay	of	biological	sciences	with	literary	criticism,	often	mediated	by	linguistics	or	psychology.	While	reviewing	this	‘cognitive’	trend	in	 literary	 study,	 Jackson	 (2000	 and	 2002)	warns	 of	 the	 difficulties	 that	 arise	 in	combining	 an	 empirically	 based	 science	 with	 the	 more	 theoretical	 humanities.	Having	 a	 solid	 framework	 or	 borderline	 to	 work	 within	 does	 not	 preclude	 the	development	 of	 interesting	 and	 unscripted	 findings:	 the	 very	 nature	 of	interdisciplinary	study	will	guarantee	such	outcomes.	But	there	is	a	certain	danger	that	 in	 casting	 the	 net	 too	wide,	 the	 Stockwell	 style	 of	 cognitive	 poetics	 fails	 to	establish	a	clear	sense	of	immediacy	and	relevance	for	itself.	And	although	the	Tsur	system	of	cognitive	poetics	has	very	meticulously	drawn	boundary	lines,	they	fall	right	on	the	territory	of	empirical	science	and	in	doing	so	set	an	extremely	high	bar	for	his	claims.		In	his	review	of	Cognitive	Poetics:	An	Introduction,	Jackson	makes	a	rather	damning	comment	about	the	‘cognitive’	methodology	behind	Stockwell’s	analysis:		 Stockwell’s	reading	is	not	dependent	on	the	cognitive	terms.	In	fact,	this	is	an	example	of	close-reading	skills.	I	am	not	claiming	that	I	myself	or	anyone	else	would	necessarily	have	 come	 to	 just	 this	 reading	without	 Stockwell’s	prompting.	 But	 I	 am	 trying	 to	 show	 that	 he	 does	 not	 need	 the	 cognitive	poetic	terms	in	order	to	make	the	statements	he	makes.	(2005,	p.	529)	
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	This	 does	 not	 suggest	 that	 Stockwell’s	 analysis	 is	 not	 insightful	 in	 of	 itself,	 but	asserts	 that	his	analysis	does	nothing	 to	demonstrate	what	 cognitive	poetics	 can	offer	in	terms	of	a	unique	contribution	to	literary	criticism.	This	would	not	be	quite	a	brutal	observation	but	for	the	fact	that	Stockwell’s	ambition	for	An	Introduction	is	indeed	to	present	to	the	world	a	whole	new	method	of	reading	literature.	In	fact,	his	 opening	 statement	 is	 rather	 simply:	 “Cognitive	 poetics	 is	 all	 about	 reading	literature”	 (2002,	 p.	 1).	 Given	 these	 lofty	 parameters	 for	 success,	 failing	 to	 offer	any	new	insights	 to	 literary	criticism	raises	some	questions	as	 to	whether	or	not	this	 system	 presents	 an	 adequate	 methodological	 foundation	 for	 the	 study	 of	cognitive	poetics.		The	aim	of	the	present	chapter	is	to	examine	how	literary	scholars	are	attempting	to	 utilise	 cognitive	 science	 to	 supplement	 traditional	 literary	 analysis.	 This	 is	contrasted	with	Chapter	Two,	which	 looks	 at	 how	 successfully	 or	 unsuccessfully	cognitive	scientists	are	bringing	their	insights	to	elucidate	the	arts	and	the	study	of	aesthetics.	 Since	 there	 are	 consistent	 methodological	 differences	 and	 guiding	ambitions	 between	 the	 ‘cognitive	 poetics’	 of	 Stockwell	 and	 Tsur,	 outlining	 and	contrasting	these	distinctions	will	pave	the	way	for	the	study	of	novels	undertaken	by	this	thesis,	and	show	more	directly	how	cognitive	science	can	begin	to	 inform	literary	study	–	as	well	as	outlining	some	pitfalls	that	can	emerge	when	combining	the	two.	Additionally,	as	something	of	literature	review	it	sets	out	how	the	literary	studies	 formally	 identified	 as	 ‘cognitive	poetics’,	 as	well	 as	 those	more	 generally	interested	in	cognitive	science,	approach	the	territory	of	novels	and	their	aesthetic	effects	as	demarcated	by	this	thesis.	
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	As	 outlined	 above,	 Tsur’s	 basic	 framework	 for	 his	 theory	 of	 cognitive	 poetics	involves	 a	 movement	 from	 non-conscious	 aspects	 of	 language	 processing	 to	conscious	aesthetic	reactions	associated	with	poetry,	along	the	simple	spectrum	of	sound-semantics-feeling.	 Stockwell’s	 structure	 of	 An	 Introduction	 involves	 a	similar	 but	 distinct	 approach	 of	 taking	 small	 elements	 from	 linguistics	 (such	 as	deixis)	and	building	towards	what	are	ostensibly	higher	level	cognitive	processes,	such	 as	 how	 the	 reader	 becomes	 ‘transported’	 by	 the	 text.	 Although	 their	 two	systems	are	not	exactly	analogous,	it	will	be	helpful	to	compare	them	in	a	side-by-side	 fashion	 so	as	 to	 see	how	 they	go	about	 creating	 literary	 criticism,	 and	what	contribution	they	offer	to	the	debate.	This	will	be	done	though	an	examination	of	their	respective	treatments	of	sound,	figurative	language	and	‘feeling’	in	cognitive	poetics.		
Sound	in	Cognitive	Poetics		Stockwell’s	 Cognitive	 Poetics:	 An	 Introduction	 (2002)	 does	 not	 cover	 the	 sound	stratum	in	great	detail,	but	his	subsequent	book	Texture:	A	Cognitive	Aesthetics	of	
Reading	(2009)	includes	an	attempt	to	tackle	the	relationship	between	sound	and	meaning.	His	explanation	is	that	these	elements	are	largely	symbolic:		 A	text	about	contemplation	–	‘Thou	still	time	unravished	bride	of	quietness,	thou	foster	child	of	silence	and	slow	time’	(Keats’	‘Ode	on	a	Grecian	Urn’)	–	lends	shushing	to	sibilants,	and	the	/s/es	then	take	on	a	symbolic	value;	a	comic	 book	 text	 about	 fighting	makes	 the	 plosives	 in	 ‘bam’	 and	 ‘kerpow’	
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take	 on	 a	 belligerent	 symbolic	 value,	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 readerly	interaction	 and	 assignment	 of	 symbolic	 value	 that	 pure	 sounds	 take	 on	aesthetic	significance.	(2009,	p.	59)		The	 question	 we	 must	 ask	 here	 is	 what,	 if	 anything,	 is	 cognitive	 about	 this	explanation?	Applying	 symbolic	 value	 to	any	element	of	 a	 text	 is	 something	well	within	 the	boundaries	of	 traditional	 criticism,	 and	although	he	 invokes	 cognitive	linguistics,	 Stockwell	 does	 not	 use	 it	 to	 explain	why	 certain	words	 demonstrate	this	symbolic	association	better	than	others.	Why	do	plosives	 lend	themselves	so	well	 to	 being	 symbolically	 associated	 with	 fighting,	 for	 instance?	 His	 example	shows	 that	 this	 association	 is	 far	 from	 just	 arbitrary,	 but	 it	 does	 nothing	 to	articulate	why	particular	sounds	match	up	so	well.		Further	 on,	 he	 applies	 this	 symbolic	 value	 to	 a	 reading	 of	 Browning’s	 ‘In	 a	Gondola’:			 	 The	moth’s	kiss,	first!		 	 Kiss	me	as	if	you	made	me	believe		 	 You	were	not	sure,	this	eve,		 	 How	my	face,	your	flower,	had	pursed	Its	petals	up;	so,	here	and	there	You	brush	it,	till	I	grow	aware	Who	wants	me,	and	wide	ope	I	burst.		
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A	brief	 analysis	 of	 the	 articulatory	 patterns	 that	 this	 text	 produces	 in	 the	mouth	suggests	a	repeated	attempt	to	create	pouting	or	pursing	lips	in	the	speaking	 reader.	 Matched	 with	 the	 semantic	 content	 of	 the	 poem,	 this	physical	gesture	 is	 inescapably	a	kiss.	For	example,	 there	are	a	number	of	words	 in	 the	 first	 stanza	 that	 require	 open,	 rounded	 lips	 in	 their	articulation:	‘moth’s’,	 ‘first’,	 ‘you’,	‘You’,	 ‘were’,	 ‘sure’,	 ‘How’,	‘your’,	 ‘flower’,	and,	of	course,	most	pointedly,	‘pursed’.	(2009,	p60)		This	is	a	very	astute	observation	and	suits	the	context	of	this	particular	poem.	If	we	recall	 the	notion	 that	 a	 ‘poetic’	 text	 can	make	 the	 reader	more	aware	of	 sensory	processes,	this	is	one	example	of	how	it	could	function.	However,	the	best	example	Stockwell	can	give	is	a	better	demonstration	of	kinaesthesia	than	of	the	possibility	that	 certain	 phonemes	 lend	 themselves	 well	 to	 symbolic	 associations.	 In	kinaesthetically	re-enacting	the	mouth’s	position	during	a	kiss,	the	reader	is	being	made	aware	of	muscular	movements	rather	than	a	quality	that	is	a	property	of	the	isolated	 phonetic	 sound,	 as	 he	 hints	 at	 the	 possibility	 of	when	 he	 discusses	 how	particular	 phonetics	 can	 take	 on	 various	 expressive	 qualities.	 What	 Stockwell	effectively	 demonstrates	 here	 is	 how	 poetry	 can	 evoke	 sensory	 systems	 not	normally	 activated	 in	 language	 processing,	 but	 he	 does	 so	 simply	 by	 stating	 the	similarity	between	the	gesture	of	a	kiss	and	the	gesture	of	a	bilabial	consonant	like	
m	or	w.	There	is	potential	here	to	do	use	cognitive	science	to	show	far	more	than	just	direct	correlations	such	as	these.		Tsur’s	discussion	of	sound	in	Towards	a	Theory	of	Cognitive	Poetics	 (2008)	draws	on	 his	 earlier	 work	What	 Makes	 Sound	 Patterns	 Expressive?	 The	 Poetic	 Mode	 of	
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Speech	Perception	(1992).	His	study	begins	with	statistical	evidence	to	support	the	correlation	 between	 particular	 phonetic	 sounds	 and	 particular	 generic	 moods,	finding	that	in	poems	by	Verlaine	and	Hugo,	and	citing	another	study	by	Fónagy	on	the	Hungarian	poet	Sándor	Petőfi,	 there	 is	an	overwhelming	correlation	between	tender	 moods	 and	 nasal	 consonants,	 with	 a	 contrasting	 correlation	 between	aggressive	 moods	 and	 voiceless	 stops	 (1992,	 p3).	 In	 an	 effort	 to	 provide	 some	causation	 to	 match	 the	 correlation,	 he	 turns	 to	 research	 on	 speech	 perception	conducted	at	the	Haskins	Laboratories.		 As	we	shall	see,	there	is	no	one-to-one	relationship	between	the	segments	of	perceived	speech	and	the	segments	of	the	acoustic	signal	that	carries	it.	According	 to	 the	 Haskins	 theory	 of	 speech	 perception	 (for	 example,	Liberman,	 1970;	 Liberman	 et	 al.,	 1967),	 there	 is	 between	 the	 two	 a	mediating	step	of	“complex	coding.”	(1992,	p8)		This	principle	of	coding	has	particular	perceptual	consequences	based	upon	how	it	proceeds.	Tsur	quotes	Liberman	et	al.	(1972)	to	explain:		 The	 special	 process	 that	 decodes	 the	 stops	 strips	 away	 all	 auditory	information	 and	presents	 to	 immediate	 perception	 a	 categorical	 linguistic	event	the	listener	can	only	be	aware	of	as	/b,	d,	g,	p,	t,	or	k/.	Thus,	there	is	for	 these	 segments	 no	 auditory,	 precategorical8	form	 that	 is	 available	 to	consciousness	 for	 a	 time	 long	 enough	 to	 produce	 a	 recency	 effect.	 The	relatively	 unencoded	 vowels,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 capable	 of	 being	
                                                
8 By ‘pre-categorical’ Tsur refers to the auditory information that is used to transmit a sound prior to 
being ‘recoded’ as a phonetic unit. 
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perceived	 in	 a	 different	 way…	 In	 the	 experiment	 by	 Crowderm	 we	 may	suppose	 that	 these	 same	 auditory	 characteristics	 of	 the	 vowel,	 held	 for	several	seconds	in	an	echoic	sensory	register,	provide	the	subject	with	rich,	precategorical	 information	 that	 enables	 him	 to	 recall	 the	 most	 recently	presented	items	with	relative	ease.	(Tsur,	1992,	p.	33-4)			Tsur	uses	this	distinction	between	the	encoded	and	(relatively)	unencoded	speech	sounds	as	an	explanation	for	the	apparent	correlation	outlined	earlier:		 Now,	 the	 perception	 of	 rich	 sensory	 material	 and	 the	 making	 of	 fine	distinctions	 precisely	 presuppose	 that	 openness,	 responsiveness	 and	susceptibility	 of	 adaptation	 characteristic	 of	 tender	 feelings	 and	 which	seem	to	be	lacking	in	aggressive	behaviour.	Reliance	on	rich	precategorical	information	 makes	 greater	 emotional	 and	 behavioural	 adaptability	possible.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Gestaltists	 (for	 example,	 Ehrenzweig,	1965)	have	observed	that	in	visual	designs	clear-cut	shapes	assume	a	high	degree	 of	 ‘plasticity’	 when	 perceived	 against	 a	 background	 of	 shadings,	“inarticulate	scribbling,”	or,	in	the	present	terminology,	rich	precategorical	information.	This	is	particularly	true	when	gestalt-free9	sensory	material	is	subliminally	perceived.	The	richer	this	precategorical	sensory	information,	the	greater	the	plasticity	of	the	consciously	perceived	visual	shapes.	(1992,	p.	34-5)		
                                                
9 It can be assumed here that Tsur is referring to sensory material that is perceived as being individual 
(not part of a larger whole, as a gestalt would be). 
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Liberman’s	account	demonstrates	this	principle	in	action:	the	relative	‘plasticity’	of	the	unencoded	vowels	means	that	they	can	be	more	effectively	adapted	to	assist	in	the	 recall	 of	 information	 than	 the	 encoded	 stops,	 owing	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 the	precategorical	auditory	information	to	function	as	a	differentiating	background.	In	his	analysis,	Tsur’s	association	between	the	quality	of	‘plasticity’	and	an	emotional	quality	 seems	 to	 be	 largely	 symbolic,	 which	 is	 something	 of	 a	 weakness	 in	 the	theory,	especially	since	it	 is	only	supported	at	this	point	by	gestalt	theory	(which	we	 will	 examine	 more	 further	 on).	 However,	 since	 this	 work	 was	 published,	modern	neuroscience	has	 taken	 some	 steps	 towards	 supporting	 this	 supposition	that	 ‘plasticity’	 has	 implications	 for	 emotion.	 Davidson	 et	 al.	 (2000)	 indicate	 in	their	research	that	neural	plasticity	–	the	ability	of	neural	pathways	to	change	and	adapt	–	is	a	key	component	of	emotional	learning.10	In	other	words,	it	may	well	be	possible	 that	 a	 reader	 may	 unconsciously	 utilise	 the	 recency	 effect	 of	 the	precategorical	information	to	more	quickly	connect	with	the	emotional	content	of	the	 poetic	 text,	 and	 this	 is	 where	 the	 comparative	 ‘tenderness’	 of	 vowels	 and	relatively	 unecoded	 consonants	 emanates	 from.	 It	 could	 be	 inferred	 that	 Tsur	 is	right,	 but	 for	 the	 wrong	 reasons.	 The	 vowels	 and	 liquids	 are	 not	 inherently	emotional,	 but	 they	 can	 be	 used	 to	 reinforce	 the	 emotional	 content	 of	 a	 text	 far	better	than	the	stops	or	the	fricatives.	11		Tsur	 does	 not	 exclusively	 rely	 on	 a	 single	 feature	 such	 as	 relative	 encoding	 to	support	 this	 hypothesis,	 however.	 He	 organises	 the	 data	 from	 Fónagy’s	 study	
                                                
10 Another correlating piece of data for the link between neural plasticity and emotion comes from a 
study by Strait et al (2009), whose research indicates that the enhanced auditory plasticity observed in 
trained musicians allows them to be more adept at detecting emotion in speech. 
11 Voiced fricatives include v and z, voiced stops include b, d and g, voiceless fricatives include f and s, 
and voiceless stops include p, t and k. It should be noted at this point that ‘stops’ are also referred to in 
linguistics as ‘plosives’ and ‘liquids’ can be referred to as ‘approximants’.  
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(1961:	 p.	 194-218)	 along	 the	 basis	 of	 other	 such	 distinctive	 features	 including	periodicity:		 Thus,	 the	 sequence	 vowels,	 liquids	 and	 nasals,	 voiced	 fricatives,	 voiced	stops,	 voiceless	 fricatives,	 voiceless	 stops,	 constitute	 a	 scale	 of	 decreasing	periodicity	 or	 sonority,	 in	 this	 order…	 The	 optimal	 tender	 sounds	 are	periodic	 (voiced),	 continuous,	 and	 relatively	 unencoded;	 the	 optimal	aggressive	 sounds	 are	 aperiodic	 (voiceless),	 abrupt,	 and	 highly	 encoded.	(1992,	p.	32)		This	scale	is	based	on	the	following	account	from	Fry	(1970,	p.	35-6):	“In	normal	speech,	 all	 vowel	 sounds,	 semi-vowels,	 liquids	 and	 nasals	 are	 periodic	 sounds,	while	 noiseless	 consonants	 are	 aperiodic.”	 Periodic	 sounds	 present	 a	 smoother	waveform	to	the	ear,	while	aperiodic	sounds	are	experienced	as	harsher	with	more	erratic	waveforms	 (Tsur,	1992,	p.	44).	Although	he	 sketches	a	 simple	 continuum	here,	 Tsur	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 reality	 is	 far	 from	 clear-cut.	 For	 example,	 he	points	 out	 how	 r	 falls	 on	 the	 periodic	 end	 of	 this	 scale	 but	 can	 be	 frequently	associated	with	aggressive	moods	(1992,	p.	32).	For	Tsur,	this	“double-edgedness”	is	of	particular	interest,	and	by	putting	these	two	scales	of	encoded-unencoded	and	periodic-aperiodic	 together,	 he	 is	 able	 to	 account	 for	 the	 supposed	 suitability	 of	sibilants	 to	 both	 onomatopoeic	 imitation	 of	 noise	 and	 to	 a	 hushing	 quality.	 The	former,	he	argues,	derives	 from	 the	aperiodic	nature	of	 the	consonant,	while	 the	latter	can	be	derived	from	the	relative	‘unencodedness’	of	the	sibilants	in	relation	to	other	consonants.		
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These	examples	are	not	the	only	expressive	qualities	he	attempts	to	account	for;	he	also	 discusses	 the	 perception	 of	 ‘bright’	 and	 ‘dark’	 vowels,	 along	 with	 ‘metallic’	consonants	such	as	k.	He	also	uses	these	insights	to	craft	an	interpretation	of	the	perceptual	 blending	 of	 colour	 and	 sound	 in	 Rimbaud’s	 ‘Les	 Voyelles’.	 Like	Stockwell,	he	interprets	these	emotional	qualities	as	being	generally	the	product	of	emotional	correlations	formed	by	the	reader,	but	his	research	is	particularly	eager	to	explain	why	certain	symbolic	associations	seem	most	appropriate	to	particular	phonemes,	 which	 Stockwell	 cannot	 explain.	 Moreover,	 his	 study	 is	 built	 on	cognitive	 science,	 psychology	 and	 linguistics	 to	 support	 his	 assertions,	 while	Stockwell’s	 claim	 to	 being	 cognitive	 hinges	 on	 the	 mere	 evocation	 of	 cognitive	linguistics.		Although	we	might	award	round	one	to	Tsur,	a	note	of	caution	should	be	sounded	about	exactly	how	formalistic	his	work	on	sound	patterns	is.	His	theory	behind	the	symbolic	associations	of	phonetics	in	poetry,	despite	the	inclusion	of	provisions	for	‘double-edged’	qualities,	 is	highly	prescriptive.	Moving	 forward	 to	 the	case	 study	chapters,	what	 should	 be	 taken	 as	 the	most	 important	 aspect	 of	 Tsur’s	work	 on	sound	 qualities	 is	 that	 he	 accounts	 for	 them	 largely	 in	 terms	 of	 non-conscious	processes.	This	is	a	helpful	way	of	explaining	why	the	qualities	associated	with	the	sounds	often	come	across	as	merely	intuitive	perceptions	about	the	nature	of	the	text,	rather	than	clearly	articulated	connections.				
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Figurative	Language	in	Cognitive	Poetics		In	Stockell’s	An	Introduction,	discussion	of	figurative	language	occurs	in	a	chapter	where	the	focus	is	on	‘conceptual	metaphor’.	This	is	the	idea	that	“many	ordinary	expressions	and	ways	of	 representing	 the	world	 rely	on	metaphorical	mappings,	even	when	most	 of	 us	 do	 not	 realise	 the	 fact”	 (2002,	 p108).	 These	 include	 such	well	worn	concepts	as	 “life	 is	a	 journey,”	 “love	 is	war,”	and	“time	 is	money.”	The	idea	 comes	 from	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson’s	 Metaphors	 We	 Live	 By	 (1980),	 a	 fairly	influential	work	that	argues	metaphorical	relationships	such	as	those	mentioned	in	this	 paragraph	 actually	 represent	 direct	 mental	 connections	 between	 two	concepts,	 in	 spite	of	 the	 fact	 in	 terms	of	 language	a	metaphor	 is	most	 commonly	understood	as	having	a	non-literal	relationship	between	those	concepts.		In	light	of	this	chapter’s	focus	on	how	poetic	technique	can	be	articulated	in	terms	of	 cognitive	 science,	 the	 question	 of	 how	metaphor	 functions	 on	 a	 mental	 level	seems	 quite	 pertinent.	 However,	 no	 sooner	 has	 Stockwell	 introduced	 cognitive	metaphor	than	he	takes	the	very	idea	of	it	for	granted.	Take	his	analysis	of	David	Gayscone’s	‘And	the	Seventh	Dream	is	the	Dream	of	Isis’:		 	 there	is	an	explosion	of	geraniums	in	the	ballroom	of	the	hotel	there	is	an	extremely	unpleasant	odour	of	decaying	meat	arising	from	the	depetalled	flower	growing	out	of	her	ear	her	arms	are	like	pieces	of	sandpaper	or	wings	of	leprous	birds	in	taxis		
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In	 the	 first	 line	 of	 this	 extract,	 since	 any	 cognitive	model	 of	 geraniums	 is	unlikely	to	 include	an	explosive	 feature,	 it	 is	most	 likely	that	 ‘explosion’	 is	read	metaphorically	as	a	poetic	representation	of	the	impact	of	the	colour	of	the	flowers.	Indeed,	I	have	just	realised	that	the	word	‘impact’	with	which	I	just	 described	 the	 effect	 is	 another	 expression	 of	 the	 same	 conceptual	metaphor	SEEING	IS	BEING	HIT.	(2002,	p.	113)		The	 question	 raised	 in	 response	 to	 this	 example	 is	 simple:	what	 is	 the	 evidence	that	 this	 use	 of	 ‘explosive’	 suggests	 that	 the	 metaphorical	 mapping	 relies	 on	 a	
conceptual	metaphor	of	“seeing	is	being	hit”,	rather	than	an	expressive	one?	This	is	taken	from	Stockwell’s	own	terminology,	where	he	defines	“expressive”	or	poetic	metaphors	as	tending	to	have	“low	clarity	but	a	high	degree	of	richness”	(2002,	p.	108),	with	‘richness’	being	defined	as	how	many	predicate	relations	are	carried	in	the	 metaphor.	 We	 could	 easily	 argue	 that	 the	 predicate	 “there	 is	 an	 explosion”	conveys	a	number	of	relations:	 the	geraniums	appeared	suddenly,	 the	geraniums	presented	a	visual	spectacle,	the	geraniums	were	scattered	everywhere.	Given	this,	it	seems	a	much	better	candidate	for	expressive	metaphor	than	a	conceptual	one,	since	‘explosion’	does	not	automatically	specify	the	semantic	feature	‘HIT’.	Indeed,	this	 example	 is	 taken	 from	 a	 surrealist	 poem,	 and	 Stockwell’s	 point	 is	 to	demonstrate	 how	 surrealist	 poetry	 disrupts	 the	 normal	 process	 of	 following	conceptual	metaphors	to	their	conclusion:		 This	 metaphorical	 resolution	 of	 the	 line,	 however,	 does	 not	 seem	satisfactory	 in	the	context	of	 the	next	 few	lines.	 Incoherence	 is	 introduced	by	 the	 cognitive	 models	 which	 are	 next	 mentioned…	 none	 of	 which	 are	
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semantically	 connected	 with	 geraniums…	 however,	 recalling	 surrealist	ideology,	 the	 framing	world	 can	 be	 imagined	 as	 the	metaphorical	 level	 in	general.	Framing	the	text	as	having	unconscious	or	irrational	status	allows	the	strange	images	to	be	read	literally.	(2002,	p.	113)		Before	he	has	even	given	a	sustained	example	of	how	conceptual	metaphor	works,	he	 is	 discussing	 how	 the	 conceptual	 metaphor	 is	 supposed	 to	 not	 be	 read	metaphorically.	 This	 would	 be	 less	 of	 a	 problem	 had	 Stockwell	 included	 some	cognitive	 analysis	 to	 indicate	 why	 ‘explosion	 is	 sight’	 is	 normally	 a	 conceptual	metaphor,	but	he	simply	takes	the	theory	for	granted	at	this	point.	In	light	of	this,	his	chapter	contributes	nothing	to	literary	theory	that	could	not	be	explained	more	simply	by	the	fact	that	certain	metaphors	have	become	dead	metaphors,	and	that	surrealism	subverts	these	clichés	to	disorientate	the	reader.		Tsur,	 by	 comparison,	 makes	 the	 distinction	 that	 the	 mere	 frequency	 of	 a	metaphoric	 representation	 is	 not	 enough	 evidence	 to	 argue	 that	 it	 becomes	 the	more	direct	representation	in	the	cognitive	hierarchy.12	His	use	of	semantic	theory	in	a	discussion	of	 figurative	 language	attempts	 to	explain	why	certain	metaphors	function	without	entering	consciousness,	despite	seeming	 to	violate	 the	ordinary	principles	of	language	when	examined	closely.	Chapter	Nine	of	Towards	a	Theory	is	replete	with	 analysis	 and	 examples;	 but	 first	 they	 require	 some	 grounding	 from	the	introductory	chapter.		
                                                
12 In the second (2008) edition of Towards a Theory, Tsur includes a chapter that is a response to 
Lakoff’s Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. He critiques at length the theory of conceptual metaphor, 
more specifically its applicability to the study of poetry. He is rather hostile to the idea of conceptual 
metaphor offering anything that conventional literary criticism has not already been able to account for. 
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Contemporary	 linguistics	 analyses	 the	 meaning	 of	 words	 in	 terms	 of	 semantic	features:	 Quillian	 (1966)	 proposed	 a	 hierarchical	 model	 that	 indicates	 how	numerous	features	are	categorised	in	a	single	word.	The	word	‘terrier’	for	instance,	includes	 the	 feature	 ‘dog’,	 and	 above	 that,	 ‘animal’,	 where	 animal	 is	 the	 highest	level	and	terrier	is	the	lowest.	At	each	level,	there	are	particular	associations	with	each	feature:	‘animal’	specifies	it	is	capable	of	movement,	‘dog’	specifies	it	has	four	legs,	 and	 ‘terrier’	 that	 it	 is	 small	 and	 typically	 very	 active.	 In	 ordinary	 language,	using	 the	 word	 ‘terrier’	 would	 specify	 these	 features	 associated	 with	 the	 lower	level	rather	than	the	higher	ones:	that	is,	the	sentence	“we	have	a	terrier”	asserts	that	one	has	a	small	and	active	dog,	rather	than	simply	that	one	has	a	dog.		What	Tsur	makes	of	 this	seemingly	trivial	 information	 is	 that	 figurative	 language	makes	 use	 of	 this	 same	 principle	 of	 the	 lowest	 hierarchical	 features	 being	 the	dominant	ones.	His	example	is	as	follows:		 On	the	other	hand,	metaphors	 tend	to	delete	all	 the	higher	 features	 in	 the	figurative	term,	and	transfer	the	lowest	feature(s)	to	the	headword:		 (5)	His	wife	is	a	gem.		
Gem	 is	a	hyponym	of	stone;	 the	 former	 is	differentiated	 from	the	 latter	by	the	 opposing	 features	 [±PRECIOUS].	 In	 the	 process	 of	 understanding,	 the	understander	 transfers	 in	 this	 sentence	 [+PRECIOUS]	 to	 his	 wife,	 and	deletes	all	other,	higher	features	that	conflict	with	the	features	of	the	proper	term	(wife),	such	as	[+MINERAL,	-ANIMATE].	(2008,	p.	14)	
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	In	simple	terms,	this	analysis	can	be	used	to	state	explicitly	why	we	understand	“X	is	 a	 gem”	 to	 mean	 that	 the	 subject	 is	 ‘precious’	 rather	 than	 that	 they	 are,	 for	instance,	‘made	of	stone’.	Tsur	then	builds	on	these	principles	in	Chapter	Nine:		 One	 must	 distinguish,	 following	 Brooke-Rose	 (1958,	 p155),	 “functional	metaphors”	 (A	 is	 called	 B	 by	 virtue	 of	 what	 it	 does),	 and	 “sensuous	metaphors”	(A	is	called	B	by	virtue	of	what	it	looks	like	or,	less	frequently,	by	virtue	of	what	it	sounds,	smells,	feels,	or	tastes	like).	In	terms	of	[the	boy	next	door	 is	a	mischief	doer	with	exhaustible	energy],	a	ball	of	fire	 in	 [the	boy	next	door	is	a	ball	of	fire]	is	a	functional	metaphor,	in	terms	of	[the	boy	next	door	 is	roly-poly,	and	has	red	hair],	 it	 is	a	sensuous	metaphor.	There	seems	to	be	in	human	nature	an	inclination	to	prefer	functional	to	sensuous	metaphors.	(2008,	p.	248)		Let	 us	 consider	 Stockwell’s	 example	 again,	 in	 light	 of	 this	 theory.	Understanding	that	when	used	metaphorically,	 ‘explosion’	more	naturally	specifies	an	‘attention-grabbing	event’	rather	than	its	physical	characteristics,	such	as	‘a	combustion’,	is	a	far	more	convincing	explanation	for	this	being	the	default	reading	than	it	being	an	example	 of	 “conceptual	 metaphor”.	 The	 mind	 automatically	 processes	 this	 as	 a	functional	metaphor,	and	it	is	only	after	reading	the	sensuous	content	of	the	rest	of	the	 poem	 that	 the	 more	 sensuous	 interpretation	 as	 the	 flowers	 appearing	 in	 a	scattered	fashion	occurs	–	an	example	of	delayed	decoding.	Tsur	postulates	on	the	cognitive	groundings	of	this	theory:		
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One	 of	 the	 assumptions	 of	 cognitive	 poetics	 is	 that	 in	 relation	 to	 poetic	language,	 cognitive	 mechanisms	 originally	 acquired	 for	 survival	 in	 man’s	physical	and	social	environment	have	been	turned	to	aesthetic	ends.	For	the	purpose	of	survival,	 it	 is	 less	 important	 to	know	what	an	object	 looks	 like	than	to	know	what	it	can	do.	This	seems	to	be	the	reason	for	the	cognitive	tendency	to	first	notice	the	functional	elements	in	a	figurative	construction	and	only	when	this	 fails	to	account	for	the	metaphor,	 to	notice	–	 if	at	all	–	the	sensuous	elements.	In	certain	styles,	of	course,	poets	may	capitalise	on	this	 preference,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 achieve	 the	 effects	 of	 markedness,	 by	having	recourse	to	sensuous	metaphors.	(2008,	p.	248-9)		Tsur	 gives	 an	 example	 of	 this	 poetic	 preferencing	 of	 sensuous	 metaphor	 from	Baudelaire’s	 “Correspondances”,	 a	 famous	 example	 of	 the	 Symbolist	movement’s	focus	on	evoking	sensations:		 Vaste	comme	la	nuit	et	comme	la	clarté.		 (Vast	as	the	night	and	as	the	light)		This	 simile	 somehow	makes	 light	 equal	 night	 in	 an	 indirect	 manner	 and	generates	 a	 powerful,	 though	 implicit	 oxymoron.	 The	 simile	 being	“somehow”	 unsatisfactory,	 its	 oxymoron	 directs	 attention	 away	 from	 the	simile	to	the	fact	that	both	night	and	light	are	treated	in	the	lines	as	“vast”.	(2008,	p.	259)		
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This	 figurative	 association	 is	 sensuous	 rather	 than	 functional,	 since	 functionally	
night	 and	 light	 are	 opposites	 of	 one	 another.	 Instead,	 the	metaphorical	mapping	compares	how	they	are	experienced,	in	terms	of	the	sense	of	their	scale.		When	 one	 compares	 the	 basic	 approach	 they	 take	 towards	 figurative	 language,	Tsur’s	 emerges	 as	 more	 the	 thorough	 and	 accounts	 for	 the	 preferencing	 of	different	 types	 of	 metaphor	 in	 a	 method	 that	 is	 demonstrably	 cognitive,	 in	 the	context	of	adaptive	use	of	survival	mechanisms,	rather	than	Stockwell	who	simply	relies	on	the	notion	that	particular	metaphors	just	happen	to	be	the	way	by	which	people	 tend	 to	 ordinarily	 think.	 As	 with	 his	 research	 on	 sound,	 Tsur	 does	 not	simply	accept	that	some	figurative	associations	occur	more	frequently	than	others,	he	 attempts	 to	 account	 for	 it	 within	 cognitive	 theory.	 In	 terms	 of	 what	 the	 two	approaches	contribute	to	literary	criticism,	Stockwell’s	only	restates	the	principle	of	 cliché,	 while	 Tsur’s	 allows	 for	 functional	 criticism	 of	 the	 perceived	 effects	 of	symbolist	and	surrealist	poetry	in	relation	to	their	stated	ambitions.13		
‘Feeling’	in	Cognitive	Poetics		This	last	example	does	not	directly	compare	the	two	scholars	in	terms	of	a	direct	aspect	of	reading,	but	rather	how	they	treat	the	issue	of	feeling	in	literature.	Given	that	 cognitive	 poetics	 can	 call	 upon	 the	 resources	 of	 modern	 psychology	 and	neuroscience	to	clarify	outstanding	problems	 in	 literature,	 it	seems	exceptionally	suited	to	articulating	feeling	in	terms	of	cognitive	processes	and	hence	applying	a	
                                                
13 The example from Baudelaire receives contextual elaboration in Chapter 20 of Towards a Theory, 
where Tsur considers this sonnet as an example of ‘ecstatic poetry’, in a systematic investigation that not 
only considers the figurative aspects of the poem but also the use of sound and the effects of its syntactic 
construction in the achievement of this ecstatic state. 
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measure	of	 objectivity	 to	 the	 topic.	This	 concern	 is	 something	Stockwell	 touches	upon	in	the	final	chapter	of	An	Introduction:		 However,	reading	can	also	be	an	emotional	process,	a	felt	experience,	even	offering	a	bodily	 frisson	of	excitement	and	pleasure,	 the	prickling	of	hairs	on	the	back	of	your	neck	and	a	line	or	an	idea	or	a	phrase	or	an	event	that	makes	you	catch	your	breath,	and	remember	it	for	a	long	time	afterwards.	(2002,	p.	151)		In	 some	ways	 this	passage	 recalls	Nabokov’s	 idea	of	 reading	 “with	 the	 spine”,	 as	mentioned	in	Lectures	on	Literature	Having	captured	the	reader’s	excitement	with	this	 eloquent	 summary	 of	 the	 allure	 of	 reading,	 Stockwell	 then	 launches	 into	 a	discussion	of	the	aesthetic	effect	which	forms	the	focus	of	his	chapter	–	the	effect	of	‘transportation’:		 First	 there	must	 be	 a	 reader	 (traveller)	who	 is	 transported.	 This	 involves	the	 reader	 adapting	 themselves	 to	 new	 conditions,	 taking	 on	 assumed	characteristics	 and	 attitudes,	 even	 assumed	 perceptions	 and	 beliefs,	 in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	literary	scene.	In	order	to	engage	in	the	simple	deictic	 projection	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 track	 a	 character’s	 point	 of	 view,	 we	must	 take	 on	 an	 imagined	 model	 of	 that	 other	 point	 of	 perception	 and	belief.	 This	 ranges	 from	a	 very	 simple	 adjustment,	 such	 as	 understanding	that	the	‘you’	addressed	to	the	character	is	not	really	a	direct	address	to	the	reader,	right	up	to	being	able	 to	model	and	make	predictions	about	views	and	beliefs	we	do	not	actually	hold.	Even	in	extreme	cases	(such	as	reading	
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Hitler’s	Mein	Kampf),	 part	 of	 the	 sense	 of	 distaste	 and	 revulsion	 for	most	people	comes	with	having	to	engage	with	ideas	that	are	not	naturally	their	own	 and	 feeling	 too	 close	 to	 them	 for	 comfort.	 It	 is	 the	 same	 cognitive	process	 that	makes	 reading	 literary	 narratives	 or	 lyrical	 expressions	 of	 a	poetic	 persona	 attractive	 and	 pleasurable,	 since	 it	 involves	 an	 aspect	 of	‘dressing	up’	in	another’s	ideas.	(2002,	p.	152-3)		Two	things	stand	out	here.	First,	 this	passage	includes	absolutely	no	theory	from	cognitive	 science,	 psychology	 or	 neuroscience	 that	 would	 provide	 empirical	 or	even	 theoretical	 grounding	 for	 these	 ideas:	 lacking	 this,	 it	 amounts	 to	 nothing	more	 than	 a	 layman’s	 account	 of	 some	 of	 the	 basic	 ideas	 offered	 by	 reader-response	theory.	Two,	it	represents	a	massive	step	back	from	the	bold	territory	of	feeling	that	Stockwell	alluded	to	in	his	opening	to	the	chapter:	we	have	gone	from	talking	 about	 physically	 feeling	 the	 hairs	 on	 your	 neck	 stand	 on	 end	 to	 merely	imagining	 yourself	 in	 a	 character’s	 place.	 To	 draw	 a	 link	 between	 the	 two,	Stockwell	 would	 presumably	 need	 to	 provide	 some	 kind	 of	 evidence	 from	cognitive	 science	 that	 suggested	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 articulate	 how	 the	 physical	senses	could	be	physically	stimulated	by	the	mere	act	of	imagination,	but	nowhere	does	he	do	so.		Instead,	 his	 chapter	 focuses	 entirely	 on	 the	 act	 of	 being	 ‘transported’	 into	 the	world	of	the	text,	which	is	very	much	a	reduction	of	the	ambition	signalled	at	the	start	of	the	chapter.	Being	‘transported’	or	‘immersed’	in	a	text	as	he	discusses	it	is	not	 necessarily	 linked	 incontrovertibly	 to	 experiencing	 an	 emotion,	 a	 physical	sensation,	or	even	being	captivated	by	a	phrase.	Stockwell	could	address	cognitive	
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poetics	 to	 elaborating	 even	 further	 upon	 the	 emotional	 and	 sensory	 effects	 of	literature,	but	instead	he	tackles	the	issue	of	emotional	and	physical	feedback	in	an	extremely	 roundabout	 manner,	 in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 diverge	 too	 far	 from	 an	ordinary	critical	discussion	of	identifying	with	a	character.		What	is	more,	his	analysis	of	the	effect	of	‘transportation’	barely	yields	anything	of	significance.	He	offers	a	lengthy	analysis	of	the	basic	plot	complexities	within	The	
Importance	of	Being	Earnest,	which	only	points	out	 the	most	obvious	details	 and	rechristens	the	shifts	in	narrative	flow	as	‘framing’:		 Keeping	track	of	all	these	facts	is	quite	a	feat	for	the	audience.	Not	only	do	enactors	 proliferate	 as	 different	 permutations	 of	 relationships	 emerge	 or	are	 disconfirmed,	 but	 the	 audience	 has	 to	 monitor	 each	 particular	permutation	 and	 identify	 it	 correctly	 within	 the	 belief	 frame	 of	 the	appropriate	 character.	 Even	 more	 complexly,	 they	 have	 to	 remember	different	apparent	belief	frames	as	held	by	the	enactors	‘Jack’	and	‘Earnest’,	and	also	have	to	recall	different	points	in	the	ongoing	frame	modification	at	which	different	belief	frames	were	held	earlier	in	the	play.	(2002,	p.	161)		This	is	an	extremely	roundabout	way	of	saying	that	the	play	is	a	farce,	and	central	to	 its	 appeal	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 keep	 the	 audience	 in	 a	 suspended	 state	 of	indeterminancy.	Nothing	at	any	point	 in	 this	analysis	 indicates	how	the	audience	could	be	as	emotionally	involved	or	feel	direct	sensory	stimulations	in	the	manner	he	signals	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	chapter.	Moreover,	once	again	 there	 is	nothing	cognitive	about	this	analysis.	
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	By	 contrast,	 Tsur	 immediately	 grounds	 any	 attempt	 to	 discuss	 the	 feeling	associated	with	literature	within	an	actual	cognitive	template,	although	I	question	how	useful	some	of	his	associations	actually	are.	First,	let	us	take	his	discussion	of	the	perception	of	how	“gestalt-free”	qualities	reflect	the	sense	of	the	other-wordly	or	ineffable,	from	the	first	chapter	of	Towards	a	Theory:		 In	 much	 Romantic	 and	 Symbolist	 poetry,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 low-categorized	meanings	can	arouse	the	impression	of	being	in	the	presence	of	the	 ineffable,	 the	 other-worldly,	 of	 getting	 a	 glimpse	 into	 some	 super-sensory,	 spiritual	 reality.	 On	 the	 semantic	 level,	 low-categorized	information,	 or	 attitude,	 or	 affect,	 can	 be	 present	 in	 poetry	 as	 what	Ehrenzweig	 (1965)	 called	 gestalt-free	 or	 thing-free	 qualities;	 as	 weak	gestalts,	 or	 as	 meaning	 components	 in	 words,	 or	 as	 abstracted	 from	 the	things	they	described.	(2008,	p.	21)		To	 articulate	 this,	 ‘low	categorised’	 specifies	 the	 same	as	 ‘pre-categorised’	 in	 the	analysis	 of	 the	 sound	 stratum.	 To	 paraphrase	 Tsur,	 this	 kind	 of	 information	normally	passed	over	by	consciousness	 is	perceived	as	 ‘gestalt-free’	according	 to	the	 laws	 of	 gestalt	 psychology,	 which	 is	 that	 consistent	 units	 tend	 to	 be	perceptually	 grouped	 together.	 As	 such,	 information	 that	 is	 hard	 to	 categorise	arouses	 the	 perception	 of	 being	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 something	 inaccessible	 to	consciousness.		
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There	 is	 a	 problem	 with	 this	 being	 used	 as	 a	 psychological	 grounding	 for	 the	source	of	 the	effect,	 in	 that	gestalt	psychology	has	been	criticised	 in	recent	years	for	the	tendency	to	be	descriptive	rather	than	explanatory.	In	the	area	Tsur	draws	upon,	the	law	of	Prägnanz	describes	how	elements	that	form	a	‘strong’	figure	tend	to	 group	 together	 perceptually,	 and	 conversely	 disorganised	 elements	 are	perceived	as	 a	 ‘weak	gestalt’.	To	use	 this	 to	 state	 that	diffuse	or	 low-categorised	elements	are	perceived	as	having	a	lack	of	tangible	presence	is	only	relabeling	the	effect,	without	giving	any	explanation	of	how	 the	gestalt-free	quality	arouses	 the	feelings	of	the	ineffable.		It	is	not	that	the	laws	of	gestalt	psychology	seem	to	be	untrue,	only	that	they	have	no	direct	recourse	to	the	science	of	perceptual	processing	and	are	thus	somewhat	vague	 (Mather,	 2009,	 p.	 277).	 So	 it	 is	 not	 that	 Tsur	 is	 wrong,	 but	 that	 he	 is	exhibiting	the	same	tendency	as	Stockwell	has	for	using	a	new	descriptive	term	to	categorise	 an	 effect	 without	 fully	 articulating	 how	 it	 functions	 cognitively.	 In	further	 elaboration	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 ‘diffuse’	 features	 in	 the	 updated	 version	 of	
Towards	a	Theory,	he	has	more	recourse	to	modern	cognitive	science:		 In	 the	 nineteen-seventies	 I	 came	 across	 cognitive	 psychologist	 Robert	Ornstein’s	study	of	consciousness,	 in	which	he	put	forward	the	conception	(which	 became	 the	 ‘received	 view’)	 that	 while	 logical	 and	 rational	consciousness	 is	 typically	 related	 to	 the	 left	 hemisphere	 of	 the	 brain,	meditative	 consciousness	 is	 related	 to	 the	 right	hemisphere…	Orientation,	emotions	 and	 mystic	 experiences	 are	 all	 typically	 right-hemisphere	activities	 (cf.	 supra,	Chapter	15).	Regarding	 the	poetic	structure	discussed	
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in	 the	 present	 section,	 I	 claimed,	 the	 emphatic	 deixis	 evokes	 a	 coherent	scene	arousing	 imagined	orientation	which,	 in	 turn,	 transfers	a	 significant	part	of	language	processing	from	the	left	to	the	right	hemisphere,	rendering	the	 related	 percepts	 more	 diffuse.	 Orientation	 involves	 not	 only	 a	perception	 of	 the	 surrounding	 space,	 but	 also	 a	 sense	 of	 one’s	 own	 body	position.	(2008,	p.	612)		Tsur	used	this	principle	to	build	on	the	idea	that	‘mystic	poetry’	relies	on	activating	the	right	hemisphere	in	his	work	On	the	Shore	of	Nothingness	(2003).	By	this	time,	he	 was	 able	 to	 introduce	 evidence	 from	 neuroscience	 to	 support	 Ornstein’s	supposition,	 taken	 from	 a	 brain	 imaging	 camera	 study	 of	 Franciscan	 nuns	 and	Tibetan	monks	at	prayer:		 The	left	orientation	area	is	responsible	for	creating	the	mental	sensation	of	a	 limited,	 physically	 defined	 body,	 while	 the	 right	 orientation	 area	 is	associated	with	 generating	 the	 sense	 of	 spatial	 coordinates	 that	 provides	the	 matrix	 in	 which	 the	 body	 can	 be	 oriented.	 In	 simpler	 terms,	 the	 left	orientation	area	creates	the	brain’s	spatial	sense	of	self,	while	the	right	side	creates	 the	 physical	 space	 in	 which	 that	 self	 can	 exist.	 	 (Newberg	 et	 al.,	2001,	p.	28)		The	imaging	found	that	the	left	orientation	area	was	inhibited	during	meditation,	allowing	 the	 meditator	 to	 reduce	 this	 sensation	 of	 a	 ‘physically	 defined	 body’.	Moreover,	 the	 study	 produced	 a	 cognitive	 account	 of	 how	 ‘active	 meditation’,	stimulated	by	chants	or	mantras,	took	place	in	the	brain:	
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	In	 [active	 meditation],	 since	 the	 intention	 is	 to	 focus	 more	 intensely	 on	some	specific	object	or	thought,	the	attention	facilitates	rather	than	inhibits	neural	 flow.	 In	 our	 model,	 this	 increased	 neural	 flow	 causes	 the	 right	orientation	area,	 in	conjunction	with	 the	visual	association	area,	 to	 fix	 the	object	of	focus,	real	or	imagined,	in	the	mind.	(Newberg	et	al.,	2001,	p.	120)		Tsur	 connects	 this	with	 another	 insight	 from	 Jenssen	et	al.	 (2000),	where	 it	was	found	 that	 mapping	 the	 brain	 activity	 during	 the	 processing	 of	 concrete	 nouns	showed	that	such	cognitive	activity	involved	intense	activation	in	the	areas	of	the	right	hemisphere	known	to	be	responsible	for	spatial	schemata	(Tsur,	2003,	p.	96).	As	 such,	 he	 theorises	 that	 an	 effect	 that	 mildly	mimics	 the	 process	 observed	 in	meditation	 –	 the	 inhibition	 of	 the	 left	 orientation	 area	 and	 the	 resulting	heightening	 of	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 body’s	 surroundings	 –	 can	 be	 achieved	 in	literature	by	a	marked	use	of	concrete	terms.	In	a	chapter	from	Towards	a	Theory,	on	 ‘Poetry	 and	Altered	States	of	Consciousness’,	Tsur	deals	with	 an	extract	 from	Whitman’s	 ‘Song	 of	 Myself’	 that	 has	 been	 described	 by	 Goodblatt	 (1990)	 as	“meditative”:		 The	smoke	of	my	own	breath,	Echoes,	 ripples	 and	 buzzed	 whispers…	 loveroot,	 silkthread,	 crotch	 and		 vine,	My	 respiration	 and	 inspiration…	 the	 beating	 of	 my	 own	 heart…	 the		 passing	of	blood	and	air	through	my	own	lungs,	
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The	 sniff	 of	 green	 leaves	 and	 dry	 leaves,	 and	 of	 the	 shore	 and	 dark-	 coloured	sea	rocks,	and	of	hay	in	the	barn,		(Song	of	Myself,	1860	II:13-17)		Note	 how	 this	 poem	 moves	 very	 rapidly	 between	 a	 myriad	 of	 concrete	 nouns:	crotch,	 vine,	 blood,	 leaves,	 and	 so	 on.	 If	 Tsur	 is	 correct	 about	 the	 principle	 that	concrete	 nouns	 can	 activate	 spatial	 schemata,	 it	would	 stand	 to	 reason	 that	 this	poem	 can	 create	 the	 meditative	 affect	 to	 which	 he	 is	 referring.	 Although	 his	research	 on	 this	 aspect	 of	mystic	 poetry	 came	 after	 his	work	 on	 the	 ‘meditative	poetry’	 of	 Whitman	 in	 Towards	 a	 Theory,	 he	 connects	 these	 two	 aspects	 of	 his	research	in	the	revised	edition	(2008,	p.	616)			Compared	 to	 Stockwell’s	 discussion	 of	 how	 the	 reader	 can	 be	 ‘transported’	 by	literature,	Tsur	seems	to	have	created	an	explanation	for	the	phenomenon	of	being	in	a	meditative	or	‘out	of	body’	state	based	around	evidence	from	cognitive	science.	The	flaw	underpinning	his	 logic,	however,	comes	from	his	 interpretation	of	brain	activity.	As	 a	brain	 imaging	procedure,	 fMRI	only	 shows	 the	 ‘peak	activations’	 of	neural	networks:	they	do	not	map	out	the	equally	significant	processes	that	go	on	beneath	 them.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 not	 scientifically	 rigorous	 to	 take	 one	 study	 that	discusses	activation	in	a	particular	area	and	directly	compare	it	to	another	study	of	the	 same	 area	 but	 with	 a	 different	 effect	 being	 studied.	 It	 would	 be	 possible	 to	design	a	study	that	tested	whether	these	two	effects	happen	in	conjunction,	but	of	course	this	is	not	what	Tsur	does.	This	kind	of	speculation	should	be	treated	not	as	clear	evidence	that	poetry	is	capable	of	producing	a	meditative	effect.	This	is	not	to	say	 that	 is	 does	 not	 exist,	 and	 Tsur	 does	 seem	 to	 have	 found	 an	 intuitively	
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important	 connection	 between	 the	 methods	 of	 meditation	 and	 the	 categorical	nature	of	 images	 in	 ‘meditative’	poetry.	 It	only	demands	more	evidence	for	some	concrete	connection	between	the	two.		Comparison	 of	 their	 two	 studies	 reveals	 that	 neither	 scholar’s	 methodology	actually	 comes	 close	 to	 meaningful	 articulation	 of	 any	 feeling	 as	 long	 as	 the	‘cognitive’	 part	 of	 the	 discussion	 amounts	 to	 little	 more	 than	 evoking	 the	terminology	 of	 cognitive	 science.	 But	 although	 Tsur	 may	 leave	 us	 somewhat	wanting	because	his	explanation	of	this	meditative	effect	relies	on	a	link	between	two	findings	of	cognitive	science	that	are	not	causally	linked,	he	at	least	attempts	to	 push	 the	 discipline	 in	 an	 extremely	 challenging	 direction.	 In	 a	 critique	 of	cognitive	poetics,	David	Miall	states:	“Given	that	literary	reading	is	so	often	imbued	with	 feeling,	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 feeling	has	 still	 received	so	 little	attention	 from	cognitive	poetics.	Of	 the	major	scholars	 in	 this	 field,	only	Reuven	Tsur	and	Keith	Oatley	have	made	significant	contributions”	(2006,	p.	43).14	Having	compared	Tsur	to	Stockwell,	who	represents	the	broader	trend	in	cognitive	poetics,	on	how	they	tackle	the	issue	of	feeling,	and	also	considering	the	insights	generated	from	Tsur’s	work	on	the	expressive	qualities	of	sound	patterns,	one	can	see	his	point.				 	
                                                
14 Oatley, nominally a psychologist straying into literary studies (the opposite of most scholars of 
cognitive poetics) has published such relevant works as: ‘A Taxomony of the Emotions of Literary 
Response and a Theory of Identification in Fictional Narrative’ (1995), ‘Meeting of Minds: Dialogue, 
Sympathy and Identification in Reading Fiction’ (1999), ‘Emotions and the Story Worlds of Fiction’ 
(2002). Oately also contributed the final essay ‘Writingandreading’ to Cognitive Poetics In Practice 
(2003). 
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A	Functional	Methodology	for	Cognitive	Poetics		Having	 observed	 the	 basic	 distinction	 between	 the	 methodology	 employed	 by	Stockwell	and	Tsur,	we	can	now	return	to	examining	the	 influence	of	 the	 two	on	the	 actual	 published	 field	 of	 cognitive	 poetics.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 preference	 for	 the	methodology	of	Tsur	 that	 this	 chapter	has	been	driving	 towards;	 the	majority	of	contemporary	studies	in	cognitive	poetics	have	adopted	ideas	from	Stockwell,	and	before	him,	Turner,	who	is	equally	reliant	on	ideas	such	as	conceptual	metaphor.	Consider	 a	 recent	 publication	 by	Wójcik-Lesse	 (2010),	which	 purports	 to	 be	 the	“first	 full-length	 cognitive	poetic	 study	of	 a	 single	 author”,	 in	 this	 case,	Elizabeth	Bishop.	 When	 Wójcik-Lesse	 asserts	 the	 usefulness	 of	 ‘cognitive	 poetics’	 to	 the	study	of	this	particular	author	in	her	introduction,	she	cites	Turner	and	Lakoff	as	the	 major	 influences	 on	 the	 theory,	 and	 footnotes	 Tsur	 merely	 as	 the	 one	 who	came	up	with	the	title.	Another	recent	collection	of	papers	on	the	subject:	Cognitive	
Poetics:	Goals,	Gaps	and	Gains	(Brône	and	Vandaele,	2009),	offers	Tsur	a	little	more	credit	 and	 includes	 an	 essay	 of	 his	 on	 metaphor,	 but	 only	 three	 of	 the	 other	scholars	in	the	collection	engage	with	his	ideas.		The	other	major	essay	collection	for	cognitive	poetics,	Gavins	and	Steen’s	Cognitive	
Poetics	 in	 Practice	 was	 released	 in	 2003,	 intended	 to	 be	 companion	 volume	 to	Stockwell’s	An	Introduction	by	mirroring	the	focus	of	each	of	his	chapters	with	an	essay	 on	 each	 subject.	 Tsur	 contributed	 an	 essay	 ‘Deixis	 and	 Abstractions’,	 but	later	 criticised	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Stockwell	 uses	 the	 concept	 of	 deixis	 for	demonstrating	cognitive	poetics	in	An	Introduction	(Tsur,	2008,	p.	595-622).	More	
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importantly	 though,	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 collection	 provides	 a	 clue	 as	 to	 the	general	discord	between	their	two	approaches:		 There	are	then,	two	kinds	of	cognitive	poetics.	One	is	more	tightly	related	to	the	rise	of	cognitive	 linguistics,	and	 is	represented	 in	part	by	the	chapters	by	Burke	and	Crisp.	There	are	two	further	chapters	in	our	collection	which	also	 take	 this	cognitive	 linguistic	 inspiration	 for	 their	starting	point,	 those	by	Hamilton	 (Chapter	5)	and	Stockwell	 (Chapter	2),	but	we	will	 return	 to	these	 in	 a	moment.	 The	 other	 kind	 of	 cognitive	 poetics	 is	more	 generally	oriented	towards	cognitive	science.	It	includes	work	by	psychologists	such	as	 Oatley	 and	 Gibbs	 as	 well	 as	 by	 poeticians	 who	 have	 been	 attuned	 to	cognitive	science	for	a	long	time,	such	as	Tsur.	(2003,	p.	5)		My	 interpretation	of	 this	notion	 that	 there	are	 ‘two	kinds’	 of	 cognitive	poetics	 is	that	Stockwell,	aided	by	Margaret	Freeman	(2000),	took	Tsur’s	very	specific	use	of	‘cognitive’	 and	 ‘poetics’	 and	 applied	 it	 as	 an	 umbrella	 term	 for	 a	 much	 broader	trend	 in	 literary	 study.	 Where	 Tsur	 explicitly	 meant	 ‘cognitive’	 to	 mean	 the	application	 of	 cognitive	 science	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 literary	 texts	 and	 their	perceived	effects	(Tsur,	2008,	p.	1),	Stockwell	uses	it	in	the	broadest	possible	sense	to	 incorporate	 any	 approach	 that	 discusses	 our	 ‘cognition’	 of	 a	 literary	 work.	Where	Tsur	borrowed	Bierwisch’s	 (1970,	p.	98-99)	definition	of	 ‘poetics’	 as	 “the	particular	regularities	that	occur	in	literary	texts	and	determine	the	specific	effects	of	poetry”	(Tsur,	2008,	p.	1),	Stockwell	used	poetics	in	the	more	general	sense	of	a	‘system’,	after	Aristotle.	If	this	analysis	makes	it	sound	like	Stockwell’s	concept	of	cognitive	 poetics	 would	 encompass	 literally	 any	 literary	 study	 that	 offers	 an	
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account	 of	 how	 we	 perceive	 a	 text,	 that	 unfortunately	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 case.	 A	review	of	 the	 companion	volumes	by	 Jackson	 (2005)	puts	 it	 fairly	bluntly:	 “Why	learn	 a	whole	 batch	 of	 new	 terms	 in	 order	 to	 do	what	 I	 take	 it	 that	most	 of	 us	already	know	how	to	do:	close	read	literary	texts?”	(2005,	p.	532).15		Oddly	 enough,	 Jackson	 makes	 the	 point	 that	 he	 recommends	 these	 books	 to	anyone	who	has	an	interest	in	what	kind	of	work	is	being	done	in	cognitive	poetics,	even	though	his	opinion	is	that	it	does	not	contribute	much	that	we	cannot	already	do	practically	as	close	reading.	 Jackson	is	a	notable	critic	of	the	general	cognitive	trend	 in	 literature,	but	he	also	has	expressed	some	interest	 in	 its	potential.	 In	an	earlier	 article	 titled	 ‘Issues	 and	 Problems	 in	 the	 Blending	 of	 Cognitive	 Science,	Evolutionary	 Psychology,	 and	 Literary	 Study’	 (2002),	 he	 argues	 that	 there	 is	indeed	 an	 ideal	 process	 for	 combining	 cognitive	 science	 and	 literary	 study	 to	achieve	interdisciplinary	outcomes:			 In	what	seems	to	be	the	ideal	model,	the	brain	is	shown	by	neuroscience	to	perform	 a	 certain	 function	 in	 a	 certain	way,	 the	 architecture	 of	 a	 certain	mental	capacity	is	shown	by	cognitive	science	to	operate	in	a	way	analogous	to	 the	brain	 function,	and	a	psychological	or	cultural	artifact	or	process	 is	shown	to	operate	in	the	same	analogous	way.	(2002,	p.	165)		
                                                
15 Tsur’s opinion has a similar ring to it: “Nor would I regard a statement like: “Reading is creative in 
this sense of using the text to construct a cognitively-negotiable world, and the process is dynamic and 
constantly shifting” as sufficient justification for calling my work cognitive. I make this comment not 
because Stockwell’s work doesn’t endorse my conception of cognitive poetics, but because if one accepts 
this as cognitive poetics, then nothing remains in linguistics or literary theory that is not cognitive poetics. 
Certainly, everything that is language or literature goes through the cognitive system of authors, readers 
and critics.” (2008, p. 601) 
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Further	 on,	 Jackson	 cites	 Tsur’s	 ‘Some	 Cognitive	 Foundations	 of	 “Cultural	Programs”’	(2002),	stating:	“In	some	ways	this	piece	is	exemplary.”	(2002,	p.	170).	He	elaborates:		 In	the	last	paragraph	of	his	essay	Tsur	alludes	to	 just	what	I	mean	when	he	speaks	of	the	metaphysical	conceit	as	a	form	of	‘‘adaptation	devices	turned	to	aesthetic	ends’’	 that	 tend	to	show	up	 in	 times	of	 ‘‘great	social,	political,	and	ideological	 upheaval.’’	 If	 cognitive	 literary	 studies	 is	 to	 become	 truly	 inter-disciplinary	(on	which	more	below),	 its	explanations	of	difference	will	have	to	 involve	 some	 dialectical	 interaction	 between	 cognitive	 universals	 and	variations	of	cultural	forms,	for	example,	great	social,	political,	or	ideological	upheaval.	 Otherwise,	 though	 the	 reasoning	 may	 be	 convincing,	 it	 will	 still	read	as	if	we	are	being	persuaded	only	that	a	cognitive	affect	is	present	in	a	literary	 object,	 and	 that	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 interest	 most	 scholars	 in	 the	humanities.	(2002,	.	170-1)		One	need	not	fully	agree	with	Jackson’s	dictum	that	cognitive	literary	study	needs	to	 address	 itself	 to	 ‘great	 social,	 political	 or	 ideological	 upheaval’	 in	 order	 to	 be	relevant	(and	this	sentiment	recurs	in	his	review	of	Stockwell),	though	it	certainly	could	be	useful.	What	is	significant	though	is	that	Jackson	approves	of	Tsur’s	idea	that	 the	metaphysical	 conceit	 represents	 an	 adaptive	 device	 turned	 to	 aesthetic	ends,	 since	 this	 is	 a	 major	 claim	 that	 Tsur	 reiterates	 many	 times	 throughout	
Towards	a	Theory,	for	more	techniques	than	just	the	metaphysical	conceit.		The	 general	 conclusion	 we	 can	 draw	 from	 this	 is	 that	 Tsur’s	 methodology	
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represents	the	more	promising	model	for	considering	how	cognitive	science	can	be	integrated	with	 literary	 study.	 It	 is	 by	 no	means	perfect,	with	 some	 examples	 of	psychological	 concepts	 being	 pushed	 too	 far	 as	 a	 universal	 explanation	 for	 the	perceived	 effect	 (most	 notably	 gestalts).	 However,	 it	 has	 not	 only	 demonstrated	compelling	application	of	empirical	evidence	from	cognitive	science	to	supplement	theory,	 which	 distinguishes	 it	 from	 Stockwell’s	 approach;	 but	 also	 it	 addresses	itself	 to	 answering	 a	 perceivable	 gap	 in	 literary	 theory,	 rather	 than	 simply	rechristening	 the	 terminology	 for	 existing	 theory.	 It	 can	 be	 used	 for	 more	categorical	 discussion	of	 the	 effects	 of	poetry	 that	 are	 likely	 to	be	unconsciously	observed.		This	is	not	to	suggest	that	there	is	nothing	of	value	in	the	work	of	Stockwell,	Turner	and	their	contemporaries,	but	that	their	research	is	of	less	relevance	to	this	thesis	because	it	does	not	successfully	engage	with	the	questions	of	feeling	in	literature	and	attempting	to	broaden	our	understanding	of	literary	aesthetics.16	By	contrast,	Tsur	engages	with	some	of	these	questions	and	offers	a	framework	for	a	‘cognitive’	investigation	that	can	be	further	built	upon.				
                                                
16 It is worth mentioning that Stockwell and Turner are both actively criticising literary study for failing 
to address itself to everyday life and everyday people. In Reading Minds Turner describes literary 
criticism as “an exclusive Disney World” (1991, p. 4), while in Texture (2009) Stockwell begins by 
stating: “literary scholarship has become an arid landscape of cultural history” (2009, p. 1) and that: 
“discussions of literature become ever more abstruse, further distant from the works themselves, divorced 
from the concerns of natural readers outside the academy, self-aggrandising, pretentious, ill-disciplined 
and, in the precise sense, illiterate” (2009 p1). For critics who are engaged in the business of spruiking a 
whole new method of literary study, it is somewhat ironic that their solution to this problem largely of 
supplanting existing terms with new ones that ‘natural readers’ would still be generally unfamiliar with. 
A far more convincing approach would be to demonstrate extensively what a cognitive approach could 
offer that traditional theory cannot. 
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Cognitive	Poetics	and	the	Novel		The	 last	 part	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 aimed	 at	 surveying	 some	 more	 of	 the	 ground	covered	 by	 cognitive	 poetics	 and	 related	 ‘cognitive’	 scholars.	 A	 general	 focus	 on	addressing	 cognitive	 poetics	 to	 poetry	 specifically	 characterises	 not	 only	 Tsur’s	work	 but	 also	 the	 bulk	 of	 cognitive	 studies	 in	 general.	 Furthermore,	 those	 that	have	addressed	themselves	to	prose	have	been	more	interested	in	articulating	the	very	 traditional	 aspects	 of	 the	 novel	 such	 as	 character,	 plot,	 and	 narrative.	 In	
Practice	(2003)	includes	Semino’s	analysis	of	Hemingway’s	‘A	very	short	story’	but	focuses	 on	 articulating	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 ‘mental	 space’	 and	 ‘possible	 worlds’	theories,	and	is	essentially	dedicated	to	plot	rather	than	aesthetics.	Emmott’s	essay	in	the	same	volume	is	addressed	to	the	idea	of	‘reading	for	pleasure’,	analysing	the	Roald	Dahl	 short	 stories	 ‘Dip	 in	 the	pool’	and	 ‘Taste’,	The	Hanging	Garden	by	 Ian	Rankin	 and	 Tulip	 Fever	 by	 Deborah	 Moggach.	 This	 focuses	 largely	 on	 how	 plot	reversals	 are	 handled	 by	 readers	 according	 to	 ‘frame	 theory’.	 Gavins’	 essay	concerns	 Donald	 Barthelme’s	 Snow	White	 and	 how	 it	 can	 be	 analysed	 in	 ‘text-world	theory’.	This	paper	 is	 largely	an	articulation	of	 the	narrative	structure	of	a	postmodern	 novel	 in	 a	 very	 linguistically	 driven	 fashion.	 These	 approaches	 are	regularly	characterised	by	their	use	of	diagrams	to	illustrate	relationships	between	text,	reader	and	character,	and	they	are	not	concerned	with	the	aesthetic	effects	of	the	text.		Similarly,	Goals,	Gain	and	Gaps	 (Brône	and	Vandaele,	2009)	 contains	an	essay	by	David	Herman	applying	cognitive	theory	to	narrative	analysis,	which	again	applies	frame	theory	to	works	like	Dubliners,	as	well	as	The	Incredible	Hulk.	The	remaining	
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references	 to	 fiction	 in	 this	 collection	 are	 largely	 incidental	 ones,	 and	 not	 about	anything	that	might	be	considered	‘poetic’.	The	trend	in	these	two	collections	can	be	summarised	as	follows:	where	an	example	of	a	very	basic	structural	element	is	given	it	generally	comes	from	poetry;	where	a	more	elaborate	textual	structure	is	being	considered	it	may	come	from	either	poetry	or	prose.	A	recent	compilation	of	essays,	Mindful	Aesthetics	 (2013),	while	not	 labelled	a	study	 in	 ‘cognitive	poetics’	includes	some	cognitively	grounded	discussion	of	works	by	 J.	M.	Coetzee,	George	Eliot,	Lloyd	Jones	and	Ian	McEwan.17			Other	 cognitive	 studies	 focused	 on	 novels	 have	 taken	 very	 particular	 focuses.	
Strange	 Concepts	 and	 the	 Stories	 they	 Make:	 Culture,	 Cognition,	 Narrative	(Zunshine,	2008)	uses	the	theoretical	model	of	childhood	essentialism	(which	is	a	psychological	 term	 for	 a	 cognitive	 bias	 formed	 during	 childhood)	 to	 compare	narratives	 across	 different	 historical	 and	 cultural	 contexts.	Cognitive	Poetics	 and	
Cultural	Memory	(Gronas,	2011)	is	more	aesthetically	focused,	but	it	argues	largely	that	the	aesthetic	pleasure	we	derive	from	literature	arises	out	of	a	cognitive	need	to	store	and	transmit	vital	 information,	appropriating	Dawkins’	 theory	of	memes	and	critiquing	Russian	Literature	in	terms	of	how	it	functions	as	a	‘mnemonic’.	The	
Language	 of	 Stories:	 A	 Cognitive	 Approach	 (Dancygier,	 2012)	 uses	 mental	 space	theory	and	‘blending’	(another	of	Turner’s	theories)	to	identify	what	makes	stories	‘special’.	There	is	a	trend	emerging	here,	it	must	be	said,	to	direct	cognitive	literary	study	to	explain	why	literature	is	so	pervasive	in	human	society	–	another	example	
                                                
17 This collection of essays is an ideal place to find discussion of how cognitive literary study fits 
alongside with post-structuralism. Because my case studies are drawn by and large from the era prior to 
post-modernism (with the possible exception of Nabokov), and also because I am more focused on the 
suitability of cognitive science to expand the techniques of close reading, I have left discussion of post-
structuralism to more capable hands. 
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being	 Nabokov	 biographer	 Brian	 Boyd’s	 On	 the	 Origin	 of	 Stories:	 Literature,	
Cognition	and	Fiction	(2009).		Boyd’s	 work	 delves	 into	 arguments	 for	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 literature	 across	human	history	that	are	structured	in	terms	of	the	idea	that	literature	must	have	an	evolutionary	 value	 in	 order	 to	 have	 survived.	 This	 latter	 trend	has	 been	dubbed	‘Literary	 Darwinism’,	 and	 other	 relevant	 works	 include	 David	 Dutton’s	 The	 Art	
Instinct:	 Beauty,	 Pleasure,	 &	 Human	 Evolution	 (2009).	 In	 what	 can	 only	 be	described	as	a	scathing	account	of	this	new	direction,	Jonathon	Kramnick	(2011),	puts	Literary	Darwinism	in	the	simplest	of	terms:		 Literary	Darwinism	has	two	defining	features:	an	adherence	to	evolutionary	psychology	 as	 an	 explanatory	 theory	 of	 human	 behavior	 and	 a	weariness	bordering	on	hostility	to	the	current	state	of	the	humanities.	(2011,	p.	317)		Some	parallels	can	be	drawn	to	the	relative	hostility	Stockwell	and	Turner	display	towards	the	contemporary	discipline	of	literature,	and	echoes	of	the	explanation	of	literary	devices	being	adaptive	cognitive	mechanisms	occur	in	the	writings	of	Tsur.	But	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes,	 Literary	 Darwinism	 should	 be	 considered	 a	related	but	distinct	critical	trend	from	cognitive	poetics.	One	that,	as	Kramnick	so	clearly	articulates,	fails	to	live	up	to	its	own	promise:		 Literary	Darwinism	promises	 to	 show	 that	 literature	played	an	 important	role	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 species,	 but	 what	 adaptive	 function	 could	 be	served	by	bare	themes,	by	subject	matter	as	such?	Failing	to	describe	how	
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“the	adapted	mind	produces	literature,”	literary	Darwinism	often	falls	back	on	more	general	and	even	genteel	notions	of	improvement.	The	move	has	a	certain	 logic.	 Literary	 Darwinism	 has	 a	 difficult	 time	 finding	 a	 place	 for	literary	 forms	 in	 the	 story	 of	 adaptation	 under	 selection	 pressure.	 At	 the	same	 time,	 it	 is	 committed	 to	 the	 propostion	 that	 literature	 must	 have	helped	us	become	the	species	we	are.	The	result	of	this	curious	imbalance	is	that	 literature	 simply	 is	 about	who	we	 are	 in	 a	 relatively	 straightforward	and	uplifting	 sense.	 	Literary	 texts	provide	 “lively	and	powerful	 images	of	human	life	suffused	with	the	feeling	and	understanding	of	the	astonishingly	capable	 human	 beings	 who	 wrote	 them.”…	 Yet	 value	 laden	 ideas	 like	complete	 humanity	 have	 no	meaning	 in	 the	 terms	 of	 evolutionary	 or	 any	other	 science	and	 tell	us	very	 little	 about	any	 cultural	 artifact.	And	 this	 is	precisely	my	point.	With	the	turn	to	a	kind	of	pabulum,	Darwinian	criticism	seems	not	very	scientific	at	all.	(2011,	p.	345-6)		It	remains	only	to	be	said	that	this	thesis	does	not	purport	to	be	related	in	any	way	to	the	ideas	of	Literary	Darwinism.		One	particular	study	rates	mention	because	it	 includes	two	of	the	same	texts	this	thesis	has	chosen	to	focus	on,	and	I	wish	to	differentiate	the	sphere	of	investigation	for	my	analysis.	Another	work	by	Zunshine,	Why	We	Read	Fiction	(2006)	includes	some	 interesting	 interpretations	 of	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 and	 Lolita,	 included	 in	 the	context	of	applying	cognitive	theory	to	a	discussion	of	what	motivates	us	to	read	(a	similar	 ambition	 to	 Gronas,	 although	 they	 approach	 it	 through	 different	paradigms).	 The	 reading	 of	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 is	 intended	 to	 illuminate	 levels	 of	
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‘intentionality’	with	a	view	to	explaining	why	people	feel	challenged	by	the	novel.	In	 general,	 the	primary	 cognitive	 theory	 informing	 this	work	 is	 ‘theory	of	mind’,	which	refers	to	our	ability	to	find	explanations	for	how	people	behave	in	terms	of	their	mental	state.	With	regards	to	Mrs	Dalloway,	Zunshine	does	explain	how	the	novel	 is	 complex	 on	 the	 level	 of	 how	 we	 understand	 the	 experience	 of	 the	characters.	However	Woolf’s	use	of	sound	and	syntax	 in	 the	creation	of	aesthetic	engagement	 adds	 to	 this	 complexity	 and	 there	 is	 the	 potential	 to	 articulate	 this	effect	 more	 closely.	 Most	 of	 all,	 Zunshine	 does	 not	 discuss	 the	 novel’s	Impressionism	 or	 the	 non-conscious	 effects	 of	 the	 ‘stream	 of	 consciousness’.	 In	regards	 to	 Lolita,	 she	 discusses	 how	 we	 are	 ‘tricked’	 into	 accepting	 Humbert’s	perspective.	 I	 believe	 there	 is	 a	 chance	 to	 discuss	 this	 from	 another	 angle,	 by	articulating	how	the	novel	utilises	perceptual	tension	as	a	literary	device,	and	how	an	 understanding	 of	 the	 sensory	 information	 of	 Lolita	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 novel’s	appeal.			Also	 in	 regards	 to	Mrs	Dalloway,	 we	must	 consider	 ‘How	 Stories	 Make	 Us	 Feel:	Towards	an	Embodied	Narratology’	 (Gallese	and	Wojciehowski,	2011)	because	 it	too	includes	a	brief	analysis	of	the	novel,	but	focuses	on	the	‘feeling	of	body’	rather	than	 the	 theory	 of	 mind.	 This	 paper	 contains	 an	 intriguing	 reference	 to	neuroscience	in	the	form	of	‘mirror	neurons’,	which	can	activate	neural	pathways	associated	with	actions	by	simply	observing	that	action	in	another	being	(2011,	p.	12).	Unfortunately,	 this	paper	does	not	stipulate	exactly	how	the	mirror	neurons	could	be	used	creatively	or	adaptively:	if	anything,	it	seems	like	this	amounts	to	a	more	 scientific	 explanation	 for	 the	 reader’s	 imaginative	 identification,	 and	
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subsequently	the	analysis	of	Mrs	Dalloway	is	extremely	brief	and	reads	like	a	very	conventional	piece	of	criticism.		To	conclude	this	chapter,	what	differentiates	the	focus	of	this	thesis	is	that	it	finds	far	more	value	in	the	work	of	Tsur	than	of	his	colleagues	in	what	has	been	called	cognitive	poetics.	The	gap	this	work	aims	to	fill	concerns	the	aesthetic	engagement	with	 the	modern	 novel,	 using	 a	 similar	 approach	 of	 taking	 techniques	 from	 the	cognitive	 sciences	 to	 shine	 new	 light	 on	 the	 appeal	 of	 such	works	 as	Lolita,	Mrs	
Dalloway	 and	 On	 the	 Road.	 In	 the	 process	 I	 hope	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 value	 of	cognitive	 literary	 study,	 with	 the	 focus	 being	 on	 using	 cognitive	 science	 to	 fully	articulate	perceptual	 effects,	 rather	 than	 simply	providing	 theoretical	models	 for	literary	 study	 that	 already	 exist	 under	 different	 names.	 The	 next	 chapter,	which	looks	 at	 how	 neuroscientists	 have	 themselves	 approached	 the	 question	 of	aesthetics,	 is	equally	crucial	to	building	a	methodology	that	can	direct	this	line	of	inquiry.			 	
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Chapter	Two:	Neuroaesthetics		
The	Neurological	Turn		As	 we	 observed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 cognitive	 poetics	 has	 had	 its	 share	 of	territorial	disputes	 and	 criticisms	 from	observers	–	not	unusual	 for	 an	emerging	theoretical	approach.	These	attacks,	however,	pale	in	comparison	to	what	the	even	newer	 theoretical	 mode	 known	 as	 ‘neuroaesthetics’	 (amongst	 other	 names)	 has	attracted	 in	 such	 a	 short	 space	 of	 time.	 Part	 of	 this	 is	 timing:	 neuroscience	 has	already	 been	 targeted	 towards	 explaining	 many	 aspects	 of	 human	 behaviour	including	 economics,	 politics	 and	 now	 the	 arts.	 Consequently,	 concerns	 are	growing	 about	 a	 potential	 over-application	 of	 such	 an	 approach.	 Popular	controversies	such	as	the	question	of	whether	neuroscience-backed	‘brain	training	games’	 have	 serious	 benefits,	 or	 the	 downfall	 of	 Jonah	 Lehrer	 (whose	 work	spanned	both	art	and	neuroscience)	over	claims	of	plagiarism	and	falsification	of	quotations,	 have	 made	 it	 a	 highly	 contentious	 topic	 in	 general.	 New	 Yorker	columnist	 Gary	Marcus	 notes	 the	 sudden	 rise	 of	 blogs	 criticising	 the	 claims	 and	application	of	neuroscience	(2012).		Not	only	has	neuroaesthetics	emerged	at	a	difficult	juncture	for	cognitive	science,	but	 it	 has	 attempted	 to	 bring	 scientific	 reasoning	 to	 the	 arts	 and	 the	 general	question	 of	what	we	 find	 beautiful.	 This	 gives	 rise	 to	 several	 points	 of	 concern:	firstly,	the	idea	that	a	reductionist	approach	will	not	account	for	individual	tastes	and	push	a	‘correct’	version	of	how	to	interpret	art.	Secondly,	that	scientific	inquiry	will	 reduce	 the	 aesthetic	 impact	 of	 the	 arts	 by	 removing	 an	 essential	 element	 of	
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mystery	from	the	process.	Finally,	there	is	the	concern	that	scientists	are	ignorant	of	 the	 concerns	 and	 endeavours	 that	 the	 humanities	 have	 contributed	 to	 our	understanding	 of	 the	 arts,	 as	 it	 is	 their	 primary	 domain.	Writing	 for	 his	Nature	column	 ‘Muse’,	 Phillip	 Ball	 goes	 as	 far	 as	 titling	 his	 critique	 of	 the	 new	 theory:	‘Neuroaesthetics	is	killing	your	soul’	(2013).	
For	one	thing,	to	suggest	that	the	human	brain	responds	in	a	particular	way	to	art	risks	creating	criteria	of	right	or	wrong,	either	 in	 the	art	 itself	or	 in	individual	 reactions	 to	 it.	 Although	 it	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 most	 researchers	 are	likely	 to	 recognize,	 experience	 suggests	 that	 scientists	 studying	 art	 find	 it	hard	 to	 resist	 drawing	 up	 rules	 for	 critical	 judgements…	 Even	 if	neuroaestheticists	refrain	 from	making	similar	value	 judgements,	 they	are	already	close	to	falling	prey	to	one.	Conway	and	Rehding	discuss	this	field	primarily	as	an	attempt	to	understand	how	the	brain	responds	to	beauty.	As	they	point	out,	beauty	is	not	a	scientific	concept	—	so	it	is	not	clear	which	questions	neuroaesthetics	is	even	examining.	(2013)	
Ball	 notes	 a	 key	 issue	 with	 the	 very	 term	 ‘neuroaesthetics’,	 that	 aesthetics	 has	traditionally	not	been	 simply	about	defining	beauty,	but	has	also	been	a	byword	for	 taste	 and	 judgement.	 These	 somewhat	 elitist	 perceptions	 have	 imbued	 a	healthy	 dose	 of	 concern	 in	 the	 humanities	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	 aesthetic	‘standard’,	particularly	since	the	advent	of	reader-response	theory.	Moreover,	Ball	is	dismissive	of	what	neuroaesthetics	can	actually	offer	us:	
And	what	will	a	neuroaesthetic	‘explanation’	consist	of	anyway?	Indications	so	 far	 are	 that	 it	 may	 be	 along	 these	 lines:	 “Listening	 to	 music	 activates	
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reward	 and	 pleasure	 circuits	 in	 brain	 regions	 such	 as	 the	 nucleus	accumbens,	ventral	tegmental	area	and	amygdala”.	Thanks,	but	no,	thanks.	Although	it	is	worth	knowing	that	musical	‘chills’	are	neurologically	akin	to	the	responses	invoked	by	sex	or	drugs,	an	approach	that	cannot	distinguish	Bach	from	barbiturates	is	surely	limited.	(2013)	
The	 concerns	 are	 all	 on	 display	 here:	 neuroaesthetics	 risks	 making	 value	judgements	about	what	is	in	good	taste,	it	ignores	key	debates	and	approaches	in	the	humanities,	and	it	can	render	complex	objects	in	unflatteringly	simple	terms.		Ball	 is	 not	 entirely	 critical:	 he	 credits	 Semir	 Zeki,	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 Institute	 of	Neuroesthetics	at	UCL	as	one	with	‘a	deep	and	sincere	appreciation	of	art,	and	an	awareness	of	the	limitations	of	the	scientific	approach	to	the	way	we	experience	it’	(2013).	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	Ball	has	a	foot	in	both	camps:	in	2010	he	published	The	Music	Instinct,	which	draws	heavily	on	the	work	of	neuroscientists	studying	 the	 processes	 behind	 our	 experience	 of	music18.	 Indeed,	 the	 title	 of	 his	article	–	“Neuroaesthetics	is	killing	your	soul”	–	seems	overly	dramatic	when	it	is	considered	 that	 Ball	 is	 not	 against	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 arts	 and	 neuroscience	 being	brought	to	the	same	table.		Ball’s	 concern	 that	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 which	 questions	 neuroaesthetics	 purports	 to	examine	 is	 compounded	by	 the	 fact	 that	 several	different	 scholars	are	writing	 in	parallel	on	neuroscience	and	 the	arts,	 and	 they	do	not	all	use	 the	 same	 terms	 to	describe	their	work.	Barry	(2006)	refers	to	‘Perceptual	Aesthetics’,	Ramachandran	
                                                
18 In the article discussed here, Ball cites ‘a rash of books and articles’ that proclaim “(in a profoundly 
ugly trope) ‘this is your brain on drugs/music/religion/sport’”. His article does not make clear precisely 
how his own work differs, other than in its choice of title. 
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(2011)	 to	 the	 ‘Universal	Laws	of	Aesthetics’,	and	Zeki	 (2011)	 to	 ‘Neuroesthetics’.	For	 his	 part,	 Zeki	 provides	 the	 following	 questions	 in	 a	 statement	 on	Neuroesthetics	listed	on	the	Institute’s	website:	“What	is	art,	why	has	it	been	such	a	 conspicuous	 feature	 of	 all	 societies,	 and	why	 do	we	 value	 it	 so	much?”	 These	seem	to	form	his	terms	of	inquiry.		One	issue	with	neuroaesthetics	that	Ball	does	not	touch	on	is	that,	at	least	for	the	present,	 the	majority	 of	 studies	 that	 can	 be	 categorised	 as	 ‘neuroaesthetics’	 are	dealing	with	 the	 visual	 arts	 as	 their	 primary	 source	 for	 examples	 and	 evidence.	This	is	despite	‘aesthetics’	being	a	term	that	can	also	be	applied	to	film,	music	and	literature.	 Brattico	 and	 Pearce	 (2013)	 have	 recently	 collated	 the	 various	neuroscience	 studies	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 music	 under	 the	 title	 ‘The	Neuroaesthetics	 of	 Music’,	 but	 literature	 has	 lagged	 behind	 dramatically	 in	attracting	studies	 in	neuroaesthetics.	Literary	study	in	this	domain	has	tended	to	either	be	corralled	under	 the	banner	of	cognitive	poetics,	Literary	Darwinism,	or	otherwise	defies	categorisation.	The	way	neuroaesthetics	favours	the	visual	arts	as	case	study	can	be	explained	by	the	specialisation	of	major	theorists,	such	as	Zeki	or	Margaret	Livingstone,	who	are	both	neurobiologists	with	a	research	background	in	the	 mechanisms	 of	 visual	 perception.	 Comparatively,	 linguistics	 offers	 the	 most	direct	correlation	from	cognitive	science	to	literary	study	–	as	can	be	seen	in	how	eagerly	 the	models	of	 linguistics	have	been	 taken	up	by	 the	scholars	of	cognitive	poetics.		This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 there	 has	 been	 some	 movement	 in	 the	 direction	 of	incorporating	 literature	and	poetry	 into	neuroaesthetics:	most	notably,	A.S.	Byatt	
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(2006,	p.	247-258)	wrote	in	favour	of	using	neuroscience	to	explain	the	poetry	of	John	 Donne.	 Tellingly,	 the	 response	 was	 one	 of	 scathing	 criticism,	 particularly	evidenced	 by	 an	 article	 by	 Raymond	 Tallis	 (2008)	 titled	 ‘The	 Neuroscience	Delusion’:		 But	 there	 is	 something	 more	 important	 (and	 more	 worrying)	 in	 Byatt’s	neuroaesthetics	 than	 its	 failure	 to	 explain	 the	 distinctive	 effect	 of	 certain	poems.	By	locating	aesthetic	pleasure	in	the	stand-alone	brain,	and	indeed	in	 small	 parts	 of	 such	 brains,	 and	 invoking	 data	 obtained	 in	 part	 from	animal	experimentation,	she	 is	performing	a	reduction	that	even	the	most	hard-line	 Marxist	 literary	 critics	 might	 shrink	 from.	 In	 her	 discussion	 of	“The	 Cross”,	 she	 argues	 that	 the	 comparison	 Donne	 makes	 between	different	crosses,	 including	 the	crossed	sutures	 in	 the	skull	 containing	 the	brain,	 “is	 nonsense	 at	 any	 level	 of	 logic	 except	 the	 brain’s	 pleasure	 in	noticing,	or	making,	analogies”.	Note:	 the	brain’s	pleasure	–	not	 the	poet’s	pleasure.	 John	Donne	the	poet	 is	reduced	to	John	Donne	the	brain	and	the	latter	to	“Everybrain”.	(2008,	p.	3)		The	 extent	 to	 which	 Byatt	 is	 claiming	 a	 universal	 reading	 of	 Donne	 based	 on	neurobiology	 can	 be	 debated,	 but	 once	 again	 we	 see	 the	 familiar	 concerns	 of	reductionism,	 universalism	 and	 the	 prescription	 of	 readings	 on	 display.	 Tallis	 is	even	more	scathing	than	Ball:	he	uses	the	piece	to	toss	a	barb	at	Zeki	for	coming	up	with	 a	 neural	 definition	 of	 “love”,	 while	 lamenting	 the	 general	 trend	 of	 literary	critics	 being	 taken	 in	 by	 neuroscience	 (although	 curiously	 enough	 the	 only	example	he	offers	 is	Norman	Bryson,	who	has	a	 foot	 in	both	 the	 literary	and	art	
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theory	 camps).	 He	 offers	 his	 unambiguously	 derisive	 view	 on	 the	 general	application	of	neuroaesthetics:		 When	 they	are	presented	with	 such	 claims	 from	respectable	 sources,	 it	 is	hardly	 surprising	 that	 even	 intelligent,	 though	 scientifically	 naive,	 critics	believe	 that	 the	 future	of	 aesthetics	 is	 in	neurology.	 If	 neuroscientists	 are	claiming	to	find	love	among	the	neurones,	one	can	hardly	blame	critics	for	being	deceived	 into	 imagining	that	neuroscience	can	explain	something	as	complex	as	reading	or	writing	a	poem,	and	that	the	experience	of	a	poem,	and	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 experiences	 of	 different	 poems,	 will	 be	found	 in	 the	 tingling	 of	 a	 certain	 constellation	 of	 neurones.	 Little	wonder	they	 forget	 that	 different	 people	 read	 quite	 differently;	 or	 that	 there	 is	 a	difference	 between	 reading	 a	 poem	 for	 a	 first,	 a	 second,	 or	 a	 hundredth	time;	 or	 between	 reading	 it	 as	 a	 naive,	 delighted,	 or	 bored	 reader,	 and	reading	it	as	an	erudite	critic.	(2008,	p.	4)		Tallis’	critique	of	neuroaesthetics	may	be	scathing,	but	it	does	raise	an	important	point.	 A	 purely	 universalising	 view	 of	 the	 neuronal	 processes	 underlying	 the	experience	 of	 reading	 literature	 would	 be	 problematic	 for	 acknowledging	 the	varying	interpretations	of	critics	and	readers,	as	much	as	it	would	be	an	example	of	reductionism.	Rather	than	deter	us	from	seeking	answers	in	neuroscience,	as	Tallis	suggests,	 this	should	be	taken	as	an	encouragement	to	use	this	knowledge	of	 the	differences	 between	 individual	 brains	 as	 a	 means	 to	 give	 unconventional	 or	challenging	readings	of	a	text	more	authenticity,	by	giving	readers	and	critics	the	tools	to	understand	mental	processes	behind	their	own	intuitions.	
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	In	order	to	demonstrate	the	potential	value	in	the	application	of	neuroaesthetics	to	literary	 study,	 let	 us	 examine	 some	of	 the	 existing	 theorists	 and	 their	work.	The	bulk	of	these	are	critiquing	the	brain’s	experience	of	‘beauty’	in	the	visual	arts,	so	as	well	as	considering	how	valuable	these	are	to	the	study	of	art,	it	is	worth	asking	whether	any	of	these	ideas	might	have	relevance	for	literary	study	as	well.		
Ramachandran’s	Laws	of	Aesthetics		Ramachandran	 is	 a	 neurologist	whose	writing	 and	 research	 examines	 the	 broad	field	of	what	makes	up	 the	 ‘human	experience’;	 he	has	 applied	 the	methods	 and	insights	 of	 neuroscience	 to	 topics	 such	 as	 creativity,	 consciousness,	 language,	evolution	and	philosophy.	He	has	also	addressed	his	research	towards	aesthetics:		 The	solution	to	the	problem	of	aesthetics,	I	believe,	lies	in	a	more	thorough	understanding	of	 the	 connections	between	 the	 thirty	visual	 centers	 in	 the	brain	 and	 the	 emotional	 limbic	 structures	 (and	 of	 the	 internal	 logic	 and	evolutionary	 rationale	 that	 drives	 them).	 Once	 we	 have	 achieved	 a	 clear	understanding	of	these	connections,	we	will	be	closer	to	bridging	the	huge	gulf	that	separates	C.P.	Snow’s	two	cultures	–	science	on	the	one	hand	and	arts,	philosophy	and	humanities	on	the	other.	(2004,	p.	59)		He	does	not	stipulate	exactly	what	is	the	‘problem’	with	aesthetics	in	the	work	this	quote	is	taken	from;	although	in	a	later	book	The	Tell-Tale	Brain	(2011,	p.	200),	he	seems	 preoccupied	with	 the	 search	 for	 principles	 uniting	 different	 styles	 of	 art.	
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Ramachrandran	 puts	 forward	 the	 claim	 that	 there	 are	 nine	 ‘universal’	 laws	 of	aesthetics,	 based	 on	 contemporary	 understanding	 of	 the	 neurological	 processes.	These	are:		 1. Grouping	2. Peak	shift	3. Contrast	4. Isolation	5. ‘Peekaboo’,	or	perceptual	problem	solving	6. Abhorrence	of	coincidences	7. Orderliness	8. Symmetry	9. Metaphor		Of	these	laws,	he	writes:		 Some	I	believe	are	genuinely	new,	or	at	least	haven’t	been	stated	explicitly	in	the	context	of	visual	art.	Others	are	well	known	to	artists,	art	historians	and	 philosophers.	 My	 goal	 is	 not	 to	 provide	 a	 complete	 account	 of	 the	neurology	of	aesthetics	(even	assuming	such	a	thing	were	possible)	but	to	tie	 strands	 together	 from	 many	 different	 disciplines	 and	 to	 provide	 a	coherent	framework.	(2011,	p.	199)		There	 are	 several	 things	 that	 must	 be	 acknowledged	 before	 we	 proceed	 to	analysis:	 firstly,	 Ramachandran’s	 methods	 as	 a	 neuroscientist	 draw	 more	 on	
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observing	subjects	with	abnormal	behaviour	than	on	more	‘high	tech’	methods	like	electroencephalography	and	fMRI,	which	makes	him	an	interesting	counterpoint	to	the	 charge	 that	 neuroscience	 relies	 too	 heavily	 on	 brain	 scans	 for	 information.	Secondly,	 he	 does	 not	 call	 his	work	 in	 this	 area	 ‘neuroaesthetics’,	 he	 is	 simply	 a	neuroscientist	writing	about	aesthetics	(his	work	has	influenced	others	writing	on	neuroscience	and	aesthetics,	as	we	will	see).	Thirdly,	by	 ‘universal’	he	means	any	ability	that	emerges	in	all	human	brains	that	develop	normally	can	be	considered	‘universal’	(2011,	p.	218).		Finally,	 Ramachandran	 appears	 to	 limit	 his	 theory	 to	 the	 visual	 arts,	 as	 these	constitute	 the	 majority	 of	 his	 examples.	 Yet	 this	 is	 confused	 by	 his	 choice	quotations	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘art’	 which	 headline	 the	 two	 chapters	 dealing	 with	aesthetics;	Picasso’s	“Art	is	a	lie	that	makes	us	realise	the	truth,”	and	Wagner’s	“Art	is	the	accomplishment	of	our	desire	to	find	ourselves	among	the	phenomena	of	the	external	world.”	Both	of	these	quotations	are	ambiguous	in	whether	they	refer	to	merely	 the	 visual	 arts	 or	 ‘art’	 as	 a	 broader	 concept	 of	 human	 creativity	 and	expression.	Ramachandran’s	book	is	subtitled:	“A	Neuroscientist’s	Quest	for	What	Makes	Us	Human”,	 so	 it	 seems	 the	 reader	 is	 easily	 led	 to	 believe	 he	 is	 speaking	about	 the	 wider	 definition	 of	 art.	 Ramachandran’s	 own	 definition	 barely	 makes	things	clearer:		 First,	I	want	to	make	a	distinction	between	art	as	defined	by	historians	and	the	 broad	 topic	 of	 aesthetics.	 Because	 both	 art	 and	 aesthetics	 require	 the	brain	to	respond	to	beauty,	there	is	bound	to	be	a	great	deal	of	overlap.	But	art	include	things	such	as	Dada	(whose	aesthetic	value	is	dubious),	whereas	
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aesthetics	 includes	 things	 such	 as	 fashion	 design,	 which	 is	 not	 typically	regarded	as	high	art.	Maybe	there	can	never	be	a	science	of	high	art,	but	I	suggest	there	can	be	principles	of	aesthetics	than	underlie	it.	(2011,	p.	193)		This	 paragraph	displays	 the	 very	pitfall	 that	Ball	 cautions	 against:	making	 elitist	assumptions	about	what	is	considered	‘high	art’.	On	the	one	hand,	Ramachandran	wants	 to	 assert	 that	 the	 principles	 of	 neurological	 aesthetics	 apply	 to	 both	 ‘high	art’	and	more	common	applications	of	human	creativity,	but	on	the	other	he	denies	that	Dada	has	any	aesthetic	value.	This	is	a	problem	for	neuroaesthetics	in	general:	how	to	account	for	the	impact	of	‘art’	that	is	not	explicitly	meant	to	be	considered	‘beautiful’,	yet	nonetheless	still	has	an	impact	on	our	senses.		Ramachandran	 goes	 even	 further	 into	 the	 territory	 of	 what	 is	 the	 difference	between	high	art	and	‘kitsch’	by	stating:		 In	 this	 chapter,	 I’ll	 speculate	 on	 the	 possibility	 that	 real	 art	 –	 or	 indeed	aesthetics	–	involves	the	proper	and	effective	deployment	of	certain	artistic	universals,	whereas	kitsch	merely	goes	through	the	motions,	as	if	to	make	a	mockery	of	the	principles	without	a	genuine	understanding	of	them.	(2011,	p.	195)		One	 can	 only	 imagine	 the	 reaction	 of	 Ball	 and	 Tallis	 to	 such	 a	 statement.	Ramachrandran	demonstrates	fully	the	danger	of	reductionist	thinking	in	blending	neuroscience	and	the	arts,	all	while	whimsically	pondering	how	a	theory	of	art	can	be	 “complete”	 without	 accounting	 for	 distinctions	 between	 high	 art	 and	 kitsch	
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(2011,	 p.	 195).	 It	 must	 be	 said	 that	 Ramachandran’s	 book	 is	 pitched	 at	 a	 more	general	 reader	 than	 an	 academic	 one,	 but	 that	 hardly	 excuses	 the	 ill-founded	accusation	 that	 the	 theory	 behind	 the	 arts	 cannot	 be	 complete	 while	 ambiguity	prevails	over	questions	of	what	is	canonical	and	what	is	kitsch.		Having	 shown	 the	 pitfalls	 of	 ultimate	 reductionism	 in	 neuroaesthetics,	 it	 is	 still	worth	examining	what	Ramachandran’s	‘laws’	can	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	the	reaction	of	the	brain	to	art.	Grouping,	according	to	Ramachandran,	draws	on	the	same	principles	of	gestalt	theory	that	Tsur	references	frequently	in	his	work.	It	is	 essentially	 the	 brain’s	 need	 to	 unite	 perceptually	 similar	 elements,	 but	Ramachandran	 contends	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sensation	 of	 delight	 accompanying	 this	process:	 “Vision	 scientists	 frequently	 overlook	 the	 fact	 that	 successful	 grouping	feels	 good.	 You	 get	 an	 internal	 “Aha!”	 sensation	 as	 if	 you	 have	 just	 solved	 a	problem”	 (2011,	 p.	 202).	 He	 gives	 an	 example	 of	 how	 grouping	 can	 affect	 the	impression	 of	 a	 Renaissance	 painting,	 in	 the	 way	 that	 the	 eye	 groups	 similar	colours	 across	 the	 painting.	 This	 is	 essentially	 an	 involuntary	 process	 that	 has	basic	evolutionary	value:		 They	found	that	 if	a	monkey	looks	at	a	big	object	of	which	only	fragments	are	visible,	then	many	cells	fire	in	parallel	to	signal	the	different	fragments.	That’s	what	you	would	expect.	But	surprisingly,	as	soon	as	the	features	are	grouped	into	a	whole	object	(in	this	case,	a	lion),	all	the	spike	trains	become	perfectly	 synchronized.	And	 so	 the	 exact	 spike	 trains	do	matter.	We	don’t	yet	know	how	this	occurs,	but	Singer	and	Gray	suggest	that	this	synchrony	tells	 higher	 brain	 centers	 that	 the	 fragments	 belong	 to	 a	 single	 object.	 I	
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would	 take	 this	 argument	 a	 step	 further	 and	 suggest	 that	 this	 synchrony	allows	the	spike	trains	to	be	encoded	in	such	a	way	that	a	coherent	output	emerges	which	 is	 relayed	 to	 the	 emotional	 core	 of	 the	 brain,	 creating	 an	“Aha!	Look	here,	it’s	an	object!”	jolt	in	you.	(2011,	p.	205)	
Ramachandran	 does	 not	 speculate	 on	 how	 significant	 this	 effect	 is	 within	 the	overall	aesthetic	experience	of	art.	That	said,	 considering	his	earlier	claim	to	use	these	laws	to	distinguish	between	‘kitsch’	and	‘high	art’	(not	to	mention	‘high	art’	and	 ‘fashion’),	 it	 is	 surprising	 to	 see	 him	 note	 that	 this	 same	 principle	 is	responsible	for	the	decision	to	pair	a	red	scarf	with	a	red	skirt	(2011,	p.	205).	From	this	 analysis,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	what	 value	 this	 principle	 presents	 to	 aesthetic	theory,	 as	 ‘like	 objects	 go	 well	 together’	 is	 not	 specific	 enough	 to	 be	 used	 in	meaningful	analysis.	
His	 second	 law,	 ‘Peak	 shift’,	 is	 a	 term	 taken	 from	 behavioural	 ecology,	 which	Ramachandran	 uses	 to	 explain	what	might	 otherwise	 be	 termed	 ‘abstraction’	 in	aesthetic	theory	–	although	he	relates	it	to	the	effects	of	caricature	(2011,	p.	207),	so	we	 should	 keep	 hyperbole	 in	mind	 as	 another	 aesthetic	 attempt	 he	might	 be	offering	an	explanation	for.	According	to	Lynn	et	al.	(2005,	p.	1300),	peak	shift	is	“a	behavioral	 response	 bias	 arising	 from	 discrimination	 learning	 in	 which	 animals	display	a	directional,	but	limited,	preference	for	or	avoidance	of	unusual	stimuli.”	Ramachandran	 offers	 an	 example	 where	 rats	 that	 are	 trained	 to	 discriminate	rectangles	from	squares	prefer	the	rectangles	that	are	least	proportionally	similar	to	squares	(2011,	p.	206-7).	He	does	not,	however,	offer	a	neurological	explanation	for	this	behavioural	phenomenon,	other	than	suggesting	that	it	could	‘probably’	be	related	to	mirror	neurons	(2011,	p.	208).	His	argument	for	how	it	relates	to	art	is	
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built	on	another	example	of	peak	shift:	a	herring	gull	chick	that	preferred	a	stick	with	three	stripes	of	red	over	its	mother’s	beak:	
The	mother	gull	has	a	prominent	red	spot	on	her	long	yellow	beak.	The	gull	chick,	 soon	 after	 it	 hatches	 from	 the	 egg,	 begs	 for	 food	 by	 pecking	vigorously	on	the	red	spot	on	the	mother’s	beak…	In	fact	Tinbergen	found	that	 you	don’t	 even	need	 a	 beak;	 you	 can	 just	 have	 a	 rectangular	 strip	 of	cardboard	with	a	red	dot	on	the	end,	and	the	chick	will	beg	for	food	equally	vigorously…	 You	 can	 readily	 fool	 these	 neurons	 by	 providing	 a	 visual	stimulus	 that	 approximates	 the	 original…	 To	 his	 amazement,	 Tinbergen	found	that	if	he	had	a	very	long	thick	stick	with	three	red	stripes	on	the	end,	the	chick	goes	beserk,	pecking	at	it	much	more	intensely	than	a	real	beak.	It	actually	prefers	this	strange	pattern,	which	bears	almost	no	resemblance	to	the	original!	(2011,	p.	209-10)	
Ramachandran	 notes	 that	 this	 example,	 of	 what	 he	 terms	 ‘ultranormal	 stimuli’	(2011,	p.	212)	the	stick	with	three	stripes,	 is	“hardly	an	exaggerated	version	of	a	real	 beak”	 (2011,	 p.	 211),	 and	 as	 such	 it	 is	 unclear	 exactly	 which	 neurological	processes	 are	 behind	 it.	 This	 however	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 stop	 Ramachandran	drawing	his	next	conclusion:	
This	brings	me	to	my	punch	line	about	semiabstract	or	even	abstract	art	for	which	 no	 adequate	 theory	 has	 been	 proposed	 so	 far.	 Imagine	 that	 the	seagulls	had	an	art	gallery.	They	would	hang	this	long	thin	stick	with	three	white	stripes	on	the	wall.	They	would	call	it	a	Picasso,	worship	it,	fetishize	it,	 and	 pay	millions	 of	 dollars	 for	 it,	 all	 the	 time	wondering	why	 they	 are	turned	on	by	it	so	much,	even	though	(and	this	is	the	key	point)	it	doesn’t	
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resemble	anything	in	their	world.	 I	suspect	this	 is	exactly	what	human	art	connoisseurs	are	doing	when	they	look	at	or	purchase	abstract	works	of	art.	(2011,	p.	212)	
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	major	 errors	with	 this	 reasoning.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 seagull	example	 shows	 how	 an	 infant,	 non-human	 subject	 responds	 to	 a	 stimulus	 it	associates	 with	 food,	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	 adult,	 human	 subject	 responding	 to	 a	stimulus	 that	 is	 not	 necessarily	 associated	with	 food.	 Secondly,	 there	 is	more	 to	abstract	 art	 than	 just	 its	 ‘ultranormal’	 quality.	 Livingstone,	who	we	will	 examine	more	 closely	 further	 into	 this	 chapter,	 discusses	 how	 colour	 luminance	 is	significant	 to	 Picasso’s	 The	 Tragedy	 (2002,	 p.	 36-7)	 and	 spatial	 imprecision	 is	important	for	Cubism	in	general	(2002,	p.	77)	to	name	just	a	few	other	perceptual	processes	 it	 can	 evoke.	 Ramachandran	 however	 treats	 ‘peak	 shift’	 as	 a	 general	principle	rather	than	a	specific	neural	mechanism	that	he	can	relate	to	individual	aspects	of	Picasso’s	work.	
By	 trial	 or	 error,	 intuition	 or	 genius,	 human	 artists	 like	 Picasso	 or	Henry	Moore	have	discovered	the	human	brain’s	equivalent	of	the	seagull	brain’s	stick	with	three	stripes.	They	are	tapping	into	the	figural	primitives	of	our	perceptual	grammar	and	creating	ultranormal	stimuli	that	more	powerfully	excite	 certain	visual	neurons	 in	our	brains	as	opposed	 to	 realistic	 looking	images.	 This	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 abstract	 art.	 It	 may	 sound	 like	 a	 highly	reductionist,	oversimplified	view	of	art,	but	bear	in	mind	that	I’m	not	saying	that’s	all	 there	 is	 to	 art,	 only	 that	 it’s	 an	 important	 component.	 (2011,	 p.	212)	
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Not	only	is	this	reductionist,	as	he	admits,	but	it	adds	nothing	to	what	we	already	know	about	abstract	art,	which	 is	 that	 it	can	make	forms	appear	 ‘ultranormal’	or	‘hyper-real’.	This	is	something	of	the	reverse	of	the	process	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	 where	 literary	 scholars	 appropriated	 the	 terms	 of	 cognitive	 science	without	fully	advancing	our	knowledge	of	how	they	function.	Had	Ramachandran	been	able	to	offer	an	explanation	of	the	mechanisms	of	peak-shift	that	would	allow	one	to	predict	why	a	rectangle	elicits	a	better	reaction	than	a	circle,	it	could	be	of	some	use	to	critical	theory.			The	 pattern	 continues	with	 his	 later	 laws.	 Contrast	 and	metaphor	 are	 obviously	well	known	to	both	the	visual	arts	and	literature,	but	Ramachandran	does	not	offer	much	 of	 an	 insight	 beyond	 reiterating	 that	 they	 are	 neurologically	 based	phenomenon	and	therefore	important.	He	also	has	two	laws	which	brush	up	rather	uncomfortably	against	one	another:	‘abhorrence	of	coincidences’	is	defined	as	the	brain’s	desire	to	find	a	plausible	alternative	to	symmetrical	arrangements	(such	as	a	 tree	 perfectly	 positioned	 between	 two	 hills),	 whilst	 going	 on	 to	 note	 the	preference	for	symmetry	at	other	times.	There	is	no	attempt	here	to	speculate	on	how	 two	 such	 ‘universal’	 laws	 can	 contradict	 one	 another	 and	 in	 what	circumstances	 one	might	 be	 favoured	 over	 another,	 which	 is	 a	 pity,	 as	 it	 would	constitute	a	welcome	attempt	to	bring	the	possibility	of	 individual	tastes	into	the	picture.	When	Ramachandran	does	examine	the	notion	of	individual	tastes	(2011,	p.	213),	he	suggests	that	we	all	share	and	undergo	the	same	responses,	but	that	for	some	of	us	other	cognitive	mechanisms	inhibit	aesthetic	appreciation	from	taking	place:	again,	this	is	an	extremely	reductionist	approach.		
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Overall,	Ramachandran’s	 ‘universal	 laws’	are	of	dubious	value	 to	neuroscientists,	art	historians	and	 literary	critics	alike.	They	are	 insightful	only	so	 far	as	offering	some	 speculation	 on	 the	 evolutionary	 origins	 of	 certain	 principles,	 but	 not	applying	detailed	accounts	of	how	the	artist	can	exploit	these	principles.	Ultimately	it	fails	his	own	test,	as	one	could	easily	find	examples	of	several	or	more	of	his	laws	in	a	work	of	art	 that	would	otherwise	be	considered	 ‘kitsch’.	Ramachandran	may	well	be	stimulating	debate	with	his	theory,	but	it	seems	to	be	such	reductionism	as	this	 that	 is	 also	 stimulating	 the	 hostility	 with	 which	 some	 critics	 regard	 the	intervention	of	neuroscience	in	the	art	world.		It	is	possible	though	that	Ramachandran’s	explanatory	powers	are	not	quite	up	to	articulating	 the	 link	 between	 these	 neurological	 mechanisms	 and	 the	 aesthetic	traits	he	recognises	as	being	significant.	It	is	important	to	keep	this	in	mind	as	we	examine	some	of	his	contemporaries	in	the	study	of	neuroaesthetics.		
Zeki	and	Livingstone		Having	seen	how	Zeki’s	name	 is	mentioned	 in	critiques	of	neuroaesthetics,	 let	us	now	 turn	 to	 examine	 his	 actual	 theories.	 What	 should	 become	 immediately	apparent	 is	 that	 his	 approach	 differs	 slightly	 but	 significantly	 from	Ramachandran’s	extremely	prescriptive	claims:		 Nor	 do	 we	 sufficiently	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 almost	 infinite	 creative	variability	 that	 allows	 different	 artists	 to	 create	 radically	 different	 styles	arises	out	of	common	neurobiological	processes.	By	probing	into	the	neural	
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basis	of	art,	neurological	studies	can	help	us	to	understand	why	our	creative	abilities	 and	 experiences	 vary	 so	 widely.	 But	 it	 can	 only	 do	 so	 by	 first	charting	 the	 common	 neural	 organization	 that	 makes	 the	 creation	 and	appreciation	of	art	possible.	(2001,	p.	99)		Rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 how	 neurological	 functions	 are	 directly	 responsible	 for	our	perception	of	‘art’	as	beautiful	or	pleasant,	Zeki	is	careful	to	acknowledge	that	art	 varies	 radically,	 and	 suggests	 that	 neuroscience	 can	 help	 account	 for	 this	 by	understanding	 the	mechanisms	 that	make	 art	 possible.	 He	 also	 offers	 a	 striking	opinion	about	the	role	of	artists:		 Similarly,	 long	before	 the	visual	motion	center	of	 the	brain	 (area	V5)	was	charted,	kinetic	artists	composed	works	that,	in	different	ways,	emphasized	motion	and	de-emphasized	 color	 and	 form.	Their	 compositions	were	 thus	admirably	suited	for	stimulating	the	cells.	This	is	why	I	believe	that	artists	are,	 in	 a	 sense,	 neurologists	 who	 unknowingly	 study	 the	 brain	 with	techniques	unique	to	them.	(2001,	p.	99)		The	ultimate	aim	of	an	artist,	according	to	Zeki,	is	to	find	a	form	of	expression	that	elicits	 the	 most	 reaction	 in	 neurological	 terms	 from	 as	 great	 an	 audience	 as	possible.	Calling	artists	 ‘neurologists’	 seems	 something	of	 a	 long	bow	 to	draw:	 it	does	 not	 automatically	 follow	 that	 attempting	 to	 communicate	 or	 express	 as	 an	artist	 does	 precludes	 a	 desire	 to	 understand	 the	 mechanisms	 underneath	 that	process.	 Another	writer	who	 claimed	 this	 same	 link	 existed	 between	 artists	 and	neurologists	 was	 the	 now	 discredited	 Jonah	 Lehrer	 in	 his	 bluntly	 titled	 work	
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Proust	was	a	Neuroscientist	(2008).	 Zeki	 puts	 a	more	 acceptable	 proposition	 not	long	afterwards.			 But	visual	art	also	obeys	the	laws	of	the	visual	brain,	and	thus	reveals	these	laws	to	us.	Of	these	laws,	two	stand	supreme.	(2001,	p.	99)		The	term	‘laws’	should	once	again	flag	some	concern	about	reductionism,	but	let	us	examine	what	he	has	to	suggest:		 The	 first	 is	 the	 law	 of	 constancy.	 By	 this	 I	 mean	 that	 the	 function	 of	 the	visual	brain	is	to	seek	knowledge	of	the	constant	and	essential	properties	of	objects	 and	 surfaces,	 when	 the	 information	 reaching	 it	 changes	 from	moment	 to	moment.	The	distance,	 the	viewing	point,	 and	 the	 illumination	conditions	change	continually,	yet	the	brain	is	able	to	discard	these	changes	in	 categorizing	 an	 object.	 Similarly,	 a	 great	 work	 of	 art	 tries	 to	 distill	 on	canvas	essential	qualities.	A	major	 function	of	art	can	thus	be	regarded	as	an	extension	of	the	function	of	the	brain,	namely,	to	seek	knowledge	about	the	 world.	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 an	 unacknowledged	 attempt	 to	 mimic	 the	perceptual	 abilities	 of	 the	 brain	 that	 led	 the	 founders	 of	 Cubism,	 Pablo	Picasso	and	Georges	Braque,	to	eliminate	the	point	of	view,	the	distance	and	the	lighting	conditions	in	their	early,	analytic	period.	(2000,	p.	99-100)		This	 analysis	 can	 be	 found	 somewhat	 wanting.	 There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	merely	 ‘seeking	 knowledge	 about	 the	world’,	 and	 ‘distilling’	 that	 knowledge	 into	the	most	 essential	 properties,	 as	 Zeki	 puts	 it.	 The	 former	might	 be	 considered	 a	
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behavioural	 trait	 in	 individuals,	 the	 latter	 is,	 based	 on	 his	 outline	 above,	 an	essential	 function	 of	 the	 brain’s	 perceptual	 processes.	 One	 could	 also	 take	 issue	with	the	suggestion	that	a	great	work	of	art	is	one	that	 ‘distills’	 its	most	essential	properties	–	it	could	easily	be	argued	that	for	a	style	of	art	such	as	realism,	minimal	‘distillation’	is	involved	on	the	artist’s	part;	instead	it	is	the	myriad	of	detail	which	is	 essential	 to	 its	 impact.	 ‘Constancy’,	 rather	 than	 ‘distillation’,	 seems	 to	 be	 the	unique	 insight	 from	the	neural	world	 that	Zeki	offers	 to	explain	 the	aesthetics	of	art.	Elsewhere,	Zeki	writes	of	the	importance	of	constancy:		 A	 simple	 and	 excellent	 example	 of	 perceptual	 constancy	 is	 provided	 by	what	is	usually	called	color	constancy.	This	refers	to	the	fact	that	the	color	of	a	surface	changes	 little,	 if	at	all,	when	the	surface	 is	viewed	in	different	illuminants.	A	green	surface,	for	example,	remains	green	whether	viewed	at	dawn,	at	dusk,	or	at	noon	on	a	cloudy	or	sunny	day.	If	one	were	to	measure	the	 amount	 of	 red,	 green	 and	 blue	 light	 reflected	 from	 the	 leaf	 in	 these	different	conditions,	one	would	find	considerable	variations.	Yet	the	brain	is	somehow	able	to	discount	these	variations	and	assign	a	constant	color	to	a	surface.	(2011,	Chapter	1)		Further	into	this	same	work,	Zeki	explains	that	the	significance	of	this	property	of	‘constancy’	 is	 essentially	 that	 colour	 as	 we	 often	 think	 of	 it	 is	 actually	 better	understood	as	a	 ‘language	of	 the	brain’	 rather	 than	as	a	property	of	 the	physical	world.	 Here	 we	 can	 see	 again	 how	 the	 criticisms	 of	 neuroaesthetics	 have	 some	justification,	as	Zeki	tends	simply	to	relocate	aesthetic	experience	to	neurological	
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terminology	without	actually	attempting	to	show	how	it	can	offer	new	insights.	Let	us	also	consider	what	Zeki’s	second	law	has	to	offer:			 The	 second	 supreme	 law	 is	 that	of	 abstraction.	By	abstraction	 I	mean	 the	process	in	which	the	particular	is	subordinated	to	the	general,	so	that	what	is	 represented	 is	 applicable	 to	 many	 particulars.	 This	 second	 law	 is	intimately	 linked	 to	 the	 first,	 because	 abstraction	 is	 a	 critical	 step	 in	 the	efficient	acquisition	of	knowledge;	without	it,	 the	brain	would	be	enslaved	to	the	particular.	The	capacity	to	abstract	 is	also	probably	 imposed	on	the	brain	by	 the	 limitations	of	 its	memory	 system,	because	 it	does	away	with	the	need	to	recall	every	detail.	Art,	too,	abstracts	and	thus	externalizes	the	inner	workings	of	 the	brain.	 Its	primordial	 function	 is	 thus	a	 reflection	of	the	function	of	the	brain.	(2001,	p.	100)		Zeki,	it	seems,	would	have	a	different	view	to	Shlovsky,	who	argued	that	‘distilling’	or	‘abstracting’	objects	(as	Zeki	puts	it)	into	their	most	notable	features	to	permit	the	economy	of	perception	was	antithetical	to	the	purpose	of	art	(1965:	12).	Like	Ramachandran,	Zeki’s	 laws	are	rather	reductionist	 in	scope,	attempting	to	derive	the	most	 essential	 properties	 of	 art	 from	 some	 key	 perceptual	 processes	 of	 the	brain.	What	 this	 suggests	 is	 that	 neuroaesthetics	 could	 be	more	 successful	 if	 its	theorists	were	less	concerned	about	coming	up	with	prescriptive	‘laws’	and	more	devoted	 to	 enhancing	 our	 understanding	 of	 some	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 aesthetic	engagement.			
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It	is	worth	mentioning	at	this	point	that	despite	Zeki’s	implicit	focus	on	visual	art,	he	 is	 also	 concerned	 with	 literature	 in	 his	 neuroaesthetics.	 But	 his	 critique	 of	Balzac’s	The	Unknown	Masterpiece	 in	Chapter	Fourteen	of	Splendors	and	Mysteries	
of	the	Brain	(2011),	while	offering	a	credible	reading	of	the	novel,	contributes	very	little	to	our	understanding	of	Balzac	and	his	writing	that	we	could	not	have	arrived	at	without	using	cognitive	science.	Rather	disappointingly,	Zeki	mostly	focuses	on	the	relationship	between	Balzac	and	Cézanne	as	the	lynchpin	in	his	analysis,	rather	than	bringing	his	understanding	of	visual	perception	fully	to	bear.		In	 spite	 of	 this	 criticism	 of	 Zeki’s	 laws,	 his	 work	 does	 provide	 some	 cognitive	explanations	for	a	few	famous	examples	of	what	might	be	termed	optical	illusions,	such	as	the	Kanizsa	cube	and	the	Rubin	vase.	He	discusses	these	in	terms	of	their	‘ambiguity’.	 The	 Rubin	 vase,	 which	 can	 appear	 as	 either	 two	 faces	 or	 a	 vase,	 is	explained	by	Zeki	in	cognitive	terms:		Imaging	 experiments	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 switch	 from	 one	 percept	 to	another	 during	 the	 presentation	 of	 bi-stable	 images	 (when	 the	 stimulus	remains	the	same	but	the	percept	changes)	is	indeed	accompanied	by	a	shift	in	the	activated	areas.	For	example,	a	shift	from	faces	to	vases	entails	a	shift	in	 the	 site	 of	 activation,	 from	 the	 region	 of	 the	 visual	 brain	 that	 is	specialized	 for	 the	 recognition	 of	 faces	 to	 the	 one	 that	 is	 specialized	 for	object	recognition.	(2011,	Chapter	10)		This	ability	to	explain	how	an	optical	effect	works	by	exploiting,	either	consciously	or	non-consciously	on	the	part	of	the	artist,	a	feature	of	design	in	the	visual	system	
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is	a	better	example	of	how	neuroaesthetics	can	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	art.	 It	 can	offer	 a	 concrete	 explanation	 that	 also	outlines	 a	principle	 of	 the	mind	which	can	in	turn	be	applied	to	explain	other	artistic	effects,	and	that	artists	can	be	mindful	of	when	attempting	to	create	work	with	aesthetic	impact.		This	a	direction	pursued	further	by	Margaret	Livingstone,	whose	work	Vision	and	
Art:	The	Biology	of	Seeing	(2002)	is	most	informative	when	it	comes	to	explaining	the	defining	features	of	art	 in	terms	of	the	visual	system.	We	mentioned	her	take	on	 luminance	 in	 connection	 with	 Ramachandran’s	 ‘laws’.	 She	 tackles	 some	intriguing	notions	 in	her	work,	such	as	 the	 idea	 that	 the	expression	on	the	Mona	
Lisa	varies	depending	upon	the	where	the	viewer’s	eye	falls	on	the	canvas.	This	she	attributes	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 low	 visual	 acuity	 (what	 is	 otherwise	 known	 as	‘resolution’)	in	the	areas	not	in	the	centre	of	our	gaze:		 The	fact	that	our	vision	has	the	highest	acuity	in	the	centre	of	gaze	does	not	mean	that	vision	in	the	rest	of	the	visual	field	is	inferior	–	it’s	just	used	for	different	things.	Foveal	vision	is	used	for	scrutinizing	highly	detailed	objects	or	 surfaces,	 whereas	 peripheral	 vision	 is	 used	 for	 organising	 the	 spatial	scene,	for	seeing	large	objects,	and	for	detecting	areas	to	which	we	should	direct	our	foveal	vision.	Our	foveal	vision	is	optimised	for	fine	details,	and	our	peripheral	vision	is	optimised	for	coarser	information.	(2002,	p.	68-71)		Like	the	different	sites	of	visual	cortex	activation	involved	in	the	Rubin	Vase,	this	discusses	a	feature	of	design	in	the	visual	system,	and	how	it	can	be	exploited	for	
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artistic	 effect.	 Livingstone	 discusses	 how	 this	 relates	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	Mona	
Lisa’s	smile	diminishes	depending	upon	the	point	of	viewing	for	the	audience:		 The	fact	that	her	expression	changed	systematically	with	how	far	my	center	of	gaze	was	from	her	mouth	suggested	to	me	that	her	lifelike	quality	might	not	 be	 so	 mysterious	 after	 all,	 but	 rather	 that	 her	 smile	 must	 be	differentially	 apparent	 in	different	 ranges	of	 image	detail.	To	 see	how	 the	Mona	Lisa’s	smile	would	look	at	various	eccentricities,	I	processed	an	image	of	her	 face	 to	 selectively	 show	 fine,	medium	or	 coarse	 components	of	 the	image.	A	clear	smile	is	more	apparent	in	the	coarse	and	medium	component	images	 than	 in	 the	 fine	 detail	 image.	 This	 means	 that	 if	 you	 look	 at	 this	painting	so	that	your	center	of	gaze	 falls	on	the	background	or	her	hands,	Mona	Lisa’s	mouth	–	which	is	then	seen	by	your	peripheral,	low	resolution	vision	 –	 appears	 much	 more	 cheerful	 than	 when	 you	 look	 directly	 at	 it,	when	it	is	seen	by	your	fine	detail	fovea.	(2002,	p.	71)		This	 explanation	 is	 extremely	 compelling,	 and	 illustrates	 exactly	 how	neuroaesthetics	 can	be	of	 functional	 value	 to	 criticism	and	art	 theory	 in	general.		By	explaining	how	an	aspect	of	design	such	as	the	separation	between	foveal	and	peripheral	vision	can	be	exploited	to	create	a	visual	effect	that	gives	the	painting	an	 almost	 human	 quality	 –	 that	 is,	 being	 able	 to	 appear	 to	 vary	 the	 facial	expression	 and	 thus	 convey	 a	 different	 emotion	 –	 Livingstone	 articulates	 the	intuition	of	critics	such	as	Gombrich	(1950)	who	refers	to	the	“amazing	degree	to	which	Lisa	 looks	alive,”	and	 “Like	a	 living	being,	 she	seems	 to	change	before	our	eyes	and	to	 look	a	 little	different	every	time	we	come	back	to	her”.	Moreover,	an	
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explanation	such	as	this	avoids	the	reductionism	demonstrated	by	Ramachandran:	although	 it	 explains	 the	 effect	 associated	 with	 the	 Mona	 Lisa	 in	 terms	 of	 a	neurological	 process,	 it	 accounts	 for	 varying	 responses	 within	 its	 own	 critical	scope.	A	person	who	only	briefly	glances	at	the	Mona	Lisa	may	focus	their	gaze	on	the	centre	of	her	face	and	thus	pick	up	only	the	smile,	whereas	a	viewer	who	takes	time	 to	 cast	 their	 eyes	 across	 the	 portrait	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 get	 the	 sense	 of	 a	changing	expression	on	the	canvas.		Since	 Livingstone’s	 work	 deals	 explicitly	 with	 visual	 arts,	 we	 will	 return	 to	 her	critical	 insights	 into	 art	 in	 Chapter	 Four,	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 links	 between	Virginia	Woolf’s	 literary	 Impressionism	and	 the	 Impressionist	painters.	For	now,	we	can	continue	in	this	vein	towards	another	important	neuroaesthetic	theorist.		
Barry’s	Perceptual	Aesthetics		The	 work	 of	 Ann	 Marie	 Barry	 is	 also	 particularly	 focused	 on	 visual	 forms	 of	communication;	 one	 of	 her	most	 notable	 books	 is	Visual	 Intelligence:	Perception,	
Image,	 and	 Manipulation	 in	 Visual	 Communication.	 	 (1997).	 Some	 of	 her	 more	recent	work	 on	 aesthetics	 and	 perception	 is	 of	 interest	 to	 us	 because	 she	 takes	some	 aspects	 of	 the	 work	 of	 Ramachandran	 and	 Zeki,	 but	 builds	 upon	 their	theories.	 In	 a	 paper	 titled	 ‘Perceptual	 Aesthetics’	 (2006)	 she	 works	 towards	creating	a	model	that	accounts	for	interactions	across	different	areas	of	the	brain	that	are	in	some	way	responsible	for	aesthetic	impact.		
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The	 brain	 is	 a	 meaning-seeking	 mechanism,	 and	 this	 suggests	 that	recognition	of	pattern	is	at	the	heart	of	all	perception,	the	process	by	which	we	 make	 meaning	 from	 both	 stimuli	 from	 the	 outer	 world	 and	 prior	experience	stored	 in	memory.	As	our	brains	have	evolved,	 the	mechanism	that	has	kept	us	alive	and	learning	is	the	brain’s	reward	system,	guiding	us	toward	what	we	need	to	have	or	do	to	survive,	warning	us	to	avoid	danger.	Aesthetics,	 which	 might	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 pleasure	 we	 find	 in	 the	experience	of	art,	is	based	on	this	reward	system	and	represents	a	level	of	pleasure	 that	 involves	all	of	 the	brain’s	basic	systems	to	some	degree:	 left	and	 right	 hemispheres,	 emotional-cognitive	 pathways	 and	 processes,	 and	neurological	networks.	Perceptual	aesthetics,	then,	seeks	to	trace	the	sense	of	pleasure	we	get	from	art	through	natural	perceptual	processes,	to	isolate	those	mechanisms	 at	work,	 and	 in	 the	 process,	 to	 understand	more	 fully	how	art	enhances	the	quality	of	our	lives.	(2006,	p.	135-6)		One	can	take	some	issue	with	the	definition	of	aesthetics	that	Barry	offers	here,	as	once	 again	 it	 defines	 aesthetics	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 is	 pleasurable	 and	 potentially	omits	categorising	art	 that	makes	employs	sensations	which	are	not	pleasurable.	Barry	 compounds	 this	 further	 by	 discussing	 how	 aesthetic	 theories	 share	 a	common	idea	that	pleasure	from	images	leads	to	euphoria	(2006,	p.	136).	She	does	immediately	demonstrate	an	awareness	of	several	mechanisms	of	perception	and	the	mind:	pattern	recognition,	 the	 reward	system	(dopamine	pathways),	 left	and	right	hemispheres,	and	the	emotional	and	cognitive	methods	of	processing,	all	of	which	she	identifies	as	being	relevant	to	the	aesthetic	experience.		
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Although	 largely	 focused	on	visual	 perception,	Barry	 touches	upon	 the	notion	of	aesthetic	 experience	 being	 common	 across	 different	 artistic	media.	 She	 refers	 to	evidence	 from	the	research	on	the	observable	effects	of	music	by	Ludwig	(1966)	and	 Blood	 and	 Zatorre	 (2001);	 the	 latter	 of	which	 demonstrates	 that	music	 can	have	both	 emotional	 and	physical	 effects	 on	 the	body,	 including	 cardio	 rhythms,	nervous	 system	 activity	 and	 breathing.	 Barry	 takes	 some	 great	 strides	 towards	addressing	the	way	in	which	different	mediums	display	and	convey	similar	themes	with	her	discussion	of	‘images’:		 Neurologically,	 an	 image	 may	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 neural	 network	 whose	potential	 meaning	 is	 realised	 through	 synchronous	 firing.	 As	 neurologist	Antonio	 Damasio	 (1999)	 describes,	 “From	 the	 perspective	 of	neurobiology…	the	brain	makes	neural	patterns	in	its	nerve-cell	circuits	and	manages	to	turn	those	neural	patterns	 into	explicit	mental	patterns	which	constitute	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 biological	 phenomenon…	 images”.	 Thus,	although	a	picture	is	an	image	of	sorts,	it	does	not	constitute	all	of	imagery.	Images	 are	 neuron	 clusters	 of	 meaning,	 a	 kind	 of	 “euro”	 currency	 that	allows	free	trade	between	sensory	experience	and	the	image	maps	of	past	experience.	(2006,	p.	138)		This	definition	of	imagery	in	terms	of	neural	networks	is	particularly	important.	By	distinguishing	between	‘pictures’	as	specific,	visual	stimuli	or	representations;	and	‘images’	 as	 a	 neuronal	 representations	 of	 meaning,	 it	 offers	 a	 compelling	explanation	of	how	the	term	‘imagery’	extends	so	readily	across	literature,	poetry,	
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visual	art,	film	and	even	music.	The	Penguin	Dictionary	of	Literary	Terms	offers	the	following	definition	of	imagery	in	literary	criticism:			 The	 terms	 image	 and	 imagery	 have	 many	 connotations	 and	 meanings.	Imagery	as	a	general	term	covers	the	use	of	language	to	represent	objects,	actions,	 feelings,	thoughts,	 ideas,	states	of	mind,	and	any	sensory	or	extra-sensory	experience.	(Cuddon,	2008,	p.	413)		Relating	 this	 to	Barry’s	concept	of	 imagery	as	derived	 from	Damasio,	we	can	see	how	this	definition	illustrates	the	principle	of	an	image	being	principally	a	cluster	of	meaning,	not	necessarily	bound	to	a	specific	sensory	domain.	Imagery	can	and	often	does	appropriate	visual	stimuli,	but	imagery	can	also	attempt	to	evoke	more	complex	forms	of	mental	representation:	those	“feelings,	thoughts,	ideas,”	as	they	are	noted	by	the	dictionary.	By	way	of	example,	consider	this	extract	from	On	the	
Road	where	Sal	prepares	 to	head	back	 to	New	York,	having	abandoned	his	West	Coast	ambitions:		 With	the	bus	leaving	at	ten,	I	had	four	hours	to	dig	Hollywood	alone.	First	I	bought	a	loaf	of	bread	and	salami	and	made	myself	ten	sandwiches	to	cross	the	country	on.	I	had	a	dollar	left.	I	sat	on	the	low	cement	wall	in	back	of	a	Hollywood	 parking	 lot	 and	 made	 the	 sandwiches.	 As	 I	 laboured	 at	 this	absurd	task,	great	Kleig[sic]	lights	of	a	Hollywood	premiere	stabbed	at	the	sky,	 that	humming	West	Coast	 sky.	All	 around	me	were	 the	noises	of	 this	crazy	gold-coast	city.	And	this	was	my	Hollywood	career	–	this	was	my	last	
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night	in	Hollywood,	and	I	was	spreading	mustard	on	my	lap	in	the	back	of	a	parking	lot	john.	(OtR,	p.93)		The	passage	is	replete	with	imagery,	much	of	 it	visual:	the	Klieg	lights	associated	with	film,	the	crude	materials	of	the	wall	he	sits	on,	the	meagre	ingredients	of	his	sandwich.	At	no	point	though	does	Kerouac	explicitly	tell	the	reader	that	Sal	feels	insignificant	and	 rejected	 in	 this	 scene:	he	 simply	 says,	 “This	was	my	Hollywood	career.”	 The	 juxtaposition	 of	 the	 different	 images,	 Sal’s	 banal	 and	 solitary	surroundings	 against	 the	 glamorous	 symbols	 of	 Hollywood	 and	 its	 gregarious	quality	suggested	by	the	humming	and	noise,	 is	what	allows	Kerouac	to	allude	to	Sal’s	dejection	with	Hollywood.	In	Barry’s	neurological	terms,	what	happens	is	that	the	words	on	the	page	stimulate	the	individual	networks	that	represent	the	images	of	 Hollywood,	 and	 for	 a	 reader	who	 is	 familiar	with	 the	 frequency	 of	 rejections	from	Hollywood,	the	images	of	Sal’s	poverty	and	isolation	help	to	realise	additional	meaning	by	firing	at	the	same	time.	This	allows	us	to	better	understand	the	neural	mechanisms	behind	imagery	and	the	effect	of	juxtaposition.		As	with	cognitive	poetics	though,	it	is	important	not	simply	to	take	what	is	already	known	 and	 accepted	 in	 literary	 criticism	 and	 simply	 recategorise	 it	 using	 labels	taken	from	cognitive	science.	Barry	demonstrates	how	this	knowledge	can	add	to	our	critical	toolbox	in	her	analysis	of	images.	She	highlights	that	while	pictures	and	imagery	are	distinct,	‘mental	imagery’	does	make	use	of	the	visual	system:		 Even	 the	 congenitally	 blind,	 it	 seems,	 dream	 in	 visual	 images.	 Although	senses	other	than	the	eyes	gather	information	from	the	outside	world,	they	
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may	 process	 it	 partly	 by	 borrowing	 mechanisms	 in	 the	 unused	 visual	cortex.	In	cases	of	early-onset	blindness,	reading	Braille	script	also	utilises	part	of	 the	visual	 cortex.	And	because	 the	brain	 continually	 rewires	 itself,	parts	 of	 the	 visual	 cortex	may	 be	 adapted	 for	 sound	 localisation	 skills	 as	well.	If	blindness	occurs	in	the	eyes,	in	fact,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	the	brain	is	incapable	of	representing	line,	color	or	perspective.	(2006,	p.	138)		Barry	cites	as	examples	artists	who	can	still	make	striking	paintings	or	other	forms	of	 visual	 art	 despite	 being	 blind,	 including	 one	 who	 is	 blind	 from	 birth.	 This	evidence	that	the	brain	is	capable	of	forming	mental	representations	in	the	visual	domain	without	direct	visual	stimulation	should	be	of	great	interest	to	the	study	of	aesthetics,	as	Barry	explains:		 Imagery,	it	seems	is	a	product	of	brain	plasticity,	not	of	retinal	stimulation	(Gazzaninga,	 2004),	 and	 it	 is	 this	 characteristic	 that	 allows	 words	 to	 be	turned	 into	mental	 images	 in	 literature,	 and	 tactile	 information	 into	paint	on	 a	 two-dimensional	 surface.	 Although	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	 brain’s	plasticity	 does	 decrease	 with	 age,	 it	 never	 disappears.	 The	 principle	 of	image	formation	seems	to	be	a	basic	characteristic	of	how	the	brain	forms	meaning,	from	the	most	basic	to	the	most	complex	and	sophisticated	level.	(2006,	p.	138)		One	 can	 see	 how	 Barry’s	 discussion	 of	 aesthetics,	 despite	 the	 referent	 terms	coming	primarily	from	the	visual	sphere,	is	not	as	limited	to	visual	arts	as	that	of	Ramachandran	or	Zeki.	This	information	is	useful	to	literary	studies,	as	it	not	only	
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reinforces	 the	understanding	 of	 imagery	 as	 a	 literary	device	 that	 can	be	used	 to	create	‘mental	images’	and	evoke	other	sensations;	but	also	because	by	discussion	of	 brain	 plasticity	 it	 also	 goes	 some	 way	 towards	 accounting	 for	 the	 varying	aesthetic	response	across	different	individuals.	Barry	herself	does	not	state	it	here,	but	plasticity	is	essentially	the	antithesis	of	Ramachandran’s	argument	that	we	all	undergo	 the	 same	 neural	 processes	 when	 viewing	 art,	 only	 for	 some	 of	 us	 the	responses	 are	 inhibited.	 The	 brain’s	 overall	 capacity	 for	 plasticity	 varies	 in	individuals,	particularly	with	age	(Mahncke	et	al.,	2006),	so	one	can	see	a	plausible	explanation	for	how	imagery	can	be	more	evocative	for	some	than	it	is	for	others.		Earlier	 in	this	chapter,	we	discussed	Ramachandran’s	theory	of	aesthetics:	one	of	his	 principles	was	 “grouping”,	 which	 he	 referred	 to	 as	 an	 “aha!”	moment.	 Barry	also	takes	up	this	idea	in	her	own	analysis:	she	refers	to	research	by	Crick	(1994)	who	suggests	that	visual	awareness	occurs	when	neurons	fire	in	a	pattern	at	a	rate	of	40hz.		 Metaphorically	speaking,	this	40hz	is	the	frequency	at	which	the	light	bulb	goes	on	and	meaning	occurs.	The	moment	when	the	brain	experiences	the	“ah-HAH!”	is	a	gestalt	in	two	senses:	first,	the	cluster	network	has	meaning	in	 itself	 as	 an	 entity	 different	 from	 the	 sum	of	 its	 parts,	 and	 second,	 as	 it	embodies	the	potential	for	larger	meaning	beyond	itself…	In	this	most	basic	perceptual	process,	 the	 achievement	of	 visual	meaning	 from	visual	 inputs	results	in	aesthetic	pleasure	simply	for	the	sake	of	problem	solving	alone	as	everything	comes	together	in	a	unified	concept.	(Barry,	2006,	p.	139)		
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While	 explained	 slightly	 more	 lucidly	 than	 as	 attempted	 by	 Ramachandran,	 the	issue	 remains	 that	 it	 is	 not	 directly	 articulated	 how	 this	 results	 in	 aesthetic	pleasure	–	at	least	in	terms	of	neural	mechanisms.	In	referring	to	it	as	a	gestalt,	it	evokes	 the	 problem	 associated	 with	 gestalt	 psychology	 that	 it	 tends	 to	 simply	reiterate	 principles	 of	 organisation	 rather	 than	 fully	 explaining	 the	mechanisms	behind	them.	Barry	does	attempt	to	move	beyond	this	limitation:		 Although	 brain	 development	 “is	 controlled	 and	 guided	 by	 the	 precise	machinery	 of	 genes”	 (Gazzaniga,	 1998,	 p.	 4),	 all	 learning	 is	 accomplished	through	chemicals	that	draw	neural	axons	toward	the	right	destination	and	that	are	reinforced	emotionally	through	direct	connection	with	the	brain’s	limbic	 structures.	 The	 key	 to	 creating	 a	 lasting	 memory	 or	 concept	 that	retains	 its	 neural	 circuitry	 (ie:	 learning)	 lies	 in	 the	 limbic	 system,	 which	gives	 continual	 emotional	 feedback	 to	 every	 part	 of	 the	 visual	 process,	adding	 an	 emotional	 weight	 that	 thereafter	 affectively	 biases	 related	perceptions.	(2006,	p.	139-40)		This	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 if	 there	 is	 aesthetic	 pleasure	 associated	with	making	connections	in	the	manner	of	perceptual	grouping,	as	discussed	by	Ramachandran,	it	 stems	 from	 feedback	 generated	 by	 the	 emotional	 systems	 which	 associated	positive	 emotion	with	 perceptual	 consistency.	 This	 at	 least	 denotes	 a	 particular	mechanism	 that	 can	 be	 considered	 responsible	 for	 the	 aesthetic	 principle,	 but	 it	still	does	not	suggest	exactly	how	understanding	this	mechanism	could	be	used	in	a	nuanced	and	articulate	explanation	of	aesthetic	reaction	to	a	work	of	art.	This	is	
 108
possibly	 due	 to	 reasons	 of	 brevity	 in	 Barry’s	 work,	 as	 she	moves	 on	 to	 discuss	some	further	systems	of	the	mind	and	their	contribution	to	aesthetic	response.		
Forms	of	Tension		From	 this	 section	 of	 Barry’s	 analysis,	 we	 can	 see	 how	 her	 model	 of	 perceptual	aesthetics	 is	 more	 promising	 than	 Ramachandran’s,	 even	 if	 it	 does	 continue	 to	show	some	elements	of	reductionism	and	shares	of	Ramachandran’s	 tendency	 to	offer	 neurological	 insights	 without	 fully	 explaining	 their	 unique	 contribution	 to	aesthetics.	 It	 also	 offers	 more	 to	 the	 field	 of	 literary	 study	 than	 Ramachandran	does.	Continuing	with	Barry’s	work,	we	find	that	she	moves	directly	into	discussing	an	element	of	aesthetic	response	that	is	best	identified	with	literature:	namely	the	story.19		 Story,	 as	 the	 term	 is	 used	 here,	 parallels	 both	 what	 neuroresearcher	Gazzaniga	 has	 called	 the	 interpreter,	 a	 left-brain	 function	 that	 keeps	 our	personal	sense	of	our	own	continuous	identity	intact,	and	what	E.M.	Forster	(1927)	 in	 his	Aspects	of	 the	Novel	 called	plot,	 the	 inner	 causal	 and	 logical	structure	 that	 holds	 together	 the	 various	 events.	 Gazzaniga	 (1998)	describes	 the	 interpreter	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 public	 relations	 agent	 that	 puts	 its	spin	on	everything	meaningful	to	us.	Immediate	emotional	response	utilizes	stored	 emotional	 memory	 to	 prepare	 each	 conscious	 thought,	 and	 the	interpreter	fills	in	the	gist	of	memory	with	plausible	details.	Both	the	writer	
                                                
19 While we are skipping over Barry’s discussion of ‘symmetry’ as the next aesthetic principle due to 
constraints of space, it is worth briefly noting that she suggests the search for visual symmetry also feeds 
into our appreciation of stories with a symmetrical plotline of ‘rising action’ and ‘falling action’. (2006, p.  
140-2) 
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and	the	neurologist	refer	to	the	imposition	of	a	causal	and	logical	structure	that	connects	events	in	a	meaningful	way,	and	both	recognize	conflict	as	an	essential	tension	in	emotional	and	cognitive	response.	(2006,	p.	142)		To	unpack	this	terminology,	what	Barry	is	suggesting	is	that	the	brain	appropriates	a	 function	 used	 for	 tracking	 continuous	 identity	 to	 attempt	 to	 impose	 its	 own	logical	structure	upon	a	series	of	events,	so	the	desire	to	find	a	consistent	narrative	is	 part	 of	 aesthetic	 reaction	 to	 the	 story.	 Additionally,	 she	 suggests	 that	 the	perception	of	conflict	or	tension	is	an	essential	part	of	this	aesthetic	response:		 The	mandate	on	symmetry	of	plot	–	and	the	tension	that	is	resolved	through	it	 –	 is	 traceable	 to	 at	 least	 Aristotle,	who	 defined	 narrative	 tension	 as	 an	essential	part	of	the	satisfaction	of	drama.	(2006,	p.	142)		It	is	worth	mentioning	here	that	Aristotle	also	figures	in	neurological	art	history	as	one	of	the	earliest	theorists,	whose	early	ideas	are	now	being	re-examined	in	light	of	existing	knowledge	of	the	mind	(see	Onians,	2007,	p.	18-29).	‘Narrative	tension’	is	 how	 we	 might	 best	 define	 this	 particular	 mechanism	 of	 aesthetic	 response.	While	narrative	technique	is	largely	dependent	upon	a	particular	writer	–	consider	the	 contrast	 between	 Nabokov’s	 use	 of	 a	 chronological	 narrative	 and	 a	 singular	point	of	view	with	Woolf’s	style	of	dramatic	shifts	in	temporal	sequence	and	point	of	view	–	narrative	tension	is	what	the	reader	imposes	on	the	work	as	they	take	it	in.	 The	 author	 can	 of	 course	 attempt	 to	 facilitate	 this	 narrative	 tension	 through	their	ordering	of	the	plot,	by	making	events	fall	in	a	manner	that	keeps	the	tension	consistent	 but	 also	 hints	 towards	 resolution,	 so	 that	 the	 reader	 can	 impose	 a	
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similar	 order	 on	 the	 story.	 This	 principle	 is	 touched	 upon	 by	 Nabokov	 in	 his	lectures	 on	 literature	 when	 he	 says:	 “What	 should	 be	 established,	 I	 think,	 is	 an	artistic	 harmonious	 balance	 between	 the	 reader’s	mind	 and	 the	 author’s	mind.”	(1980,	p.	4)		Again	though,	much	of	this	material	largely	recasts	already	understood	theories	of	narrative	and	plot	in	cognitive	terminology.	What	holds	the	most	potential	to	add	to	 the	critical	 toolbox	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 tension	 is	a	device	not	 restricted	purely	 to	narrative,	where	it	is	represented	as	conflicts	or	character	arcs	in	which	the	reader	feels	a	desire	for	resolution;	but	also	as	a	device	that	influences	other	elements	of	aesthetic	 response	 to	 a	 text.	Barry	 suggests	 that	 tension	has	 greater	 significance	than	just	plot:		 The	 tension	 associated	 with	 unresolved	 ambiguity	 so	 fundamental	 to	literary	and	visual	art	is	part	of	the	mind’s	innate	search	for	synthesis.	This	search	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 aesthetic	 response.	 Contemporary	 theorists	Williams	and	Newton,	in	fact,	propose	that	a	balance	between	the	emotional	and	the	cognitive	is	the	key	to	all	satisfaction	in	life,	and	they	fault	a	post-Renaissance,	 rational-cognitive	 cultural	 bias	 for	 much	 of	 the	 mental	restlessness	of	modern	life.	(2006,	p.	143)		There	are	two	things	to	note	here.	First,	that	we	can	understand	how	a	variant	of	literary	 ambiguity,	 where	 two	 possible	 meanings	 are	 in	 opposition	 with	 one	another	 (as	 opposed	 to	 multiple	 but	 consistent	 meanings),	 functions	 on	 an	aesthetic	 level	 in	 that	 it	provokes	a	sense	of	 tension	 for	 the	reader.	Tension	thus	
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can	be	seen	to	influence	the	level	of	semantic	processing	as	well	as	the	mechanism	behind	 imposing	 narrative	 order.	 Secondly,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 a	 cultural	 bias	towards	 the	 rational	 response	 creates	 a	 ‘mental	 restlessness’	 is	 intriguing	 for	aesthetic	 theory:	 it	 creates	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 form	 of	 tension	 that	 relies	 on	 a	potential	 disharmony	 between	 emotional	 and	 rational	 conclusions,	 and	 the	cultural	 preference	 to	 value	 the	 rational	 over	 the	 emotional.	 This	 is	 similar	 to	ambiguity	in	that	 it	stems	from	inconsistent	but	equally	compelling	meanings	co-existing	in	a	text,	only	in	this	case	it	is	a	more	complex	form	of	processing.			As	an	example	of	this	latter	form,	consider	how	in	Lolita	there	exists	a	significant	source	of	tension	for	the	reader:	between	the	temptation	to	accept	Humbert’s	lust	for	Lolita	as	a	natural	form	of	sexual	desire,	and	the	rational	understanding	that	his	actions	are	unlawful	and	immoral.	As	Lionel	Trilling	puts	it,	 in	reading	Lolita	 it	 is	all	 too	 tempting	 to	 “condone	 the	violation”	 (1958,	p.	 14)	 that	Humbert	 commits.	Although	 the	 rational	 response	 is	 culturally	preferred,	 the	emotional	 response	 is	hard	 to	 discount.	 Barry	 references	 the	work	 of	 neurologist	 Joseph	 LeDoux,	 who	specialises	in	emotions,	to	account	for	their	impact.	Here	is	what	LeDoux	has	to	say	on	 the	 connections	 between	 the	 amygdala	 (a	 region	 involved	 in	 emotional	processing)	and	the	cortex	(the	upper	area	of	the	brain	more	involved	in	rational	processing),	 and	 how	 arousal	 mechanisms	 bias	 our	 attention	 towards	 the	emotional	response:		 You	can’t	have	a	sustained	feeling	of	fear	without	the	activation	of	arousal	systems.	 These	 play	 an	 essential	 role	 in	 keeping	 conscious	 attention	directed	 toward	 the	 emotional	 situation,	 and	 without	 their	 involvement	
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emotional	 states	 would	 be	 fleeting…	 particularly	 important	 to	 the	persistence	of	emotional	responses	and	emotional	feelings	is	the	activation	of	arousal	systems	by	the	amygdala.	 	Amygdala-triggered	arousal	not	only	arouses	 the	 cortex	 bus	 also	 arouses	 the	 amygdala,	 causing	 the	 latter	 to	continue	 to	 activate	 the	 arousal	 systems,	 creating	 the	 vicious	 cycles	 of	emotional	arousal.	(1996,	p.	298)		LeDoux’s	point	is	that	emotional	response	of	this	kind,	despite	links	to	the	cortex,	is	 ultimately	 self-sustaining	 and	 very	 difficult	 to	 shut	 off.	 As	 such,	 where	 there	exists	 a	 serious	 disconnect	 between	 an	 emotional	 response	 and	 a	 rational	response,	 the	mind	cannot	 simply	discount	 the	emotional	 response	despite	what	our	cultural	biases	might	dictate,	and	must	ultimately	push	on	for	resolution.	This	form	of	tension,	bound	to	a	form	of	literary	ambiguity	that	can	be	manifested	in	the	response	to	a	character,	a	theme	or	an	event	in	the	text,	is	one	system	responsible	for	what	drives	a	reader	to	search	for	this	resolution.	It	shows	that	the	impetus	to	read	a	novel	is	not	necessarily	bound	to	narrative	tension,	and	for	a	novel	such	as	Kerouac’s	On	the	Road	it	explains	how	the	lack	of	sophisticated	plot	development	is	compensated	for	by	other	forms	of	tension	in	the	novel.	These	include	the	tension	created	 by	 Sal’s	 perpetual	 search	 for	 states	 of	 enlightenment	 and	 transcendence	that	he	never	 completely	 finds,	 as	well	 as	 rhythmic	 and	 thematic	 structures	 that	emulate	 the	 musical	 tension	 employed	 by	 jazz	 –	 which	 we	 will	 examine	 more	closely	in	the	coming	chapter.		For	 now	 though,	 let	 us	 conclude	 this	 analysis	 of	 Barry’s	 work	 with	 a	 few	more	notes	on	what	she	has	to	say	about	tension,	as	well	as	the	interaction	of	different	
 113 
pathways	 of	 neurological	 response	 (such	 as	 emotional-rational).	 If	we	 recall	 the	issue	 flagged	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 our	 discussion	 of	 Barry,	 the	 tendency	 to	 describe	aesthetic	 impact	purely	 in	 terms	of	pleasure,	we	 find	 that	 although	 she	does	not	acknowledge	it	openly,	this	analysis	of	tension	has	provided	something	of	a	more	nuanced	picture	of	aesthetic	response.	Art	can	obviously	inspire	emotions	that	are	negative,	 such	 as	 Dean’s	 selfish	 behaviour	 in	On	 the	Road	 when	 he	 continues	 to	string	the	women	in	his	life	along	and	lie	to	them.	But	whether	or	not	the	reader	is	actually	 repelled	 from	 the	 work	 depends	 upon	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 writer	 can	harness	a	source	of	tension	between	different	responses.	What	Kerouac	does	at	the	moment	where	Dean	is	being	castigated	by	Galatea	Dunkel	 is	 fairly	 instructive	of	how	this	can	be	exploited	by	the	writer:		 ‘You	 have	 absolutely	 no	 regard	 for	 anybody	 but	 yourself	 and	 your	 damn	kicks.	All	you	can	think	about	is	what’s	hanging	between	your	legs	and	how	much	money	 or	 fun	 you	 can	 get	 out	 of	 people	 and	 then	 you	 throw	 them	aside.	Not	only	that	but	you’re	silly	about	it.	It	never	occurs	to	you	that	life	is	 serious	and	 there	are	people	 trying	 to	make	something	decent	out	of	 it	instead	of	just	goofing	all	the	time.’	That’s	what	Dean	was,	the	HOLY	GOOF.	(OTR,	p.	176)		The	capitalisation	of	 ‘HOLY	GOOF’	draws	so	much	attention	to	itself	that	it	seems	as	if	Sal	has	just	had	a	serious	epiphany	about	Dean’s	character.	This	undercuts	the	way	 Galatea	 attacks	 Dean’s	 character,	 creating	 a	 sense	 of	 tension	 between	 the	rational	 evidence	 she	 presents	 that	 Dean	 is	 inconsiderate	 and	 selfish,	 and	 Sal’s	continual	 intuition	 that	 his	 behaviour	 is	 somehow	 the	 key	 to	 a	 form	 of	
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transcendence,	as	the	‘holy	goof’	implies	here.	Negative	emotions	are	mediated	by	perceptual	 tension,	 inviting	the	reader	to	continue	to	experience	the	novel	 in	the	hope	 of	 seeing	 this	 resolved	 in	 some	 way.	 Eventually,	 Sal	 comes	 to	 realise	 that	Dean	is	 incapable	of	changing	his	ways	after	Dean	abandons	him	in	Mexico,	right	before	the	end	of	the	novel.	In	some	ways	this	is	a	resolution	of	this	tension,	as	the	emotional	and	rational	experiences	of	Dean’s	character	start	to	align.		Barry	 discusses	 later	 in	 ‘Perceptual	 Aesthetics’	 how	 aesthetic	 pleasure	 can	 be	understood	in	terms	of	neuroanatomy.	Part	of	this	can	be	explained	by	the	release	of	dopamine	through	the	brain	as	a	behavioural	reward	mechanism.	Dopmaine	is	particularly	 important	 when	 considering	 the	 neuroaesthetics	 of	 music,	 as	 it	 has	been	 shown	 to	 be	 released	 in	 anticipation	 of	 resolution	 to	 patterns	 of	 harmonic	tension	 (Menon	 and	 Levitin,	 2005;	 Salimpoor	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 This	 too	 will	 be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	coming	chapter,	but	it	is	briefly	worth	mentioning	here	 that	 it	 is	 the	anticipation	 of	 resolution	 to	 tension	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	actual	consummation	of	 that	resolution	which	seems	to	trigger	the	release	of	dopamine	(Huron	 and	Margulis,	 2009,	 p.	 581).	 As	 such,	we	 can	 see	 how	 in	music	 at	 least,	tension	 is	 itself	 a	 source	 of	 aesthetic	 pleasure,	 based	 on	 neurological	 research.	Having	 suggested	 that	 Barry	 is	 continuing	 the	 idea	 that	 aesthetic	 response	 is	entirely	 pleasurable,	 it	 must	 be	 said	 in	 fairness	 to	 her	 that	 the	 neurological	experience	of	pleasure	does	appear	to	be	particularly	significant.		As	a	whole,	Barry’s	theory	of	perceptual	aesthetics	is,	despite	treating	the	subject	with	 some	broad	 strokes	 rather	 than	detailed	 textual	 analysis,	 perhaps	 the	most	insightful	of	the	neuroaesthetic	theorists,	and	by	far	the	most	relevant	for	literary	
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study.	 There	 are	 some	 other	 insights	 she	 offers	 on	 aesthetic	 theory	 that	we	will	touch	upon	 in	 the	 coming	 chapters,	 particularly	 the	distinction	between	 ‘bottom	up’	and	‘top	down’	processing	in	the	analysis	of	Mrs	Dalloway.		
Cognitive	Poetics	versus	Neuroaesthetics		Let	 us	 now	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 these	 two	 chapters	 of	 methodology	 and	literature	 review	 by	 comparing	 the	 two	 approaches	 to	 interdisciplinary	 study	involving	cognitive	science	and	literary	criticism.		Cognitive	poetics	as	practised	by	Stockwell	is	primarily	based	upon	bridging	some	of	 the	 gap	 between	 literary	 theory	 and	 linguistics	 by	 appropriating	 terms	 and	some	 ideas	 from	 cognitive	 science:	 particularly	 linguistics,	 with	 concepts	 like	deixis	 figuring	 heavily	 in	 his	 analysis.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 if	 we	 consider	Ramachandran’s	work,	we	 can	 see	 that	he	 takes	 some	aesthetic	 techniques	 from	the	 art	 world	 and	 gives	 them	 new	 terms,	 such	 as	 ‘peak	 shift’,	 which	 he	 uses	interchangeably	to	refer	to	either	caricature	or	abstraction	as	aesthetic	techniques.	One	 can	 see	 the	 flaw	 with	 both	 approaches	 is	 that	 they	 do	 not	 contribute	 to	advancing	 the	 field	 of	 aesthetics	 or	 adding	 to	 the	 critical	 toolbox,	 and	by	 adding	new	terms	they	only	further	complicate	the	existing	theory.		In	 contrast,	 the	 approaches	 of	 Tsur	 and	Barry	 are	more	 fruitful	where	 aesthetic	experience	is	concerned.	Although	both	authors	occasionally	display	this	tendency	to	 re-categorise	 rather	 than	expand	our	existing	understanding	 (such	as	 through	their	use	of	‘gestalt’	as	a	referential	principle	rather	than	being	able	to	explain	the	
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neural	 mechanisms	 behind	 it),	 they	 attempt	 to	 answer	 more	 difficult	 questions	about	literary	study	by	using	evidence	from	cognitive	science.	In	particular,	Tsur’s	analysis	 of	 the	 qualities	 that	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 sound,	 while	 undoubtedly	tending	 towards	 the	 normative	 in	 its	 approach,	 does	 give	 literary	 criticism	 an	excellent	 framework	upon	which	 to	discuss	 the	effects	of	sound	 in	 literature	and	poetry.			Likewise,	 Barry	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 clear	 framework	 to	 understand	 imagery,	particularly	 how	 it	 transcends	 simply	 being	 equivalent	 to	 a	 pictorial	 or	 visual	representation,	 and	 how	 it	 links	 multiple	 artistic	 media	 together	 by	 relating	meaning	in	a	manner	that	is	not	bound	to	specific	sensory	systems.	Most	promising	though	 is	her	analysis	of	 the	systems	 that	contribute	 to	 tension,	as	she	 identifies	this	as	important	element	of	aesthetic	engagement	with	a	text.	Tension	is	a	concept	used	in	literary	criticism,	but	it	deserves	more	clarification,	particularly	in	terms	of	the	neurological	mechanisms	 that	give	rise	 to	 tension.	 	As	before,	 let	us	examine	what	the	Penguin	Dictionary	of	Literary	Terms	offers	on	the	subject	of	tension:		
Tension:	A	term	used	 in	a	particular	sense	by	Allen	Tate	to	designate	the	totality	 of	 meaning	 in	 a	 poem.	 He	 derives	 it	 from	 the	 logical	 terms	‘extension’	 and	 ‘intension’	 by	 removing	 the	 prefixes.	 Extension	 =	 literal	meaning;	intension	=	metaphorical	meaning.	The	simultaneous	coexistence	of	 these	 sets	 of	meaning	 constitutes	 tension.	 It	may	 also	 refer	 to	 ‘conflict	structures’.	For	example,	 the	counterpoint	between	the	rhythm	and	meter	of	a	poem	and	speech	rhythms;	or	between	the	concrete	and	the	abstract.	Some	critics,	 following	the	theories	of	Anaximander	and	Heraclitus,	take	it	
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to	mean	 the	 balance	 of	mental	 and	 emotional	 tensions	which	 are	 held	 to	give	shape	and	unity	to	a	work.	(Cuddon,	2008,	p.	904)		Although	 one	 can	 see	 that	 Tate’s	 derivation	 of	 ‘tension’	 from	 ‘extension’	 and	‘intension’	is	more	of	a	clever	example	of	wordplay	than	of	using	the	appropriate	term,	there	is	definitely	some	continuity	with	Barry’s	notion	of	tension	making	use	of	a	clash	between	emotional	and	rational	reactions.	In	this	definition	there	is	also	the	 hint	 of	 tension	 existing	 at	 the	 level	 of	 rhythmic	 structure,	 which	 we	 will	examine	further	in	the	next	chapter.	But	from	this	it	is	easy	to	see	how	this	kind	of	broad	 definition	 of	 tension	 that	 is	 currently	 available	 to	 literary	 theorists	 is	somewhat	unwieldy.		Barry’s	work	 allows	 us	 to	 expand	 on	 this	 limited	 definition	 of	 tension	 by	 firstly	accounting	 for	 it	 in	 cognitive	 terms,	 and	 by	 showing	 how	 there	 are	 different	applications	 of	 tension:	 narrative	 tension,	 semantic	 ambiguity,	 and	 tension	between	 the	 emotional	 and	 rational	 responses	 to	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 text.	 In	 the	coming	 chapters,	 we	 will	 explore	 these	 distinct	 forms	 of	 tension	 in	more	 detail	through	our	case	studies.		These	 approaches	 of	 Tsur	 and	 Barry	 provide	 some	 of	 the	 methodological	framework	 to	 inform	the	approach	of	 this	 thesis,	 requiring	a	careful	 synthesis	of	their	insights	and	the	way	they	utilise	cognitive	science	to	support	their	intuitions	about	the	aesthetic	impact	of	art.	Of	course,	there	are	gaps	in	their	research	to	be	filled.	What	I	particularly	hope	to	demonstrate	in	the	coming	chapters	is	how	the	novels	of	Kerouac,	Woolf	and	Nabokov	show	that	their	aesthetic	impact	is	crucially	
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intertwined	 with	 their	 ability	 to	 evoke	 sensory	 information	 from	 cross-modal	sensory	domains,	 such	as	how	Kerouac	borrows	 from	 the	 structures	of	 jazz,	 and	Woolf	 structures	 her	 ‘Impressionism’	 in	 a	 similar	 manner	 to	 the	 Impressionist	painters.	The	aim	of	this	 is	 to	 further	show	how	aesthetic	response	makes	use	of	the	 brain’s	 capacity	 for	 utilising	 pathways	 beyond	 those	 directly	 responsible	 for	processing	 the	 relevant	 sensory	 information,	 as	 Barry	 touches	 upon	 in	 her	analysis.	 The	 key	 to	 this	 is	 in	 exploring	 what	 has	 been	 discovered	 by	 existing	neurological	approaches	to	aesthetics,	including	the	neuroscience	of	music	and	the	research	of	Zeki	and	Livingstone	that	explains	the	aesthetic	impact	of	visual	art.		We	might	now	return	to	the	criticisms	of	neuroaesthetics	flagged	by	Ball	and	Tallis	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	and	ask	if	they	still	seem	justified	given	what	we	have	examined	of	 the	 leading	 theorists.	For	Ramachandran’s	heavily	reductionist	approach,	their	criticism	is	valid,	as	Ramachandran	attempts	to	account	for	varied	individual	 response	 by	 dismissing	 it	 as	 the	 product	 of	 inhibitions.	 But	 for	 Zeki,	Livingstone	 and	Barry,	 the	 claim	 that	 neuroaesthetics	 is	 simply	 reductionist	 and	offers	 no	 new	 interpretations	 does	 not	 hold	 up.	 An	 effective	 neuroaesthetic	reading	does	not	come	down	simply	to	the	arrangement	of	“a	certain	constellation	of	neurones”,	as	Tallis	puts	it,	but	to	understanding	the	mechanisms	that	shape	and	influence	 human	 perception,	 and	 using	 them	 to	 expand	 and	 clarify	 aesthetic	theory.	The	neurons	themselves	are	not	the	source	of	aesthetic	experience,	but	the	mechanisms	of	cognitive	science	can	help	 to	articulate	 the	experience	of	art;	and	they	 can	 even	 do	 so	 accounting	 for	 the	 varied	 aesthetic	 response	 across	individuals.	 	
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Chapter	Three:	Kerouac	and	Music			
Kerouac’s	Jazz		Kerouac’s	cult	novel	On	the	Road	is	closely	intertwined	with	the	musical	culture	of	mid	twentieth	century	America.	There	are	the	episodes	where	Sal	and	Dean	haunt	the	 jazz	 clubs	 of	 New	 York	 and	 San	 Francisco,	 with	 Dean	 raving	 about	 the	musicians	 as	 if	 they	 were	 prophets.	 Kerouac’s	 own	 obsession	 with	 jazz	 comes	through	to	the	point	that	during	Part	Three	he	gives	the	reader	a	crash-course	in	the	history	of	the	genre.	In	1959	on	The	Steve	Allen	Show	he	read	the	final	passage	of	the	novel	aloud,	with	Allen’s	band	playing	behind	him	–	a	performance	that	no	doubt	 added	 to	 the	 public	 association	 of	 the	 Beat	 Generation	with	music.	 There	were	also	notable	friendships	and	exchanges	of	 influence	between	the	beat	poets	and	some	rock	musicians	of	 the	Sixties,	such	as	 that	between	Allen	Ginsberg	and	Bob	 Dylan,	 or	 Michael	 McClure	 and	 Jim	 Morrison.	 Think	 also	 of	 the	 commonly	caricatured	image	of	the	beat	poets	sitting	around	playing	bongo	drums	to	accent	the	rhythm	of	their	compositions.		But	 still	more	 captivating	 than	 the	 thematic	 prominence	 of	 jazz	 is	 the	 idea	 that	Kerouac’s	 writing	 was	 literally	 modelled	 on	 or	 evoked	 the	 sensations	 of	 music.	This	 notion	 has	 existed	 as	 long	 as	 On	 the	 Road	 itself:	 among	 the	 earliest	encouragement	Kerouac	received	after	completing	his	legendary	scroll	manuscript	was	from	Seymour	Wyse,	an	old	friend	from	his	days	at	Horace	Mann.	Wyse	wrote	
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from	England	in	1951	to	tell	Kerouac	that	On	the	Road	“really	swings”	and	that	he	was	“in	an	entirely	new	groove	now”	(Nicosia,	1983,	p.	353).	The	choice	of	words	is	likely	more	 than	 figurative:	Wyse	 is	 credited	with	 introducing	 a	 young	Kerouac,	who	then	imagined	that	a	Dixieland	group	was	the	best	jazz	on	offer,	to	the	likes	of	Count	Basie	and	Lester	Young	in	New	York	(Nicosia,	1983,	p.	65).	Nor	is	it	confined	to	 On	 the	 Road:	 although	 Kerouac’s	 subsequent	 publications	 never	 achieved	 as	much	acclaim,	 later	 critics	have	devoted	 substantial	 analysis	 to	 the	 extent	of	 the	influence	 of	 jazz	 on	 these	works.	Most	 evidence	 for	 this	 correlation	 comes	 from	Kerouac’s	own	writings,	particularly	the	summary	of	his	technique	he	produced	for	Burroughs	and	Ginsberg:	‘Essentials	of	Spontaneous	Prose’.		
Procedure:	 Time	 being	 of	 the	 essence	 in	 the	 purity	 of	 speech,	 sketching	language	is	undisturbed	flow	from	the	mind	of	personal-secret	idea	words,	blowing	(as	per	jazz	musician)	on	subject	of	image.	(Kerouac,	1993)		Generally	speaking,	 this	analogy	has	been	 interpreted	as	an	attempt	 to	achieve	a	literary	version	of	an	improvised	performance.	To	paraphrase:	he	takes	an	image	the	way	a	jazz	soloist	takes	a	melody,	and	creates	an	original	representation	of	the	image	based	on	the	first	thought	he	has,	 in	a	similar	way	to	the	manner	in	which	the	musician	reworks	the	melody	into	an	original	phrase.	Kerouac	also	stated	in	an	interview	for	Paris	Review:		 “Yes,	jazz	and	bop	[are	influences]	in	the	sense	of	a,	say,	tenor	man	drawing	a	breath	and	blowing	a	phrase	on	his	saxophone,	till	he	runs	out	of	breath,	and	when	he	does,	his	 sentence,	his	 statement’s	been	made...	 that’s	how	 I	
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therefore	separate	my	sentences,	as	breath	separations	of	mind.”	(Plimpton	(ed.),	1974,	p.	361-95)		What	 this	 indicates	 is	 that	 Kerouac	 not	 only	 attempted	 to	 follow	 the	 style	 of	improvised	 music,	 he	 also	 adopted	 what	 he	 believed	 was	 a	 similar	 measure	 of	phrasing.		How	deep,	 though,	does	 this	actually	 run	 in	his	printed	works?	The	Paris	Review	interview	is	cited	by	both	Hunt	(1981)	and	Weinreich	(1987)	in	their	convergent	arguments	 that	 Kerouac’s	 use	 of	 sound	 is	 organised	 in	 a	 way	 that	 structurally	resembles	 jazz.	 Both	 critics	 examine	On	 the	 Road	 and	 Visions	 of	 Cody,	 and	 both	arrive	at	a	similar	conclusion	that	Cody	offers	a	better	example	of	the	technique	at	work.	Weinreich’s	chapter	about	On	the	Road	is	titled:	“The	Road	as	Transition.”	In	other	words,	On	the	Road	was	the	vehicle	for	the	development	of	a	style	that	was	more	fully	realised	in	Cody.		A	 dissenting	 opinion	 comes	 from	 Malcolm	 (1999),	 who	 charges	 that	 the	associations	 with	 jazz	 are	 not	 felt	 as	 formal	 influences	 on	 Kerouac’s	 structure.	Malcolm	interprets	Kerouac’s	statements	of	theory	the	same	way	he	interprets	the	abundance	of	jazz	scenes	in	On	the	Road:	as	evidence	of	Kerouac’s	obsessive	desire	to	associate	with	African-American	culture.	 In	dismissing	 the	arguments	of	Hunt,	Weinreich	 and	 Hipkiss	 (1976),	 Malcolm	 charges	 that	 “little	 formal	 [musical]	terminology	 is	 employed	 by	 either	 the	 critics	 or	 Kerouac.”	 Malcolm	 also	 argues	that	 Kerouac’s	 spontaneous	 style	 owes	 more	 to	 the	 stream	 of	 consciousness	 of	Woolf	and	Joyce	than	to	improvised	jazz	performances.	Yet	his	own	argument	also	
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references	the	fact	that	improvisation	in	jazz	is	never	truly	created	on	the	spot,	but	crafted	out	of	phrases	and	patterns	practised	and	heard	by	the	musician	before	he	takes	his	solo	(1999,	p.	88).	This	has	a	direct	correlate	in	the	way	Kerouac	crafted	his	 prose,	 particularly	 during	 the	 composition	 of	On	 the	Road:	 when	 he	wrote	 a	complete	draft	of	the	novel	in	1951,	he	reworked	extracts	from	his	travel	 journal	into	 the	 new	 draft,	 embellishing	 or	 honing	 them	 slightly	 (Theado,	 2009,	 p.	 17).	What	 Kerouac’s	 craftsmanship	 style	 and	 improvised	 jazz	 have	 in	 common	 is	 an	illusion	 of	 spontaneous	 composition	 that	 hides	 a	 technique	 of	 cobbling	 together	disparate	phrases	and	ideas	from	practice	sessions.		Malcolm’s	essay	does	raise	an	important	point	in	that	Kerouac’s	published	dictums	on	 the	 craft	 of	 writing	 have	 generated	 a	 lot	 of	 confusion	 about	 his	 use	 of	 jazz.	Firstly,	 ‘Essentials	 of	 Spontaneous	 Prose’	 was	 written	 before	 On	 the	 Road	 was	published,	 but	 after	 the	 bulk	 of	 it	 had	 been	 composed.	 The	 media	 frenzy	 that	surrounded	 Kerouac	 at	 the	 time	On	 the	Road	was	 published	 dredged	 up	 his	 old	ideas	 and	 incorporated	 them	 into	 the	 evolving	 legend	 of	 On	 the	 Road’s	spontaneous	 composition	 over	 three	 weeks	 in	 Manhattan.	 So	 it	 is	 common	 to	associate	 On	 the	 Road	 with	 spontaneous	 prose,	 where	 in	 reality	 the	 published	version	 of	 On	 the	 Road	 is	 highly	 edited.	 Although	 Weinreich	 observes	 this	distinction,	 she	 too	 finds	 reason	 to	 connect	 Kerouac’s	 cultivated	 ‘Spontaneous	Prose’	techinique	to	the	structure	of	On	the	Road:			 A	continued	examination	of	Kerouac’s	essay	“The	Essentials	of	Spontaneous	Prose”	in	tandem	with	a	close	reading	of	sections	of	the	text	of	On	the	Road	will	provide	concrete	evidence	of	a	compositional	process	analogous	to	the	
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structures	 of	 jazz	 and	 of	 a	 repetition	 of	 these	 musical	 structures	 that	provides	 a	 deeper	 pattern	 than	 the	 novel’s	 linear	 surface	 might	 suggest.	(1987,	p.	43)		Weinreich’s	 analysis	 of	 Kerouac’s	 body	 of	work	 also	 touches	 upon	 an	 important	point	 that	 comes	 close	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 engagement	with	music:	 namely	 that	Kerouac	has	an	acute	awareness	of	sound	patterns	and	employs	them	in	a	poetic	manner,	particularly	to	suggest	meaning	in	key	areas:		 Note	 the	 pacing	 in	 the	 “unconscious”	 exposition	 that	 follows:	 “[at	 a	 place	called	Port	Allen.]	Port	Allen	–	where	the	river’s	all	rain	and	roses	in	a	misty	pinpoint	 darkness	 and	where	 we	 swung	 around	 a	 great	 circular	 drive	 in	yellow	foglight	and	suddenly	saw	the	great	black	body	below	a	bridge	and	crossed	 eternity	 again”	 [1957,	 p141].	 First,	 the	 repetition	 of	 Port	 Allen	creates	 force.	 Second,	 the	 poetic	 affects	 are	 tighter.	 The	 rolling	 r’s	 of	“where”,	 “river”,	 “rain”,	 “roses”	are	picked	up	by	 “darkness,”	with	 “where”	again	 creating	 a	 circular	motion.	The	word	 “swung”	 is	 repeated,	 “around”	picks	up	the	rolling	r	as	does	“circular	drive,”	which	actually	states	what	the	writing	 accomplishes	 at	 the	 levels	 of	 both	 sound	 and	 sense.	 And	 the	alliteration	of	the	b’s	in	“black	body	below	a	bridge”	suggests	something	still	mysterious	as	the	passage	comes	full	circle	in	crossing	the	Mississippi	(and	eternity)	again.	(1987,	p.	45)		The	strength	of	this	analysis	lies	in	its	ability	to	identify	what	seems	significant	in	the	passage,	namely	the	pacing	and	the	sound.	The	problems	with	this	extract	are	
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the	 vague	 attempts	 to	 account	 for	 some	 kind	 of	 effect.	 First	 she	 states	 that	 the	repetition	of	Port	Allen	creates	“force.”	How?	What	kind	of	force?	Does	she	merely	mean	force	as	in	‘emphasis’,	or	force	as	in	‘kinaesthesia’?	Next,	it	is	claimed	that	the	
r	sounds	are	“rolling”.	Does	this	mean	the	text	encourages	the	reader	to	‘roll’	the	r,	sounding	more	like	the	French	uvular	fricative	than	the	English	alveolar	liquid?	Is	there	 sound	kind	of	 ‘rolling’	 effect	 inherent	 in	 the	 repetition	or	 even	 the	natural	sound	of	the	r?	Or	is	‘rolling’	simply	a	figurative	term	for	alliteration?	Echoing	what	we	saw	earlier	from	the	Penguin	Dictionary,	alliteration	of	b	 is	signalled	as	being	responsible	for	an	effect,	described	as	“something	mysterious”.	How	exactly	does	it	achieve	this?	Weinreich	also	states	that	the	writing	replicates	a	 ‘circular	drive’	 in	both	 sound	 and	 sense:	 yet	 the	 ‘sound’	 part	 of	 her	 analysis	merely	boils	 down	 to	instances	of	repetition.	What	exactly	is	circular	about	Kerouac’s	use	of	sound?		None	of	this	should	be	taken	as	a	disagreement	with	Weinreich’s	intuition	that	the	language	is	capable	of	producing	effects	for	the	reader,	but	rather	to	highlight	the	problems	 in	 resorting	 to	 intuition	 to	 characterise	 those	 effects.	 In	 general,	Weinreich	is	to	be	applauded	for	attempting	to	tackle	Kerouac’s	conspicuous	use	of	sound,	as	she	is	practically	the	only	one	to	do	so	in	the	critical	scholarship.	There	is	an	entire	book	of	essays	about	On	the	Road,	and	not	one	of	them	covers	sound	in	any	significant	detail.	To	me	it	seems	that	the	simplest	explanation	is	that	literary	criticism	 lacks	 a	 systematic	 approach	 to	 analysing	 the	 sound	 of	 a	 text,	 so	 the	majority	of	critics	ignore	it.		In	this	single	passage	from	Kerouac	–	a	mere	four	lines	–	Weinreich	identifies	four	effects,	 vaguely	 described	 as	 “force”,	 “rolling”,	 “circular	motion”	 and	 “something	
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mysterious”.	 Leaving	 aside	 the	 latter,	 the	 perceptual	 theme	 seems	 to	 be	momentum:	 the	 passage	 not	 only	 describes	 momentum	 but	 also	 apparently	imitates	it.	So	how	do	we	begin	to	articulate	momentum	in	strict	literary	terms?	I	mentioned	 kinaesthesia	 earlier:	 Penguin’s	 dictionary	 defines	 it	 thus:	 “A	 sense	 of	movement	or	muscular	effort	…	inherent	in	the	rhythm,	momentum	and	energy	of	words.”	 (1998,	p.	443)	So	either	 the	words	 themselves	must	have	momentum	or	‘energy’,	or	the	rhythm	of	the	line	must	produce	it.	Now	the	question	becomes	how	do	we	 explain	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 sensation	 of	momentum	 through	 the	 use	 of	either	 rhythm	 or	 particular	 words?	 In	 search	 of	 answers,	 we	 come	 closer	 and	closer	to	the	cognitive	mechanisms	of	perception.		The	determination	among	Weinreich,	Hunt,	and	more	recently	Hrebeniak	(2008)	to	find	a	relationship	between	the	structure	of	jazz	and	the	structure	of	Kerouac’s	writing,	 coupled	with	 the	 testament	 of	Wyse	 and	 Kerouac’s	 own	 ideas,	 suggests	that	the	notion	of	something	musical	about	his	style	is	a	fairly	strong	intuition.	The	ambition	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 reopen	 the	 question	 of	 this	 link,	 by	 focusing	 on	whether	 or	 not	 his	 style	 could	 cognitively	 be	 perceived	 in	 a	 manner	 similar	 to	music.	The	aim	is	to	go	where	previous	critics	have	been	unable	to	travel:	deeper	into	the	mind;	and	to	take	up	Malcolm’s	call	to	use	the	terminology	of	music	to	its	full.		
A	Note	on	Texts		The	bulk	of	this	chapter	focuses	on	On	the	Road	 for	its	case	study,	although	some	parallels	 are	 drawn	 with	 some	 other	 examples	 from	 Kerouac’s	 prose.	 It	 is	
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important	 to	 discuss	 the	 focus	 on	 On	 the	 Road	 as	 opposed	 to	 one	 of	 his	 more	experimental	works,	particularly	 for	a	sound-based	analysis.	Hunt	and	Weinreich	certainly	 make	 the	 case	 that	 Visions	 of	 Cody	 adheres	 closer	 to	 Kerouac’s	spontaneous	 prose	 style,	 and	 as	 a	 reworked	 form	 of	On	 the	Road	 it	might	 seem	truer	 therefore	to	his	overall	vision.	 In	regards	to	 the	supposed	musicality	of	 the	text,	however,	my	argument	is	that	On	the	Road	offers	a	far	better	example	of	the	musical	dimension	to	his	work.		The	principal	reason	for	this	 lies	 in	the	rhythmic	and	syntactic	style	of	the	novel,	which	 is	a	key	component	of	 its	musical	appeal.	Paradoxically,	Kerouac’s	musical	analogy	 in	 ‘Essentials	 of	 Spontaneous	 Prose’	 quashes	 this	 dimension	 of	 the	 text	when	 put	 into	 practice.	 Kerouac	 began	 to	 regard	 regular	 punctuation	 as	 an	impediment	 when	 his	 focus	 became	 jotting	 down	 his	 thoughts	 as	 quickly	 as	possible:		
Method:	 No	 periods	 separating	 sentence-structures	 already	 arbitrarily	riddled	by	false	colons	and	timid	usually	needless	commas-but	the	vigorous	space	 dash	 separating	 rhetorical	 breathing	 (as	 jazz	 musician	 drawing	breath	 between	 outblown	 phrases)--"measured	 pauses	 which	 are	 the	essentials	of	our	speech"	(1993)		In	 adhering	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 letting	 his	 thoughts	 rush	 out	 like	 the	 notes	 from	 a	saxophone,	 Kerouac	 forgoes	 his	 ability	 to	 use	 other	 forms	 of	 punctuation	 for	rhythmic	 patterning.	 In	 traditional	 prose	 it	 is	 true	 that	 punctuation	 is	 generally	dictated	by	 the	demands	of	 syntax,	 but	 the	 resulting	prosody	holds	 standards	of	
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how	long	different	forms	of	punctuation	are	held	in	breath.	A	comma,	for	instance,	is	generally	shorter	than	a	full	stop.	Without	varying	these	pauses,	the	oral	quality	of	his	prose	diminishes	as	the	tendency	becomes	to	read	out	words	in	long	strings	–	 the	 longer	 they	 become,	 the	 less	 individual	 words	 are	 spoken	 with	 the	 key	stresses,	and	rhythmic	patterns	disappear.	With	Visions	of	Cody,	Kerouac	reduces	his	 reliance	 on	 full	 stops:	 by	 ‘October	 in	 the	 Railroad	 Earth’,	 he	 barely	 uses	anything	but	dashes.		This	 style,	 taken	 in	 conjunction	 with	 Kerouac’s	 claims	 about	 his	 compositional	style,	 suggests	 that	 he	 would	 actually	 read	 the	 whole	 sentence	 aloud	 without	pauses	for	breath.	Quite	the	contrary:	Kerouac	actually	had	an	extremely	keen	ear	for	rhythm,	as	is	well	noted	by	everyone	who	liked	to	hear	him	perform.	This	can	be	heard	today	in	some	of	the	oral	performances	he	recorded	with	Steve	Allen.	To	illuminate	the	difference,	first	consider	this	extract	from	the	final	paragraph	of	On	
the	Road:		 So	 in	America	when	 the	 sun	goes	down	and	 I	 sit	on	 the	old	broken	down	river	pier	watching	the	 long	skies	over	New	Jersey,	and	sense	all	 that	raw	land	that	rolls	 in	one	unbelievable	huge	bulge	over	to	the	West	Coast,	and	all	that	road	going,	all	the	people	dreaming	in	the	immensity	of	it…	(OTR,	p.	281)		Taking	the	recording	of	Kerouac’s	performance	from	The	Steve	Allen	Show,	 I	have	transcribed	it	using	additional	punctuation	to	represent	the	pauses	he	takes:		
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So,	in	America,	when	the	sun	goes	down,	and	I	sit	on	the	old	broken	down	river	pier	watching	the	long	long	skies	over	New	Jersey,	and	sense	all	that	raw	land	that	rolls	in	one	unbelievable	huge	bulge	over	to	the	West	Coast,	and	all	that	road	going,	and	all	the	people	dreaming	in	the	immensity	of	it....	(Kerouac	&	Allen,	1959)		The	difference	 is	notable.	Kerouac’s	original	begins	 to	 charge	off	with	breakneck	pace,	but	the	oral	performance	initially	establishes	a	much	steadier,	contemplative	rhythm	 through	 the	 additional	 pauses,	which	 then	 gives	way	 to	 an	 expansionist	acceleration.	 Other	 than	 this,	 his	 performance	 largely	 follows	 the	written	 text	 –	aside	 from	 some	 notable	 repetitions	 (such	 as	 ‘long’,	 and	 later	 “I	 think	 of	 Dean	Moriarty”	as	 the	 final	 cadence).	Now,	 compare	 this	with	 ‘October	 in	 the	Railroad	Earth’.	First,	the	printed	text:		 There	was	a	little	alley	in	San	Francisco	back	of	the	Southern	Pacific	station	at	 Third	 and	 Townsend	 in	 redbrick	 of	 drowsy	 lazy	 afternoons	 with	everybody	at	work	in	offices	in	the	air	you	feel	the	impending	rush	of	their	commuter	 frenzy	 as	 soon	 they’ll	 be	 charging	 en	 mass	 from	 Market	 and	Sansome	 buildings	 on	 foot	 and	 in	 buses	 and	 all	 well-dressed	 thru	workingman	 Frisco	 of	 Walkup	 truck	 drivers	 and	 even	 the	 poor	 grime-bemarked	Thirds	Street	of	lost	bums	even	Negroes	so	hopeless	and	long	left	East	 and	meanings	 of	 responsibility	 and	 try	 that	 now	 all	 they	 do	 is	 stand	there	spitting	in	the	broken	glass	sometimes	fifty	 in	one	afternoon	against	one	wall	at	Third	and	Howard...	(LT,	p.	40)		
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The	 sentence	 runs	 on	 for	 another	 four	 lines	 before	 Kerouac	 uses	 a	 comma,	 and	four	 more	 still	 before	 it	 comes	 to	 an	 end:	 a	 very	 striking	 example	 of	 his	Spontaneous	Prose	style.	However,	his	actual	delivery	style	was	far	from	being	as	breathless	and	chaotic	as	this	syntax	would	suggest.	In	keeping	with	the	previous	example	 from	On	the	Road,	 I	 have	 transcribed	Kerouac’s	 reading	 of	 this	 passage	(again	accompanied	by	Allen)	using	traditional	punctuation	to	mark	the	moments	where	he	pauses:		 There	was	a	little	alley	in	San	Francisco,	back	of	the	Southern	Pacific	station	at	 Third	 and	 Townsend,	 in	 redbrick	 of	 drowsy	 lazy	 afternoons	 with	everybody	at	work	in	offices	-	in	the	air	you	feel	the	impending	rush	of	their	commuter	 frenzy,	 as	 soon	 they’ll	 be	 charging	 en	 mass	 from	 Market	 and	Sansome	 buildings	 on	 foot	 and	 in	 buses	 and	 all	 well-dressed	 thru	workingman	 Frisco	 of	 Walkup	 truck	 drivers;	 and	 even	 the	 poor	 grime-bemarked	Thirds	Street	of	lost	bums	even	Negroes	so	hopeless	and	long	left	East,	and	meanings	of	 responsibility	and	 try,	that	now	all	 they	do	 is	 stand	there	spitting	in	the	broken	glass,	sometimes	fifty	in	one	afternoon	against	one	wall	at	Third	and	Howard...	(Kerouac	and	Allen,	1959)		It	is	possible	that	Kerouac’s	sensitivity	to	the	musician	playing	behind	him	led	him	to	deliver	a	more	evenly-paced	reading,	allowing	pauses	for	musical	accentuation	–	but	 in	 recordings	 of	 his	 other	works,	 ranging	 from	Visions	of	Cody	 to	Desolation	
Angels,	 there	 is	 no	music	 and	 the	 phrasing	 style	 remains	 similar.	What	 emerges	from	the	recording	of	October	in	the	Railroad	Earth	are	neater	units	organised	by	
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stresses	and	elisions;	in	fact,	his	rhythm	could	almost	be	described	as	trochaic,	and	it	gives	the	passage	a	sense	of	controlled	energy:			 						/									x						-						/			x							/				x								x						/									x							/				x										/									-						x					 
There was a little alley in San Francisco, back of the 
 /    -   x / -    /  x  -    /    x   /   x 
Southern Pacific station at Third and Townsend, 	In	 the	 printed	 text,	 these	 patterns	 are	 completely	 lost	 on	 the	 reader,	 as	 having	commas	 acting	 as	 new	 lines	 is	 essential	 to	 conveying	 the	 trochaic	 feel.	 Kerouac	does	 not	 conform	 to	 his	 own	 standards	 specified	 in	 ‘Essentials	 of	 Spontaneous	Prose’	of	using	a	dash	for	the	breath;	indeed,	he	gives	no	hint	of	where	the	pauses	should	come,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	recorded	version	shows	a	deliberate	sense	of	 rhythm,	 pacing,	 and	 exploitation	 of	 readerly	 impulses	 about	 the	 length	 of	different	units	within	the	sentence.		My	interpretation	of	the	recordings	is	that	Kerouac	had	a	particularly	keen	gift	for	oral	performance.	Nicosia	states	that:	“People	were	always	impressed	by	Kerouac’s	special	love	of	sound,	which	was	obvious	just	from	the	way	Jack	talked”	(1983,	p.	305).	But	this	became	a	double	edged	sword:	his	familiarity	with	his	own	rhythm	meant	that	he	no	longer	felt	the	need	to	mark	it	within	his	prose,	and	consequently	his	 readers	were	 left	with	no	 real	 clues	 to	 follow	his	 sense	of	 rhythm.	Kerouac’s	two	most	 commercially	 successful	 novels	were	 unquestionably	On	 the	Road	 and	
The	Dharma	Bums:	these	are	distinct	from	the	writings	of	his	‘Spontaneous	Prose’	period	in	that	they	use	punctuation	with	far	greater	regularity.	One	could	attribute	this	success	to	the	theme	of	travel	that	is	central	to	both	novels,	but	my	argument	is	 that	 this	 theme	 was	 supplemented	 by	 the	 easily	 followed	 rhythmic	 patterns	
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within	 the	 novel.	 When	 Kerouac’s	 ‘spontaneous’	 works	 like	 ‘October	 in	 the	Railroad	 Earth’	 are	 accented	 with	 punctuation,	 rhythmic	 patterns	 emerge	 to	accentuate	the	motions	and	themes	of	the	text.		Kerouac’s	 spontaneous	 prose	 compositions	 do	 illustrate	 his	 technique,	 but	 the	reader’s	appreciation	of	the	musical	element	of	his	writing	is	largely	obscured	by	the	 lack	 of	 rhythmic	 markings.	 As	 such,	 the	 best	 texts	 to	 examine	 in	 this	investigation	 are	 those	 with	 a	 regular	 sense	 of	 punctuation.	 Visions	 of	 Cody	 is	punctuated	 to	 a	 similar	degree	 to	On	the	Road;	 however	 in	Cody	 the	paragraphs,	themselves	 an	 important	 rhythmic	 unit	 in	 Kerouac’s	 style,	 tend	 to	 be	 fairly	standardised	as	extremely	long	segments,	with	little	potential	for	pattern	variation.	These	 may	 seem	 like	 minute	 differences,	 but	 as	 we	 shall	 see	 they	 can	 have	significant	consequences	for	the	reader.		
Music	and	Language		The	 entry	 point	 into	 Kerouac’s	 supposed	 musicality	 is	 the	 question	 of	 how	naturally	close	music	is	to	language	to	begin	with.	Longfellow	once	surmised	that	music	 is	 the	“universal	 language	of	mankind”	(1835),	and	Darwin	considered	the	idea	 that	 music	 and	 language	 were	 both	 once	 part	 of	 an	 evolutionary	‘protolanguage’	(Fitch,	2009).	The	past	three	decades	of	neurological	research	on	the	 two	areas	has	shown	 that	music	 is	 far	 from	universal,	with	different	cultural	styles	 having	 systems	 that	 may	 transfer	 no	 more	 easily	 across	 borders	 than	distinct	 languages	 would.	 Research	 has,	 however,	 thrown	 up	 some	 similarities	between	the	processing	of	music	and	language.	
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	At	a	basic	level,	music	can	be	defined	as	a	system	of	sounds	organised	according	to	aesthetic	principles	or	for	aesthetic	purposes.	The	governing	aspects	that	combine	to	 create	 music	 and	 distinguish	 individual	 genres,	 styles	 and	 compositions	 are:	pitch,	 timbre,	volume,	melody,	harmony	and	rhythm	(the	 latter	 includes	 the	sub-aspects	 meter,	 tempo	 and	 phrasing).	 These	 are	 organised	 according	 to	 varying	levels	of	importance	throughout	different	cultures:	the	Western	classical	tradition	emphasises	pitch	and	harmony,	for	instance,	while	an	Indian	musical	style	such	as	
tabla	 emphasises	 timbre	 and	 rhythm	 (Patel,	 2008).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	‘timbre’	 itself	 is	 a	 fairly	arbitrary	 concept	 in	musical	 terms,	whereas	 in	 cognitive	psychology	it	explicitly	refers	to	the	number	and	intensity	of	overtones	produced	by	 a	 sound	wave.	 In	music,	 timbre	 tends	 to	 refer	 to	 any	 component	 of	 tone	 not	governed	 by	 pitch	 or	 volume.	 In	 general,	 all	 of	 these	 elements	 are	 present	 in	different	cultural	styles,	only	in	varying	degrees	of	prominence.		These	 elements	 have	 some	 basic	 correlations	 with	 language	 processing;	 for	instance,	 pitch,	 volume	 and	 rhythm	 all	 play	 a	 role	 in	 delivering	 the	 subtleties	 of	language.	In	non-tonal	languages	pitch	is	used	for	subtle	changes	in	interpretation,	and	 in	 tonal	 languages	 it	 often	 signifies	 a	 completely	 different	 word.	 But	 while	phonetics	represent	the	smallest	units	of	sound	that	can	be	differentiated	from	one	another	(Moore,	2003,	p.	301),	 they	show	a	degree	of	resistance	to	modifications	and	omissions	 that	 sets	 language	apart	 from	music.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 this	 very	ability	that	 allows	 for	 language	 to	 combine	with	music	 in	 song,	 since	 abstract	 phonetic	categories	can	withstand	the	demands	of	the	musical	system.	By	way	of	example,	the	word	 ‘I’	will	 often	 sound	 closer	 to	 ‘ah’	when	 sung	 at	 a	 lower	 note,	 since	 the	
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frequency	of	the	formants	required	to	produce	i	is	relatively	high.	Despite	this,	we	still	understand	the	word	as	intended.		So	 although	 music	 and	 language	 make	 use	 of	 the	 same	 general	 auditory	mechanisms,	 speech	 perception	 is	 a	 far	 more	 complicated	 and	 heavily	 debated	process	than	music.	Patel	(2008)	and	Koelsch	(2005)	have	indicated	that	the	two	systems	 do	 sometimes	 share	 neural	 resources	 in	 cognitive	 processing:	 Patel	argues,	 for	 instance,	 that	melodic	 contour	 processing	may	 be	 shared	 by	musical	melody	 and	 linguistic	 prosody,	 and	 Koelsch	 argues	 that	 patterns	 of	 harmonic	tension	 are	 handled	 by	 the	 same	 neurological	 process	 that	 reacts	 to	 linguistic	syntax	 violations.	 Patel’s	 exhaustive	 study	 of	 the	 similarities	 and	 differences	between	music	 and	 language	 is	 the	 best	 place	 to	 explore	 the	 subject	 in	 greater	detail:	 for	 our	 purposes	 it	 is	 important	 simply	 to	 establish	 that	 they	 are	 distinct	categorical	systems.	Bop	jazz,	purported	to	be	a	huge	influence	on	Kerouac’s	style,	is	 largely	 based	 around	 categorical	 perception	 of	 pitch	 intervals	 organised	 into	harmonic	 scales.	On	 the	other	hand,	Kerouac’s	prose	and	 indeed	all	writings	 call	upon	 the	 brain’s	 categorical	 perception	 of	 abstract	 phonetic	 representations.	 As	such,	Malcolm’s	dismissal	of	the	structural	relationship	between	the	two	is	heavily	validated	by	cognitive	science.		At	the	same	time	though,	timbre	and	rhythm	are	important	accentual	qualities	for	bop	 and	 indeed	 for	 Kerouac.	 The	 next	 question	 is	 to	 examine	 how	 close	 these	relationships	run,	and	to	establish	whether	the	connection	is	merely	analogous,	or	if	there	is	any	deeper	neurological	basis.		
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The	Sounds	of	the	Road		In	the	published	version	of	On	the	Road:	The	Original	Scroll,	editor	Howard	Cunnell	preserves	one	of	Kerouac’s	typographical	errors	–	“I	 first	met	met	Neal”,	because	“it	 so	 beautifully	 suggests	 the	 sound	 of	 a	 car	 misfiring	 before	 a	 long	 journey.”	(2007,	 ii)	Most	of	 the	emphatic	 sound	patterns	 in	On	the	Road	were	no	accident,	however,	 contrary	 to	 Truman	 Capote’s	 aspersion	 that	 Kerouac’s	 style	was	 “only	typing”	(Nicosia,	1983,	p.	588).	In	fact,	they	were	a	large	part	of	Kerouac’s	attempt	to	redefine	the	way	in	which	he	told	his	stories.		An	examination	of	Kerouac’s	 journals	 in	 the	years	before	he	composed	 the	scroll	draft	shows	that	he	had	a	vision	for	On	the	Road	that	was	thematically	close	to	the	final	novel.	The	first	mention	notes	that	the	story	concerns:	“two	guys	hitch-hiking	to	California	in	search	of	something	they	don’t	really	find,	and	losing	themselves	on	the	 road,	 and	 coming	all	 the	way	back	hopeful	of	 something	else.”	 (WW,	 p.	 123).	This	was	in	1948.	A	year	later,	he	had	‘started’	On	the	Road	twice,	and	in	October	he	noted	 that	with	 twenty	 five	 thousand	words	written	he	 still	 didn’t	 feel	 it	 had	“begun”	(WW,	p.	236).	He	began	to	envision	 it	as	more	of	a	narrative	poem,	with	short	 chapters	 acting	 in	 place	 of	 verses	 (WW,	 p.	 241-2).	 Then	 in	 December	 he	scribbled	 down	 a	 maxim	 of	 great	 importance	 for	 his	 future	 style:	 “It’s	 not	 the	words	that	count	but	the	rush	of	truth	which	uses	words	for	its	purpose”	(WW,	p.	252).		This	 ‘rush	of	 truth’	 finds	 its	 embodiment	 in	Kerouac’s	prose	 as	 the	use	of	 sound	and	rhythmic	patterns	to	recreate	the	events	as	vividly	as	possible	for	the	reader:	
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appealing	directly	to	their	sensory	and	perceptual	faculties	rather	than	relying	on	semantically	precise	description.	This	was	an	idea	Kerouac	developed	in	an	essay	he	wrote	 for	his	classes	at	 the	New	School	 for	Social	Research.	He	compared	 the	choice	 of	words	he	 imagined	hypothetical	writers	would	use	 to	 describe	 “a	man	musing	 on	 eternity”.	 The	 ‘intellectual’,	 semantically	 precise	 writer	 would	 call	 it	“wonderingly	 thinking”,	 but	 the	 ‘metaphysical’	 writer	 would	 call	 it	 ‘dumbly	mulling’.	Kerouac	writes:		 There	 are	 beauties	 in	 “dumbly	mulling”:	 the	 rhythm	 of	 the	 “U”	 vowels	 as	well	as	the	rhythm	of	the	words	together;	plus	the	easy	 loll	on	the	tongue	(two	“Ls”);	plus,	finally,	that	indecipherable	mystique	of	the	seen	word.	We	know	that	–	great	ships	are	blowing	in	the	harbor	at	night,	–	but	it	requires	metaphysical	prowess	(at	its	height)	to	show	us,	further,	that,	really	–	great	boats	are	blowing	in	the	gulfs	of	night.	(WW,	p.	400-401)		Gerald	Nicosia	 claimed	 that	 Kerouac	 had	 little	 gift	 for	 intellectualising	 literature	(1983,	 p.	 453):	 reading	 this	 essay	 adds	 some	 credence	 to	 that	 view,	 as	 Kerouac	cannot	 aptly	 extend	 his	 comparison	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 mellifluous	 ‘dumbly	mulling’	 is	 “more	 accurate	 and	 more	 useful”	 (WW,	 p.	 400)	 than	 ‘wonderingly	thinking’.	But	it	does	demonstrate	that	what	Kerouac	lacked	in	critical	thinking,	he	made	 up	 for	 in	 intuition.	 He	 was	 able	 to	 sense	 that	 particular	 combinations	 of	words	seemed	more	powerful	and	poetic,	even	 if	he	was	unable	 to	articulate	 the	reasons	why.		
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In	On	the	Road,	one	can	see	this	conviction	about	representing	the	rush	of	truth,	or	rather,	 appealing	directly	 to	 the	 senses.	One	of	 the	most	 famous	passages	 comes	early	in	the	novel,	where	Sal	explains	his	emphatic	interest	in	Dean	and	Carlo:		 ...because	the	only	people	for	me	are	the	mad	ones,	the	ones	who	are	mad	to	live,	mad	to	talk,	mad	to	be	saved,	desirous	of	everything	at	the	same	time,	the	ones	who	never	yawn	or	say	a	commonplace	thing,	but	burn,	burn,	burn	like	fabulous	yellow	roman	candles	exploding	like	spiders	across	the	stars...	(OTR,	p.	7)		There	 is	 of	 course	 a	 powerful	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 use	 of	 ‘mad’	 that	 suggests	 their	enthusiasm	 borders	 on	 the	 crazy.	 But	 additionally,	 the	 simile	 of	 the	 firework	 is	subtly	 extended	 throughout	 the	 whole	 passage	 by	 the	 sounds	 of	 the	 piece.	Kerouac’s	triple	repetitions	of	‘mad’	and	‘burn’	prime	the	harsh	plosives	of	d	and	b,	and	then	in	“exploding	like	spiders	across	the	stars”	there	is	a	repetition	of	sp	.	The	minute	 shift	 in	 this	 phonetic	 unit	 from	 the	 hissing	 sibilants	 (recalling	 Tsur’s	analysis,	1992,	p.	44)	to	the	pop	of	the	plosives	imitates	the	sounds	of	a	firework	trailing	 upward	 into	 the	 sky	 before	 exploding	 loudly.	 This	 added	 sonorous	dimension	strengthens	the	impact	of	the	passage,	priming	the	sounds	of	a	firework	through	emphatic	repetition.	Notably,	in	the	original	scroll	published	in	2007,	this	contrast	is	not	so	apparent:	as	Kerouac	had	instead	written	“but	burn,	burn,	burn	like	 roman	 candles	 across	 the	night”	 (OS,	 p.	 111).	 Evidently,	Kerouac’s	 extensive	revision	 period	 allowed	 him	 the	 opportunity	 to	 tighten	 these	 phonetic	 patterns	and	reinforce	those	he	felt	to	be	intuitively	strong.		
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Instances	 of	 phonemic	 repetition	 and	 contrasts	 such	 as	 these	 are	 among	 what	forms	 the	 “rush	 of	 truth”	Kerouac	was	 aiming	 at.	 The	 recourse	 to	 sound	 gives	 a	non-conscious	sensation	(a	‘rush’,	in	the	sense	of	‘sudden	emotion’)	that	the	image	is	a	particularly	strong	one	(truth).	This	command	of	sound	is	an	important	part	of	the	musical	appeal	to	On	the	Road,	particularly	in	the	sections	that	actually	depict	music.	Kerouac’s	early	literary	agent,	Rae	Everitt,	thought	his	jazz	scenes	were	the	best	in	American	literature	(Nicosia,	1983,	p.	352),	and	the	first	time	anything	from	
On	the	Road	appeared	in	print	was	a	compilation	of	those	scenes	called	‘Jazz	of	the	Beat	 Generation’	 for	 New	 World	 Writing	 (Nicosia,	 1983,	 p.	 465).	 Much	 of	 this	impact	can	be	attributed	to	Kerouac’s	sustained	use	of	onomatopoeia.		 The	 behatted	 tenorman	 was	 blowing	 at	 the	 peak	 of	 a	 wonderfully	satisfactory	 free	 idea,	a	rising	and	falling	riff	 that	went	 from	 ‘EE-yah!’	 to	a	crazier	 “EE-de-lee-yah!’	 and	 blasted	 along	 by	 a	 big	 brutal	 Negro	 with	 a	bullneck	who	didn’t	give	a	damn	about	anything	but	punishing	his	busted	tubs,	crash,	rattle-ti-boom,	crash.	(OTR,	p.	179)20		Once	again,	 the	 repetition	 is	 even	more	apparent	 in	 the	published	version,	 as	he	added	‘busted’	where	the	original	draft	had	merely	read	‘punishing	his	tubs’	(OS,	p.	295)21.	Besides	his	 attempt	 to	 transcribe	 the	 exact	 sounds	of	 the	 saxophone	and	drums,	there	is	the	emphatic	repetition	of	b	in	the	description	of	the	drummer,	and	
                                                
20 It is worth noting that a recording of Kerouac reading this passage can be found on the disc ‘Beat 
Generation Poetry – The Ultimate Collection’: Master Classics Records, 2011. Apparently recorded 
before On the Road was a hit, Kerouac reads with a disappointing lack of enthusiasm and pace, compared 
to his emphatic performances on other records. 
21 The original draft also read “blasted along to the rolling crash of butt-scarred drums hammered by a 
big brutal Negro” (OS:295). It is possible that Kerouac omitted this to more quickly establish the 
repetition of b. 
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vowel	i	in	the	description	of	the	tenorman.	If	we	recall	Tsur’s	order	of	phonemes	in	terms	of	periodicity,	derived	from	Fry	(1970,	p.	35-6),	the	sounds	repeated	in	the	description	of	the	tenorman	are	more	periodic	and	thus	closer	to	a	musical	note;	while	the	relatively	aperiodic	plosive	is	closer	to	a	noise.	In	effect,	Kerouac’s	use	of	repetition	 mimics	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 musicians	 in	 the	 traditional	 bop	 group:	 the	tenorman	 is	 assigned	 melodic	 lines	 of	 notes,	 while	 the	 drummer	 plays	 the	percussive	sounds	(which	are	generally	processed	atonally)	that	dictate	beat	and	tempo.	The	bilabial	plosives	b	 and	d	 are	particularly	effective	at	ornamenting	 the	description	of	 the	drums	because	 in	acoustic	 terms	they	present	a	quick	burst	of	noise,	 much	 like	 a	 drum.	 Similar	 repetition	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 passage	depicting	the	jazz	musician	Slim	Gaillard:		 He’ll	 sing	 ‘Cement	Mixer,	 Put-ti-Put-ti’	 and	 then	 suddenly	 slow	 down	 the	beat	and	brood	over	his	bongos	with	 fingertips	barely	 tapping	 the	skin	as	everybody	 leans	forward	breathlessly	to	hear;	you	think	he’ll	do	this	 for	a	minute	 or	 so,	 but	 he	 goes	 right	 on,	 for	 as	 long	 as	 an	 hour,	 making	 an	imperceptible	 little	 noise	 with	 the	 tips	 of	 his	 fingernails,	 smaller	 and	smaller	all	the	time	til	you	can’t	hear	it	any	more...	(OTR,	p.	159)		Here	 the	repetition	of	 the	voiced	plosive	b	 that	begins	 the	passage,	as	Slim	plays	the	bongos,	gives	way	to	a	repetition	of	a	voiceless	plosive	 t;	 travelling	down	the	scale	 of	 periodicity	 and	 becoming	 yet	 more	 like	 an	 indistinct	 noise.	 Again,	Kerouac’s	repetition	subtly	mimics	the	musical	scene	for	the	reader.		
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On	their	own,	these	repetitive	sound	patterns	are	largely	ornamental	to	the	action	of	 the	 text.	 Any	 sense	 that	 they	might	 be	 ‘musical’	 only	 emerges	when	 they	 are	placed	in	sections	where	music	becomes	the	thematic	focus.	But	while	those	sound	patterns	 outside	 of	 passages	 that	 directly	 reference	 music	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	perceived	 as	 acoustically	 similar	 to	music,	 their	 repetitive	 quality	 contributes	 to	the	perception	of	another	important	cue:	the	rhythm	of	Kerouac’s	prose.		
The	Rhythms	of	the	Road		It	 is	 worth	 beginning	 by	 extrapolating	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 rhythm	 in	 music	 and	language.	In	essence,	rhythm	is	a	composite	of	metre	and	phrasing	–	an	instance	of	figure	 and	 ground,	 where	 metre	 acts	 as	 the	 ground	 onto	 which	 the	 phrasing	projects	 figure.	Now,	 in	 traditional	Western	poetry,	 the	basic	unit	of	metre	 is	 the	syllable;	whereas	in	traditional	Western	music	the	basic	unit	of	metre	is	the	‘beat’.	The	 major	 difference	 is	 that	 musical	 beats	 rely	 on	 temporal	 periodicity	 where	syllables	do	not	(Patel,	2008).		What	 this	 means	 for	 a	 comparison	 of	 musical	 and	 poetic	 rhythm	 is	 that	 the	perceptual	 categorisation	 system	 music	 calls	 upon	 is	 far	 more	 rigidly	 defined.	Indeed,	 it	 is	 the	 periodicity	 of	 musical	 metre	 that	 allows	 for	 the	 perception	 of	strong	and	weak	beats:	essentially,	strong	beats	are	those	that	fall	on	mathematical	intervals	that	support	the	periodic	rhythm,	such	as	the	first	and	third	beats	of	a	bar	in	 4/4	 timing;	 while	 weak	 beats	 (off-beats)	 fall	 on	 other	 intervals.	 Temporal	periodicity	is	important	for	allowing	motor	commands	to	synchronise	with	music:	in	 other	 words,	 for	 people	 to	 dance.	 Syllables	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 same	
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periodicity	 as	musical	 beats,	 particularly	 in	 English.	 In	 the	 1940s,	 Kenneth	 Pike	proposed	 that	 some	 languages	do	 in	 fact	 divide	 syllables	 into	 equal	measures	 in	time	 (Pike,	 1945),	 such	 as	 French	 and	 Spanish,	whereas	English	divides	 stresses	into	 equal	 measures	 in	 time.	 Over	 time,	 however,	 empirical	 studies	 failed	 to	validate	this	theory.		So	in	terms	of	comparing	traditional	poetic	rhythm	to	musical	rhythm,	it	is	difficult	to	establish	a	direct	link	between	the	two.	However,	a	particularly	modern	take	on	the	scansion	system	by	Derek	Attridge	offers	some	more	compelling	evidence	that	poetry	can	be	perceived	as	having	a	beat.	Attridge	(1990)	offers	the	example	of	the	A.	 A.	 Milne	 poem	 ‘Disobedience’,	 a	 nursery-rhyme	 style	 of	 poem	 with	 heavy	repetition	in	the	first	lines:			 James	James		 Morrison	Morrison	Weatherby	George	Dupree	Took	great	Care	of	his	mother		 Though	he	was	only	three.	(Milne,	1924)		Attridge	acknowledges	that	it	is	difficult	to	do	justice	to	this	poem	merely	in	terms	of	the	traditional	Western	scansion	systems	of	stressed	and	unstressed	syllables:		 What	is	needed,	then,	is	an	approach	that	begins	not	with	the	abstractions	of	 metrical	 feet	 or	 grids	 of	 strong	 and	 weak	 positions,	 but	 with	 the	
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psychological	and	physiological	reality	of	the	sequences	of	rhythmic	pulses	perceived,	and	enjoyed,	by	reader	and	listener	alike.	(1990,	p.	1016)		His	 assignment	 of	 beats	 and	 off-beats	 elucidates	 the	 poem’s	 clear	 temporal	structure	 that	 traditional	scansion	does	not	account	 for	(‘B’	represents	a	beat,	 ‘o’	an	off-beat	and	‘o’	a	‘double	off-beat’;	that	is,	an	offbeat	falling	over	two	syllables):			 James James Morrison Morrison Weatherby George Dupree 
  B  o  B  o  B   o    B    o   B   o     B     o B    [o B] 
 Took great Care of his mother Though he was only three. 
	 		B  o  B  o B    o      B   o  B       o     B o  B   [o B] 	One	can	immediately	see	how	this	notation	captures	the	energy	of	the	poem	better	than	 traditional	 poetic	 scansion:	 it	 indicates	 how	 ‘Dupree	 and	 ‘three’	 have	 a	particularly	strong	metrical	weight,	as	the	line	ends	on	what	is	considered	in	music	to	be	a	strong	beat	–	the	third	beat	of	the	line.			What	 Attridge’s	 analysis	 highlights	 is	 that	 the	 key	 to	 this	 perception	 of	 an	 even	beat	in	the	poem	is	the	heavy	repetition	in	the	first	lines.	This	effectively	sets	up	a	form	of	temporal	periodicity	that,	once	established,	dictates	the	reader	into	fitting	the	stress	patterns	of	the	rest	of	the	poem	into	this	particular	framework.	This	kind	of	 heavy	 repetition	 is	most	 commonly	 associated	with	 nursery	 rhyme	 and	 other	childlike	compositions	–	indeed,	repetition	is	generally	understood	to	be	a	stylistic	error	 in	 prose	 syntax.	 Kerouac,	 however,	 repeats	 stress	 patterns,	 phonetic	patterns,	even	whole	words	at	various	emphatic	points	within	his	prose.	The	effect	of	 the	 temporal	 periodicity	 it	 suggests	 is	 highly	 important	 in	 creating	 a	musical	sense	to	his	writing.	A	notable	example	occurs	in	Part	Two,	as	they	head	west	from	New	Orleans:	
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	 What	 is	 the	Mississippi	 River?	 –	 a	 washed	 clod	 in	 the	 rainy	 night,	 a	 soft	plopping	 from	 drooping	Missouri	 banks,	 a	 dissolving,	 a	 riding	 of	 the	 tide	down	the	eternal	waterbed,	a	contribution	to	brown	foams,	a	voyaging	past	endless	vales	and	trees	and	leaves,	down	along,	down	along...	(OtR,	p.141-2)		In	 her	 analysis	 of	 this	 passage,	 Weinreich	 describes	 Kerouac’s	 answer	 to	 his	rhetorical	question	as	“gushing	forth”,	noting	the	repetitions	of	the	“short	o	sound”	(1987:46).	To	be	more	precise,	Kerouac	makes	use	of	 several	 forms	of	 emphatic	assonance	in	this	section:	the	ɒ	in	‘washed	clod’	and	‘soft	plopping’,	the	aɪ	in	‘riding	of	 the	 tide’,	 and	 the	 u	 and	 ʊ	 in	 ‘drooping	 Missouri’.	 The	 assonance	 dictates	 the	pattern	of	stresses	that	follow,	accompanied	by	regular	elisions	that	are	a	hallmark	of	Kerouac’s	folksy,	conversational	style:			 x  /  -    /  -   x   / x    /    x  /     /  x     x   
 a washed clod in the rainy night, a soft plopping from  
 o  B  o   B     o    B  o   B  o Bo  B  o  B     o 
 
    /  -     x / x   /   
 drooping Missouri banks 
  B     o      B o   B  [o] 		 	The	 repetition	 of	 these	 vowel	 sounds	 creates	 an	 effect	 of	 adjacent	 stresses	 that	would	be	normally	marked	as	a	spondee,	which	 in	traditional	scansion	slows	the	line	down.	With	Attridge’s	notation,	however,	we	can	see	how	the	off-beats	create	a	sense	of	continual	motion.	Although	the	first	unit	contains	four	beats	(and	begins	on	an	offbeat),	 the	comma	evens	 the	rhythm	out	by	creating	a	pause	 for	another	beat	before	 the	next	unit,	 so	 that	we	are	encouraged	 to	 read	 the	passage	as	 two	five-beat	units.	Then,	however,	this	pattern	is	disrupted	by	‘a	dissolving’.		
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-  x   /  x   x  /  x  x   -   /    x    x  - /  x   x -  / 
a dissolving, a riding of the tide down the eternal waterbed 
	 	o            B  o  B  o   B    o     B     o     B        o        B    o  B    o     B   o   B  o    	The	 phonetic	 repetitions	 and	 elisions	 paint	 a	 different	 picture	 this	 time:	 they	suggest	a	longer	foot,	a	faster	paced	anapaest.	Now,	although	the	underlying	pulse	is	the	same,	from	the	comma	after	 ‘dissolving’	every	second	beat	is	marked	as	an	unstressed	 syllable.	 This	 is	 in	 fitting	with	musical	metre,	 where	 in	 a	 4/4	 bar	 of	music	 the	 second	 and	 fourth	 beats	 are	 the	 ‘weak’	 ones.	 So	 there	 is	 still	 an	isochronous	 pulse	 underlying	 this	 passage.	 However,	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	section	 where	 every	 beat	 is	 stressed,	 only	 every	 strong	 beat	 is	 stressed	 in	 this	section.	As	a	result,	this	section	feels	comparatively	faster	as	there	are	more	beats	to	 fit	 into	 the	 line.	 In	 fact,	 it	would	be	better	 still	 to	 assume	 that,	 in	 our	musical	comparison,	this	would	be	closer	to	the	faster	rhythm	of	8/8	time.	These	rhythmic	shifts	supplement	Kerouac’s	image	of	the	river:	it	begins	as	a	slow	trickle	fed	by	the	rain	and	 then	gradually	builds	momentum	as	 it	 runs	 to	 the	sea	and	becomes	 the	‘riding	of	the	tide’.		As	 this	 indicates,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 a	 reader	 who	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	 emphatic	phonetic	repetition	to	sense	an	underlying	‘beat’	within	various	points	of	his	prose.	Kerouac’s	interest	lay	in	finding	a	niche	between	poetry	and	prose,	as	he	recorded	of	his	view	for	On	the	Road	in	1949:	“Not	a	river-like	novel;	but	a	novel	like	poetry,	or	 rather,	 a	 narrative	 poem,	 an	 epos	 in	 mosaic,	 a	 kind	 of	 Arabesque	preoccupation...”	(WW,	p.	241).	The	finished	work	is	not	bound	by	the	conventions	of	poetic	rhythm;	rather,	 it	adopts	different	rhythmic	patterns	to	suit	a	particular	tone,	image	or	theme.	Because	the	text	is	written	in	a	prose	style,	and	the	reader	is	not	 accustomed	 to	 phonetic	 repetition	 that	 seems	 more	 than	 accidental,	 these	
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patterns	become	a	highly	prominent	feature	when	they	occur,	and	often	Kerouac’s	dictum	 that	 ‘it’s	 not	 the	 words	 that	 count’	 becomes	 apparent	 as	 the	 rhythmic	effects	 take	 hold.	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 his	 description	 of	 the	 hobo	 ‘Mississippi	Gene’:		 Although	 Gene	was	white	 there	was	 something	 of	 the	wise	 and	 tired	 old	Negro	 in	him,	 and	 something	 very	much	 like	Elmer	Hassel,	 the	New	York	dope	addict,	in	him,	but	a	railroad	Hassel,	a	travelling	epic	Hassel,	crossing	and	recrossing	the	country	every	year,	south	in	the	winter	and	north	in	the	summer,	and	only	because	he	had	no	place	he	could	stay	in	without	getting	tired	 of	 it	 and	 because	 there	 was	 nowhere	 to	 go	 but	 everywhere,	 keep	rolling	under	the	stars,	generally	the	Western	Stars.	(OtR,	p.	25)		Elmer	Hassel	 is	only	ever	 referred	 to	 in	passing	during	 the	novel	and	 the	reader	knows	 little	 about	 him	 other	 than	 that	 he	 is	 a	 ‘dope	 addict’;	 this	 is	 because	 the	actual	Hassel,	Hubert	Huncke,	was	imprisoned	during	Kerouac’s	travels.22	As	such,	what	is	more	prominent	in	this	extract	is	the	way	Hassel’s	name	serves	to	establish	a	brief	repetitive	rhythm	in	his	description	of	Gene:			 /  x   /   x    / x   -   /    x   / x    / x    /  -    x  
 but a railroad Hassel, a travelling epic Hassel, crossing and  
  B  o   B   o   B o  B o   B   o    B  o  B o  Bo B    o 
 
  /   x  /   x   /   x   / x   /      /   x   x   /  x   x 
 recrossing the country every year, south in the winter and 
 B    o  B   o   B   o B  o  B  o B o      B    o 
 
  /     x  x   /  x 
  north in the summer... 
 B   o     B  o 
                                                
22 Beat Generation aficionados would be aware that Huncke is credited with having coined the phrase 
‘beat’; and Kerouac’s apparent reverence for him is part of his broader worldview that society’s 
downcasts, such as hobos and junkies, are more spiritually pure and thus ‘beatified’. 
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	The	difference	between	this	pattern	and	that	of	the	description	of	the	Mississippi	is	that	stressed	syllables	tend	to	follow	commas,	creating	what	would	traditionally	be	called	a	dactyl.	The	similarity	 to	the	Mississippi	passage	 is	reflected	 in	the	subtle	change	that	develops	after	the	fairly	steady	alternation	of	single	syllable	beats	and	off-beats,	where	 from	 ‘south	 in	 the	winter’	 the	 beat	 is	 dominated	 by	 double	 off-beats.	This	again	has	a	slightly	quicker	feel	–	musically	this	would	be	the	equivalent	of	 subdividing	 the	 notes	 with	 the	 bar,	 to	 turn	 four	 notes	 a	 bar	 into	 eight.	 The	overall	effect	 is	that	this	shift	creates	a	similar	sense	of	acceleration	and	building	momentum.	This	rhythm	conveyed	through	brief	repetitions	is	often	used	to	great	effect	where	Sal	describes	the	view	as	he	travels:			 Soon	it	got	dusk,	a	grapy	dusk,	a	purple	dusk	over	tangerine	groves	and	long		 melon	 fields,	 the	 sun	 the	 color	 of	 pressed	 grapes,	 slashed	with	 burgundy		 red,	the	fields	the	color	of	love	and	Spanish	mysteries.	I	stuck	my	head	out		 the	window	and	took	deep	breaths	of	the	fragrant	air.	(OtR,	p.	72)		Here	 the	 repetition	 of	 ‘dusk’	 establishes	 a	 general	 iambic	 pattern	 through	 the	phrasing	of	‘a	grapy	dusk,	a	purple	dusk’.	This	pattern	sustains	a	general	sense	of	momentum	which	is	interrupted	slightly	by	the	heavily	stressed	‘pressed	grapes’:	the	 subsequent	 unit	 has	 a	 brief	 trochaic	 feel,	 before	 the	 final	 unit	 reverts	 to	 the	iambic	pattern.	Dobyns	(1996,	p.	81)	notes	that	establishing	a	metric	pattern	and	then	breaking	away	from	it	for	poetic	purposes	has	roots	in	the	French	style	of	vers	
libre,	 and	 was	 put	 to	 use	 by	 Eliot	 and	 Larkin.	 This	 disruption	 has	 the	 effect	 of	
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suggesting	a	brief	moment	of	 looking	back	at	 the	scene	 through	 the	car	window,	whilst	the	overall	sense	of	momentum	continues.			Overall,	the	perception	of	an	occasional	isochronous	pulse	within	Kerouac’s	prose	seems	 a	 fairly	 strong	 explanation	 for	 where	 a	 non-conscious	 sensation	 that	 his	writing	 is	occasionally	 ‘musical’	might	come	from.	It	gives	Wyse’s	notion	that	the	novel	 ‘swings’	 particular	 validity,	 since	 the	 jazz	 aficionado	 might	 have	 been	particularly	 sensitive	 to	 this	 pattern.	 Literary	 critics	 versed	 in	 traditional	 prose,	however,	 would	 have	 little	 other	 than	 Joyce	 to	 compare	 such	 a	 use	 of	metre	 in	prose	to,	and	it	took	those	familiar	with	the	rhythms	of	poetry	to	see	any	value	in	Kerouac.	The	 chief	 example	would	be	his	 editor	 at	Viking,	Malcolm	Cowley,	who	edited	the	Viking	editions	of	Whitman’s	poetry.	 It	was	Cowley’s	recommendation	and	 editorial	 assistance	 that	 not	 only	 got	 Kerouac	 his	 contract,	 but	 saw	 him	through	to	actually	having	the	book	published.	As	we	shall	soon	see,	this	notion	of	a	 perceptual	 pulse	 within	 the	 rhythm	 of	 the	 prose	 feeds	 into	 another	 musical	element	of	Kerouac’s	work.		
Tension	and	Resolution		The	enduring	commercial	and	communal	popularity	of	music	as	an	art	form	owes	much	 to	 the	 cognitive	 ability	 to	 synchronise	 muscular	 movements	 with	 an	underlying	beat.	Yet	one	of	the	most	striking	aspects	of	the	musical	style	Kerouac	admired	so	much	was	that	it	was	that	it	was	uncommon	for	people	to	dance	to	it,	and	was	actually	far	less	popular	than	the	previous	trend,	swing	(Gridley	1978,	p.	169-170).	This	is	apparent	even	in	On	the	Road:	Kerouac	uses	deceptive	verbs	like	
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“everybody	was	 rocking	and	 roaring”	 (OtR,	p.	 179)	 to	 summarise	 the	 reaction	 to	the	music,	but	what	he	actually	describes	amounts	to	people	 jumping	or	bobbing	up	and	down:	“Galatea	and	Marie	with	beer	in	their	hands	were	standing	on	their	chairs,	shaking	and	jumping”	(OtR,	p.	179);	or,	describing	Dean:	“his	head	bowed,	his	hands	socking	in	together,	his	whole	body	jumping	on	his	heels	and	the	sweat,	always	the	sweat”	(OtR,	p.	183).	The	band’s	audience	do	not	so	much	tend	to	dance	but	to	move	about	in	ecstasy.		What	then	is	the	cognitive	basis	for	this	reaction?	Stylistically,	one	significant	way	in	 which	 bop	 differed	 from	 swing	 was	 the	 use	 of	 more	 complex	 harmonic	structures,	and	that	the	chord	progressions	of	bop	compositions	“projected	a	more	unresolved	 quality”	 (Gridley	 1978,	 p.	 142).	 Essentially	 what	 composers	 and	improvisers	like	Parker	and	Gillespie	were	doing	was	to	introduce	more	notes	that	fell	outside	 the	categorised	scale	of	 the	piece,	creating	dissonant	 intervals	before	returning	to	the	regular	scale	tones.	Robert	Jourdain	offers	an	eloquent	summary	of	how	this	affects	the	listener:		 From	these	principles,	it’s	easy	to	see	how	music	generates	emotion.	Music	sets	up	anticipations	and	then	satisfies	them.	It	can	withhold	its	resolutions,	and	 heighten	 anticipation	 by	 doing	 so,	 then	 satisfy	 the	 anticipation	 in	 a	great	gust	of	resolution.	When	music	goes	out	of	its	way	to	violate	the	very	expectations	 that	 it	 sets	 up,	 we	 call	 it	 ‘expressive’.	 Musicians	 breathe	‘feeling’	 into	 a	 piece	 by	 introducing	 minute	 deviations	 in	 timing	 and	loudness.	 And	 composers	 build	 expression	 into	 their	 compositions	 by	purposefully	violating	anticipations	they	have	established.	(1997,	p.	312)	
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	These	 patterns	 of	 tension	 and	 resolution	 can	 occur	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 musical	experience:	 rhythmic	 syncopation	 is	 one	 example.	 Harmonic	 tension	 however	 is	perhaps	 the	 most	 strongly	 associated	 with	 emotional	 or	 ecstatic	 responses	 to	music,	 and	 it	 is	 a	key	 feature	of	 instrumental	 genres	 such	as	 classical	 and	 jazz.23	The	effect	of	categorical	violations	such	as	those	produced	by	harmonic	complexity	can	be	highly	pronounced	for	some	people,	particularly	trained	musicians.	This	can	sometimes	 take	 the	 form	 of	 what	 Sloboda	 describes	 as	 “a	 pleasant	 physical	sensation	often	experienced	as	a	‘shiver’	or	a	‘tingle’	running	from	the	nape	of	the	neck	 down	 to	 the	 spine”	 (1991,	 p.	 110).	 This	 sensation	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	‘thrills’	(Goldstein,	1980)	or	‘chills’	(Blood	and	Zatorre,	2001).	Goldstein	found	that	music	 was	 the	 most	 effective	 at	 stimulating	 chills	 (though	 they	 could	 also	 be	sparked	by	 reactions	 to	visual	 arts	or	 literature);	Blood	and	Zatorre	profiled	 the	cerebral	 effects	 of	 musicians	 reacting	 to	 harmonically	 complex	 pieces.	 Their	findings	proved	particularly	interesting:		 Subjective	 reports	 of	 chills	 were	 accompanied	 by	 changes	 in	 heart	 rate,	electromyogram,	 and	 respiration.	 As	 intensity	 of	 these	 chills	 increased,	cerebral	blood	flow	increases	and	decreases	were	observed	in	brain	regions	thought	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 reward,	 motivation,	 emotion,	 and	 arousal,	including	 ventral	 striatum,	 midbrain,	 amygdala,	 orbitofrontal	 cortex,	 and	
                                                
23 So notable was the use of harmonic complexity in jazz and classical that for many years commentators 
assumed that modern jazz composers had been influenced primarily by contemporary classical composers 
like Stravinsky (Gridley 1978:139). In recent years, the musical ethnologist Gerhard Kubik provided 
evidence that this harmonic complexity also characterised the multi-part vocal traditions of Africa, 
suggesting that the harmonies used by Parker and others were more likely to have emerged from African-
American cultural memory. See Kubik (2005): ‘The African Matrix in Jazz Harmonic Practices’, 167-
222. 
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ventral	medial	 prefrontal	 cortex.	 These	 brain	 structures	 are	 known	 to	 be	active	in	response	to	other	euphoria	inducing	stimuli,	such	as	food,	sex,	and	drugs	of	abuse.	This	finding	links	music	with	biologically	relevant,	survival-related	stimuli	via	their	common	recruitment	of	brain	circuitry	involved	in	pleasure	and	reward.	(2001,	p.	11818)		Feeling	 the	 ‘chills’	 through	 a	 piece	 of	music	 can	 theoretically	 trigger	 the	 brain’s	inbuilt	system	of	rewards	that	it	uses	to	motivate	behaviour	necessary	for	survival:	key	to	this	is	a	chemical	called	dopamine,	which	today	is	understood	to	be	released	in	anticipation	of	a	reward	(previously	it	was	believed	that	dopamine	itself	was	the	reward:	cf.	Huron	and	Margulis,	2009,	p.	581).		A	study	by	Salimpoor	et	al.	(2011)	indicates	 that	 while	 listening	 to	 music,	 dopamine	 may	 be	 released	 merely	 in	anticipation	 of	 a	 resolution	 to	 the	 harmonic	 tension.	 Menon	 and	 Levitin	 (2005)	extended	the	work	of	Blood	and	Zatorre	by	explicitly	studying	the	reactions	of	non-musicians:	 their	 findings	 showed	 that	 even	 without	 musical	 training,	 the	mesolimbic	 system	 –	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 transmission	 of	 dopamine	 –	could	be	activated	by	classical	music.		The	 importance	of	 dopamine	 to	harmonically	 complex	music	 goes	 a	 long	way	 to	explaining	why	Dean	reacts	with	such	ecstasy	 to	 jazz.	Moreover,	 if	one	considers	what	 constitutes	 Dean’s	 constant	 pursuit	 of	 ‘kicks’,	 namely	 food,	 sex,	music	 and	drugs,	they	all	correspond	to	increased	neurological	activity	of	dopamine.	Notably,	Huron	 and	 Margulis	 write	 that	 dopamine	 “appears	 to	 reward	 wanting	 or	
expectation,	 not	 consummation”	 (2009,	 p.	 581).	 This	 is	 the	 very	 basis	 of	 Dean’s	
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hedonism;	 and	 it	 helps	 to	 understand	why	 disparate	 elements	 such	 as	 jazz	 and	drugs	were	such	a	common	interest	to	the	Beat	Generation.		Moreover	though,	one	could	describe	On	the	Road	as	a	novel	that	favours	wanting	and	 expectation	 rather	 than	 consummation.	 One	 observable	microstructure	 that	repeats	throughout	the	novel	is	the	way	Kerouac	constantly	raises	the	expectation	of	something	that	is	never	fully	delivered.	Early	on,	Sal	muses:	“Somewhere	along	the	 line	I	knew	there’d	be	girls,	visions,	everything,”	(OTR,	p.	10).	Yet	most	of	his	encounters	with	girls	end	in	disappointment,	his	visions	seem	to	have	little	impact	on	his	life,	and	he	rarely	if	ever	finds	what	he	set	out	for.	Throughout	Part	One	in	particular,	 Sal	 is	 constantly	 brimming	 with	 excitement	 about	 every	 location	 he	approaches;	but	he	usually	leaves	less	than	satisfied.		Essentially,	 On	 the	 Road	 is	 a	 novel	 that	 excels	 in	 exciting	 the	 reader	 through	 a	strong	 ability	 to	 generate	 expectations,	 rather	 than	 in	 the	 actual	 content	 of	 the	adventures	themselves.	Indeed,	not	only	does	Kerouac	generate	expectations	on	a	macro	 level	 about	 the	 adventures	 awaiting	 Dean	 and	 Sal:	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 he	constantly	generates	the	expectation	that	certain	patterns	will	form	in	his	writing	style.	The	key	point	is	that	the	rhythmic	repetitions	scattered	throughout	the	novel	are	 never	 so	 constant	 as	 to	 directly	 enter	 consciousness.	 Instead,	 they	 are	more	likely	 experienced	 as	non-conscious	patterns	 that	 the	brain	processes	discretely.	Additionally,	 violations	 of	 syntactic	 expectations	 regarding	 the	 length	 of	 clauses,	sentences	and	paragraphs	in	a	work	of	prose	occur	at	key	regularities.	These	two	would	 be	 likely	 be	 experienced	 as	 non-conscious,	 but	 if	 the	 effect	 they	 have	 of	creating	an	expectation	of	a	resolution	to	the	regular	syntactic	form	operates	in	a	
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similar	way	to	musical	expectation,	then	what	would	be	consciously	felt	would	be	a	pleasurable	 sensation.	 The	 nearest	 correlation	 that	 a	 reader	might	 have	 for	 this	sudden	 sense	 of	 pleasure	 from	 an	 aesthetic	 stimulus	would	 likely	 be	music,	 and	this,	coupled	with	a	sense	of	rhythmic	pulse	within	Kerouac’s	writing,	might	lend	some	credence	to	the	notion	that	his	writing	can	be	perceived	as	‘musical’.			In	 essence,	 these	 non-conscious	 patterns	 constitute	 a	 literary	 version	 of	musical	tension.	Goldstein’s	(1980)	research	indicated	that	‘thrills’	could	be	experienced	as	a	response	to	literature:	the	minute	nature	of	the	patterns	in	On	the	Road	suggests	that	 it	 is	 unlikely	 they	 would	 ever	 be	 experienced	 as	 profoundly	 as	 those	 in	expressive	music,	but	a	similar	sensation	is	theoretically	possible.	This	may	be	the	most	 intriguing	 explanation	 yet	 for	 the	 intuition	 that	On	 the	 Road	 is	 musical	 in	some	way:	not	in	the	sense	that	it	resembles	music	on	a	purely	symbolic	level,	as	Kerouac	 critics	 have	 been	 arguing	 for	 some	 time;	 but	 rather	 that	 it	 has	 the	potential	to	imitate	a	pleasurable	sensation	that	is	most	commonly	associated	with	music.		As	 a	 perceptual	 device,	 the	 manipulation	 of	 tension	 for	 aesthetic	 effect	 is	 not	confined	to	music.	Dobyns	writes	on	the	importance	of	tension	to	free	verse:		 A	basic	form	of	tension	is	the	anxiety	created	in	the	reader	when	the	writer	apparently	frustrates	what	the	reader	has	anticipated	to	be	the	direction	of	the	poem	both	in	form	and	content:	the	higher	the	anxiety,	the	greater	the	tension.	 Tension	 can	 be	 created	 in	many	ways.	 One	way	 is	 to	 establish	 a	pattern	 and	 then	 seem	 to	 depart	 from	 it.	 Another	 is	 to	 delay	 or	 avoid	
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natural	points	of	rest	–	that	is,	places	of	punctuation	or	syntactical	pauses	–	by	 enjambment	 or	 by	 frustrating	 the	 development	 of	 the	 sentence	 by	holding	 back	 a	 particular	 part	 of	 speech:	 for	 instance,	 by	 delaying	 the	subject,	verb	or	direct	object.	Tension	can	also	work	to	direct	the	reader’s	attention	to	particular	parts	of	them	poem	by	threatening	to	frustrate	what	he	has	begun	to	anticipate.	(1996,	p.	55)		Dobyns	notes	that	the	three	primary	features	for	controlling	tension	in	a	poem	are	the	line	breaks,	stress	patterns	and	repetition	(1996,	p.	108-130).	He	also	raises	an	important	point:	that	the	shape	of	the	words	on	the	page	brings	expectations:		 The	 reader’s	 approach	 to	 the	 poem	 is	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 the	 poem’s	visual	 shape	 on	 the	 page.	 If	 the	 poem	 is	 long	 or	 short,	 symmetrical	 or	asymmetrical,	has	 long	or	short	 lines,	 this	affects	 the	reader’s	expectation.	As	 readers,	we	not	 only	 bring	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 poem,	we	 also	 bring	 a	sense	of	how	much	effort	will	be	required	to	read	the	poem,	as	well	as	some	sense	 of	 possible	 reward.	 If	 the	 poem	 is	 large,	 long	 and	blocky,	 it	 is	 even	more	 necessary	 to	 make	 the	 poem	 interesting	 to	 the	 reader	 as	 soon	 as	possible.	 If	 the	poem	is	 thin,	short	and	 looks	easy	 to	read,	 then	the	writer	has	more	time	to	work	with	the	reader’s	expectations.	(1996,	p.	135-6)		Perceptual	 tension	 is	 an	 important	 aesthetic	device	 across	multiple	 forms	of	 art.	Yet	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 typical	 application	 of	 tension	 in	 music	 and	literature	is	the	distinction	between	conscious	and	non-conscious	processing.	In	a	plot-driven	 novel,	 for	 instance,	 an	 author	 may	 create	 tension	 by	 purposefully	
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creating	expectations	about	events	and	holding	off	on	delivering	those	events.	This	represents	 a	 conscious	 form	 of	 tension:	 musical	 tension,	 however,	 is	 generally	processed	 non-consciously.	 Harmonic	 syntax	 violation	 is	 based	 on	 an	 acquired	categorical	 perception	 of	 pitch	 intervals	 that	 is	 generally	 processed	 discretely;	trained	musicians	may	identify	the	relations,	but	for	general	listeners	the	source	of	the	 tension	 remains	 non-conscious.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 a	 novel	 we	 are	 generally	perfectly	capable	of	identifying	the	source	of	tension.		Dobyns’	 observations	 on	 poetry	 reveal	 how,	 like	 music,	 it	 can	 create	 tension	through	 elements	 that	 are	 usually	 processed	 discretely.	 Poetry	 can	 also	 utilise	conscious	forms	of	tension,	such	as	ambiguity	(here	we	might	recall	our	discussion	of	Barry	in	Chapter	2),	giving	the	potential	for	a	synthesis	between	conscious	and	non-conscious	experience.	To	a	certain	extent,	this	is	what	Kerouac	achieves	in	On	
the	Road.	There	are	elements	of	tension	that	are	experienced	consciously	as	part	of	the	 narrative:	 many	 of	 these	 arc	 throughout	 the	 text,	 such	 as	 the	 continually	unresolved	 sense	 of	 longing	 Sal	 has	 for	 an	 America	 he	 never	 finds,	 and	 the	supposed	genius	of	Dean	that	he	repeatedly	fails	to	demonstrate.	Many	elements,	however,	are	experienced	non-consciously:	and	these	are	what	give	to	the	novel	a	perceptual	effect	that	opens	up	comparisons	with	music.		
Visions	of	Sal		Having	established	the	sensory	and	perceptual	basis	for	this	effect	of	tension,	what	remains	 now	 is	 to	 explore	 the	 specific	means	 by	which	Kerouac	was	 creating	 it.	Dobyns	provides	us	with	a	basis	for	this,	having	identified	the	main	sources	of	non-
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conscious	 tension	 in	 poetry.	 We	 can	 immediately	 identify	 similar	 features	 in	Kerouac’s	prose.	A	key	component	is	the	delaying	or	avoidance	of	“natural	points	of	 rest”:	 Kerouac’s	 style	 is	 replete	 with	 examples	 of	 sentences	 that	 run	 beyond	expected	cadences,	most	notably	those	that	continue	for	several	lines	before	a	full	stop.	Of	course,	long	sentences	are	a	common	device	in	modernist	prose:	but	what	characterises	Kerouac’s	in	particular	is	the	‘run-on’	feel,	owing	to	a	general	lack	of	coordinating	 conjunctions	 and	 a	 preference	 for	 parataxis	 in	 his	 style.	 By	way	 of	example,	consider	another	jazz	scene:	the	concert	by	bop	pianist	George	Shearing	at	the	famous	club	Birdland	in	New	York:		 The	drummer,	Denzil	Best,	sat	motionless	except	for	his	wrists	snapping	the	brushes.	And	Shearing	began	to	rock;	a	smile	broke	over	his	ecstatic	face;	he	began	to	rock	in	the	piano	seat,	back	and	forth,	slowly	at	first,	then	the	beat	went	up,	and	he	began	rocking	fast,	his	left	foot	jumped	up	with	every	beat,	his	neck	began	to	rock	crookedly,	he	brought	his	face	down	to	the	keys,	he	pushed	his	hair	back,	his	combed	hair	dissolved,	he	began	to	sweat.	(OtR,	p.	116)		There	are	some	notable	repetitions	here.	First	 is	 that	of	 ‘began	 to	rock’,	which	 is	repeated	 twice	 in	 full	 and	 echoed	 by	 ‘began	 rocking’	 and	 ‘began	 to	 sweat’.	 The	other	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 independent	 clauses	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	sentence	 all	 begin	 with	 ‘he’	 or	 ‘his’,	 creating	 a	 further	 source	 of	 repetition.	Moreover,	the	last	four	of	these	are	followed	by	a	word	that	begins	with	a	plosive	(/b/,	 /p/	 and	 /k/),	 giving	 the	 passage	 its	 percussive	 element.	 Consider	 too	what	
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happens	 when	 the	 sentence	 is	 analysed	 using	 Attridge’s	 scansion,	 this	 time	focusing	purely	on	the	underlying	beats	and	off-beats	in	the	passage:		
his left foot jumped up with every beat, his neck began to rock 
o    B  o B  o  B  o  B  o    B o   B o B o   B   o B   o  B o  
 
 
crookedly, he brought his face down to the keys, he pushed his 
 B   o   B o   B       o   B  o  B    o     B oB o  B     o 
 
 
hair back, his combed hair dissolved, he began to sweat 
 B  o  B oB o    B  o  B    o   B o B  o    B  o   B   o 	This	pattern	of	beats	and	off	beats	begins	just	after	Kerouac	writes	“then	the	beat	went	up”.	What	is	notable	is	that	before	this	moment	in	the	passage,	the	beats	and	offbeats	fall	on	longer,	multisyllabic	words;	but	after	the	beat	‘goes	up’	the	words	are	generally	shorter	and	simpler,	imitating	this	effect	of	a	faster	rhythmic	tempo	by	allowing	the	reader	to	‘speed	up’	by	moving	quicker	from	word	to	word.	Again,	through	 a	 combination	 of	 rhythmic	 and	 phonetic	 variation,	 Kerouac	manages	 to	create	a	mimetic	sensation	of	jazz	for	the	reader.		As	mentioned	above,	many	of	the	expressions	regarding	Shearing	are	independent	clauses,	yet	only	once	does	Kerouac	uses	the	conjunction	‘and’.	Moreover,	he	only	uses	 two	 semi-colons,	 preferring	 to	 comma-splice.	 While	 the	 latter	 is	 generally	considered	 a	 stylistic	 error,	 Strunk	 and	White	 (1959)	 note	 that	 clauses	 that	 are	short	and	alike	in	form	are	considered	an	acceptable	use	of	the	comma	splice.	As	a	result	 of	 all	 this,	 Kerouac’s	 sentence	 strikes	 a	 rather	 compelling	 balance.	 It	 is	written	in	such	a	way	that	the	reader	anticipates	certain	cadences	(either	more	full	stops	 or	 semi-colons)	 to	 regulate	 the	 style	 in	 line	with	 traditional	 formal	 prose.	Importantly,	 however,	 the	 sentence	 does	 not	 deviate	 too	 far	 from	 stylistic	convention	to	the	point	of	appearing	unstructured.		
 158
	The	 importance	 of	 this	 becomes	 noticeable	 if	 we	 return	 to	 the	 comparison	 of	cadences	 in	 the	written	and	oral	versions	of	October	in	the	Railroad	Earth.	When	the	written	version	goes	on	as	long	as	it	does,	it	appears	merely	unstructured	and	chaotic.	 But	 the	 more	 controlled	 cadence	 in	 the	 oral	 version	 allows	 minute	deviations	to	exist	without	plunging	the	reading	into	chaos;	for	instance,	the	run-on	 of	 ‘in	 redbrick	 of	 drowsy	 lazy	 afternoons	with	 everybody	 at	 work	 in	 offices’	becomes	 apparent,	 and	 contrasts	with	 the	 controlled	 beginning.	 This	 establishes	rhythmic	tension,	which	aesthetically	supplements	the	gradual	progression	of	the	scene	towards	a	chaotic	picture	of	the	city	in	motion.		This	kind	of	tension	is	effective	because	it	strikes	the	fine	balance	between	being	salient	enough	to	enter	consciousness	as	a	perceptual	effect,	yet	staying	relatively	discrete	 by	 conforming	 just	 close	 enough	 to	 acceptable	 sentence	 structure	 and	style,	to	avoid	bringing	the	source	of	the	tension	into	consciousness	as	well.	This	is	a	 key	 difference	 between	 novels	 written	 in	 Kerouac’s	 ‘Spontaneous	 Prose’	 style	and	On	the	Road.	In	the	former,	the	reader	becomes	overwhelmed	with	structural	tension	 that	 promises	 no	 resolution	 and	 can	 be	 quickly	 identified	 as	 a	 stylistic	fault;	 in	 the	 latter,	 the	 anticipation	 is	never	 too	 far	 from	being	 resolved,	 and	 the	source	 of	 the	 tension	 remains	 non-conscious.	 As	 in	music,	 a	 brief	 deviation	 to	 a	dissonant	 note	 that	 quickly	 resolves	 to	 the	 original	 scale	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	expressive	device,	but	too	many	dissonant	intervals	becomes	unpleasant.		The	extent	of	jazz’s	influence	on	Kerouac’s	style	of	writing,	however,	perhaps	runs	even	 deeper	 than	 previously	 speculated,	 as	 minute	 patterns	 of	 tension	 and	
 159 
anticipation	 characterise	 his	 style	 in	 On	 the	 Road.	 At	 first	 glance,	 the	 book	resembles	a	 traditional	novel	 in	 that	 it	carries	many	of	 the	syntactic	conventions	that	we	expect	 from	prose;	unlike	the	styles	he	adopted	 in	Visions	of	Cody	or	The	
Subterraneans.	Yet	as	we	have	seen	from	the	rhythmic	analysis,	there	are	moments	embedded	throughout	the	regular	structure	where	the	syntax	becomes	more	what	we	expect	of	verse,	and	at	times	conveys	an	underlying	beat	–	which	one	rarely	if	ever	expects	to	pick	up	in	traditional	prose.		My	 argument	 as	 to	 why	 On	 the	 Road	 is	 the	 most	 commercially	 successful	 and	enduringly	popular	of	Kerouac’s	fiction	is	that	it	represents	his	most	accomplished	blend	 of	 prose	 and	 poetry.	 This	 was	 the	 unwitting	 product	 of	 the	 nine	 year	composition	and	revision	period	he	endured	before	it	made	it	onto	the	shelves:	it	gave	him	the	best	chance	to	focus	his	intuitions	about	projecting	the	‘rush	of	truth’	to	the	reader	and	refine	those	passages	with	exceptionally	poetic	overtones.	These	microstructures	of	poetry	within	what	is	generally	categorised	as	a	work	of	prose	create	moments	 of	 tension,	 and	 anticipation	 of	 a	 resolution	 to	 the	 regular	 form.	The	fact	that	his	poetic	rhythms	are	never	sustained	for	very	long,	and	even	within	those	 patterns	 have	 moments	 where	 they	 temporarily	 fall	 out	 of	 rhythm,	effectively	 ‘losing	 the	 beat’,	 is	 itself	 a	 feature	 that	 helps	 to	 ensure	 this	 musical	sensation	 is	heightened	for	the	reader.	As	Robert	 Jourdain	explains,	a	completely	consistent	beat	might	eventually	become	dampened	in	our	consciousness,	and	the	effect	would	be	lost:		 Habituation	occurs	in	all	parts	of	our	experience,	and	at	all	levels.	A	flashing	display	 on	 a	 VCR	 soon	 ceases	 to	 draw	 our	 attention.	 So	 does	 a	 perfectly	
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even	 beat	 in	 music.	 We	 still	 hear	 every	 feature	 of	 the	 sound,	 of	 course,	because	habituation	is	never	total.	But	the	beat	is	less	forceful	than	it	would	be	 if	 it	 were	 varied	 slightly.	 One	 cause	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 may	 be	temporary	 neural	 exhaustion	 when	 the	 same	 brain	 circuits	 are	 activated	again	and	again.	Slight	variation	overcomes	this	failing.	(1997,	p.	314)		So	although	this	aspect	of	Kerouac’s	style	in	On	the	Road	might	not	have	been	the	product	 of	 intentional	 design,	 through	 his	 continual	 revision	 over	 such	 a	 long	period	it	may	have	emerged	gradually,	and	contributed	to	the	novel’s	sensation	of	being	‘like	jazz’.			Of	course,	to	perceive	On	the	Road	as	 jazz-like	is	most	 likely	for	a	specific	type	of	reader	with	experiences	that	would	allow	them	to	relate	to	this	sensation	of	music.	This	would	require	they	have	some	sensitivity	to	poetic	structures,	perhaps	also	a	familiarity	with	the	styles	of	music	Kerouac	describes,	so	as	to	have	a	comparable	sense	of	a	stimulus	 that	produces	 feelings	of	pleasant	 tension.	As	such,	when	the	novel	debuted	in	1957,	it	is	likely	that	it	would	have	resonated	more	directly	with	Kerouac’s	contemporaries	and	the	youth	who	enjoyed	the	same	underground	jazz	scene	 that	 he	 did,	 and	 less	 so	 with	 literary	 critics	 expecting	 a	 traditional	 novel	conforming	to	certain	stylistic	standards.		
“Everything	was	like	jazz”	
	
On	the	Road	 is	not	 the	only	novel	of	Kerouac’s	where	 these	kinds	of	patterns	are	fairly	prevalent.	One	example	was	already	given	in	the	introduction	to	this	thesis:	
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from	Kerouac’s	Desolation	Angels,	where	he	describes	the	scene	in	a	San	Francisco	jazz	 bar	 after	 his	 character	 Jack	 Dulouz	 has	 just	 returned	 from	 his	 time	 as	 a	watchman	on	Desolation	peak:		 The	 bartenders	 are	 the	 regular	 band	 of	 Jack,	 and	 the	 heavenly	 drummer	who	looks	up	in	the	sky	with	blue	eyes,	with	a	beard,	is	wailing	beer-caps	of	bottles	and	jamming	on	the	cash	register	and	everything	is	going	to	the	beat	–	It’s	the	beat	generation,	it’s	béat,	 it’s	the	beat	to	keep,	it’s	the	beat	of	the	heart,	it’s	being	beat	and	down	in	the	world	and	like	old	time	lowdown	and	like	in	ancient	civilisations	the	slave	boatmen	rowing	galleys	to	a	beat	and	servants	spinning	pottery	to	a	beat.	(1965,	p.	137)		Once	 again,	 the	 plosive	 /b/	 is	 prevalent	 throughout	 this	 passage,	 not	 just	 in	 the	repetition	 of	 ‘beat’	 but	 in	 the	 alliteration	 of	 ‘bartenders’,	 ‘band’,	 blue’,	 ‘beard’,	giving	it	a	percussive	accent.	Then	there	is	a	rhythmic	pattern	established	after	the	first	 occurrence	 of	 the	 word	 beat,	 which	 we	 can	 again	 examine	 in	 terms	 of	 the	beats	and	off	beats:			
It’s the beat generation, it’s béat, it’s the beat to keep, it’s 
 B    o    B   o   B  oB   B   o B o  B    o   B    o  B  o  B 
the beat of the heart, it’s being beat and down in the world and  
 o    B    o      B  o   B   o     B    o   B      o    B     o 
like old time lowdown 
 B    o    B   o   B 	Here	 again,	 the	 rhythmic	 patterning	 is	 fairly	 consistent.	 So	 this	 passage	 has	 the	phonetic	and	rhythmic	elements	consistent	with	Kerouac’s	style	of	imitating	jazz	in	
On	the	Road.	A	recording	also	exists	of	Kerouac	reading	this	passage,	without	any	musical	accompaniment:	his	phrasing	takes	on	the	gentle	rhythm	outlined	above.	
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	Earlier	 in	 the	 chapter	 we	 considered	Malcolm’s	 largely	 symbolic	 analysis	 of	 the	relationship	between	jazz	and	Kerouac’s	writing,	with	his	argument	that	Kerouac’s	obsession	with	 jazz	was	a	manifestation	of	his	primitivism	and	 its	accompanying	predilection	 for	 all	 aspects	 of	 African-American	 culture.	 Whaley	 (2004)	 also	touches	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 primitivism	 as	 explaining	 Kerouac’s	 appropriation	 of	jazz,	 but	 he	 adds	 some	 extra	 layers	 of	 interpretation,	 using	 a	 passage	 from	Kerouac’s	The	Dharma	Bums	as	a	pivot.		 Then	suddenly	everything	was	like	 jazz:	 it	happened	in	one	insane	second	or	so:	I	looked	up	and	saw	Japhy	running	down	the	mountain	in	huge	twenty	foot	 leaps,	running,	 leaping,	 landing	with	a	great	drive	of	his	booted	heels,	bouncing	 five	 feet	 or	 so,	 running,	 then	 taking	 another	 long	 crazy	 yelling	yodelaying	sail	down	the	sides	of	the	world	and	in	that	flash	I	realised	it’s	
impossible	to	fall	off	mountains	you	fool	and	with	a	yodel	of	my	own	began	running	down	the	mountain…	(1959,	p.	74)		Whaley	 suggests	 that	 the	 jazz-like	 style	 of	 the	 passage	 is	 principally	 symbolic	 in	nature:		 On	one	level,	Ryder’s	descent	may	be	said	to	resemble	jazz	(especially	bop)	in	 the	way	a	solo	may	take	unusual	 “leaps”	 from	one	note	 to	 the	next	and	give	 no	 account	 to	 the	 available,	 more	 conventionally	 used,	 notes	 in	between.	At	another	moment	the	solo	may	seem	to	be	“running”	in	orderly	fashion	through	diatonic	arpeggios	or	scales,	or	chromatic	runs.	 Jazz	solos	
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seem	to	“bounce”	as	they	syncopate	or	swing	the	beat	 in	a	particular	way.	Finally,	the	“yodelaying”	voice	resembles	the	jazz	solo	insofar	as	the	latter	is	heard	as	an	extension	of	the	voice.	(2004,	p.	32-3)		This	 is	 fairly	astute	symbolic	analysis	of	 the	connections	between	 jazz	and	 Japhy	Ryder’s	 wild	 descent	 down	 the	 side	 of	 the	 mountain.	 If	 we	 apply	 the	 style	 of	rhythmic	and	structural	analysis	 from	the	reading	of	On	the	Road	 to	 this	passage	from	 Dharma	 Bums,	 what	 becomes	 clear	 is	 that	 Kerouac	 creates	 a	 mimetic	description	of	the	jazz-like	descent,	as	it	sails	down	the	mountainside.	‘Running’	is	used	 as	 the	 repetitive	 hook	 throughout	 the	 passage,	 as	with	 ‘beat’	 in	Desloation	
Angels.	 It	 establishes	 a	brief	pattern	of	 ‘running,	 leaping,	 landing’	with	Kerouac’s	typical	 style	 of	 staccato	 commas,	 and	 then	 breaks	 into	 a	 run-on	 sentence	 that	creates	 a	 mild	 sense	 of	 tension,	 which	 is	 resolved	 just	 as	 Kerouac’s	 character	resolves	 his	 own	 sense	 of	 fright	 and	 goes	 after	 Japhy.	 The	 ‘yodelaying’	moment	comes,	as	Whaley	notes,	within	a	moment	where	it	can	be	taken	to	resemble	a	jazz	solo	that	takes	place	during	a	break	–	which	Whaley	compares	to	a	famous	break	by	Charlie	Parker	on	the	track	‘A	Night	in	Tunisia’	(2004,	p.	32).	In	this	case	though	the	break	takes	place	just	after	Kerouac	has	built	a	sense	of	rhythm.		There	 are	 other	 examples	 to	 be	 found	 across	 Kerouac’s	 prose,	 but	 they	 seem	strongest	and	most	consistent	in	the	works	that	were	created	or	revised	after	his	experiments	with	‘Spontaneous	Prose’	had	subsided.	Chiefly	these	are	On	the	Road,	
The	Dharma	Bums	and	Desolation	Angels:	 by	 the	 time	 it	 came	 to	writing	Big	Sur,	Kerouac	had	again	moved	closer	to	the	style	of	 ‘Spontaneous	Prose’.	This	musical	element	of	 his	writing	 style	 occurs	 every	now	and	 then	within	 these	works,	 and	
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although	 it	 is	 never	 sustained	 for	 too	 long	 (whether	 by	 accident	 or	 design),	 it	establishes	a	trace,	non-conscious	sensation	that	something	‘like	jazz’	is	happening	within	 the	 passage.	 Kerouac	 criticism	 has	 been	 grappling	 with	 symbolic	explanations	for	it	over	several	decades;	to	those	they	can	now	add	the	more	direct	understanding	that	it	really	is	analogous	to	jazz	in	terms	of	its	principle	aesthetic	effect.		
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Chapter	Four:	Impressionism	in	Mrs	Dalloway			
First	Impressions		Virginia	Woolf	herself	noted	upon	 finishing	Mrs	Dalloway	 that	 it	would	challenge	the	literary	world.	“The	reviewers	will	say	that	it	is	disjointed	because	of	the	mad	scenes	 not	 connecting	 with	 the	 Dalloway	 scenes”	 (1978,	 p.	 75).	 This	 intuition	turned	out	 to	be	 correct.	After	publication,	 she	noted	 that	 she	had	 received	 ‘two	unfavourable	reviews’	(1978,	p.	81),	but	also	an	encouraging	letter	of	praise	from	‘a	 young	man	 in	Earl’s	Court.’	He	wrote:	 “This	 time	you	have	done	 it	 –	 you	have	caught	life	and	put	it	in	a	book...”	(1978,	p.	81).			Contrary	 to	 her	 anxieties	 about	 the	 novel	 and	 some	 poor	 early	 reviews,	Woolf’s	experimental	 fiction	 in	Mrs	Dalloway	 has	 since	 been	 accepted	 as	 part	 of	 literary	canon.	As	well	as	being	understood	as	one	of	 the	original	modernist	authors,	 the	works	of	Woolf	are	often	considered	to	carry	examples	of	literary	Impressionism.	It	is	this	literary	technique	that	this	chapter	will	focus	upon,	aiming	to	expand	our	understanding	 of	 it	 through	 cognitive	 science.	 It	 attempts	 to	 show	 that	 the	‘disjointed’	 nature	 highlighted	 above	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 process	 of	 being	 able	 to	recreate	life-like	sensations	for	the	reader,	such	as	the	man	who	wrote	to	Woolf.	As	the	previous	chapter	focused	on	connections	with	music,	this	chapter	will	in	turn	delve	deeper	 into	 the	connections	between	Woolf’s	style	and	the	visual	school	of	Impressionism.		
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It	will	 offer	 a	 brief	 survey	 of	 the	 current	 scholarship	 on	 literary	 Impressionism,	principally	so	as	to	establish	links	with	the	methodology	and	theories	outlined	in	Chapters	One	and	Two.	Following	this,	it	will	discuss	how	the	concept	of	‘delayed	decoding’	 often	 considered	a	 core	part	 of	 literary	 Impressionism	 fits	 in	with	our	cognitive	 framework.	 The	 chapter	 will	 then	 move	 into	 a	 perceptual	 analysis	 of	some	of	the	distinctive	effects	associated	with	visual	Impressionism,	and	look	for	points	of	 comparison	with	Woolf’s	 style	 in	Mrs	Dalloway.	This	will	 extend	across	three	 broad	 categories	 of	 comparison:	 equiluminance	 (a	 key	 aspect	 of	 Monet’s	work),	sound	(following	on	from	our	discussion	of	sound	in	Kerouac),	and	finally	how	 the	 novel	 represents	 time,	 and	 the	 way	 this	 can	 be	 related	 to	 our	 own	mechanisms	of	time	perception.		To	 begin,	 let	 us	 examine	 this	 excellent	 description	 of	 literary	 Impressionism	provided	by	Van	Gunsteren:		 The	Literary	Impressionists,	like	the	Impressionists	in	painting,	focused	on	perception.	 They	 attempted	 to	 formulate	 reality	 by	 breaking	 it	 into	momentary	fragments,	selected	intuitively	and	subjectively.	They	relied	on	sensory	 (ap)perceptions,	 used	 clusters	 of	 images	 and	 rendered	 their	emotions	 in	a	 ‘slice	of	 life’	picture	of	 some	everyday,	ordinary	experience.	(1990,	p.7).		What	distinguishes	Impressionism’s	treatment	of	sensation	and	emotion	from	the	realist	literature	of	the	nineteenth	century	is	this	focus	on	representing	the	act	of	perception	with	the	greatest	authenticity.	This	meant	embracing	a	subjective	and	
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therefore	potentially	 imperfect	 representation	 rather	 than	 relying	on	omniscient	narration	 to	 interpret	 and	 summarise	 what	 their	 characters	 felt.	 Sensory	perceptions	 are	 presented	 as	 though	 they	 are	 immediate	 reactions	 rather	 than	slower	interpretations.		Jesse	Matz,	who	has	written	extensively	on	literary	Impressionism,	has	this	to	say	about	the	relationship	between	the	visual	and	literary	schools	of	Impressionism:		 The	 Impressionisms	 of	 painting	 and	 literature	 share	 an	 interest	 in	subjective	perception.	This	shift	from	object	to	subject,	with	its	emphasis	on	point	of	view,	 seems	 to	have	entailed	 in	both	arts	attention	 to	evanescent	events,	 radical	 fidelity	 to	 perceptual	 experience,	 and	 a	 consequent	inattention	to	what	had	been	art’s	framing	concerns.	Out	were	plot,	schema	and	 other	 forms	 of	 rationalising	 conceptual	 knowledge:	 freedom,	informality	and	emphasis	on	the	experience	of	the	senses	enabled	the	artist	to	make	art	more	perfectly	 reflect	 lived	experience.	And	 freedom	 from	all	other	 goals	 allowed	 the	 artist	 to	 get	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 perception,	 from	which	all	other	forms	of	experience	follow.	(2001,	p.	45)		Using	this	as	a	framework,	we	can	see	how	the	observations	about	the	fate	of	Mrs	Dalloway	pulled	 from	Woolf’s	diary	 fit	 this	general	mould	of	 Impressionism.	The	‘disjointed’	 plot	 structure	 was	 written	 precisely	 so	 that	 Woolf	 could	 “more	perfectly	 reflect	 lived	 experience”,	 as	Matz	 puts	 it.	 But	Matz	 goes	 on	 to	 sound	 a	note	of	caution	regarding	the	idea	of	drawing	a	close	analogy	between	the	world	of	art	and	literature:	
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	 Analogies	 between	 the	 arts	 are	 always	 suspect.	 Beyond	 the	 pleasure	 and	usefulness	of	basic	 interdisciplinarity,	 important	warnings	begin	to	sound,	and	these	gain	special	authority	when	it	comes	to	Impressionism,	primarily	because	such	analogies	have	often	supported	claims	that	Impressionism	is	not	 literary.	 Superficial	 sensation	 may	 work	 well	 in	 painting,	 but	 it	trivialises	 literature:	 this	has	been,	as	we	have	seen,	 the	argument	behind	misunderstandings	of	the	literary	impression	–	the	argument	that	 led	Max	Nordau,	 for	 example,	 to	 conclude	 that	 “Impressionism	 in	 literature	 is	 an	example	 of	 the	 atavism	which	we	have	 noticed	 as	 the	most	 distinguished	feature	in	the	mental	life	of	degenerates.”	(2001,	p.	45-6)		Matz’s	 example	 of	 Nordau’s	 attitude	 towards	 Impressionism	 is	 indeed	 a	 rather	strong	warning	 to	 tread	 carefully	where	 attempting	 not	 only	 to	 create	 analogies	between	 the	 arts,	 but	 also	 to	 attempt	 to	 rationalise	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 science.	Nonetheless,	this	is	one	of	the	ambitions	of	this	chapter.	Matz	and	Van	Gunsteren’s	language	 used	 to	 define	 Impressionism	 takes	 us	 back	 to	 the	 familiar	 terms	 of	perception	and	sensation.	These	are	indeed	at	the	heart	of	Impressionism,	whether	literary	or	visual.		Having	arrived	at	this	familiar	point,	we	might	now	recall	Shlovsky’s	observations	about	the	‘deautomatisation’	effect	of	poetic	language:			 We	 find	 material	 obviously	 created	 to	 remove	 the	 automatism	 of	perception;	the	author's	purpose	is	to	create	the	vision	which	results	from	
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that	 deautomatized	 perception.	 A	 work	 is	 created	 ‘artistically’	 so	 that	 its	perception	is	impeded	and	the	greatest	possible	effect	is	produced	through	the	slowness	of	the	perception.	(1965,	p.	33).		This	deautomatised	perception	 is	one	particularly	 crucial	 facet	of	Mrs	Dalloway’s	artistic	 impact.	 It	 works	 against	 our	 expectations	 of	 a	 linear	 narrative,	 a	 clear	chronology	and	an	omniscient	narrator.	Sudden	shifts	in	tense,	ambiguities	about	point	of	 view	and	 the	exact	 chronology	of	 the	moment	disrupt	 the	experience	of	conventional	reading,	of	being	able	to	move	quickly	from	one	event	to	the	next	by	simply	following	the	plot.	By	complicating	the	narrative	in	this	way,	Woolf	impedes	the	 automatic	 perception	 of	 textual	 information	 and	 in	 a	 manner	 of	 speaking	imitates	the	confusion	and	the	emotional	state	of	her	key	characters,	particularly	Septimus	 as	 he	 suffers	 from	 the	 effects	 of	 shell-shock.	 For	 some	 readers,	 this	mimetic	 effect	 will	 be	 off-putting;	 but	 this	 deautomatised	 perception	 has	 the	potential	to	imitate	aspects	of	the	human	experience	that	are	more	effective	than	if	they	are	simply	told	directly.		As	an	example	of	how	this	deautomisation	functions	in	the	novel,	let	us	consider	a	passage	where	Peter	Walsh	undertakes	his	visit	to	Clarissa:		 ‘Do	 you	 remember	 the	 lake?’	 she	 said,	 in	 an	 abrupt	 voice,	 under	 the	pressure	 of	 an	 emotion	which	 caught	 her	 heart,	made	 the	muscles	 of	 her	throat	stiff,	and	contracted	her	lips	in	a	spasm	as	she	said	‘lake’.	For	she	was	a	child,	throwing	bread	to	the	ducks,	between	her	parents,	and	at	the	same	time	a	grown	woman	coming	to	her	parents	who	stood	by	the	lake,	holding	
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her	life	in	her	arms	which,	as	she	neared	them,	grew	larger	and	larger	in	her	arms,	until	 it	became	a	whole	 life,	a	complete	 life,	which	she	put	down	by	them	and	said	‘This	is	what	I	have	made	of	it!	This!’	And	what	had	she	made	of	it?	What	indeed?	sitting	there	sewing	this	morning	with	Peter.	(MD,	p.	46)		The	passage	opens	with	an	innocuous	question	from	Clarissa,	all	of	five	words	long,	before	 it	moves	 into	 describing	 in	 vivid	 sensory	 and	 emotional	 detail	 the	 toll	 it	takes	her	 to	 ask	 this	 question:	 her	 stiff	 throat,	 abrupt	 voice,	 her	 lips	 in	 a	 spasm.	Then	Woolf	writes	‘For	she	was	a	child’,	implying	at	first	that	she	is	remembering	her	experience	as	a	child	by	the	lake	when	she	asks	the	question,	but	also	shifting	the	narrative	away	from	the	present	to	the	past.		Then,	the	line	“at	the	same	time	a	grown	 woman”	 further	 impedes	 the	 steady	 perception	 of	 this	 passage,	 as	 the	reader	is	confronted	by	the	ambiguity	of	this	image	of	Clarissa	as	both	a	child	and	a	grown	 woman.	 It	 forces	 them	 to	 question	 whether	 she	 is	 perhaps	 having	 two	distinct	but	related	memories	of	the	lake,	first	as	a	girl	and	second	as	a	woman;	or	if	the	co-existence	of	these	two	ages	signifies	that	this	is	not	simply	the	province	of	memory	and	this	is	instead	Clarissa’s	poetic	description	of	her	feeling	unsettled	by	Peter	Walsh’s	 presence.	 The	 continued	 imagery	 of	 showing	her	 parents	 ‘her	 life’	and	then	turning	the	question	to	herself:	 ‘and	what	had	she	made	of	 it?’	makes	it	seem	as	if	she	is	evaluating	her	life	having	been	confronted	by	Peter,	as	the	passage	returns	to	a	mundane	image	of	her	sewing.		It	takes	a	careful	reading	of	this	passage	to	notice	and	fully	appreciate	these	shifts	and	 points	 of	 ambiguity,	 and	 in	 part	 it	 owes	 this	 to	 having	 done	 away	 with	omniscient	 narration.	 Yet	 this	 is	 an	 essential	 component	 in	 this	 aesthetic	
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experience	of	Clarissa’s	emotional	turmoil	at	this	moment.	The	passage	is	long	and	the	narrative	style	makes	 it	seem	longer	still;	but	by	contrast	 the	actual	dialogue	takes	barely	any	time.	It	becomes	more	noticeable	if	one	aligns	the	dialogue	from	these	pages	but	omits	all	of	the	descriptive	paragraphs	that	accompany	them:		 Clarissa:	‘Herbert	has	it	now.	I	never	go	there	now.’	Clarissa:	‘Do	you	remember	the	lake?’	Peter:	‘Yes.	Yes,	yes	yes.’	Clarissa:	‘Well,	and	what’s	happened	to	you?	Peter:	‘Millions	of	things!’	‘I	am	in	love.	In	love,	in	love	with	a	girl	in	India.’	Clarissa:	‘In	love!’	‘And	who	is	she?’	(MD,	p.	46-8)		While	this	actual	conversation	between	Clarissa	and	Peter	takes	up	only	a	few	lines,	the	 text	 runs	 for	 several	 pages.	 In	 between	 each	 phrase	 of	 their	 conversation,	Woolf	 impedes	 the	 flow	 of	 the	 conversation	 by	 taking	 time	 to	 dwell	 on	 their	thoughts	and	by	constructing	temporal	shifts	in	each	individual	paragraph.	As	such,	the	reader	is	allowed	to	feel	for	himself	or	herself	how	difficult	it	is	for	Clarissa	and	Peter	to	talk	directly	to	one	another,	because	of	all	that	has	come	between	them	in	the	past.			
Delayed	Decoding		Joseph	Conrad	 and	Ford	Madox	Ford	 are	 the	most	 common	names	 that	 recur	 in	discussions	 of	 literary	 Impressionism,	 although	 Woolf,	 Stephen	 Crane	 and	Katherine	Mansfield	are	also	frequently	connected	with	the	movement.	Examples	
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of	the	devices	that	characterise	literary	Impressionism	can	also	be	found	in	Proust	and	 Joyce.	 Ford	 is	 perhaps	most	 responsible	 for	 creating	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 ‘literary’	Impressionism,	 through	his	 essay	 ‘On	 Impressionism’.	 Saunders	writes	 that	Ford	envisaged	Impressionism	as	a	movement	occupying	its	own	time	period	between	realism	and	modernism.	Ford’s	novel	The	Good	Soldier	 is	noted	both	 for	having	a	fragmented	narrative	and	a	grammar	of	colour	that	can	be	compared	to	a	painting	–	with	certain	colours	taking	on	symbolic	values	(Liu,	2014,	p.	107).			However,	 the	 locus	 classicus	 of	 how	 the	 literary	 form	 of	 Impressionism	 actually	functions	in	terms	of	the	reader’s	approach	to	the	text	 is	Ian	Watt’s	discussion	of	Joseph	Conrad,	in	Conrad	in	the	Nineteenth	Century.	Watt	coined	the	term	‘delayed	decoding’	 to	describe	how	the	reader	undergoes	a	perceptual	experience	derived	from	 the	 same	 experience	 as	 the	 character.	 As	Watt	 describes	 it,	 the	 technique	“combines	the	forward	temporal	progression	of	the	mind,	as	it	receives	messages	from	the	outside	world,	with	the	much	slower	reflexive	process	of	making	out	their	meaning”	 (1979,	p.	175).	Watt’s	 classic	example	 is	 taken	 from	Heart	of	Darkness,	when	Marlowe’s	boat	is	attacked:		 Something	 big	 appeared	 in	 the	 air	 before	 the	 shutter,	 the	 rifle	 went	overboard,	 and	 the	 man	 stepped	 back	 swiftly,	 looked	 at	 me	 over	 his	shoulder	in	an	extraordinary,	profound,	familiar	manner,	and	fell	upon	my	feet.	The	side	of	his	head	hit	the	wheel	twice,	and	the	end	of	what	appeared	a	long	cane	clattered	around	and	knocked	over	a	little	camp-stool.	(Conrad,	1995,	p.77)		
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At	 first	 glance,	 despite	 the	 note	 of	 his	 head	 hitting	 the	 wheel,	 the	 language	surrounding	 the	 man	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 overly	 violent.	 But	 as	 Marlowe	continues,	the	reality	of	what	has	occurred	starts	to	dawn	on	him:		The	 thin	 smoke	 had	 blown	 away,	we	were	 clear	 of	 the	 snag,	 and	 looking	ahead	 I	 could	 see	 that	 in	 another	hundred	 yards	 or	 so	 I	would	be	 free	 to	sheer	off,	away	from	the	bank,	but	my	feet	felt	so	very	warm	and	wet	that	I	had	to	look	down.	The	man	had	rolled	on	his	back	and	stared	straight	up	at	me;	 both	 of	 his	 hands	 clutched	 that	 cane.	 It	was	 the	 haft	 of	 a	 spear	 that,	either	 thrown	or	 lunged	 through	 the	 opening,	 had	 caught	 him	 in	 the	 side	just	below	the	ribs…	(1995,	p.77)		At	this	point	the	reader	completes	the	picture	and	realises	that	the	cane	is	actually	a	spear	and	the	wetness	encroaching	on	Marlowe’s	feet	is	the	man’s	blood.	Because	Conrad	reports	Marlowe’s	 initial	perceptions,	stripped	of	 their	violent	referential	properties,	he	allows	 the	 reader	 to	undergo	a	 sense	of	 shock	when	 they	actually	comprehend	 what	 is	 occurring.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 are	 undergoing	 the	 same	perceptual	experience	as	Marlowe,	as	Watt	puts	it.		Watt’s	 concept	 of	 delayed	 decoding	 relates	 well	 with	 Shlovsky’s	 idea	 of	deautomised	 perception,	 although	 in	 this	 case	 the	 automatic	 process	 that	 is	impeded	 is	 the	 rational	 centres	 of	 the	 brain	 putting	 together	 a	 clear	 account	 of	what	happened	to	 the	man	on	 the	boat.	By	not	simply	 telling	 the	reader	 that	 the	spear	 hits	 the	 man,	 Conrad	 forces	 the	 reader	 to	 undergo	 his	 or	 her	 own	rationalisation	of	the	scene	and	in	doing	so	he	draws	attention	to	a	mental	process	
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we	might	 take	 for	granted.	A	similar	event	occurs	 in	Mrs	Dalloway	when	Clarissa	visits	the	florist,	Miss	Pym,	and	while	letting	her	train	of	thought	run	away	she	is	interrupted	by	a	sudden	noise:		 As	 if	 this	 beauty,	 this	 scent,	 this	 colour,	 and	Miss	Pym	 liking	her,	 trusting	her,	were	a	wave	which	she	let	flow	over	her	and	surmount	that	hatred,	that	monster,	surmount	it	all;	and	it	lifted	her	up	and	up	when	–	oh!	a	pistol	shot	in	the	street	outside!	(MD,	p.	14)		Miss	 Pym	 immediately	 explains	 that	 we	 have	 heard	 a	 motor	 car	 backfiring,	providing	 a	 rational	 explanation	 at	 once.	 Yet	 the	 power	 of	 this	 style	 lies	 in	 the	sudden	leap	to	first	person	narration	and	the	abrupt	use	of	the	dash	to	 interrupt	the	 previous	 train	 of	 thought.	 The	 emphasis	 then	 is	 not	 on	 what	 has	 actually	happened	or	even	what	Clarissa	hears,	but	on	the	nature	of	her	reaction.	Compared	to	the	mundane	reality	that	follows,	this	sudden	perception	and	its	violent	nature	suggest	Clarissa	is	in	a	hypersensitive	state.	The	reader	is	not	told	this	explicitly	by	any	narrative	voice	but	they	may	interpret	it	themselves.	Hence	there	is	an	illusion	of	 authenticity,	 of	 being	 able	 to	 judge	based	on	 first-hand	evidence,	 bringing	 the	reader	 to	 undergo	 their	 own	 moment	 of	 decoding	 as	 they	 arrive	 at	 a	 rational	explanation	 for	 the	 initial	 perception	 reported	 by	 Clarissa.	 Indeed	 these	 two	examples	 are	 somewhat	 antonymic	 in	 their	 outcomes:	 Conrad’s	 language	 during	the	delivery	of	the	initial	impression	is	purposefully	non-violent	to	make	the	shift	to	 a	 violent	 interpretation	 more	 shocking	 and	 show	 Marlowe’s	 disorientation;	while	Woolf’s	initial	impression	is	violently	written	so	as	to	make	the	de-escalation	
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offered	by	Miss	Pym	more	potent,	and	to	make	the	reader	aware	of	Clarissa’s	state	of	nervousness.		In	 terms	 of	 critical	 debate	 around	 the	 idea	 of	 literary	 Impressionism,	Watt	 and	Matz	 are	 extremely	 important	 theorists.	 Matz	 extensively	 investigates	 how	 the	term	‘impression’	has	been	used	from	philosophical	origins	through	to	the	writings	of	Proust,	Conrad	and	Woolf,	not	to	mention	Joyce	and	Henry	James.	His	argument	is	 that	 Impressionism	 as	 an	 artistic	 movement	 in	 literature	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	distinct	tradition,	despite	the	overlaps	with	modernism	and	realism	(2001,	p.	30-50).	This	chapter	aims	to	expand	the	ideas	of	Watt,	Matz	and	other	impressionist	theorists	with	material	from	the	cognitive	sciences.		Ann	 Banfield	 has	 also	 written	 in	 detail	 on	 the	 influence	 of	 Impressionism	 on	Woolf’s	 work.	 “Her	 oft-noted	 Impressionism	 of	 style	 deliberately	 imitates	 the	Monet-like	analysis	of	 appearances”	 (2000,	p.	270).	Banfield	primarily	 interprets	Woolf’s	 Impressionist	 influence	as	being	manifested	 in	 the	 temporal	 structure	of	key	 novels	 such	 as	 To	 the	 Lighthouse.	 Banfield	 essentially	 views	 Woolf’s	 early	fiction	and	 short	 stories	 as	being	 similar	 in	design	 to	 the	original	 Impressionists	(Monet	 and	 Renoir),	 but	 her	 later	 stories	 being	 more	 influenced	 by	 the	 Post-Impressionists,	such	as	Cézanne	and	Pissaro.			 Woolf	knew	too	well	Fry’s	criticism	of	Impressionism	to	be	content	with	a	form	that	stopped	with	 impressions.	 Impressionist	 “vision”	required	Post-Impressionist	“design,”	Paul	Cézanne’s	geometry.	Story	must	be	turned	into	novel.	(2003,	p.	472-3)	
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	This	 is	not	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 earlier	 Impressionists	do	not	bear	 any	 relation	 to	Woolf’s	 concept	 of	 Impressionism.	 What	 is	 most	 relevant	 about	 the	 Post-Impressionists	is	their	‘design’,	which	in	Cézanne’s	case	refers	to	his	interest	in	the	elemental	 forms	 of	 geometry	 and	 colour.	 Banfield	 argues	 Woolf	 transforms	“Impressionist	colour	and	light”	into	“the	colourless	physical	time	series”	for	To	the	
Lighthouse	 (2003,	 p.	 511).	 In	 her	 view,	 while	 the	 novel’s	 time	 provides	 the	equivalent	 of	 Cézanne’s	 canvas	 as	 a	 design	 for	 Impressionism,	 Woolf	 was	 less	influenced	by	Bergson’s	concept	of	 time	 than	has	been	 traditionally	claimed,	and	was	 more	 influenced	 by	 Russell’s	 concept	 of	 relativity.	 In	 drawing	 on	 these	influences,	Woolf	 resembles	 Zeki’s	 concept	 of	 the	 artist	 being	 a	 neurologist	who	studies	 the	 brain	 through	 their	 search	 for	 artistic	 technique.	 Banfield	 notes	 that	there	was	a	scientific	framework	behind	Woolf’s	appropriation	of	the	visual	arts.		Woolf	’s	aesthetic	was	dualist.	The	model	came	from	the	visual	arts,	though	it	 also	has	 a	 source	 in	British	 science.	One	 version	of	 science’s	 dualism	 is	what	 Alexandre	 Koyré	 has	 in	 mind	 when	 he	 observes	 of	 the	 Galilean	revolution	that	it	changed	the	idea	of	the	real	world	as	given	to	the	senses;	after	 Galileo,	 there	 is	 a	 rupture	 between	 the	 sensible	 world	 and	 the	 real	world,	that	is,	the	world	of	science.	(2003,	p.	476).	
	One	 of	 the	 ambitions	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 expand	 on	 Banfield’s	 arguments	 and	show	that	they	are	equally	relevant	for	Mrs	Dalloway.	Her	idea	that	literary	time	is	the	 equivalent	 of	 Impressionist	 colour	 will	 be	 expanded	 upon	 by	 drawing	 links	
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with	what	 cognitive	 science	 can	 tell	 us	 of	 the	 perception	 of	 time.	 It	will	 also	 be	shown	 that	 behind	 the	 works	 of	 Monet	 there	 was	 an	 equivalent	 to	 Cezanne’s	geometry	 –	 Monet’s	 use	 of	 equiluminance	 –	 that	 finds	 itself	 expressed	 in	 Mrs	
Dalloway	on	an	analogous	level.		This	is	far	from	the	first	work	approach	Virginia	Woolf’s	fiction	following	the	surge	of	interdisciplinary	studies	applying	cognitive	science	to	the	arts.	Susan	Nalbantian	(2008)	 discusses	 how	 To	 the	 Lighthouse	 can	 inform	 our	 understanding	 of	 a	neuronal	interpretation	of	creativity,	connecting	it	with	a	form	of	neuroaesthetics	informed	 more	 by	 Jean-Pierre	 Changeux	 than	 by	 Zeki.	 Lisa	 Zunshine’s	Why	We	
Read	 Fiction	 (2006),	 which	 discusses	 the	 literary	 significance	 of	 the	 ‘Theory	 of	Mind’:	 the	 ability	 to	 ascribe	 a	mental	 state	 to	 someone	 based	 upon	 our	 external	observations	 of	 that	 person	 or	 character.	 Essentially,	 Theory	 of	Mind	 is	 a	 broad	term	 for	 how	 humans	 empathise	 with	 one	 another.	 It	 represents	 a	 more	theoretical	 model	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 empathy;	 although	 it	 seems	 to	 brush	awkwardly	 up	 against	 Literary	 Darwinism	 in	 terms	 of	 striking	 out	 towards	neurological	territory	with	an	interest	in	cold	evolutionary	logic,	only	to	resort	to	generalisations	about	 the	nature	of	humanity	 that	 ignore	 that	evolutionary	 logic.	Zunshine	is	directly	engaged	with	the	notion	that	Mrs	Dalloway	is	a	difficult	novel	to	 read;	 indeed,	 one	 chapter	 is	 titled:	 ‘Can	 cognitive	 science	 tell	 us	 why	we	 are	afraid	of	Mrs	Dalloway?’	Her	close	reading	of	the	passage	where	Hugh	Whitbread	produces	a	fountain	pen	shows	how	many	layers	of	interpretation	can	be	built	into	a	single	paragraph;	and	it	identifies	how	this	taxes	our	cognitive	capacities,	as	we	try	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 different	 relationships	 between	 different	 subjects.	 Yet	
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Zunshine	herself	notes	that	this	approach	alone	does	not	constitute	‘the	cognitive	approach’,	effectively	inviting	further	study	on	the	novel.			‘Theory	 of	Mind’	 suggests	 that	we	 gain	 enjoyment	 through	 testing	 our	 ability	 to	read	the	emotional	states	of	others	in	social	situations;	similar	to	the	rationale	for	Tsur’s	 view	 of	 how	 we	 derive	 pleasure	 from	 wit	 (Tsur,	 2008,	 p.	 10-11	 and	Zunshine,	2006).	Gallese	and	Wojciehowski	offer	a	corresponding	view	to	‘Theory	of	Mind’:	 the	 ‘Feeling	of	Body’.	The	basis	 for	 this	 theory	draws	on	a	neurological	observation	 concerning	 ‘mirror	 neurons’,	 where	 if	 a	 person	 observes	 another	person	performing	an	action	or	expressing	an	emotion,	the	same	neuron	will	fire	in	the	brains	of	both	the	observer	and	the	observant.	Mirror	neurons	are	detailed	in	Ramachandran	(2011)	as	a	phenomenon	that	provides	evidence	for	how	humans	made	great	advances	in	technology,	social	skills	and	language	in	a	relatively	short	period	of	 time	 in	 evolutionary	 terms.	However,	 in	 the	Gallese	 and	Wojciehowski	paper	the	investigation	of	how	mirror	neurons	actually	impact	upon	our	reading	of	
Mrs	Dalloway	is	simple	to	the	point	of	being	redundant.	The	authors	merely	make	the	point	that	the	reader	may	actually	feel	the	sensations	Clarissa	does	when	she	imagines	the	death	of	Septimus,	because	the	same	neurons	might	fire	for	them	as	would	for	Clarissa.		The	larger	question	which	neither	of	these	two	works	answers	is	specifically	how	these	abilities	of	the	mind	to	empathise	or	feel	bodily	sensations	are	generated	by	the	 text	 itself.	 If	 the	answer	called	simply	on	 the	power	of	 imagination,	 then	Mrs	
Dalloway	 would	 surely	 be	 no	 more	 distinctive	 a	 novel	 than	 any	 other.	 This	investigation,	 then,	 seeks	 to	 uncover	 what	 devices	 within	 the	 text	 can	 have	 an	
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emotional	or	sensory	 impact	upon	 the	reader,	and	how	best	 to	account	 for	 them	using	cognitive	science.		In	 terms	 of	 using	 science	 in	 an	 unpalatable	 attempt	 to	 justify	 one’s	 personal	antipathy	towards	an	artistic	movement,	it	is	hard	to	go	past	the	opinion	of	Nordau	as	quoted	by	Matz	earlier	as	one	of	the	most	appalling	examples.	The	opinions	of	the	 neurologist	 Steven	 Pinker	 certainly	 come	 close	 though.	 In	 his	 highly	controversial	work	The	Blank	Slate,	which	deals	with	the	idea	of	human	nature,	he	launches	a	scathing	attack	on	modernism	in	general	(and	it	should	be	mentioned	that	what	he	calls	‘modernism’	appears	to	encapsulate	just	about	everything	from	Cubism	 to	postmodernism).	He	begins	by	misquoting	Woolf’s	 anecdote	 from	 ‘Mr	Bennett	 and	 Mrs	 Brown’	 that	 “in	 or	 about	 December,	 1910,	 human	 character	changed.”	Pinker	substitutes	or	otherwise	mistakes	“human	nature”24	for	“human	character”	and	uses	it	to	critique	modernism	for	failing	to	appeal	to	what	he	claims	is	an	innate	standard	of	aesthetic	taste:		 Modernism	 certainly	 proceeded	 as	 if	 human	 nature	 had	 changed.	 All	 the	tricks	 that	artists	had	used	 for	millennia	 to	please	 the	human	palate	were	cast	aside.	In	painting,	realistic	depiction	gave	way	to	freakish	distortions	of	shape	and	color	and	then	to	abstract	grids,	shapes,	dribbles,	splashes,	and,	in	 the	$200,000	painting	 featured	 in	 the	recent	comedy	Art,	a	blank	white	canvas.	 In	 literature,	 omniscient	 narration,	 structured	 plots,	 the	 orderly	introduction	 of	 characters,	 and	 general	 readability	 were	 replaced	 by	 a	stream	of	consciousness,	events	presented	out	of	order,	baffling	characters	
                                                
24 Pinker’s source for this quote, which he rather generously ‘attributes’ to Virginia Woolf, is not the 
essay ‘Mr and Mrs Brown’ but “countless English course outlines”.	
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and	 causal	 sequences,	 subjective	 and	 disjointed	 narration,	 and	 difficult	prose.	(2002,	p.	410)		Suffice	to	say	that	Pinker	has	drawn	a	lot	of	criticism,25	and	deservedly	so	when	he	illustrates	 that	 charge	 from	 Chapter	 Two	 that	 was	 levelled	 against	 certain	neuroscientists:	 that	 of	 discussing	 the	 arts	 in	 such	 reductionist	 terms	 as	 having	universal	 standards	 of	 good	 taste.	 Pinker’s	 discussion	 of	 modernism	 notes	correctly	 that	certain	political	and	social	attitudes	played	a	part	 in	shaping	 these	new	styles,	but	he	treats	this	as	though	it	were	an	excuse	for	what	he	considers	a	violation	of	his	own	aesthetic	standards.		If	there	is	to	be	a	meaningful	engagement	between	cognitive	science	and	literature	on	 the	 topic	 of	 Impressionism,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 avoid	 both	 Pinker’s	 pitfall	 of	reductionism	 and	 the	 overly	 simplified	 ideas	 of	 ‘Theory	 of	 Mind’	 or	 ‘Feeling	 of	Body’.	Instead,	what	this	chapter	will	offer	is	a	closer	study	of	the	mechanisms	of	perception	that	relate	to	the	mental	effects	 Impressionism	appropriated	with	the	ambition	of	better	representing	the	experience	of	‘life	itself’.		
‘De-automatised’	Perception		As	 we	 have	 seen	 from	 Chapter	 Two,	 Barry’s	 ‘Perceptual	 Aesthetics’	 offers	 a	number	of	 insights	 into	 some	of	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 how	our	minds	 respond	 to	artistic	 forms.	 Much	 of	 Barry’s	 work	 hinges	 upon	 structures	 in	 the	 brain’s	organisation	 that	 have	 significance	 for	 aesthetics:	 left	 and	 right	 brain,	 emotional	
                                                
25 For some notable rebuttals to Pinker, see Dancygier (2012) and Zunshine (2006). 
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versus	 rational	 processing,	 and	 top-down	 versus	 bottom-up	 processing.	 Some	 of	these	structures	have	already	made	their	way	into	Woolf	scholarship,	with	Priest	(2009)	exploring	 the	distinction	between	right-brain	and	 left-brain	perception	 in	Woolf’s	fiction.	In	this	chapter	we	examine	how	the	distinction	between	top-down	and	bottom-up	processing	 is	 significant	 for	understanding	Mrs	Dalloway.	Here	 is	what	Barry	has	to	say	of	bottom-up	processing:		 At	 the	most	basic	 level	of	perception,	 automatic	perceptual	 (“bottom-up”)	processing	responds	emotionally	below	the	level	of	conscious	awareness	to	the	affective	meaning	of	color,	line,	shape	and	movement.	So	called	abstract	art	exemplifies	this	well...	Neurologically	speaking	the	paint	color	achieves	an	impact	on	the	most	basic	level	of	bottom-up	processing.	Picked	up	by	the	retina,	the	color	frequency	is	sent	to	the	thalamus,	where	it	is	then	split	and	travels	 simultaneously	 to	 the	 amygdala,	 where	 its	 inherent	 emotion	 is	realized,	 and	 to	 the	 visual	 cortex,	where	 it	 is	 identified	 as	 blue.	 (2006,	 p.	145)		The	 evolutionary	 value	 of	 bottom-up	 processing	 is	 that	 emotional	 reactions	 to	stimuli	occur	more	immediately	than	the	cognitive	response	of	the	cortex:	which,	by	contrast,	responds	in	what	Barry	describes	as	a	“more	refined,	detailed	fashion,	imposing	maps	of	pre-knowledge	and	implicit	experiential	logic	on	new	emotional	response”	 (2006,	p.	144).	Much	of	what	 is	processed	directly	 through	 the	senses	does	 not	 enter	 direct	 consciousness:	 only	 the	 relevant	 emotion	 or	 sensation	appears.	 In	 this	 extract	 Barry’s	 examples	 come	 from	 visual	 art:	 but	 in	 a	 literary	
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context	we	 could	 point	 to	 the	 phonetic	 information	 as	 a	 correlate	 of	 bottom-up	processing.		Top-down	processing	is	not	strictly	the	opposite	of	this	approach,	but	one	where	the	 responses	 of	 the	 cortex	 wield	 more	 influence	 than	 those	 of	 the	 emotional	centres	of	the	brain.	Zeki	has	this	to	say	of	top-down	processing:		 What	 is	meant	 by	 "top-down”	 is	 vague	 in	 neurological	 terms,	 but	what	 is	implied	 is	 that	a	“higher”	 thought	process	 influences	 the	way	 in	which	we	interpret	 things	 or	 that	 a	 “higher”	 area	 influences	 neural	 activity	 in	 a	“lower”	 area.	 Implicit	 in	 such	 thinking	 is	 the	 supposition	 that	 processing	and	perception	are	always	entirely	different.	(2011,	location	1399)		Broadly	speaking,	a	novel	 like	Mrs	Dalloway	 challenges	our	ability	 to	process	 the	novel	in	a	top-down	manner.	This	is	not	to	say	that	we	cannot	achieve	a	top-down	reading	 of	 the	 novel,	 but	 that	 Woolf	 inhibits	 the	 ability	 to	 come	 up	 with	 these	detailed	 responses	 through	 the	 novel’s	 complex	 shifts	 of	 perspective	 and	 time.	Although	 it	 becomes	 possible	 to	make	 full	 sense	 of	 these	 over	 time	 or	 with	 re-reading,	in	the	initial	reading	of	Mrs	Dalloway	bottom-up	processing	is	more	likely	to	 be	 dominant.	 Impressions	 based	 on	 sound	 patterns	 and	 perceived	 emotional	states	 of	 the	 characters	 come	 to	 the	 fore,	 both	 representing	 forms	 of	 processing	that	occur	below	the	level	of	consciousness.		It	 is	well	noted	that	Woolf	was	writing	at	a	time	when	various	revolutions	 in	the	fields	of	psychology	were	transforming	the	way	people	understood	the	mind.	Chief	
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among	 these	 of	 course	 the	works	 of	 Freud	 and	 his	 theories	 of	 the	 unconscious.	However,	during	the	composition	of	Mrs	Dalloway	(then	titled	‘The	Hours’),	Woolf	became	familiar	with	a	literary	meditation	on	the	nature	of	consciousness:	that	of	Proust’s	 In	 Search	 of	 Lost	 Time.	 Dalgarno	 notes	 that	 Moncrieff’s	 translation	 of	Proust,	 to	which	Woolf	had	access,	made	some	translation	decisions	that	masked	some	of	the	detail	in	Proust’s	treatment	of	consciousness:		 [Moncrieff]	 simplified	 Proust’s	 extensive	 vocabulary	 of	 words	 for	 mental	functions,	 reducing	 it	 to	 conscious	 and	 unconscious…	 his	 mistranslations	resulted	 in	Woolf’s	preference	 for	 the	Proustian	 image	of	 the	unconscious	as	the	source,	not	of	error	and	struggle	as	in	Freud’s	work,	but	of	the	artist’s	unique	access	to	the	underwater	world	of	the	mind.	(2011,	p.	97)		Scenes	 from	 In	 Search	 of	 Lost	 Time,	 such	 as	 the	 moment	 where	 the	 narrator	 of	
Swann’s	Way	 takes	a	bite	of	a	madeleine	soaked	 in	 tea,	prompting	him	to	vividly	recall	his	childhood	at	Combray,	offered	Woolf	a	thematic	model	for	the	mediating	impact	 of	 the	 ‘unconscious’	 on	 the	 character.	 Woolf’s	 own	 moments	 of	 non-conscious	triggering	of	her	character’s	memories	are	more	subtly	developed	in	Mrs	
Dalloway,	 beginning	 from	 the	 first	 page	where	 the	 very	 act	 of	 stepping	 into	 the	morning	air	leads	Clarissa	to	recall	her	days	at	Bourton.	Did	this	model	of	mental	processes	 influence	not	only	her	character	construction,	but	also	her	attempts	 to	draw	in	her	readers?		Cuddy-Keane	 (2003)	 offers	 a	 reading	 of	Woolf’s	 essay	 ‘How	 Should	 One	 Read	 a	Book?’,	 comparing	 it	 also	 with	 Woolf’s	 analysis	 of	 Dostoyevsky’s	 The	 Eternal	
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Husband.	 She	 suggests	 that	 Woolf	 developed	 an	 opinion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 non-consciousness	similar	to	that	modelled	by	Barry:		 Here	unconscious	assimilation	is	not	prior	to	conscious	apprehension;	it	is	an	ever-present,	formative	participant	enabling	the	apparent	seamlessness	of	 conscious	 thought.	 The	 “vivid	 streak	 of	 achieved	 thought”	 is,	 under	microscopic	 examination,	 made	 of	 a	 chain	 of	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	links.	 The	 unconscious	 is	 thus	 not,	 in	 Woolf’s	 construction,	 a	 passive	container	 or	 a	 deterministic	 mechanism;	 it	 is	 an	 active	 and	 creative	participant	in	thought.	(2003,	p.	125)		The	unconscious	associations	that	Cuddy-Keane	refers	to	can	be	seen	to	function	in	this	 manner	 during	 Mrs	 Dalloway,	 as	 a	 mediating	 tool	 that	 blends	 individual	thoughts	and	perceptions	into	a	continual	‘stream	of	consciousness’.	For	example,	the	opening	passage	of	the	novel	depicts	Clarissa	stepping	into	the	London	air	and	recalling	her	time	at	Bourton.		 And	then,	thought	Clarissa	Dalloway,	what	a	morning	–	fresh	as	if	issued	to	children	on	a	beach.	What	 a	 lark!	 What	 a	 plunge!	 For	 so	 it	 had	 always	 seemed	 to	 her,	when,	with	a	little	squeak	of	the	hinges,	which	she	could	hear	now,	she	had	burst	open	the	French	windows	and	plunged	at	Bourton	into	the	open	air.	How	 fresh,	 how	 calm,	 stiller	 than	 this	 of	 course,	 the	 air	 was	 in	 the	 early	morning;	like	the	flap	of	a	wave;	the	kiss	of	a	wave;	chill	and	sharp	and	yet	(for	a	girl	of	eighteen	as	she	then	was)	solemn,	feeling	as	she	did,	standing	
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there	 at	 the	 open	 window,	 that	 something	 awful	 was	 about	 to	 happen;	looking	at	the	flowers,	at	the	trees	with	the	smoke	winding	off	them	and	the	rooks	 rising,	 falling;	 standing	 and	 looking	until	 Peter	Walsh	 said,	 "Musing	among	the	vegetables?"	–	was	that	it?	–	"I	prefer	men	to	cauliflowers"	–	was	that	it?	(MD,	p.	3)		In	a	manner	reminiscent	of	how	the	young	Marcel	of	Swann’s	Way	suddenly	recalls	his	 past	 through	 the	 madeleine,	 the	 sensation	 of	 the	 morning	 air	 is	 enough	 to	trigger	Clarissa’s	memories	of	Burton.	A	series	of	unconscious	associations	bridge	her	conscious	 thoughts	 into	a	seamless	connection:	 the	 ‘fresh’	 feel	of	 the	London	morning	is	associated	with	the	‘fresh’	feel	of	the	Bourton	morning,	and	she	recalls	automatically	 the	 ‘squeak	 of	 the	 hinges’	 on	 the	 French	windows	 at	Bourton.	 She	automatically	corrects	her	thoughts	with	unconscious	speed:	“the	flap	of	the	wave”	becomes	 “the	 kiss	 of	 the	wave”,	 and	 ”Musing	 among	 the	 vegetables?”	 is	 queried	against	the	possibility	of	Peter	having	actually	said	“I	prefer	men	to	cauliflowers.”	In	 this	 way,	 the	 process	 of	 unconscious	 association	 builds	 upon	 active	 thought,	allowing	 temporal	 gaps	 such	 as	 that	 between	 the	 present	 time	 and	 Bourton	 to	appear	absolutely	seamless,	and	to	allow	the	reader	to	experience	the	perceptual	effect	of	Clarissa	being	transported	within	her	own	memory.		Sensations	and	brief	 impressions	of	 the	kind	 that	Clarissa	experiences	above	are	essential	to	creating	the	elaborate	transitions	between	different	characters	in	Mrs	
Dalloway.	A	powerful	 indication	 that	Woolf’s	 ideas	were	headed	 in	 this	direction	before	she	discovered	Proust	or	began	writing	Mrs	Dalloway	 can	be	 found	 in	her	essay	Modern	Fiction,	originally	penned	in	1919:	
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	 Examine	 for	 a	 moment	 an	 ordinary	 mind	 on	 an	 ordinary	 day.	 The	 mind	receives	 a	 myriad	 of	 impressions	 –	 trivial,	 fantastic,	 evanescent,	 or	engraved	with	the	sharpness	of	steel.	From	all	sides	they	come,	an	incessant	shower	of	 innumerable	atoms…	Is	 it	not	the	task	of	the	novelist	to	convey	this	varying,	this	unknown	and	uncircumscribed	spirit,	whatever	aberration	or	complexity	it	may	display,	with	as	little	mixture	of	the	alien	and	external	as	possible?	(2006,	p.	2089)		That	 Woolf	 sought	 to	 avoid	 discarding	 the	 seemingly	 trivial	 impressions	 of	everyday	 existence	 and	 instead	 build	 them	 into	 her	 fiction	 is	 well	 established.	Having	established	that	 this	style	of	gathering	 impressions	 fits	 in	with	Barry	and	Zeki’s	 concept	 of	 ‘bottom-up’	 processing,	 we	 now	 have	 a	 window	 into	 how	 we	might	compare	literary	Impressionism	more	directly	against	visual	Impressionism.	For	 this	 task,	 we	 turn	 to	 one	 of	 Zeki’s	 neuroscience	 contemporaries	 who	 was	flagged	earlier	in	Chapter	Two.	
	
Equiluminance		On	 one	 very	 simple	 level,	 the	 relationship	 between	 impressionist	 literature	 and	impressionist	painting	is	identified	by	Zeki	(2011)	as	deliberately	creating	a	work	that	is	in	a	certain	sense	“unfinished”.	Zeki	writes	that	Cézanne	and	Pissaro:	“left	it	to	the	viewer’s	brain	to	construct	the	image.”		
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Moreover,	 by	 leaving	 so	much	of	 it	 apparently	unfinished,	 he	 leaves	open	the	possibility	that	the	paintings	themselves	could	have	been	developed	in	a	number	of	ways,	both	 for	 the	painter	and	the	viewer.	How	it	 is	 integrated	and	developed	depends	on	the	viewer,	or	rather	on	the	brain	of	the	viewer,	and	may	change	from	one	viewing	to	the	other.	(2011,	location	2027)		The	early	 Impressionist	artists	were	 indeed	heavily	criticised	 for	 the	 ‘unfinished’	look	 of	 their	work.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Cézanne	 and	 Pissaro	 belonged	 to	 a	 later	movement	 that	 Woolf’s	 contemporary	 Roger	 Fry	 described	 as	 “Post-Impressionism”.	Banfield	(2003)	argues	that	Woolf	was	in	fact	more	influenced	by	Post-Impressionism,	 aware	 that	 Fry	 had	 criticised	 the	 early	 Impressionism	 for	lacking	 design.	 As	 the	 artists	 moved	 from	 impressionist	 blurring	 of	 details	 and	colours	to	the	post-impressionist	precision	of	pointillism,	so	too,	Banfield	argues,	did	 Woolf	 move	 from	 ‘impressionist’	 short	 stories	 to	 post-impressionist	 novels,	where	 the	 longer	 form	 allowed	 for	 a	 more	 creative	 use	 of	 the	 passage	 of	 time.	Stewart	 (1982)	 corroborates	 this	 view	 that	 the	 early	 Impressionists	 influenced	Woolf’s	early	fiction	and	short	stories	in	his	detailed	discussion	of	Woolf’s	fictional	works	 up	 to	 but	 not	 including	 Mrs	 Dalloway.	 He	 notes	 the	 short	 story	 ‘Kew	Gardens’	as	being	an	important	moment	in	Woolf’s	development:		 Woolf	 crystallized	 her	 Impressionist	 style	 in	 “Kew	 Gardens”	 (1919).	 The	people	 are	 etherealized	 or	 dehumanized	 by	 the	 play	 of	 light	 through	 a	shifting	 lens,	 alternately	 microscopic	 or	 blurred,	 that	 synthesizes	 human	and	natural	objects.	A	disembodied	eye	dramatises	sensuous	 life	of	plants	and	reduces	moving	figures	to	splashes	of	colour.	(1982,	p.	241-2)	
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	Stewart’s	interpretation	of	Woolf’s	use	of	Impressionism	hinges	upon	her	choice	of	imagery	and	the	way	those	images	and	the	characters	blend	together	in	the	story.	This	 constitutes	 a	 fairly	 basic	 analogy	 between	 literature	 and	 painting,	 where	Woolf’s	 images	 are	 blended	 in	 a	 similar	 manner	 to	 Monet’s	 colours.	 Although	Stewart	 and	 Banfield	 consider	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 to	 be	 in	 a	 separate	 category	 of	influence,	 there	are	elements	of	 their	own	work	 that	 I	believe	can	be	 fleshed	out	into	 a	 more	 detailed	 link	 between	 the	 early	 Impressionists	 and	 Mrs	 Dalloway.	Further	into	his	essay,	Stewart	writes:			 Light	 is	 life,	and	objects,	 liberated	 from	the	cramp	of	mind,	vibrate	on	 the	retina.	In	language	equivalent	to	Monet’s	use	of	paint,	Woolf	seeks	to	render	‘the	 instantaneous	envelopment,	 the	same	 light	spread	over	everywhere.’”	(1982,	p.	242)		Although	he	is	once	again	focused	on	an	analogous	relationship	between	paint	and	language,	Stewart	hints	that	the	effect	of	Monet’s	painting	is	bound	up	in	the	light	he	is	capturing.	Being	able	to	articulate	some	more	of	the	science	behind	this	light	may	help	us	to	understand	the	effects	Woolf	imitates	in	her	own	work.		As	we	recall	from	Chapter	Two,	Livingstone	was	one	of	the	first	neurobiologists	to	delve	into	the	specifics	of	how	the	visual	sense	functions	in	the	production	of	our	aesthetic	 experience	 of	 visual	 art.	 On	 the	 topic	 of	 Impressionism,	 Livingstone’s	work	 demonstrates	 some	 of	 the	 scientific	 details	 of	 light	 and	 vision	 that	 the	Impressionist	painters	were	exploiting	for	aesthetic	effect,	whether	knowingly	or	
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intuitively.	For	instance,	her	analysis	of	Monet	shows	that	in	his	Grainstack	in	the	
Morning,	Snow	Effect	 (1891)	he	successfully	depicted	the	way	shadows	appear	to	contain	different	colour	casts	to	the	overall	ambient	light:		 Let’s	consider	the	shadow	of	a	haystack	on	a	sunny	winter	day	(so	that	the	shadow	will	be	cast	on	white	snow,	not	coloured	ground).	The	snow	will	be	illuminated	 both	 by	 the	 yellowish	 direct	 light	 from	 the	 sun	 and	 by	 the	indirect	bluish	light	from	the	sky.	In	the	shadow	of	the	haystack,	the	snow	will	 be	 lit	 only	 by	 the	 scattered	 light,	 from	 the	 sky,	which	 is	more	 bluish	than	 direct	 sunlight,	 so	 the	 shadow	 will	 look	 bluish,	 compared	 with	 the	mixed	 light	 surrounding	 it.	 Claude	 Monet	 captured	 the	 phenomenon	 of	coloured	shadows	in	several	of	his	haystack	paintings.	(2002,	p.	95)		This	 focused	 composition	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 fine	 detail	 places	 significance	 on	 the	interplay	 of	 light	 and	 shadow.	 Normally	 the	 blended	 colours	 of	 light	 create	 a	diffuse	 illuminant	 to	 which	 we	 are	 generally	 insensitive	 (2002,	 p.	 95).	 What	Monet’s	 painting	 achieves	 is	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 light	 that	 is	 not	normally	 observed,	 to	 make	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 visual	 experience	 that	 is	 normally	unavailable	to	consciousness	become	all	too	apparent.	This	is	a	process	that	has	an	important	analogy	with	the	idea	of	 ‘de-automatised’	perception	discussed	earlier:	in	 a	 similar	 fashion,	Monet	 disrupts	 the	 normative	 processing	 of	 the	 shadow	 by	introducing	 colours	 not	 ordinarily	 picked	 up	 by	 the	 mind,	 but	 recorded	 by	 the	retina	and	processed	below	the	normal	level	of	consciousness.		
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Woolf	 too	 finds	 a	 way	 in	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 to	 bring	 various	 experiences	 into	consciousness	 where	 they	 might	 otherwise	 be	 unavailable	 directly.	 When	 an	airplane	appears	in	the	sky	over	the	park	where	Septimus	and	Reiza	are	sitting,	the	text	 records	 the	 difficulty	 experienced	 by	 everyone	 around	 them	 in	 trying	 to	understand	what	is	being	written	in	the	sky.		 But	what	letters?	A	C	was	it?	An	E,	then	an	L?	Only	for	a	moment	did	they	lie	still;	then	they	moved	and	melted	and	were	rubbed	out	again	in	the	sky,	and	the	 aeroplane	 shot	 farther	 away	 and	 again,	 in	 a	 fresh	 space	of	 sky,	 began	writing	a	K,	an	E,	a	Y	perhaps?	(MD,	p.	22)		Although	the	consensus	amongst	those	watching	it	seems	to	be	that	the	airplane	is	writing	 “Kreemo	 toffee”,	 that	 does	 not	 stop	 the	 passage	 from	 continuing	 on	 and	further	delaying	the	automatic	processing	of	the	letters	as	they	appear.	Further	on,	Woolf	refers	to	the	letters	“E,	G	or	L”	as	having	attached	themselves	to	clouds	(MD,	p.	23).	Then,	just	as	Septimus	and	Reiza	start	to	spell	‘toffee’	together,	getting	as	far	as	 “T…o…f….”	 the	 nursemaid	 beside	 them	 says	 “K…r…”.	 Through	 this	 perpetual	inability	 of	 the	 onlookers	 to	 process	 the	 alphabetic	 characters	 into	 complete	words,	 Woolf	 pushes	 the	 phonetic	 elements	 of	 the	 language	 into	 a	 pictorial	representation	 for	 the	 reader.	 	 The	 plane’s	 writing	 is	 so	 diffuse	 that	 the	 novel	alternates	 between	 reading	 it	 as	 “C,	 E,	 L”,	 to	 “K,	 E,	 Y”	 then	 “E,	 G,	 L”,	making	 the	letters	 seem	 almost	 interchangeable.	 A	 moment	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 symbol	 of	advertising	is	stripped	of	any	referential	quality	and	instead	becomes	a	moment	of	collective	disharmony	among	the	characters.	The	effect	for	the	reader	is	to	become	hyper-conscious	 of	 the	 process	 of	 converting	 a	 pictorial	 representation	 into	
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language,	once	this	process	has	been	made	difficult	and	‘de-automatised’.	In	doing	so,	Woolf	 exposes	a	part	of	our	everyday	perceptual	experience	 that	we	 take	 for	granted.		Livingstone	goes	on	to	consider	another	prominent	effect	in	Monet’s	painting:	the	illusion	of	motion	in	what	are	essentially	fixed	images:		 One	of	 the	most	novel	accomplishments	of	 the	 Impressionist	artists	 is	 the	shimmering,	alive	quality	they	achieved	in	many	of	their	paintings.	I	suggest	that	 some	 of	 the	 colour	 combinations	 these	 artists	 used	 have	 such	 a	 low	luminance	 contrast	 –	 and	are	 in	 effect	 equiluminant	 –	 that	 they	 create	 an	illusion	of	motion…	The	Where	system	is	responsible	for	our	ability	to	see	motion	 and	position,	 as	well	 and	depth.	 Therefore	 if	 an	 image	 is	made	 of	bright	equiluminant	colours,	the	What	system	can	see	those	objects	clearly,	but	their	position	and	stability	are	not	registered	by	the	Where	system,	so	they	can	seem	to	jitter	or	move	around.	(2002,	p.	153)		To	unpack	this	terminology,	the	What	and	Where	systems	are	theoretical	models	proposed	 for	 understanding	 how	 the	 components	 of	 the	 visual	 system	 function	together.	 As	 mentioned,	 the	 Where	 system	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 perception	 of	motion,	but	what	creates	the	illusion	of	motion	is	the	fact	that	the	Where	system	cannot	 actually	 register	 these	 objects,	 as	 it	 is	 colour	 blind	 and	 relies	 on	 sensing	luminance	 contrast.	 Because	 the	 Where	 system	 is	 also	 responsible	 for	 fixing	objects	 in	 stationary	 positions,	 if	 it	 cannot	 function	 properly,	 the	 objects	 may	appear	 to	 be	 changing	 position	 ever	 so	 slightly	 as	 the	 eye	moves	 over	 the	 piece	
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(Livingstone,	 2002,	 p.	 157).	 Monet’s	 painting	 exploits	 this	 quirk	 of	 the	 visual	system	to	create	this	illusory	motion,	as	Livingstone	explains:		 In	The	Poppy	Field	outside	of	Argenteuil	 (1873),	Monet	 paints	 the	 flowers	with	a	red	that	is	approximately	equiluminant	with	the	green	of	the	green	of	the	grass	and	the	skirt	of	 the	woman	 in	 the	 foreground.	The	What	system	can	distinguish	the	poppies	and	the	skirt	from	the	grass	because	it	is	colour	selective	 and	 the	 colours	 are	 easily	 distinguishable.	 But	 the	 colours,	although	 bright,	 do	 not	 have	 so	 much	 luminance	 contrast,	 so	 the	 Where	system	cannot	see	them	clearly.	Therefore	their	position	is	uncertain.	They	seem	to	move	or	change	position,	as	if	stirred	by	a	breeze.	(2002,	p.	153)		This	 illusory	 element	 behind	 the	 painting	 highlights	 how	 Monet	 is	 capable	 of	evoking	 sensory	 impressions	 beyond	 what	 is	 immediately	 expected	 of	 a	 two	dimensional	canvas.	His	paintings	with	key	areas	of	 low	luminance	contrast	have	the	 capacity	 to	 recall	 a	 sense	 of	 motion	 for	 the	 viewer,	 of	 the	 scene	moving	 as	though	it	is	in	some	way	coming	to	life	for	the	viewer.			Colour	 luminance	 is	 important	 in	 Livingstone’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 Impressionist	painters	not	only	because	of	how	it	creates	this	effect	of	imitating	motion,	but	also	because	of	 the	effects	that	arise	where	multiple	colours	are	of	similar	 luminance.	Livingstone	writes	of	this:		 The	Color	system	operates	at	a	surprisingly	low	resolution.	That	is,	cells	in	the	Color	system	have	much	 larger	receptive	 fields	and	there	are	 fewer	of	
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them	than	in	the	Where	system	or	in	the	Form	part	of	the	What	system.	This	means	 that	 our	 perception	 of	 colour	 is	 coarse.	 Painters	 who	 use	watercolours	 or	 pastels	 often	 exploit	 the	 low	 resolution	 of	 our	 colour	system	by	applying	their	colour	in	a	looser	or	blurrier	way	than	the	higher-contrast	outlines	of	 the	object	 to	which	 the	 colour	applies.	That	 is,	 if	 they	use	a	colour	that	has	a	low-luminance	contrast	with	the	background	(as	is	often	 seen	 with	 watercolours	 or	 pastels)	 they	 can	 draw	 high-contrast	outlines,	and	the	color	will	seem	to	conform	to	the	outlines,	even	if	it	does	not.	(2002,	p.	165)		Livingstone	demonstrates	how	 this	 technique	was	used	by	Monet	 in	The	Palazzo	
Ducale	as	seen	from	San	Giorgio	Maggiore,	where	although	 the	brushstrokes	used	in	the	water,	the	sky	and	the	buildings	are	all	composed	of	different	hues,	notably	blues,	reds	and	yellows,	within	these	individual	regions	on	the	canvas	the	hues	are	all	 of	 similar	 luminance.	Where	 they	 vary	 is	 in	 the	 outlines	 that	 form	 the	 high-contrast	 boundary	 between	 the	 buildings	 and	 the	 sky,	 or	 the	 buildings	 and	 the	water	(2002,	p.	178-9).	She	also	notes	how	this	same	principle	was	utilised	by	the	Post-Impressionist	 painters,	 such	 as	 Seurat	 and	 Signac	 with	 their	 Pointillist	technique;	and	she	goes	on	to	talk	about	the	aesthetic	impact	of	blending	colours	at	similar	luminance:		 What	makes	variegated	surfaces	so	interesting	is	the	fact	that	the	size	of	the	dots	 is	 such	 that	you	can	see	simultaneously	both	 the	separateness	of	 the	dots	and	a	blending	together	to	form	a	single	 larger	surface.	The	aesthetic	interest	 in	 these	 paintings	 –	 or	 the	 appeal	 of	 tweed	 clothing	 or	 marble	
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countertops	 –	 lies	 in	 the	 interplay	 between	 blending	 and	 opposing	 that	happens	at	a	scale	that	is	near	the	resolution	of	your	color	system.	That	is,	because	your	colour	system	is	low	resolution,	the	colours	of	the	individual	elements	can	merge,	even	at	the	same	time	that	you	can	still	resolve	them.	(2002,	p.	176)		This	 idea	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 effect	 arising	 from	 similar	 luminance	 can	 perhaps	 also	been	 seen	 to	 operate	 in	Mrs	Dalloway.	 For	 Clarissa,	 her	 perception	 of	 the	world	around	 her	 takes	 on	 a	 kind	 of	 equiluminance	 in	 that	 both	 major	 and	 trivial	perceptions	have	a	noticeable	impact	on	her.	As	already	mentioned,	Woolf’s	style	is	to	impede	the	automatic	processing	of	the	text	and	slow	down	perception:	much	of	this	 being	 achieved	 through	 the	 complex	 verbal	 textures	within	 her	writing.	 Yet	although	it	can	be	difficult	to	follow	the	writing	within	a	particular	paragraph,	the	borders	between	paragraphs	usually	remain	extremely	distinct.	Where	Monet	uses	changes	in	luminance	to	properly	delineate	the	borders	of	objects	within	his	scene,	Woolf	 sets	 her	 borders	 using	 paragraph	 breaks.	 Consider	 this	 passage	 from	Mrs	
Dalloway	as	an	example:		 Strange,	she	thought,	pausing	on	the	landing,	and	assembling	that	diamond	shape,	that	single	person,	strange	how	a	mistress	knows	the	very	moment,	the	very	temper	of	her	house!	Faint	sounds	rose	in	spirals	up	the	well	of	the	stairs;	 the	 swish	 of	 a	mop;	 tapping;	 knocking;	 a	 loudness	when	 the	 front	door	 opened;	 a	 voice	 repeating	 a	 message	 in	 the	 basement;	 the	 chink	 of	silver	on	a	tray;	clean	silver	for	the	party.	All	was	for	the	party.	(MD,	p.	41)		
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Within	 this	 paragraph,	 the	 densely	 packed	 information	 and	 excess	 of	 nouns	 and	verbs	 somewhat	 imitates	 this	effect	of	an	area	being	at	 similar	visual	 luminance.	Compared	 to	 a	more	 diffuse	 sentence	 like	 the	 one	 that	 precedes	 this	 paragraph,	“for	she	must	also	write,	and	see	that	things	generally	were	more	or	less	in	order”	(MD,	 p.	 41),	 it	 requires	more	 perceptual	 effort	 to	 read	 the	 paragraph	 and	make	sense	of	all	the	information	contained	within.	Although	individual	terms	stand	out,	in	 moving	 our	 eyes	 over	 the	 paragraph	 there	 is	 a	 temptation	 to	 blend	 some	 of	these	 together,	 to	 run	 ‘tapping’	 and	 ‘knocking’	 onto	 one	 another,	 or	 to	 quickly	perceive	 the	bulk	of	 the	paragraph	as	 simply	a	 catalogue	of	blended	sounds.	But	the	 end	 and	 beginning	 of	 this	 paragraph	 remain	 distinct	 enough	 to	 allow	 the	reader	to	categorise	it	as	a	separate	unit	of	sorts.		Being	 able	 to	 simultaneously	 perceive	 the	 essential	 outlines	 of	 a	 section	 of	Mrs	
Dalloway,	 but	 also	being	 aware	 that	 there	 is	 enough	 textual	 richness	within	 that	section	that	can	prove	captivating	if	focused	upon,	is	much	like	the	effect	of	similar	luminance	 in	 the	 paintings	 of	 Monet	 or	 Seurat.	Woolf	 uses	 this	 technique	 quite	frequently	throughout	the	text:	another	notable	example	occurs	when	Peter	Walsh	returns	to	his	hotel	and	finds	a	letter	waiting	for	him	from	Clarissa:		 These	hotels	are	not	consoling	places,	far	from	it.	Any	number	of	people	had	hung	 their	 hats	 upon	 those	 pegs.	 Even	 the	 flies,	 if	 you	 thought	 of	 it,	 had	settled	on	other	people’s	noses.	As	for	the	cleanliness	which	hit	him	in	the	face,	it	wasn’t	cleanliness,	so	much	as	bareness,	frigidity,	a	thing	that	had	to	be.	Some	arid	matron	made	her	rounds	at	dawn,	sniffing,	peering,	causing	blue	nosed	maids	to	scour,	for	all	the	world	as	if	the	next	visitor	were	a	joint	
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of	meat	 to	be	served	on	a	perfectly	 clean	platter.	For	sleep,	one’s	bed;	 for	sitting	 in,	one’s	arm-chair;	 for	cleaning	one’s	 teeth	and	shaving	one’s	chin,	one	tumbler,	one	looking	glass.	Books,	letters,	dressing	gown,	slipped	about	on	the	impersonality	of	the	horse-hair	like	incongruous	impertinences.	And	it	was	Clarissa’s	letter	that	made	him	see	all	this!	(MD:	169-70)		Again,	because	of	how	densely	packed	this	passage	 is	with	concrete	 terms,	 it	has	this	same	quality	of	being	at	‘similar	luminance’.	Peter	Walsh’s	rapid	assessment	of	the	 items	 in	his	hotel	 room	and	 their	utilitarian	purposes	 “for	 sleep,”	 “for	 sitting	in,”	 “for	 cleaning	 one’s	 teeth	 and	 shaving	 one’s	 skin”	 all	 have	 distinct	meanings	when	 examined	 separately,	 but	 up	 close	 they	 tend	 to	 blend	 into	 a	 contiguous	description	 of	 the	 room	 and	 any	 features	 contained	 within.	 What’s	 more,	 this	passage	 is	bookended	by	 thoughts	of	Clarissa	–	 the	 first	 right	before	 the	passage	begins,	where	he	wonders,	 “Why	couldn’t	 she	 let	him	be?”	and	 then	 towards	 the	end	 where	 he	 blames	 her	 letter	 for	 sending	 him	 into	 this	 state	 of	 increased	sensitivity	to	the	hotel’s	cleanliness.		Overall,	what	we	have	seen	from	this	analysis	of	the	theories	behind	the	aesthetic	and	perceptual	 features	of	 Impressionist	painting	 is	 that	Woolf	was	 imitating	the	effect	of	 this	 technique	on	more	 than	 just	overall	 symbolic	 levels.	By	making	her	readers	aware	of	aspects	of	perception	that	do	not	ordinarily	enter	consciousness;	and	by	breaking	passages	into	distinct	units	contained	of	dense	writing	that	can	be	individually	resolved	but	is	tempting	to	blend	together,	Woolf	appropriated	some	of	the	perceptual	effects	of	Impressionism	and	put	them	to	use	as	aesthetic	devices	in	literature.	
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Aural	Impressionism		While	the	novel	is,	like	an	impressionist	canvas,	experienced	primarily	as	a	visual	text	as	its	readers	read	the	letters	on	the	page,	the	spoken	sound	that	those	letters	recall	allows	Woolf	to	embellish	the	experience	of	her	characters	in	Mrs	Dalloway.	McKluskey’s	 Reverberations:	 Sound	 and	 Structure	 in	 the	 Novels	 of	 Virgina	 Woolf	(1986)	 extensively	 catalogues	 the	 different	 sound	 patterns	 that	 characterise	Woolf’s	style,	but	some	of	the	perceptual	effects	attributed	to	it	are	almost	bizarre	and	 rather	 strangely	 rationalised.	 McKluskey	 draws	 on	 a	 sound	 pattern	 that	Masson	 (1961)	 calls	 the	 ‘knot’,	 where	 the	 phonetic	 components	 of	 a	 key	 word	recur	in	isolation:		 Knotting	 and	 unknotting	 are	 important	 patterns	 in	 Mrs	 Dalloway.	 A	significant	 knot	 exists	 in	 that	 novel	 in	 the	 word	 spectre.	 Even	 when	 the	word	itself	does	not	appear,	its	sounds	echo:		 one	 feels…	Clarissa	was	positive,	a	particular	hush	or	solemnity,	an	indescribable	pause:	a	suspense…		She’s	 looking	 at	 me,	 he	 thought,	 a	 sudden	 embarrassment	 coming	over	him,	though	he	had	kissed	her	hands.	Putting	his	hand	into	his	pocket,	he	took	out	a	large	pocket	knife	and	half	opened	the	blade…	(1986,	p.	18)		
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The	 underlined	 sound	 repetition	 seems	 reasonably	 relevant,	 but	 the	 idea	 of	 the	word	 ‘spectre’	 echoing	 is	 difficult	 to	 fathom.	 McKluskey	 offers	 the	 following	analysis	of	the	significance	of	these	patterns:		 By	 the	 time	 Peter	 Walsh	 experiences	 the	 grey	 nurse	 as	 “one	 of	 those	spectral	presences”	(p85),	we	are	already	perceiving	as	spectres	of	the	past	all	 the	 memories	 Clarissa	 and	 Peter	 draw	 out.	 The	 first	 draft	 of	 Mrs	
Dalloway	 shows	 extended	 passages	 on	 the	 benevolent	 spectre	 which	suggest	 perhaps	 that	 that	was	 initially	 to	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 central	 image	 in	 a	novel	where	the	characters	are	haunted	by	spectral	presences,	benevolent	or	 otherwise.	 The	 remaining	 echoes	 of	 the	 word	 are	 the	 spectre	 of	 the	image,	all	that	is	left	to	us	perhaps,	but	revealing	enough.	(1986,	p.	18)		In	 reality,	 the	word	 ‘spectre’	 appears	 exactly	 twice	 in	 the	 published	 edition	Mrs	
Dalloway.	 If	we	are	being	generous,	 ‘spectral’	 also	appears	 twice.	Now,	when	 the	elements	are	underlined	as	 they	are	here	and	presented	 in	conjunction	with	 this	word,	 it	will	 be	 natural	 to	 pick	 up	 the	 association,	 but	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	word	‘echoes’	seems	to	be	reading	 far	 too	much	 into	the	composition	(especially	when	the	 word	 ‘spectre’	 does	 not	 even	 appear	 anywhere	 before	 the	 first	 quotation!).	Attributing	the	source	of	this	effect	(which	is	an	effect	that	the	reader	is	supposed	to	experience,	according	to	McKluskey)	to	a	symbolic	association	with	a	synonym	for	 ghost	 seems	 to	 be	 clutching	 at	 straws	 for	 a	 link	 between	 a	 non-conscious	sensation	and	conscious	idea.	It	 is	without	doubt	one	of	the	stranger	examples	of	analysis	performed	in	the	Woolf	scholarship.		
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However,	 if	 we	 backtrack	 at	 this	 point	 we	may	 salvage	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 sound	patterns	 of	 Woolf	 are	 indeed	 significant.	 How	 though	 can	 we	 articulate	 their	potential	 effect	on	 the	 reader,	particularly	without	 resorting	 to	 strange	 symbolic	associations?	Let	us	begin	by	taking	McKluskey’s	first	quote	in	full,	with	view	to	the	context	in	which	it	appears:		 For	having	lived	in	Westminster	–	how	many	years	now?	over	twenty,	–	one	feels	 even	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 the	 traffic,	 or	 waking	 at	 night,	 Clarissa	 was	positive,	a	particular	hush,	or	solemnity;	an	indescribable	pause;	a	suspense	(but	 that	might	 be	 her	 heart,	 affected,	 they	 said,	 by	 influenza)	 before	 Big	Ben	strikes.	There!	Out	it	boomed.	First	a	warning,	musical;	then	the	hour,	irrevocable.	The	leaden	circles	dissolved	in	the	air.	(MD,	p.	4)		The	 context	 of	 the	 paragraph	 links	 this	 intangible	 sensation	 not	 with	 Clarissa’s	memories	or	‘spectres’	of	the	past,	but	with	a	sense	of	apprehension	relating	to	the	rigor	of	modern	life,	particularly	a	metropolitan	life	enforced	by	the	metallic	tones	of	Big	Ben.	In	Tsur’s	analysis	of	the	‘double-edged’	quality	of	sibilants,	he	notes	that	they	can	often	convey	a	‘tender’	or	‘hushing’	quality	(1992,	p.	43-7).		Indeed,	‘hush’	is	one	such	word	used	by	Woolf.	Contrasted	with	this	is	the	onomatopoeic	‘boom’,	where	the	rapid	onset	of	the	soundwave	of	b	is	particularly	symbolic	of	a	sudden,	explosive	sound.		So	we	are	told	that	Clarissa	‘feels’	a	particular	quality	which	is	characterised	by	a	string	 of	 descriptive	 terms:	 ‘particular	 hush’,	 ‘solemnity’,	 ‘indescribable	 pause’,	‘suspense’.	 These	 all	 guide	 the	 reader	 towards	 the	 semantic	 features	 common	
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between	each	phrase,	but	in	doing	so	they	are	also	establishing	a	repetition	of	key	sounds.	This	section,	where	the	repetition	primes	the	voiceless	consonants	s	and	p,	contrasts	with	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 voiced	 consonant	b.	 In	 fact,	 because	b	 and	p	represent	 the	 same	 articulatory	 gesture,	 the	 transition	 from	 voiceless	 to	 voiced	consonants	 is	 extremely	 acute.	 The	 reader	 might	 become	 conscious	 then	 of	 the	effect	 of	 transitioning	 between	 significance	 sounds	 in	 this	manner,	 even	 if	 he	 or	she	does	not	consciously	register	the	nature	of	the	phonetic	differences	at	the	core	of	this	effect	–	that	is	what	remains	in	the	realm	of	the	non-conscious.	This	effect	of	transitioning	 supplements	 Woolf’s	 writing	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 might	 fully	 display	how	 closely	 related	 it	 is	 in	 style	 to	 Impressionism.	 The	 reader	 is	 not	 merely	presented	with	synonyms	related	to	a	silence	in	the	hope	that	they	might	reach	a	conscious	understanding	of	the	semantic	concept	Woolf	is	alluding	to:	instead,	they	are	encouraged	via	use	of	phonemic	repetition	to	experience	that	same	transition	from	 silence	 to	 sudden	 noise.	 In	 doing	 so,	Woolf	 prompts	 them	 to	 undergo	 the	same	sensation	as	Clarissa	–	which	perhaps	has	the	effect	of	showing	exactly	what	is	otherwise	‘indescribable’	about	the	nature	of	this	pause.		A	 contrasting	 example	 of	 the	 use	 of	 sound	 occurs	 further	 into	 the	 novel,	 where	Septimus	and	Reiza	watch	a	 skywriter	 from	a	park	bench.	Note	 in	particular	 the	consonants	k	and	r	in	the	passage:		 ‘K…	R…’	said	the	nursemaid,	and	Septimus	heard	her	say	‘Kay	Arr’	close	to	his	ear,	deeply,	softly,	like	a	mellow	organ,	but	with	a	roughness	in	her	voice	like	a	grasshopper’s,	which	rasped	his	spine	deliciously	and	sent	running	up	into	his	brain	waves	of	sound	which,	concussing,	broke.	(MD,	p.	23-24)	
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	As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 disputed	 word	 being	 written	 in	 the	 sky	 is	 most	 likely	‘Kreemo’.	 Septimus	 focuses	 intently	 on	 the	 first	 two	 consonants,	 and	 they	 are	significant	choices.	According	to	Tsur,	k	and	r	both	have	considerable	 ‘aggressive	potential’	 owing	 to	 their	 aperiodic	 nature	 (1992,	 p.	 29-35).	 The	 most	 repeated	sound	throughout	this	passage	is,	once	again,	s.	But	here	we	are	looking	at	its	other	‘double-edged’	quality,	that	is,	the	manner	in	which	it	can	suggest	or	imitate	noise.	Tsur	suggests	that	this	too	has	to	do	with	their	aperiodic	quality	(1992,	p.	44-45).		By	repeating	the	sounds	k	and	r	through	reporting	not	only	the	nurse’s	speech,	but	also	 the	 sound	 as	 it	 reaches	 Septimus’	 ear,	 their	 aggressive,	 aperiodic	 quality	becomes	primed.	This	then	guides	the	repetition	of	s	throughout	the	paragraph	to	seem	 less	 like	 the	 ‘hushing’	 of	 the	 previously	 quoted	 extract,	 and	more	 like	 the	suggestion	 of	 constant	 noise.	 k	 and	 r	 continue	 to	 recur	 to	 reinforce	 this	 general	sensation.	Moreover,	they	are	contrasted	with	repetitions	of	more	‘tender’	sounds	at	 key	 moments:	 the	 repeated	 d	 and	 i	 in	 ‘deeply’	 and	 ‘deliciously’.	 But	 as	 the	passage	 draws	 to	 an	 end,	 the	 k	 returns	 abruptly	 with	 ‘concussed’	 and	 ‘broke’,	abruptly	 disrupting	 the	 proliferation	 of	more	 pleasant	 sounds,	 implying	 that	 the	pleasant	 sensation	 has	 ended	 for	 Septimus.	 Essentially,	Woolf’s	 choice	 of	 words	not	only	 conjure	up	direct	 images	of	how	Septimus	 is	 affected	by	 the	 sound,	but	they	mimic	the	ambiguity	he	seems	to	feel	whereby	the	sound	affects	him	in	a	way	that	 is	 both	 rough	 but	 pleasing,	 again	 leaving	 the	 reader	 with	 a	 conscious	impression	formed	through	a	non-conscious	sensation.		
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As	with	Kerouac,	sound	patterns	and	rhythmic	detail	can	be	used	to	create	effects	of	motion,	 and	here	we	might	 also	 recall	 that	Monet’s	The	Poppy	Field	outside	of	
Argenteuil	 creates	an	 illusion	of	motion.	McNichol	 (1990)	draws	out	 some	of	 the	poetic	devices	used	in	Woolf’s	prose;	her	chapter	on	Mrs	Dalloway	concentrates	on	the	‘rhythmic	order’	of	the	novel.	In	general,	McNichol	is	discussing	rhythm	not	as	a	technique	but	as	a	symbolic	device	used	to	represent	the	flow	of	 life	and	wider	reality	 around	 the	 characters	 of	 the	 novel,	 but	 there	 references	 to	 the	 actual	sensation	of	 rhythm	 in	key	passages,	 such	as	 the	depiction	of	London	on	page	4;	and	these	hint	upon	the	aesthetic	impact	of	the	challenging	text.		 In	 this	passage	different	 kinds	of	movement,	 of	 noise,	 of	 vehicles,	 objects,	and	people	are	all	tumbled	out	in	no	kind	of	logical	order,	though	the	listing	does	 fall	 on	 the	 ear	with	 an	 easy	 and	 jolly	 rhythm...	 It	 is	 as	 if,	 therefore,	Virginia	Woolf	 has	 herself	 ‘tumbled’	 it	 out,	 creating	 it	 afresh,	 and	 built	 it	round	 Clarissa.	 The	 prose	 exactly	 represents	 Clarissa’s	 excited	 way	 of	seeing	it	at	this	particular	moment	and	in	a	particular	frame	of	mind.	(1990,	p.	66)		Essentially	the	rhythm,	which	seems	to	run	contrary	to	the	regular	constraints	of	prose	syntax,	allows	the	text	to	transfer	to	the	reader	a	sense	of	the	rhythm	felt	by	Clarissa	in	London	at	that	moment.	First,	here	is	Woolf’s	passage:		 Heaven	only	knows	why	one	 loves	 it	 so,	how	one	sees	 it	 so,	making	 it	up,	building	it	round	one,	tumbling	it,	creating	every	moment	afresh…	for	that	very	reason:	they	love	life.	In	people’s	eyes,	in	the	swing,	tramp,	and	trudge;	
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in	 the	 bellow	 and	 uproar;	 the	 carriages,	 motor	 cars,	 omnibuses,	 vans,	sandwich	men	 shuffling	 and	 swinging;	 brass	 bands;	 barrel	 organs;	 in	 the	triumph	 and	 the	 jingle	 and	 the	 strange	 high	 singing	 of	 some	 aeroplane	overhead	was	what	she	loved;	life,	London;	this	moment	of	June.	(MD,	p.4)		McNichol	 refers	 to	 this	passage	as	 ‘tumbling	out’,	 echoing	Woolf,	 and	also	noting	that	it	falls	on	the	ear	with	 ‘an	easy	and	jolly	rhythm’.	This	rhythm	is	essential	to	creating	 a	 sense	 of	 motion	 through	 kinaesthesia.	 The	 sentences	 are	 drawn	 out,	with	the	regular	commas	acting	as	an	off-beat	in	sections	such	as	‘swing,	tramp	and	trudge’,	the	latter	two	being	heavily	onomatopoeic	of	the	act	of	a	foot	falling.	The	alliteration	of	s	in	‘sandwich	men	shuffling	and	swinging’	encourages	the	reader	to	find	 another	 beat/off-beat	 pattern	 aided	 by	 eliding	 syllables	 before	 the	 off-beat.	There	are	several	instances	of	alliteration	in	this	passage,	giving	more	credence	to	this	 overall	 sense	 of	 rhythm.	 As	 the	 passage	 unfolds,	 the	 imagery	 comes	 back	inward	from	the	sights	of	the	street	to	Clarissa	herself,	and	it	becomes	implicit	that	these	are	her	observations	as	she	walks	the	streets	of	London.	The	reader	thus	has	a	 kind	 of	 connection	 to	 her	 footsteps	 in	 the	 rhythm	Woolf	 imparts	 through	 this	passage.	 Using	 this	 technique,	 Woolf	 creates	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 motion	 Clarissa	undergoes	 as	 she	 walks	 through	 downtown	 London,	 surrounded	 as	 she	 is	 by	images	of	motion.		One	of	 the	key	 impressionist	 lines	of	 the	novel	 is	 “the	 leaden	circles	dissolved	 in	the	 air”.	 This	 is	 consistently	 repeated	 after	Big	Ben	 strikes,	 enough	 to	 suggest	 it	forms	a	description	of	the	chimes	fading	away.	What	is	most	striking	though	is	the	synaesthetic	nature	of	 the	 image:	a	 sound	being	described	 in	 terms	of	a	physical	
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shape,	which	is	itself	suggested	to	be	heavy,	metallic	and/or	dull.	Confronted	with	a	description	that	is	challenging	to	rationalise,	our	swift	perception	of	the	novel	is	impeded	 as	we	 attempt	 to	 figure	 out	what	 it	means	 or	 implies.	 Therein	 lies	 the	most	 important	 effect:	 creating	 a	 sensation	 of	 confusion	 and	 possible	 anxiety	surrounding	Big	Ben’s	omnipresent	chimes.	This	effect	associated	with	the	novel’s	key	 symbol	 of	 timekeeping	 becomes	 relevant	 as	we	 consider	 the	 final	 aspect	 of	Impressionism	in	Mrs	Dalloway:	the	irregular	flux	of	time.		
Temporal	Impressionism		Here	is	where	we	return	to	Banfield’s	essay	on	Woolf	and	its	argument	that	Woolf	is	better	thought	of	as	a	post-Impressionist	than	associated	with	the	likes	of	Monet.	Her	 central	 link	 between	 the	 novel	 and	 the	 visual	 arts	 is	 through	 Woolf’s	representation	of	time:		 Literature’s	 counterpart	 to	 the	 geometry	 of	 spatial	 relations	 were	 the	temporal	 relations	 of	 Cambridge	 time	 philosophy.	 Contrary	 to	 a	 common	assumption,	Woolf	adopted	not	Henri	Bergson’s	philosophy	but	G.	E.	Moore	and	Bertrand	Russell’s	realism.	Time	passes	not	as	duree	but	as	a	series	of	still	moments.	 Temporal	 relations	 connect	moments	 as	 spatial	 ones	 unify	Impressionism’s	atomized	color,	with	the	mathematical	theory	of	continuity	playing	a	crucial	role.	(2003,	p.	471)		In	her	essay,	Banfield’s	theorem	is	tested	against	the	‘Time	Passes’	segment	of	To	
The	Lighthouse.	This	next	section	analyses	the	equally	important	thematization	of	
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time	in	Mrs	Dalloway,	with	the	aim	being	to	explore	how	apt	this	dimension	is	as	an	analogue	to	visual	Impressionism.		To	 understand	 this,	 we	 must	 ask	 how	 our	 brains	 perceive	 time.	 According	 to	Merchant,	Harrington	and	Meck	there	is	“no	specific	biological	system	that	senses	time	as	there	are	for	sight,	hearing,	and	taste”	(2013,	p.	314).	As	such,	the	models	of	 time	 perception	 involve	 input	 from	 different	 areas	 of	 the	 brain	 working	 in	tandem,	 such	 as	 Buhusi	 and	Meck’s	 Striatal	 Beat	 Frequency	model	 (2005).	 This	model	 hypothesises	 that	 various	 organs	 within	 the	 body	 oscillate	 to	 a	 certain	frequency,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	discern	 intervals	 of	 time	accurately	 is	derived	 from	areas	within	 the	basal	ganglia	counting	 the	number	of	beats	within	an	 interval.26	While	 research	has	demonstrated	how	accurate	 the	 timing	mechanism	can	be,	 it	has	also	reinforced	the	notion	that	subjective	perception	of	time	can	be	altered	by	various	 emotional	 states,	 such	 as	 fear	 and	 depression	 (Droit-Volet	 et	 al.,	 2013).	This	 is	not	to	say	that	the	ability	to	correctly	delineate	time	intervals	diminishes,	but	 that	 overall	 perception	 of	 time	 can	 change.	 For	 instance,	 Droit-Volet	 et	 al.	describe	 the	 effect	 of	 fearful	 situations	 on	 the	 perception	 of	 time:	 “without	disrupting	 time	 discrimination,	 the	 internal	 clock	 automatically	 runs	 faster	 in	 a	threatening	 situation,	 thus	 producing	 a	 lengthening	 effect	 associated	 with	 a	constant	state	of	alertness,	mobility	and	readiness	to	act”	(2013,	p.	4).	This	notion	that	 subjective	 perception	 of	 time	 can	 differ	 greatly	 from	 the	 accurate	measurement	of	time	is	crucial	to	Mrs	Dalloway.			
                                                
26 An alternate model is the Scalar Expectancy Theory, where an internal pacemaker system creates a 
series of pulses against which interval timing can be judged. See Rakitin et al, 1998. 
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In	 addition	 to	 these	modelled	 systems	of	 interval	 timing,	 the	brain	 also	 contains	the	 suprachiasmatic	 nucleus,	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 circadian	 rhythm.	Bernard	et	al.	(2007)	describe	its	importance:		 Circadian	 rhythms,	 characterized	 by	 a	 period	 close	 to	 24	 hours,	 are	observed	 in	 nearly	 all	 living	 organisms,	 from	 cyanobacteria	 to	 plants,	insects,	and	mammals.	In	mammals,	the	central	circadian	clock	is	located	in	the	suprachiasmatic	nucleus	(SCN)	of	 the	hypothalamus,	where	 it	receives	light	signals	from	the	retina.	(2007,	p.	668)		The	 circadian	 clock	 is	 not	 responsible	 for	 precise	 judgements	 of	 time,	 but	regulating	behaviour	through	timed	intervals	gleaned	from	natural	conditions.	As	such,	 the	 twenty-four	 hour	 period	 it	 delineates	 represents	 an	 instinctive	 time	period	rather	than	a	calculated	one.	Woolf’s	decision	to	restrict	Mrs	Dalloway	to	a	single	day,	like	Joyce’s	Ulysses,	becomes	even	more	significant	when	observed	that	within	the	novel,	objective	accounts	of	the	actual	time	each	scene	takes	place	in	are	difficult	to	come	by.	There	are	direct	references	to	precise	hours	in	certain	scenes,	but	at	key	points	even	the	precise	timing	of	Big	Ben	is	blurred:		 The	clock	began	striking.	The	young	man	had	killed	himself,	but	she	did	not	pity	him;	with	the	clock	striking	the	hour,	one,	two,	three,	she	did	not	pity	him,	with	all	 this	going	on.	There!	The	old	 lady	had	put	out	her	 light!	The	whole	house	was	dark	now	with	this	going	on,	she	repeated,	and	the	words	came	to	her,	Fear	no	more	the	heat	of	 the	sun.	She	must	go	back	to	 them.	But	 what	 an	 extraordinary	 night!	 She	 felt	 somehow	 very	 like	 him	 –	 the	
 207 
young	man	who	had	killed	himself.	She	felt	glad	that	he	had	done	it;	thrown	it	away	while	they	went	on	living.	The	clock	was	striking.	The	leaden	circles	dissolved	in	the	air.	(MD,	p.	204)		The	 immediate	assumption	here	 is	 that	 the	time	 is	 three	o’clock,	but	 the	passage	remains	highly	ambiguous.	It	can	also	be	read	as	Clarissa	counting	the	time,	then	interrupting	herself	as	her	stream	of	consciousness	shifts	to	thoughts	of	Septimus	and	 the	old	 lady.	Because	of	 the	 length	of	 the	 text	between	 this	 interruption	and	the	 point	 when	 Clarissa	 again	 observes	 ‘The	 clock	 was	 striking’,	 it	 might	 be	inferred	 that	 the	clock	has	continued	striking	 this	whole	 time,	and	 thus	 the	hour	could	 be	 closer	 to	 eleven	 or	 twelve	 o’clock.	 This	 indeed	 is	 the	 interpretation	favoured	by	Benjamin	(1965,	p.	217)27,	while	Wright	(1944)	claims	that	the	ending	takes	place	at	three	a.m.		The	 principal	 difference	 between	 these	 two	 neurological	 timing	 mechanisms	becomes	 apparent	 not	 only	 in	 the	 themes	 of	Mrs	 Dalloway,	 but	 in	 the	 reader’s	involvement	in	the	text.	To	return	to	Banfield,	her	premise	is	that	Woolf	creates	a	series	of	temporal	relations	that	are	essentially	analogous	to	the	use	of	geometry	and	colour	in	an	impressionist	canvas,	creating	continuity	out	of	discontinuity.	In	
Mrs	Dalloway,	not	only	do	the	characters	demonstrate	that	their	experience	of	time	can	go	faster	or	slower	 in	key	moments,	but	the	reader’s	own	perception	of	 time	passing	 is	 frustrated	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	 chronology.	 Importantly,	 this	 is	exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 novel	 takes	 place	 in	 a	 single	 day,	 making	 the	individual	hours	of	the	day	more	significant	than	in	a	novel	that	takes	place	over	a	
                                                
27 Benjamin’s paper includes an excellent summary of the implied timeline of Mrs Dalloway, including 
notes on all major moments within the narrative that have an ambiguous time. 
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longer	period.	On	page	170,	Peter	Walsh	notes	he	has	received	Clarissa’s	letter	by	six	o’clock.	Scarcely	thirty	pages	later	on	page	204,	Clarissa	stands	outside	on	her	balcony	at	an	hour	that	can	be	interpreted	as	between	eleven	and	three	o’clock,	as	discussed	above.	Contrast	this	time	period	with	another	that	begins	on	page	77,	as	Septimus	says	“I	will	tell	you	the	time”.	Here	it	is	revealed	to	be	quarter	to	twelve,	but	by	page	103	we	are	being	told,	“it	was	precisely	twelve	o’clock”.	Over	what	is	almost	the	same	number	of	pages,	the	elapsed	time	period	differs	significantly.		It	 is	precisely	because	these	fluctuations	of	time	are	so	difficult	to	follow	that	the	novel	 becomes	 so	 effective	 in	 its	 aesthetic	 representation	 of	 time.	 The	 reader	struggles	 to	 impose	 some	 kind	 of	 order	 on	 the	 disorderly	 narrative	 form,	 by	attempting	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 where	 chronological	 time	 falls.	 In	 some	 instances	there	are	precise	hours	cited,	but	at	other	 times	 the	clock	 is	mentioned	 to	strike	but	no	 time	 is	 cited,	only	 images	 such	as	 ‘the	 leaden	circles	dissolved	 in	 the	air’.	The	reader	 is	 then	 forced	 to	 look	 for	 clues	as	 to	what	 time	 it	actually	 is	 in	other	details:	particularly	in	the	imagery	Woolf	uses	to	describe	the	atmosphere	around	her	characters.	 It	 is	unspecified	at	what	time	the	novel	begins,	but	we	are	drawn	instead	to	her	description	of	the	morning:		 How	 fresh,	 how	 calm,	 stiller	 than	 this	 of	 course,	 the	 air	 was	 in	 the	 early	morning;	like	the	flap	of	a	wave,	or	the	kiss	of	a	wave,	chill	and	sharp...	(MD,	p.	3)		The	words	‘fresh’,	‘chill’	and	‘sharp’	suggest	coolness	in	the	air,	implying	the	sun	is	still	 at	 a	 lower	 angle	 and	 the	 time	 is	 around	or	 earlier	 than	 ten	o’clock.	The	 last	
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precise	 delineation	 of	 time	 is	 six	 o’clock	 on	 page	 170,	 but	 seven	 pages	 later	 the	imagery	is	of	the	evening	light	beginning	to	fade:		 I	 resign,	 the	 evening	 seemed	 to	 say,	 as	 it	 paled	 and	 faded	 above	 the	battlements	and	prominences,	moulded,	pointed,	of	hotel,	flat,	and	block	of	shops,	I	fade,	she	was	beginning,	I	disappear,	but	London	would	have	none	of	 it,	and	rushed	her	bayonets	 into	 the	sky,	pinioned	her,	and	constrained	her	to	partnership	in	her	revelry.	(MD,	p.	177)		What	is	significant	here	is	that	the	novel	takes	place	in	June	(MD,	p.	4).	At	this	time	of	year	in	London,	the	longer	days	mean	the	sun	would	likely	be	setting	closer	to	nine	o’clock.	Chronological	time	has	most	likely	sped	up	relative	to	the	pace	of	the	novel,	as	it	takes	Peter	Walsh	a	couple	of	hours	to	ruminate	on	Clarissa’s	letter	and	eat	 his	 dinner.	 Importantly	 however,	 the	 confusion	 this	 places	 the	 reader	 in	mirrors	Peter’s	own	sense	of	confusion	at	London	being	so	alive	at	this	hour,	as	we	are	 told	on	page	177:	 ‘The	prolonged	evening	was	new	 to	him.’	Having	 spent	 so	much	time	in	India,	Peter	has	grown	accustomed	to	a	cycle	of	activity	based	around	a	different	period	of	light	associated	with	the	different	latitude.	Woolf	mimics	this	sense	 of	 confusion	 arising	 from	 the	 heightened	 activity	 in	 contravention	 of	 the	circadian	rhythm	by	speeding	up	the	pace	of	time	in	the	text.		The	 overall	 effect	 of	 these	 fluxes	 of	 time	 becomes	 highly	 impressionistic.	Woolf	frustrates	the	reader’s	ability	to	keep	track	of	time	intervals,	making	the	passage	of	time	a	more	significant	object	than	in	a	simpler	chronology.	A	key	effect	of	this	is	that	by	searching	for	simpler	clues	to	the	time	of	day	in	the	imagery	of	the	text,	the	
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reader	is	unwittingly	imitating	the	actions	of	keeping	time	purely	through	clues	the	suprachiasmatic	nucleus	receives	in	the	form	of	 light	signals	from	the	retina.	The	reader	 can	 be	 encouraged	 in	 this	way	 to	 not	 rely	 on	 the	 clocks	 in	 the	 novel	 for	accurate	timing,	but	to	instead	revert	to	a	more	natural	way	of	keeping	time,	even	when	this	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	the	hive	of	activity	during	the	night.		This	 depiction	 of	 time	 underscores	Woolf’s	modernist	 ethos	 and	 her	 ‘attempt	 to	come	 closer	 to	 life’	 (Woolf,	 2006,	 p.	 2089).	 “Life	 is	 not	 a	 series	 of	 gig-lamps	symmetrically	 arranged,”	 she	wrote,	 “life	 is	 a	 luminous	 halo,	 a	 semi	 transparent	envelope	surrounding	us	from	the	beginning	of	consciousness	to	the	end.”	(2006,	p.	 2089).	 Woolf	 depicts	 the	 human	 perception	 of	 time	 not	 as	 clear	 and	chronological	as	 the	clocks	mark	 it	out	 to	be:	she	demonstrates	how	it	 fluctuates	under	 the	 impact	 of	 emotions.	 Moreover,	 in	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 she	 represents	 the	anxiety	of	modernity	for	her	characters	by	manipulating	the	reader’s	sense	of	time,	speeding	 it	 up	 or	 slowing	 it	 down	 at	will,	 confronting	 them	with	 the	 sense	 that	modern	time	for	London	society	violates	the	body’s	natural	clock,	instilling	in	them	an	attitude	of	uncertainty	towards	the	society	they	are	presented	with	–	a	feeling	that	 is	 echoed	 by	 the	 characters	 in	 the	 novel.	 Time	 is	 one	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 her	impressionistic	canvas,	as	it	is	left	to	the	reader	to	piece	together	the	timeframe	of	the	novel,	both	for	the	action	in	the	present	but	also	in	the	past.		As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 impressionist	 nature	 of	 Mrs	 Dalloway	 is	 manifested	 in	different	textual	elements:	the	analogous	effects	of	‘equiluminance’	borrowed	from	the	 Impressionist	 painters,	 the	 sound	 patterns,	 the	 uneven	 flux	 of	 chronological	time,	 and	 the	 effect	 of	 de-automatised	 perception.	When	Mrs	Dalloway	was	 first	
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written	 it	 coincided	 with	 increasing	 interest	 in	 perception	 from	 science,	psychology,	 philosophy	 and	 the	 arts.	 Almost	 a	 century	 later,	 our	 increased	understanding	 of	 the	 neural	 mechanisms	 surrounding	 these	 various	 elements	makes	 the	 perceptual	 effects	 Woolf	 exploited	 for	Mrs	 Dalloway	 take	 on	 a	 new	lucidity,	 justifying	her	vision	and	 that	of	 the	young	man	who	wrote	 that	 she	had	‘caught	life	and	put	it	in	a	book’.	 	 	
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Chapter	Five:	Nabokov,	Cross-Modality	and	Sensory	Aesthetics		 Lolita.	Light	of	my	life,	fire	of	my	loins.	My	sin,	my	soul.	Lo-lee-ta:	the	tip	of	the	tongue	taking	a	trip	of	three	steps	down	the	palate	to	tap,	at	three,	on	the	teeth.	Lo.	Lee.	Ta.	(AL,	p.	9)		Vladimir	Nabokov’s	controversial	novel	opens	with	these	evocative	lines	in	which	the	 narrator,	 Humbert	Humbert,	 sets	 out	 for	 the	 reader	 his	 infatuation	with	 the	titular	character.	In	this	short	extract	the	emphasis	on	the	senses	is	apparent	in	the	way	Humbert	repeats	her	name,	slowing	it	down	each	time	from	‘Lolita’	to	‘Lo-lee-ta’	to	‘Lo.	Lee.	Ta.’	The	effect	is	to	make	the	phonetics	of	her	name	stand	out	to	the	reader,	to	impede	their	automatic	absorption	and	parsing	as	simply	the	signifier	of	a	character.	The	sensory	properties	of	this	name	are	to	be	understood	as	holding	significant	power	over	the	narrator.		By	impeding	this	kind	of	higher	level	processing,	Nabokov	also	draws	attention	to	the	curious	way	in	which	he	maps	these	and	other	sensory	impressions	within	the	text.	‘The	tip	of	the	tongue	taking	a	trip’	contains	so	much	alliteration	it	resembles	a	tongue-twister;	but	it	also	represents	a	sense-transference	from	the	auditory,	in	this	 case	 the	 syllables,	 to	 the	 somatosensory;	 which	 in	 this	 case	 is	 the	proprioception	of	the	tongue’s	location	inside	the	mouth	and	the	touch	of	it	against	the	teeth.	Nabokov	makes	us	aware	of	the	physical	movements	that	produce	these	sounds,	 but	 he	 also	 transposes	 the	 sound	 of	 ‘Lolita’	 into	 a	 visual	 and	 tactile	representation.		
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	In	literary	criticism,	cross-sensory	mappings	that	are	used	either	as	a	metaphorical	device	 or	 as	 a	 more	 general	 stylistic	 impression	 conveyed	 by	 the	 text	 are	traditionally	bundled	under	 the	 term	 ‘literary	synaesthesia’.	This	 term	 is	derived	from	 a	 neurological	 phenomenon	 in	 which	 stimulation	 of	 one	 sensory	 system	invokes	automatic	and	involuntary	perceptions	that	stem	from	a	different	system,	hence	the	name	being	derived	from	Greek	terms	for	‘together’	and	‘sensation’.	One	of	 the	most	 common	 examples	 is	 being	 able	 to	 simultaneously	 and	 consistently	perceive	 letters	 as	 having	 distinctive	 colours;	 a	 condition	 that,	 by	 no	 small	coincidence,	is	one	that	Nabokov	himself	claims	to	have	experienced.		The	 neurological	 phenomenon	 of	 synaesthesia	 is	 of	 great	 interest	 to	 cognitive	scientists	such	as	Ramachandran	who	aim	to	understand	the	brain	by	studying	its	eccentricities.	 Literary	 criticism	 however	 has	 been	 altogether	 more	 cautious	 in	approaching	synaesthesia,	skirting	around	the	broader	prospect	of	engaging	with	a	phenomenon	that	could	potentially	cast	new	light	on	the	aesthetic	experience	of	a	literary	text.	Consider	how	Tsur	(2008)	defines	his	terms	of	reference	in	a	chapter	on	literary	synaesthesia:		 The	 term	 synaesthesia	 suggests	 the	 joining	 of	 sensations	 derived	 from	different	 sensory	 domains.	 One	 must	 distinguish	 between	 the	 joining	 of	sense	 impressions	 derived	 from	 the	 various	 sensory	 domains,	 and	 the	joining	 of	 terms	 derived	 from	 the	 vocabularies	 of	 the	 various	 sensory	domains.	 The	 former	 concerns	 synaesthesia	 as	 a	 psychological	phenomenon;	 the	 latter	 is	Verbal	Synaesthesia.	Literary	Synaesthesia,	 then,	
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is	the	exploitation	of	verbal	synaesthesia	for	specific	literary	effects.	(2008,	p.	283)		Tsur’s	 defintion	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 terms	 of	 reference	 employed	 by	 Ullmann	(1945,	 1957)	 and	 Ruddick	 (1984),	 who	 between	 them	 study	 the	 incidents	 of	literary	 synaesthesia	 in	 Byron,	 Keats	 and	 Dickinson.	 Although	 Tsur’s	 definition	constitutes	a	reasonable	attempt	to	ground	the	subject	matter	of	his	inquiry	within	an	objective	realm,	he	has	also	avoided	the	question	of	whether	or	not	neurological	synaesthesia	 is	 related	 to	 or	 can	 tell	 us	 anything	 about	 verbal	 synaesthesia.	 He	states	 further	 down	 the	 page:	 “Literary	 synaesthesia	 is	 concerned	 with	 verbal	constructs	 and	 not	 with	 ‘dual	 perceptions’”	 (2008,	 p.	 283)	 Yet	 as	 Lakoff	 and	Johnson	 (1980)	 argue,	 the	 supposedly	 abstract	 language	 of	 metaphors	 is	frequently	grounded	 in	our	physical	experience.	The	Dictionary	of	Literary	Terms	
and	Literary	Theory	also	notes	that	this	‘verbal	synaesthesia’	is	not	purely	a	literary	phenomenon:		 Homer,	 Aeschylus,	 Horace,	 Donne,	 Crashaw,	 Shelley	 and	 dozens	 of	 other	poets	had	used	synaesthetic	effects.	We	use	them	in	everyday	speech	when	we	talk	of	‘a	cold	eye’,	‘a	soft	wind’,	‘a	heavy	silence’,	‘a	hard	voice’,	‘a	black	look’	and	so	forth.	(Cuddon	(ed.),	1998,	p.	889)		When	terms	such	as	these	are	engrained	in	our	lexicon,	it	is	only	by	isolating	their	components	 that	we	 realise	 the	 curiously	 cross-sensory	property	 they	 exhibit.	 It	does	not	make	immediate	sense	why	the	sight	of	an	eye	should	evoke	a	sensation	of	temperature,	but	the	phrase	‘a	cold	eye’	is	accepted	readily,	as	is	‘a	warm	glance’.	
 216
In	 literature,	 these	 phrases	 stand	 out	when	 the	writer	 is	more	 imaginative	with	their	 joining	of	 sensory	domains,	 as	with	Charles	Baudelaire’s	 ‘Correspondances’	where	he	claims	“II	est	des	parfums	frais	comme	des	chairs	d'enfants”,	which	can	be	 translated	as	 “There	are	perfumes	 that	are	as	cool	as	 the	 flesh	of	 children.”	A	‘cool	perfume’	does	not	immediately	seem	unnatural,	but	by	his	use	of	the	simile	it	becomes	unfamiliar.		Given	 that	we	 use	 a	 form	 of	 synaesthetic	 language	 in	 our	 everyday	 expressions,	how	significant	 is	this	for	our	perception	of	a	text?	Tsur	goes	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	literary	synaesthesia	has	some	consistent	properties	associated	with	it:		 In	Romantic	poetry	 and	 in	19th	Century	 Symbolism,	 Literary	 Synaesthesia	typically	 contributes	 to	 some	 undifferentiated	 emotional	 quality,	 some	“vague,	dreamy,	or	uncanny	hallucinatory	moods”,	or	some	strange,	magical	experience	or	heightened	mystery.	(2008,	p.	283)		Tsur’s	 suggestion	 of	 an	 undifferentiated	 emotional	 quality,	 tells	 us	 that	 cross-sensory	processing	–	or	cross-modal	processing,	as	it	 is	more	frequently	referred	to	 –	 is	worth	 investigating	 in	 literature	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	may	prove	 to	 be	 the	source	of	distinctive	aesthetic	experience	for	the	reader.		Consider	 for	 a	 moment	 what	 we	 have	 already	 investigated	 in	 these	 case	 study	chapters:	Woolf’s	use	of	‘Impressionism’	has	been	studied	for	its	links	to	the	visual	form	of	 Impressionism,	while	Kerouac’s	prose	has	been	examined	 in	 terms	of	 its	resemblance	to	music.	The	language	of	both	visual	and	aural	aesthetic	experiences	
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is	 appropriated	 by	 critics	 and	 readers,	 in	 a	 way	 that	 further	 shows	 how	 cross-modal	 mappings	 underpin	 the	 way	 we	 think	 about	 and	 communicate	 our	experiences	 of	 literature.	 Ezra	 Pound’s	 terms	 of	 phanopoeia	 and	 melopoeia	 are	also	 instructive	 in	 their	 appeal	 to	 the	 visual	 and	 aural	 properties	 of	 language	(1934,	 p.	 37).	 According	 to	 Pound,	 language	 can	 be	 ‘charged’	 with	 meaning	 by	appealing	 to	 the	visual	 imagination	(phanopoeia)	or	by	 the	sound	and	rhythm	of	speech	(melopoeia).			This	 chapter	 examines	 in	 detail	 what	 the	 new	 science	 of	 cross-modality	 can	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	the	mind	as	it	interacts	with	literature.	It	raises	questions	as	to	exactly	how	much	of	our	experience	of	a	text	is	grounded	in	cross-modal	 relationships	 rather	 than	 just	 semantics.	 It	 examines	 the	 contribution	 of	these	 textual	 cross-modal	 mappings	 to	 our	 aesthetic	 appreciation	 of	 the	 novel.	
Lolita	is	the	key	vehicle	for	this	investigation,	as	we	will	examine	how	the	blending	of	 sensory	 domains	 creates	 pleasurable	 readings	 that	 exist	 in	 tension	 with	 the	transgressive	subject	matter	of	the	novel.	Lionel	Trilling	wrote	of	Lolita:	“we	find	ourselves	 the	 more	 shocked	 when	 we	 realise	 that,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 reading	 the	novel,	we	have	come	virtually	to	condone	the	violation	it	represents.”	(1958,	p.	14)	This	 chapter	will	 demonstrate	 one	 aspect	 of	 how	Nabokov	 achieves	 this:	 not	 so	much	 having	 the	 reader	 ‘condone’	 the	 violation,	 but	 in	 producing	 a	 tension	between	the	pleasures	of	the	text’s	verbal	effects	experienced	at	a	non-conscious,	intuitive	level,	and	the	‘higher-level’	processing	that	tends	to	recoil	from	the	text’s	morally	transgressive		content	at	a	semantic	level.		
 218
Furthermore,	 since	 synaesthesia	 has	 provided	 cognitive	 scientists	 with	 valuable	evidence	for	how	the	mind	works,	based	on	the	principle	that	studying	minds	that	represent	outliers	in	neurobiology	can	tell	us	more	about	the	normal	functions	of	the	brain,	this	chapter	will	use	these	insights	to	demonstrate	how	these	principles	are	 reflected	 in	 some	 of	 Nabokov’s	 fiction,	 including	 Lolita.	 This	 chapter	 is	 not	purporting	 to	offer	 a	 complete	 reading	of	Lolita,	 but	 to	 show	how	elements	of	 it	become	more	significant	in	light	of	what	synaesthesia	and	cross-modality	can	tell	us	of	the	reader’s	mind	and	the	author’s	mind.		
Synaesthesia		One	 of	 Nabokov’s	 many	 eccentricities	 was	 that	 he	 exhibited	 colour-grapheme	synaesthesia.	 In	 Speak,	 Memory	 he	 presents,	 with	 his	 characteristic	 flair	 and	attention	to	detail,	what	he	calls:	“a	fine	case	of	coloured	hearing”.		 Perhaps	‘hearing’	is	not	quite	accurate,	since	the	colour	sensation	seems	to	be	 produced	 by	 the	 very	 act	 of	 my	 orally	 forming	 a	 given	 letter	 while	 I	imagine	 its	 outline.	 The	 long	 a	 of	 the	 English	 alphabet	 (and	 it	 is	 this	alphabet	I	have	in	mind	farther	on	unless	otherwise	stated)	has	for	me	the	tint	of	weathered	wood,	but	a	French	a	evokes	polished	ebony.	This	black	group	 also	 includes	 hard	 g	 (vulcanized	 rubber)	 and	 r	 (a	 sooty	 rag	 being	ripped).	 Oatmeal	n,	 noodle-limp	 l,	 and	 the	 ivory	 backed	 hand-mirror	 of	o	take	 care	 of	 the	 whites…	 Passing	 onto	 the	 blue	 group,	 there	 is	 steely	 x,	thundercloud	z,	and	huckleberry	k.	Since	a	subtle	interaction	exists	between	sound	and	shape,	I	see	q	as	browner	than	k,	while	s	is	not	the	light	blue	of	c,	
 219 
but	 a	 curious	mixture	of	 azure	and	mother-of-pearl.	Adjacent	 tints	do	not	merge,	 and	 diphthongs	 do	 not	 have	 special	 colours	 of	 their	 own,	 unless	represented	by	a	single	character	in	some	other	language…(S,M,	p.	17).		Here	we	must	 first	 establish	 that	Nabokov	 is	 not	 simply	being	 overly	 fanciful	 or	imaginative	 in	 his	 writing,	 and	 that	 synaesthesia	 is	 a	 verified	 neurological	phenomenon	 -	 not	 simply	 the	 product	 of	 an	 overactive	 imagination	 or	 poetic	license.		For	 most	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 accounts	 of	 synaesthesia	 were	 greeted	 with	scepticism.	As	noted	by	Cytowic	and	Eagleman	(2009,	p.	16),	behaviourism	was	the	dominant	 psychological	 paradigm	 during	 a	 massive	 decline	 in	 publications	 on	synaesthesia	between	 the	1920s	 and	1940s;	 and	alongside	 explanations	of	 over-imagination	 or	metaphoric	 expression,	 it	was	 often	 postulated	 that	 synaesthetes	were	 merely	 recalling	 childhood	 associations	 between	 colours	 and	 letters	 or	numbers:		 Many	 in	 the	 scientific	 establishment	 rolled	 their	 eyes	 at	 the	 notion	 of	synaesthesia	 and	 tried	 to	 explain	 away	 a	 very	 common	 type	 –	 namely,	sensing	 letters	 and	numbers	 as	 coloured	 even	 though	 they	 are	 printed	 in	black	ink	–	by	arguing	that	synaesthetes	were	just	‘remembering’	childhood	associations	 from	 colouring	 books	 or	 refrigerator	 magnets,	 and	 that	 was	why	the	letter	A	was	red	or	D	was	green,	for	example.	(2009,	p.	5)					
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These	critics	would	likely	have	been	frustrated	by	Nabokov,	who	testifies	that	the	first	time	he	became	aware	of	his	synaesthesia	was	when	he	played	with	a	set	of	coloured	alphabet	blocks	aged	seven	years	old,	and	remarked	 to	his	mother	 that	the	colours	were	“all	wrong”	(S,M,	p.	18).		Furthermore,	 Nabokov	 demonstrates	 a	 vague	 familiarity	 with	 the	 scientific	literature	about	his	 condition	 that	would	have	been	available	 at	 the	 time,	noting	only	that	the	earliest	source	he	can	find	for	it	comes	from	“an	albino	physician	in	1812,	in	Erlangen”	(S,M,	p.	18).	His	intuition	that	‘hearing’	is	not	the	most	accurate	term	 to	 describe	 his	 condition	 touches	 upon	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 his	account	focuses	on	matching	a	colour	with	the	grapheme	representing	that	letter,	although	he	does	distinguish	between	the	French	and	English	pronunciations	of	a.	This	grapheme-colour	form	is,	according	to	Simner	et	al.	(2005),	the	second	most	common	 form	 of	 synaesthesia,	 occurring	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 one	 in	 ninety	 people.	Synaesthesia	 takes	 on	 many	 forms:	 sound-colour,	 smell-colour,	 taste-colour,	sound-smell,	sound-taste,	vision-taste:	they	are	too	numerous	to	list	here	in	their	entirety.	 In	 the	 study	by	Simner	et	al.,	 the	most	 common	 form	of	 synaesthesia	 is	identified	 as	 experiencing	 coloured	 days	 of	 the	week,	 and	 the	 likelihood	 that	 an	individual	displays	any	form	of	synaesthesia	is	around	4.3%.		Beyond	this	demonstration	of	 the	diffuse	nature	of	synaesthesia	as	a	condition28,	there	 is	more	objective	evidence	verifying	 its	authenticity.	To	quote	Cytowic	and	Eagleman:		
                                                
28 It is important to note here that the Simner et al study contrasts from previous estimates by using a 
sampling that does not rely on self-reporting, making it less prone to confirmation bias. 
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Objective	evidence	 that	 synaesthesia	 is	not	 imagination	 comes	 from	brain	scanning,	which	 shows	 that	 brain	 activation	 patterns	 during	 synaesthesic	experience	 are	 not	 similar	 to	 those	 seen	when	 subjects	 visualise	 in	 their	mind’s	 eye.	 Rather,	 the	 activations	 more	 closely	 match	 the	 patterns	observed	during	actual	perception.	(2009,	p.	14)		Evidence	 comes	 not	 only	 from	 brain	 scans	 but	 from	 the	 observations	 of	Ramachandran	 and	 Hubbard	 (2001)	 that	 people	 who	 identified	 as	 synaesthetes	were	able	to	perform	a	complex	grouping	task	much	faster	than	non-synaesthetes	–	 drawing	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 involuntarily	 have	 a	 sensory	 experience	 of	 colour	when	perceiving	particular	grapheme.		Nabokov’s	 synaesthesia	 has	 received	 some	 attention	 for	 how	 it	manifests	 in	 his	writing.	Characters	from	Ada	and	The	Gift	either	display	or	recall	synaesthesia,	and	as	 Cytowic	 and	 Eagleman	 point	 out	 the	 very	 name	 Ada	 is	 a	 private	 joke	 in	Nabokov’s	 synaesthetic	 alphabet,	 forming	 a	 black-yellow-black	 pattern	 that	imitates	 a	 yellow	 swallowtail	 butterly	 (2009,	 p.	 1975-6).	 Czyżewska	 (2011)	examines	 the	 frequency	 of	 Nabokov’s	 synaesthetic	 metaphors	 in	 Pale	 Fire	 and	
Lolita,	 collating	 68	 examples	 of	 such	 metaphors	 and	 noting	 that	 the	 majority	mapped	touch	onto	either	sight	or	sound.	Johnson	(1985)	and	Foster	(1993)	touch	on	 the	 relationship	 between	 synaesthesia	 and	 memory,	 with	 the	 view	 that	Nabokov’s	apparently	virtuosic	memory	(as	displayed	 in	particular	during	Speak,	
Memory)	was	either	aided	by	or	a	product	of	his	synaesthesia.	This	point	is	taken	up	 by	 Dann	 (1998)	 who	 gives	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 instances	 of	 synaesthesia	 in	Nabokov’s	writing	and	connects	these	to	the	notion	that	Nabokov	was	capable	of	
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eidetic	 memory,	 a	 term	 which	 denotes	 the	 ability	 to	 perfectly	 recall	 images	 or	sounds.	What	Dann	has	 to	say	about	 the	 literary	 fascination	with	synaesthesia	 is	particularly	interesting:		 This	 liberation	 has	 been	 the	 continual	 theme	 in	 the	 Romantic	 fascination	with	 synaesthesia.	 Synaesthesia	 has	 always	 been	 a	 magnet	 for	 Romantic	ideas,	because	it	seems	to	validate	the	belief	in	the	primacy	of	imagination	in	human	cognition,	as	well	as	 to	ratify	 the	original	wholeness,	continuity,	and	interfusion	of	immediate	experience	before	its	divination	into	atomistic	sensations.	Many	who	 have	 seized	 on	 synaesthesia	 for	 support	 have	 also	maintained	 that	 the	 ultimate	 function	 of	 literature	 and	 the	 arts	 is	 to	manifest	the	fusion	of	these	senses.	(1998,	p.	ix)		This	fascination	with	the	idea	of	an	experience	that	could	be	more	authentic	than	reality	 was	 one	 of	 the	 defining	 features	 of	 the	 Symbolist	 movement,	 with	Baudelaire’s	‘Correspondances’	and	Rimbaud’s		‘Les	Voyelles’	being	two	prominent	examples	 of	 how	 synaesthesia	 influenced	 Symbolist	 poetry.29 	In	 light	 of	 our	continued	 investigation	of	how	 literature	 is	 influenced	by	processes	of	 sensation	and	cognition,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 look	at	whether	 the	 influence	of	 synaesthesia	 in	literature	is	simply	thematic	–	as	a	rallying	point	for	these	ideas	of	experience	and	imagination	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 Symbolists	 –	 or	 if	 it	 offers	 a	 new	 route	 into	understanding	our	perception	of	a	text.		
                                                
29 This same obsession with unfiltered experience can be said to have characterised Kerouac’s stylistic 
experiments, and indeed the Symbolist poets were a major influence on the Beat writers.  
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Coming	 back	 to	 Nabokov,	 he	 made	 use	 of	 synaesthesia	 as	 a	 thematic	 device	 in	several	 novels.	 Dann	 shows	 us	 how	 this	 synaesthetic	 ‘gift’	 recurs	 throughout	different	characters	Nabokov	created	across	his	many	stories:		 Nabokov	endowed	many	of	his	fictional	heroes	–	Cincinnatus	in	Invitation	to	
a	Beheading,	Fyodor	in	The	Gift,	Van	in	Ada	or	Ardor:	A	Family	Chronicle,	and	Adam	 Krug	 in	 Bend	 Sinister	 –	with	 some	 form	 of	 synaesthesia.	 In	 Bend	
Sinister,	Nabokov’s	 first	 American	 novel,	 the	 philosopher	Adam	Krug	 tells	an	 uncompromising	 listener	 that	 “the	 word	 ‘loyalty’	 phonetically	 and	visually	reminds	me	of	a	golden	fork	lying	in	the	sun	on	a	smooth	spread	of	yellow	silk.”	(1998,	p.	121).		He	 does	 not	 include	 Humbert	 Humbert,	 the	 narrator	 of	 Lolita	 in	 this	 analysis.	Nabokov’s	 son	 Dmitri,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 writes	 “Synesthetic	 phenomena	 recur	throughout	 Nabokov’s	 work	 and	 are	 assigned	 to	 characters	 in	 two	 of	 his	major	English-language	works,	Lolita	and	Ada”	(Cytowic	and	Eagleman,	2009,	p.	253).	A	closer	examination	of	Humbert’s	expressions	in	the	novel	reveals	that	occasionally	he	describes	his	experience	 in	terms	that	approach	a	sensory	blending	similar	 to	synaesthesia.	“With	a	swishing	sound	a	sunburst	swept	the	highway”	(AL,	p.	218),	he	writes,	 creating	 a	 sight-sound	mapping	between	 a	purely	 visual	 phenomenon	(the	 sun)	 and	 a	 separate	 sensory	 domain.	 Another	 example	 occurs	 later	 in	 the	novel.		
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She	was	only	the	faint	violet	whiff	and	dead	leaf	echo	of	the	nymphet	I	had	rolled	myself	 upon	with	 such	 cries	 in	 the	 past;	 an	 echo	 on	 the	 brink	 of	 a	russet	ravine,	with	a	far	wood	under	a	white	sky…	(AL,	p.	277)		There	is	a	sight-sound	mapping	used	in	‘dead	leaf	echo’,	which	gives	way	to	a	more	conventional	 description	 of	 the	 echo	 by	 its	 proximity	 to	 a	 vividly	 articulated	landscape.	 The	 ‘faint	 violet	whiff’	 is	most	 logically	 read	 as	 a	 reference	 to	 violet-scented	 perfume,	 but	 violet	 also	 has	 colour	 connotations.	 This	 device	 is	 used	 by	Nabokov	at	other	moments:	“I	remember	reaching	the	parking	area	and	pumping	a	handful	of	rust-tasting	water”	(AL,	p.	84),	where	the	visual	property	of	‘rust’	comes	to	the	fore,	even	in	the	semantic	context	in	which	it	is	used	to	describe	a	taste.	The	taste	of	 rust,	 after	 all,	 is	not	 as	 significant	 to	human	experience	as	 its	distinctive	colour.	One	can	see	how	Nabokov’s	cross-modal	mappings	usually	 involve	colour	or	sight,	consistent	with	his	own	synaesthesia.		It	is	important	to	be	cautious	in	investigating	Humbert’s	descriptive	style	that	we	do	 not	 assume	 that	 it	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 character	 displaying	 true	 neurological	synaesthesia.	 Nabokov’s	 references	 to	 cross-sensory	 transders	 are	 carefully	grounded	 within	 conventional	 experience,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 real	 suggestion	 that	Humbert	 has	 synaesthesia.	 Some	 of	 these	 associations	 will	 however	 become	relevant	further	into	this	chapter.				
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Synaesthetic	Perceptions		Next	 we	 shall	 explore	 how	 neuroscience	 accounts	 for	 the	 phenomenon	 of	synaesthesia.	At	 its	simplest	 is	understood	to	be	 ‘cross	talk’	between	areas	of	the	brain	that	are	normally	distinct	and	part	of	separate	neuronal	networks.	Cytowic	and	Eagleman	note	that	there	are	three	plausible	explanations	why	this	cross	talk	is	 prevalent	 in	 people	 with	 neurological	 synaesthesia.	 First,	 there	may	 be	more	neuronal	pathways	between	the	distinct	areas	of	a	synaesthete’s	brain,	giving	rise	to	more	cross-talk.	Second,	that	synaesthetes	and	non-synaesthetes	actually	share	the	same	neuronal	pathway	that	leads	to	cross	talk,	but	that	they	are	inhibited	for	non-synaesthetes.	Finally,	there	is	the	suggestion	that	brain	plasticity,	the	process	by	which	neural	pathways	are	modified,	is	reduced	for	synaesthetes;	meaning	that	cross-modal	 links	 formed	between	 two	concepts	at	an	early	age	remain	constant	throughout	life	(2009,	p.	214-216).			Given	 this	 evidence	 that	 synaesthesia	 is	 frequent	 enough	 to	 be	 statistically	significant,	and	also	plausibly	related	to	behaviours	we	all	exhibit,	it	is	pertinent	to	speculate	as	to	whether	or	not	this	phenomenon	could	have	a	major	effect	on	the	experience	of	literature.	Could	it	be	the	source	of	some	aesthetic	experience,	such	as	a	colour	symbolism	that	affects	our	perception	of	a	text?		Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 fundamental	 elements	 of	 synaesthesia	 makes	 it	 very	difficult	 to	 develop	 predictive	 responses	 for	 individuals,	 in	 that	 the	 actual	experiences	and	associations	of	different	synaesthetes	vary	wildly	from	person	to	person.	While	 the	 letter	D	might	be	associated	with	blue	 for	one	synaesthete,	 for	
 226
another	 it	 could	 associated	 be	 green.	 While	 one	 person	 with	 lexical-gustatory	synaesthesia	might	associate	a	phoneme	with	the	taste	of	rare	beef,	another	might	associate	it	with	the	taste	of	banana.	Some	trends	have	been	observed,	particularly	in	 the	 well-studied	 area	 of	 grapheme-colour	 synaesthesia.	 Baron-Cohen	 et	 al.	(1993)	 report	 that	 73%	 of	 synaesthetes	 consider	 the	 letter	 O	 to	 be	 white,	 an	observation	also	reported	by	Day	(2005),	who	adds	that	A	is	most	commonly	red	and	I	and	E	most	commonly	yellow.	But	variations	are	all	 too	common.	Nabokov,	his	wife	Vera	and	son	Dmitri	all	exhibited	synaesthesia,	but	their	associations	were	different.	 For	 Nabokov	 ‘A’	 could	 be	 either	 brown	 or	 ebony	 depending	 upon	 the	phonetic	context;	for	Dmitri	it	was	“red	–	a	rich,	luminous	carmine”	(Cytowic	and	Eagleman,	2009:249).	Rimbaud’s	‘Les	Voyelles’	provides	another	case	study:		 A	noir,	E	blanc,	I	rouge,	U	vert,	O	bleu:	voyelles,	Je	dirai	quelque	jour	vos	naissances	latentes.	(1871,	1-2)		For	Rimbaud,	A	is	black,	E	is	white,	I	is	red,	O	is	blue	and	U	is	green.	His	vowels	are	completely	distinct	from	the	reported	statistical	norms	of	Baron-Cohen	and	Day.	Of	course,	Rimbaud’s	poem	is	most	commonly	read	as	a	symbolist	conceit,	and	so	one	should	 not	 expect	 that	 it	 would	 correlate	 directly	 with	 the	 experience	 of	 a	 true	synaesthete.		What	 this	 means	 is	 that	 as	 far	 as	 grapheme-colour	 and	 phoneme-colour	synaesthesia	 are	 concerned,	 it	 is	 seemingly	 impossible	 to	 take	 a	 raw	 text	 and	predict	whether	the	choice	of	word	would	elicit	a	particular	colour	response,	with	a	view	 to	 interpreting	 the	 role	of	 that	particular	 colour	 in	 crafting	a	 symbolic	or	
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emotional	 response	 to	 the	 text.	 Of	 course,	 knowing	 a	 particular	 synaesthete’s	colour	associations	can	act	as	a	starting	point,	but	even	this	would	be	difficult.	As	Cytowic	and	Eagleman	point	out,	for	certain	synaesthetes	the	individual	colours	of	letters	can	change	depending	upon	the	context	they	appear	in.	They	note:		 For	 many	 individuals,	 a	 word’s	 first	 letter	 dominates	 the	 rest	 of	 the	sequence,	 whereas	 others	 discern	 a	 blending	 in	 which	 all	 the	 letters	influence	 one	 another.	 Some	 report	 that	 vowels	 tend	 to	 fade	 into	 the	background	under	the	dominating	influence	of	neighbouring	consonants;	in	other	cases,	vowels	inherit	the	shade	of	nearby	colours.	(2009,	p.	67)		They	also	note	that	the	semantic	properties	of	the	word	can	exert	an	influence	on	the	colour	associated	with	it,	and	that	this	can	change	with	experience:		 For	 example,	 it	 is	 common	 for	 the	 word	 APPLE	 to	 be	 reddish,	 BANANA	yellow,	 and	 ORANGE	 orange.	 Sometimes	 synaesthetes	 find	 that	 colours	change	subsequent	to	their	learning	a	new	word	definition.	When	Cassidy	C	encountered	 the	 new	 word	 “phthalocyanine,”	 his	 synaesthetic	 colour	experience	was	determined	by	the	colours	of	the	word’s	individual	letters.	However,	 upon	 learning	 that	 phthalocyanine	 is	 the	 name	of	 a	 vivid-green	pigment,	he	now	experiences	the	word	as	shown	in	the	bottom	half	of	figure	3.5	[a	mix	of	blue	and	green	letters].	(2009,	p.	68-70).		Even	leaving	aside	these	variations,	the	idiosyncratic	nature	of	synaesthesia	makes	it	 impossible	to	predict	responses.	Even	emotional	responses	can	be	experienced	
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as	 synaesthetic	 percepts:	 Ramachandran	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 highlight	 the	 case	 of	 a	subject	 who	 perceives	 colours	 around	 individuals	 that	 correlate	 with	 their	personality	and	his	emotional	connotations	to	them.	Schweizer	et	al.	(2013)	report	a	subject	who	experienced	disgust	at	words	written	in	blue	and	a	milder	disgust	at	bright	 yellow.	 Just	 as	much	variation	 in	 associations	would	occur	 in	 these	 cases,	making	 it	 nearly	 impossible	 to	 account	 for	 a	 text	 in	 this	 way	 from	 a	 purely	objective	standpoint.		It	 would	 also	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 assume	 that	 Nabokov’s	 own	 synaesthetic	 colour	correspondences	are	of	particular	significance	to	his	own	writing,	beyond	perhaps	a	 kind	 of	 private	 joke.	 Nabokov	 made	 this	 extremely	 clear	 to	 Alfred	 Appel,	 the	annotator	of	Lolita:		 There	 exist	 novelists	 and	poets,	 and	 ecclesiastic	writers,	who	deliberately	use	 colour	 terms,	 or	 numbers,	 in	 a	 strictly	 symbolic	 sense.	 The	 type	 of	writer	 I	 am,	 half	 painter,	 half	 naturalist,	 finds	 the	 use	 of	 symbols	 hateful	because	it	substitutes	a	dead	general	idea	for	a	live	specific	impression.	I	am	therefore	puzzled	and	distressed	by	the	significance	you	lend	to	the	general	idea	 of	 ‘red’	 in	 my	 book.	 When	 the	 intellect	 limits	 itself	 to	 the	 general	notion,	or	primitive	notion,	of	a	certain	colour	it	deprives	the	senses	of	 its	shades	 [...]	 I	 think	 your	 students,	 your	 readers,	 should	 be	 taught	 to	 see	things,	to	discriminate	between	visual	shades	as	the	author	does,	and	not	to	lump	them	under	such	arbitrary	labels	as	“red”.		(AL,	p.	364)			
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For	 Nabokov,	 sensory	 material	 such	 as	 colour	 was	 to	 be	 used	 to	 recreate	 the	authenticity	 of	 experience,	 rather	 than	 to	 act	 as	 a	 symbolic	 map	 running	throughout	the	narrative.	So	the	direct	relationship	specified	between	colour	and	graphemes	that	people	with	this	type	of	synaesthesia	experience	is	unlikely	to	be	of	material	value	to	our	interpretation	of	a	text.			Having	 said	 this,	 it	 must	 be	 recorded	 that	 synaesthesia	 does	 seem	 to	 be	responsible	 for	 some	 aesthetic	 experience.	 Cytowic	 and	 Eagleman	 note	 that	synaesthetes	 often	 find	 that	 their	 gift	 facilitates	 aesthetic	 responses	 to	 the	most	trivial	information:		 Synesthetes	often	gush	over	 trivial	 tasks	 such	as	 remembering	 a	name	or	phone	 number,	 calling	 it	 ‘gorgeous’	 or	 ‘delightful’,	 whereas	 mismatched	perceptions	–	such	as	seeing	a	letter	printed	in	the	wrong	colour	ink	–	can	be	like	fingernails	on	a	blackboard.	(2009,	p.	54)		Although	 we	 have	 discounted	 the	 direct	 possibility	 of	 Humbert	 being	 a	synaesthete,	one	can	see	echoes	of	how	this	otherwise	trivial	task	of	recalling	the	name	of	Lolita	evokes	so	much	pleasure	for	him	in	the	novel’s	opening	lines.	Here	Nabokov	 is	 likely	 imbuing	 his	 protagonist	 with	 traces	 of	 his	 own	 aesthetic	response.	 Cytowic	 and	 Eagleman	 also	 cite	 the	 account	 of	 professor	 of	neuropathology	 who	 experiences	 coloured	 phonemes	 and	 number	 forms	(numbers	that	appear	in	physical	space	relative	to	one	another):		
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Let	me	say	that	this	is	a	delightful	trait	to	have.	I	tend	to	use	it	consciously	and	 unconsciously	 to	 help	 me	 remember	 correct	 sequences...	neuropathological	 classifications,	 names	 and	 locations	 of	 anatomical	structures	 (especially	 neuroanatomical	 structures	 –	 you	 should	 see	 the	
beautiful	array	of	colours	in	the	brain!)	(2009,	p.	55)		Essentially	 it	 is	possible	 for	 synaesthesia	 to	provoke	 responses	 to	 simple	 stimuli	that	 span	 both	 delight	 and	 disgust,	 and	 to	 which	 non-synaesthetes	 would	experience	 little	 aesthetic	 response.	 This	 element	 of	 synaesthesia	 manifests	 its	influence	 on	 a	 text	 such	 as	 Lolita	 in	 the	 way	 that	 Nabokov	 emphasises	 the	importance	 of	 its	 simplest	 elements,	 such	 the	 names	 of	 characters.	 From	 the	introduction	of	this	chapter	it	is	obvious	that	‘Lolita’	is	a	name	that	is	intended	to	elicit	 pleasure;	 let	 us	 now	 consider	 what	 Nabokov	 had	 to	 say	 about	 the	 name	‘Humbert	Humbert’:		 The	 double	 rumble	 is,	 I	 think,	 very	 nasty,	 very	 suggestive.	 It	 is	 a	 hateful	name	 for	a	hateful	person.	 It	 is	 also	a	kingly	name,	but	 I	did	need	a	 royal	vibration	for	Humbert	the	Fierce	and	Humbert	the	Humble.	(AL:	319-320)		Humbert	 is	not	 the	only	character	 in	 the	novel	whose	name	displays	elements	of	alliteration	 or	 repetition:	 there	 is	 Gaston	 Grodin,	 who	 has	 a	 similar	 name	 as	Humbert,	one	of	two	syllables	rhyming	on	the	first	and	last	consonants	–	and	like	Humbert	displays	an	interest	in	children,	only	towards	boys.	Likewise,	Clare	Quilty,	who	 is	 identified	 by	 Appel	 as	 Humbert’s	 ‘double’	 and	makes	 pornographic	 films	which	 he	 tries	 to	 make	 Lolita	 star	 in	 after	 he	 kidnaps	 her,	 has	 an	 element	 of	
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alliteration	in	that	both	parts	of	his	name	start	with	k.	Regardless	of	whether	or	not	these	 examples	 of	 phonetic	 repetition	 can	 be	 connected	 directly	with	Nabokov’s	coloured	 graphemes,	 his	 elaborate	 names	 for	 his	 characters	 seems	 to	 be	 linked	with	the	general	trend	of	synesthetes	assigning	pleasant	or	unpleasant	emotional	qualities	to	otherwise	ordinary	symbols	such	as	names.		
‘The	Rich	Semantic	Whirlpool’		As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 direct	 sensory	 relationships	 of	 synaesthesia	 are	 better	approximated	 than	 recreated.	 For	 our	 investigation,	 the	 next	 step	 is	 to	 examine	more	closely	what	synaesthesia	suggests	about	the	operations	of	the	mind	and	our	mechanisms	of	perception,	and	how	these	inform	our	understanding	of	a	text	such	as	Lolita.	
	One	question	posed	by	both	Ramachandran	and	Cytowic	 in	 their	observations	 is	whether	 synaesthesia	 is	 linked	 with	 creativity	 in	 the	 brain.	 The	 belief	 that	creativity	was	 localised	 in	 the	 right	 hemisphere	 of	 the	brain	 and	 any	other	 such	correlations	(such	as	left-handed	people	being	inherently	more	creative)	has	been	thoroughly	debunked	(Deitrich,	2007;	Lindell	and	Kidd,	2011).	According	to	Arden	
et	al.	 (2010),	 existing	 studies	 of	 ‘creative	 cognition’	 show	 very	 little	 evidence	 of	overlap	of	results;	so	essentially	the	processes	and	neurological	structures	behind	what	we	 consider	 ‘creativity’	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 fully	 explained	 by	 neuroscience.	Nevertheless,	 the	 notion	 that	 creativity	 and	 synaesthesia	 have	 some	kind	 of	 link	commands	 some	 interest,	 both	 statistically	 and	 theoretically.	 Domino	 (1989)	
 232
contends	that	in	a	non-random	survey	of	fine	arts	students,	twenty	three	percent	report	that	they	have	some	form	of	synaesthesia.		Ramachandran	puts	forward	a	theoretical	case	for	synaesthesia	being	linked	with	exceptional	creativity	in	neurological	terms:		 If	ideas	and	concepts	exist	in	the	form	of	brain	maps,	perhaps	we	have	the	answer	to	our	question	about	metaphor	and	creativity.	 If	a	mutation	were	to	 cause	 excess	 connections	 (or	 alternatively,	 to	 permit	 excessive	 cross-leakage)	 between	 different	 brain	 areas,	 then	 depending	 upon	 where	 and	how	 widely	 in	 the	 brain	 the	 trait	 was	 expressed,	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 both	synaesthesia	 and	 a	 heightened	 facility	 for	 linking	 seemingly	 unrelated	concepts,	words,	images	or	ideas.	Gifted	writers	and	poets	may	have	excess	connections	between	word	and	language	areas.	Gifted	painters	and	graphic	artists	may	have	excess	connections	between	high	level	visual	areas.	Even	a	single	 word	 like	 ‘Juliet’	 or	 ‘the	 sun’	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 the	 centre	 of	 a	semantic	whirlpool,	or	of	a	rich	swirl	of	associations.	In	the	brain	of	a	gifted	wordsmith,	 excess	 connections	 would	 mean	 larger	 whirlpools	 and	therefore	 larger	regions	of	overlap	and	a	concomitantly	higher	propensity	toward	metaphor.	This	 could	explain	 the	higher	 incidence	of	 synaesthesia	in	creative	people	in	general.	(2011,	p.	104-5)		Nabokov	offers	a	particularly	convincing	example	of	a	synaesthete	with	the	ability	to	draw	on	these	‘large	regions	of	overlap’	to	imbue	ordinary	language	with	layers	
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of	meaning.	His	account	of	the	choice	of	the	name	‘Lolita’,	taken	from	the	interview	with	Playboy,	demonstrates	how	much	thought	went	into	this	one	artistic	decision:		 	Playboy:	What	one	critic	has	termed	your	“almost	obsessive	attention	to	the	phrasing,	rhythm,	cadence	and	connotation	of	words”	is	evident	even	in	the	selection	of	names	for	your	own	celebrated	bee	and	bumblebee—Lolita	and	Humbert	Humbert.	How	did	they	occur	to	you?		Nabokov:	For	my	nymphet	I	needed	a	diminutive	with	a	lyrical	lilt	to	it.	One	of	 the	most	 limpid	 and	 luminous	 letters	 is	 ‘L’.	 The	 suffix	 ‘-ita’	 has	 a	 lot	 of	Latin	tenderness,	and	this	I	required	too.	Hence:	Lolita.	However	it	should	not	 be	 pronounced	 as…	most	 Americans	 pronounce	 it:	 Low-lee-ta,	with	 a	heavy,	 clammy	 ‘L’	 and	 a	 long	 ‘O’.	 No,	 the	 first	 syllable	 should	 be	 as	 in	‘lollipop’,	 the	 ‘L’	 liquid	and	delicate,	 the	 ‘lee’	not	 too	 sharp.	 Spaniards	and	Italians	 pronounce	 it,	 of	 course,	 with	 the	 necessary	 note	 of	 archness	 and	caress.	(1964)		For	Nabokov,	a	suitable	name	for	 the	character	had	to	draw	upon	the	expressive	properties	 associated	with	 a	 particular	 sound,	 and	 he	 distinguishes	 between	 the	American	 and	 European	 pronunciation	 as	 a	 source	 of	 important	 meaning.	 He	continues	in	this	vein:			Another	 consideration	was	 the	welcome	murmur	 of	 its	 source	 name,	 the	fountain	 name:	 those	 roses	 and	 tears	 in	 ‘Dolores’.	 My	 little	 girl’s	 heart-
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rending	 fate	had	 to	be	 taken	 into	 account	 together	with	 the	 cuteness	 and	limpidity.	 Dolores	 also	 provided	 her	 with	 another,	 plainer,	 more	 familiar	and	infantile	diminutive:	Dolly,	which	went	nicer	with	the	surname	‘Haze,’	where	 Irish	mists	 blend	with	 a	 German	 bunny	 –	 I	 mean	 a	 small	 German	hare.		Playboy:	You’re	making	a	word-playful	reference,	of	course,	to	the	German	term	for	rabbit—Hase.	(1964)30		From	 the	 name	 ‘Lolita’	 and	 its	 formal	 nomenclature	 ‘Dolores	 Haze’,	 Nabokov	derives	 several	metaphorical	 connections:	 ‘Dolly’	 echoes	 ‘doll’	 and	 brings	 up	 the	connotations	of	childhood	and	of	an	idolised	replica	of	a	young	girl;	and	‘Haze’	has	the	connotations	of	a	 fog	or	mist	 that	clouds	vision,	as	well	as	 the	reference	 to	a	rabbit.	In	the	annotations	to	Lolita,	Appel	(AL:	328)	notes	further	that	breaking	her	name	 into	 the	 syllables	 ‘Lo-lee-ta’	 creates	 a	 further	 literary	 reference	 to	 Poe’s	‘Annabel	Lee’	 (1849),	 a	poem	about	a	man’s	devotion	 to	a	woman	he	 fell	 in	 love	with	 at	 a	 young	 age.	 In	Lolita,	 Annabel	 is	 also	 the	name	of	 the	 young	 girl	whom	Humbert	claims	to	have	initiated	his	taste	for	‘nymphets’.	For	Nabokov,	‘Lolita’	and	‘Dolores	 Haze’	 were	 the	 centre	 of	 one	 of	 these	 ‘rich	 semantic	 whirlpools’	 that	Ramachandran	writes	about.		If	 the	 simplest	 explanation	 for	 creative	 thought	 in	 the	 brain	 is	 indeed	 increased	talk	 between	 different	 areas	 or	 more	 direct	 neural	 pathways	 between	 different	
                                                
30 If this exchange seems particularly flattering to the polygot knowledge of the interviewer, it is worth 
remembering that Nabokov was known to draft his questions and answers in advance of an interview, and 
then turn up for what was essentially a reading of the script. As such, the reference to the German word 
for rabbit is most likely Nabokov’s own flourish. 
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areas,	 then	 it	makes	 sense	 that	 a	 synaesthete	would	 be	more	 skilled	 at	 creative	tasks.	Does	this	also	mean	that	a	synaesthete	would	have	a	heightened	response	to	a	 creative	 work?	 Consider	 the	 case	 of	 a	 synaesthete	 who	 experiences	 colour	 in	response	to	sound:		 I	 see	 shapes	 and	 colors	 in	 response	 to	 sounds.	 I	 enjoy	 electronic	 music	because	 it	 evokes	such	wonderful	 shapes	and	colors...	 as	 if	 I	were	 looking	through	 a	 plastic	 transparency	which	 is	 in	 front	 of	my	 eyes.	 If	 I	 shut	my	eyes,	or	if	it	is	at	night	in	the	dark,	then	the	shapes	are	the	only	thing	in	the	field	and	are	therefore	more	intense.	(Cytowic	and	Eagleman,	2009,	p.	88)		Still,	 the	 increased	 creativity	 associated	 with	 synaesthesia	 has	 some	 bearing	 on	how	 the	 web	 of	 semantic	 and	 phonetic	 traits	 can	 influence	 a	 writer’s	 work,	 as	demonstrated	by	the	sheer	detail	Nabokov	put	 into	the	choice	and	description	of	the	name	‘Lolita’.	It	is	worth	taking	another	look	at	the	novel’s	opening	to	unpack	how	much	semantic	and	phonetic	detail	is	at	work.		Lolita,	light	of	my	life,	fire	of	my	loins.	My	sin,	my	soul.	Lo-lee-ta:	the	tip	of	the	tongue	taking	a	trip	of	three	steps	down	the	palate	to	tap,	at	three,	on	the	teeth.	Lo.	Lee.	Ta.	(AL,	p.	5)		Nabokov’s	use	of	alliteration	disrupts	the	normal	cognitive	process	of	moving	from	the	 sound	of	 the	 name	 to	 the	meaning	 implied	 by	 those	 sounds,	 and	 directs	 our	attention	 back	 onto	 those	 sounds,	 where	 we	 may	 distinguish	 these	 perceptual	qualities.	The	alliteration	of	 light,	 life	and	 loins	primes	 the	 l	 sound	 in	our	minds,	
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and	 in	 the	 subsequent	 repetitions	 of	 the	 name,	 the	 punctuation	 stresses	 each	syllable	and	draws	out	a	contrast	between	what	Tsur	refers	to	as	the	tender	l	and	the	harsher	t	(1992,	p.	3).	In	between	these	two	stressed	iterations	of	“Lolita’,	we	find	a	section	where	t	instead	of	l	provides	both	alliterative	and	rhyming	patterns,	almost	like	a	tongue-twister	in	places.		Here	we	might	 also	 recall	Tsur’s	 concept	of	 the	mental	preference	 for	 functional	metaphors	over	sensuous	ones.	This	concept,	particularly	 including	 the	notion	of	poetic	 recourse	 to	 favour	 the	 sensuous,	 has	 implications	 for	 Nabokov	 and	 his	widely	 noted	 penchant	 for	 playing	 word-games,	 because	 in	 this	 instance	 his	metaphors	 can	 be	 both	 functional	and	 sensuous.	 Consider	 the	 use	 of	 ‘fire	 of	my	loins’,	which	can	be	reasonably	 interpreted	both	as	 functional	–	 in	the	sense	that	fire	is	destructive	and	consuming	–	but	also	sensuous,	suggesting	the	heat	of	sexual	desire.		Even	more	interestingly,	an	interpretation	of	‘Lolita:	the	tip	of	the	tongue	taking	a	trip	of	three	steps	down	the	palate’	as	a	functional	metaphor	for	the	production	of	the	 sound	 cannot	 be	 sustained	 because	 of	 one	 slight	 problem:	 Nabokov’s	description	 of	 the	 muscular	 movements	 is	 not	 strictly	 correct.	 Both	 t	 and	 l	 are	alveolar	 consonants,	 formed	with	 the	 tip	 of	 the	 tongue,	 but	 they	 are	 articulated	
between	 the	 teeth	 and	 the	 palate	 on	 the	 alveolar	 ridge.	 It	 seems	 unlikely	 that	Nabokov	 would	 be	 completely	 ignorant	 of	 phonetic	 articulations	 (the	aforementioned	 ‘Sounds’	 includes	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 “labial	 consonants”,	 for	instance),	 especially	 since	 he	 has	 at	 least	 one	 part	 of	 the	 articulatory	 pattern	correct.	This	leads	us	to	a	more	plausible	alternative:	‘palate’	deceptively	leads	us	
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to	 interpret	 it	 functionally	 as	 part	 of	 the	mouth,	 but	 it	 sensuously	 implies	 one’s	‘taste’	 for	 something.	 Because	 the	 sensuous	 interpretations	 are	 not	 the	 more	natural	 interpretation,	 Nabokov	 uses	 them	 to	 hide	 what	 amounts	 to	 very	suggestive	 information	 in	plain	sight.	 In	 this	short	extract,	Nabokov	has	 included	sensory	information	that	is	both	directly	evocative	of	several	senses	–	sight	(light),	temperature	 (fire),	 touch	 (tap)	 and	 sound	 (Lo-lee-ta)	 –	 while	 also	 hinting	discretely	at	other	sensations:	taste	(palate)	and	sexual	pleasure	(fire	of	my	loins).		Picking	up	on	Tsur’s	idea	of	poetry	exploiting	cognitive	processes,	both	processes	exploit	 another	 cognitive	 process:	 the	 perception	 of	 tension,	 as	 discussed	 in	Chapters	Two	and	Three.	An	adaptive	explanation	for	the	importance	of	tension	to	art,	both	musical	and	literary,	is	that	a	feeling	of	tension	or	suspense	is	a	survival	mechanism	that	focuses	our	attention	until	the	feeling	is	resolved,	and	an	element	that	resolves	this	tension	becomes	marked	as	important	for	future	survival.31		Consider	the	prosodic	boundaries	generated	by	the	different	phrases	in	this	short	extract.	The	first	few	are	compact	units	separated	by	punctuation:	“Lolita:	light	of	my	life,	fire	of	my	loins.	My	sin,	my	soul.	Lo-lee-ta.”	Moreover,	with	the	exception	of	‘my	sin,	my	soul’,	 these	units	are	dominated	by	 the	alliteration	of	 l.	But	 then	 the	following	 prosodic	 unit	 breaks	 this	 pattern	 in	 two	 ways:	 it	 proceeds	 far	 longer	without	 any	 rests	until	 the	word	 ‘tap’,	 and	 the	dominant	 alliterative	pattern	 is	 t.	Because	of	the	marked	difference	between	t	and	l	in	terms	of	musical	quality,	this	pattern	 violation	 is	 felt	 even	 more	 strongly,	 and	 the	 combined	 effect	 creates	 a	feeling,	however	slight,	of	tension..	The	final	unit	returns	us	to	this	pattern	that	has	
                                                
31 C.f. Bruner and Postman (1947): ‘Tension and Tension Release as Organising Factors in Perception’ in 
Journal of Personality, Vol. 15, p300-308. 
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otherwise	been	dominant	throughout	the	passage,	quickly	resolving	this	sense	of	tension.	 The	 effect	 of	 this	 careful	 manipulation	 of	 tension	 reinforces	 the	 word	‘Lolita’	as	the	dominant	tone	within	the	passage,	and,	considering	the	innuendo	of	the	 unit	 that	 contains	 the	 word	 ‘palate’,	 emphasises	 that	 ‘Lolita’	 brings	 release	from	tension.		As	 we	 can	 see,	 the	 name	 ‘Lolita’	 and	 the	 brief	 passage	 that	 introduces	 it	 to	 the	reader	 are	 both	 rich	 with	 sensory	 and	 semantic	 detail.	 If	 there	 is	 indeed	 a	 link	between	 synaesthesia	 and	 enhanced	 creativity	 in	 individuals,	 it	 seems	 entirely	likely	that	one	of	the	effects	of	Nabokov’s	synaesthesia	made	itself	felt	in	the	way	he	chose	to	name	his	characters.		
Synaesthesia	and	Memory		As	 noted	 earlier	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 what	 practical	 use	 synaesthesia	 can	 offer,	some	 of	 the	 subjects	 studied	 by	 synaesthesia	 researchers	 report	 that	 it	 also	functions	an	aid	to	memory.	This	extends	from	the	ability	to	make	speedy	recall	of	signifiers	 such	 as	 names	 by	 drawing	 on	 the	 additional	 sensory	 perceptions	(Cytowic	and	Eagleman,	2009,	p.	52),	to	even	more	specific	and	almost	astonishing	powers	of	recall.			 In	our	experience	about	10%	of	synaesthetes	experience	eidetic	images,	or	what	 is	 popularly	 called	 ‘photographic	 memory’...	 An	 eidetic	 image	recreates	 previously	 seen	 objects	 or	 events	 with	 great	 clarity,	 either	immediately	after	they	have	been	viewed	or	after	a	considerable	period	of	
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time.	Like	some	synaesthetic	percepts,	eidetic	images	are	spatially	extended	in	 that	 eidetikers	 behave	 as	 if	 they	 are	 scanning	 an	 externally	 projected	image.	(2009,	p.	53)		Nabokov	is	another	case	Cytowic	and	Eagleman	put	forward	as	evidence	of	eidetic	recall.	Dann	(1998)	has	covered	in	very	precise	detail	how	Nabokov	demonstrates	the	 qualities	 associated	 with	 eidetic	 memory:	 giving	 examples	 of	 how	 the	 trait	manifests	in	his	literary	writing	as	well	as	in	Speak,	Memory.	This	is	one	especially	notable	passage	from	Nabokov’s	autobiography:	
I	witness	with	pleasure	the	supreme	achievement	of	memory,	which	is	the	masterly	 use	 it	makes	 of	 innate	 harmonies	when	 gathering	 to	 its	 fold	 the	suspended	 and	 wandering	 tonalities	 of	 the	 past.	 I	 like	 to	 imagine,	 in	consummation	 and	 resolution	 of	 those	 jangling	 chords,	 something	 as	enduring,	 in	 retrospect,	 as	 the	 long	 table	 that	 on	 summer	 birthdays	 and	namedays	used	to	be	laid	for	afternoon	chocolate	out	of	doors,	in	an	alley	of	birches,	limes	and	maples	at	its	debouchment	on	the	smooth	sanded	space	of	 the	 garden	 proper	 that	 separated	 the	 park	 and	 the	 house.	 I	 see	 the	tablecloth	and	 the	 faces	of	 seated	people	sharing	 in	 the	animation	of	 light	and	shade	beneath	a	moving,	a	 fabulous	foliage,	exaggerated,	no	doubt,	by	the	same	faculty	of	 impassioned	commemoration,	of	ceaseless	return,	 that	makes	me	always	approach	 that	banquet	 table	 from	the	outside,	 from	 the	depth	of	the	park	—as	if	the	mind,	in	order	to	go	back	thither,	had	to	do	so	with	 the	 silent	 steps	 of	 a	 prodigal,	 faint	 with	 excitement.	 Through	 a	tremulous	prism,	I	distinguish	the	features	of	relatives	and	familiars,	mute	
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lips	 serenely	moving	 in	 forgotten	 speech.	 I	 see	 the	 steam	of	 the	 chocolate	and	the	plates	of	blueberry	tarts.	I	note	the	small	helicopter	of	a	revolving	samara	that	gently	descends	upon	the	tablecloth,	and,	lying	across	the	table,	an	adolescent	girl's	bare	arm	indolently	extended	as	far	as	it	will	go,	with	its	turquoise-veined	underside	turned	up	to	the	flaky	sunlight,	the	palm	open	in	lazy	expectancy	of	something	—perhaps	the	nutcracker.	(S,M,	p.	128-9)	
Nabokov	 celebrates	 the	 act	 of	 memory	 itself	 through	 his	 vivid	 and	 detailed	reconstruction	of	this	scene	from	his	youth	for	the	reader,	demonstrating	the	art	of	eidetic	recall.	What	gives	 it	 this	evocative	quality	 is	 the	way	sensory	 information	seems	so	precisely	articulated	 in	his	account	of	 this	birthday	party.	He	notes	 the	lips	moving	on	the	partygoers,	the	steam	of	the	chocolate,	the	veins	on	the	arm	of	a	girl	 –	 all	 these	 are	 seemingly	 minute	 details	 that	 would	 normally	 be	 forgotten,	leaving	only	the	outlines	of	the	scene	accessible	to	memory.	By	contrast,	Nabokov’s	account	is	strong	on	details	but	almost	devoid	of	a	sense	of	why	this	memory	is	so	important.	And	it	 is	not	only	the	visual	details	but	also	the	traces	of	other	senses	that	 contribute	 to	 this	 holistic	 rendering	 of	 the	 scene.	 As	 Dann	 puts	 it	 in	 his	analysis	of	this	same	passage:		 When	Nabokov	says	“I	see,”	“I	note”	and	“I	distinguish”,	and	when	he	notes	the	direction	 from	which	he	approaches	 the	scene,	he	does	 so	because	he	literally	sees	(and	to	a	lesser	degree	hears,	feels,	tastes	and	smells)	this	past	event	 as	 if	 it	 were	 once	 more	 present	 before	 him	 in	 all	 its	 indolent	 and	sumptuous	glory.	(1998,	p.	135)		
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Details	like	the	‘steam	of	the	chocolate’	and	the	‘plates	of	blueberry	tarts’	prime	the	reader’s	 sense	of	 taste.	Nabokov	 also	 creates	 a	 kind	of	 synaesthetic	metaphor	 in	the	way	he	describes	memory	in	terms	of	musical	imagery:	the	‘innate	harmonies’,	‘jangled	chords’	and	‘tonalities’,	which	evokes	the	aural	sensations	of	music.	This	is	subtly	 reinforced	 by	moments	 of	 alliteration	 in	 his	 description:	 ‘smooth	 sanded	space’,	 ‘fabulous	 foliage’,	and	 ‘silent	steps’.	Of	course,	Dann	cannot	actually	know	that	 Nabokov’s	 description	 of	 the	 memory	 is	 completely	 accurate	 rather	 than	 a	literary	reconstruction.	It	is	not	the	accuracy	that	matters	so	much	as	the	attention	to	detail.		Sensory	detail	is	also	recalled	with	such	evocative	precision	in	Lolita.	Compare	the	passage	 from	 Speak,	 Memory	 with	 this	 extract	 from	 Lolita,	 where	 Humbert	recounts	his	unsuccessful	tryst	with	Annabel	as	a	child:		 In	a	nervous	and	slender-leaved	mimosa	grove	at	the	back	of	their	villa,	we	found	a	perch	on	the	ruins	of	a	 low	stone	wall.	Through	the	darkness	and	tender	 trees	 we	 could	 see	 the	 arabesques	 of	 lighted	 windows	 which,	touched	up	by	 coloured	 inks	of	 sensitive	memory,	 appear	 to	me	now	 like	playing	cards	–	presumably	because	a	bridge	game	was	keeping	the	enemy	busy.	She	trembled	and	twitched	as	I	kissed	the	corner	of	her	lips	and	hot	lobe	of	her	ear.	A	cluster	of	stars	glowed	above	us,	between	the	silhouettes	of	long	thin	leaves;	that	vibrant	sky	seemed	as	naked	as	she	was	under	her	light	frock.	I	saw	her	face	in	the	sky,	strangely	distinct,	as	if	it	emitted	a	faint	radiance	of	its	own…	and	her	bare	knees	caught	and	compressed	my	wrist,	and	 slacked	 again;	 and	 her	 quivering	 mouth,	 distorted	 by	 the	 acridity	 of	
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some	mysterious	potion,	with	a	sibilant	 intake	of	breath	came	near	 to	my	face.	She	would	try	to	relieve	the	pain	of	 love	by	first	rubbing	her	dry	lips	against	mine…	(AL,	p.	14-5)		Nabokov	 renders	 this	 scene	 primarily	 through	 visual	 references	 –	 the	 villa,	 the	wall,	 the	 windows,	 the	 sky	 –	 and	 supplements	 them	 with	 other	 sensory	perceptions.	 The	 ‘hot	 lobe’	 of	 her	 ear	 evokes	 temperature,	 the	 ‘sibilant	 intake	 of	breath’	 evokes	 sound,	 ‘compressed	my	wrist’	 and	 ‘her	dry	 lips’	 evoke	 touch,	 and	further	into	the	passage	he	refers	to	her	letting	him	“feed	on	her	open	mouth”	(AL,	p.	15),	evoking	taste	(also	through	the	reference	to	the	‘acridity’	of	the	‘mysterious	potion’),	 and	 “I	 recall	 the	 scent	 of	 some	 kind	 of	 toilet	 powder”,	 completing	 the	spectrum	of	sensory	perceptions	with	smell.		Humbert’s	memory	 of	 this	 tryst	with	 Annabel	 seems	 eerily	 precise,	 hinting	 that	perhaps	he	has	traces	of	this	same	eidetic	gift	as	Nabokov.	Furthermore,	he	seems	to	 display	 an	 almost	 scientific	 intuition	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	memory.	When	he	introduces	the	reader	to	Annabel,	here	is	what	he	has	to	say:		 There	are	two	kinds	of	visual	memory:	one	when	you	skilfully	recreate	an	image	in	the	laboratory	of	your	mind,	with	your	eyes	open	(and	then	I	see	Annabel	 in	 such	 general	 terms	 as:	 “honey-colored	 skin,”	 “thin	 arms,”	“brown	 bobbed	 hair,”	 “long	 lashes,”	 “big	 bright	 mouth”);	 and	 the	 other	when	 you	 instantly	 evoke,	 with	 shut	 eyes,	 on	 the	 dark	 innerside	 of	 your	eyelids,	 the	 objective,	 absolutely	 optical	 replica	 of	 a	 beloved	 face,	 a	 little	ghost	in	natural	colors	(and	this	is	how	I	see	Lolita).	(AL,	p.	11)	
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	Humbert	 contrasts	 a	 ‘recreation’	 of	 the	 memory	 with	 one	 that	 is	 an	 evocation.	Despite	his	qualification	of	it	as	‘skilful’	the	former	seems	somewhat	incomplete,	as	the	general	terms	he	uses	are	arranged	in	a	staccato	rhythm	formed	by	quotation	marks	 and	 commas,	 making	 them	 seem	 to	 be	 separate	 from	 one	 another.	 The	description	 of	 the	 evoked	 memory	 is	 more	 contiguous,	 it	 runs	 together	 in	 a	smoother	 rhythm.	Humbert	 does	 not	 so	much	 distinguish	 between	 two	 kinds	 of	memory	as	one	that	is	more	complete	and	one	that	is	difficult	to	recall	perfectly	–	as	one	gets	older,	visual	memory	declines	(Soininen	et	al.,	1994).	This	is	consistent	with	Humbert’s	age.			Dann’s	study	of	synaesthesia	focuses	on	the	way	in	which	it	has	been	interpreted	or	imagined	as	the	entry	point	to	some	kind	of	transcendental	state.	He	makes	the	following	claim	about	how	Nabokov’s	synaesthesia	has	been	received:		 Like	 Symbolist	 poetry,	 Kandinsky’s	 abstract	 canvases,	 or	 Scriabin’s	phantasmagoria,	 Nabokov’s	 verbal	 art	 employs	 synaesthesia	 to	 challenge	materialism	and	privilege	individual	perception;	but	 instead	of	pointing	to	the	spiritual	world,	his	art	points	only	to	itself,	and	to	Nabokov’s	subjective	inner	world.	(1998,	p.	121)		Overall,	 Dann	 rejects	 the	 idea	 that	 synaesthesia	 leads	 to	 some	 kind	 of	transcendental	 knowledge,	 though	 he	 details	 how	 artists	 and	 poets	 (such	 as	Rimbaud	and	Kandinsky,	as	noted	above)	have	thought	otherwise	and	attempted	to	 represent	 or	 approach	 transcendental	 knowledge	 in	 their	 creative	 work.	 His	
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chapter	on	Nabokov	deals	largely	with	this	link	between	synaesthesia	and	eidetic	memory,	and	how	Nabokov	uses	it	 in	his	fiction.	He	draws	this	conclusion	on	the	value	of	Nabokov’s	eideticism:		 With	 his	 superlative	 observational	 powers	 and	 his	 extraordinary	 literary	gifts,	 Nabokov	made	magnificent	 prose	 from	 his	 eidetically	 recalled	 past,	but	its	images	brought	him	and	his	readers	no	closer	to	any	transcendental	truth	than	did	the	synaesthete’s	photisms.	(1998,	p.	160)		For	 Dann,	 Nabokov’s	 ‘gift’	 is	 one	 that	manifests	 itself	 artistically,	 as	 he	 uses	 his	eidetic	attention	to	detail	to	imbue	his	prose	with	evocative	sensory	detail.	Recall	Ramachandran’s	theory	of	synaesthesia	and	creativity:	if	Ramachandran	is	correct	about	 the	 increased	connections	 in	 the	brain	of	a	 synaesthete,	 it	 seems	 to	 follow	logically	 that	 this	 also	 leads	 to	 increased	 capacity	 for	 memory.	 Cytowic	 and	Eagleman	 offer	 a	 similar	 viewpoint	 in	 their	 discussion	 of	 colour-grapheme	synaesthesia:		 When	asked	what	good	synaesthesia	is,	a	common	response	is	“It	helps	you	remember.”	 Perhaps	 because	 they	 lack	 semantic	 meaning,	 synaesthetic	percepts	are	easily	and	vividly	remembered,	often	better	than	the	triggering	stimulus.	 While	 memorising	 matrices	 is	 a	 special	 case,	 many	 find	 that	grapheme-colour	 synaesthesia	 helps	 them	 retrieve	 names.	 [P]eople	 often	remember	 that	 someone	 possessed	 a	 name	 of	 a	 particular	 colour.	 For	example,	when	 Linda	DiRaimondo	 encounters	 an	 acquaintance	 she	 hasn’t	seen	 in	a	while,	 she	 says	 to	herself	 “That’s	 a	yellow	name.	Yellows	are	Ts	
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and	Ys”	She	does	not	know	anyone	whose	name	starts	with	Y,	so	by	process	of	elimination	she	goes	through	her	mental	 list	of	names	beginning	with	T	until	she	remembers	who	her	acquaintance	is.	(2009,	p.	81)		On	the	subject	of	memory	and	recall,	it	was	mentioned	earlier	that	Ramachandran	and	Hubbard	(2004)	developed	a	test	to	prove	synaesthesia	existed.	Here	are	the	specifics	of	their	experiment,	as	detailed	by	Ramachandran	in	The	Tell-Tale	Brain:		 To	 answer	 this	 question	 I	 devised	 patterns	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 shown	 in	Figure	3.4:	a	forest	of	blocky	5s	with	a	few	blocky	2s	scattered	among	them.	Since	the	5s	are	just	mirror	images	of	the	2s,	they	are	composed	of	identical	features:	two	vertical	lines	and	three	horizontal	ones.	When	you	look	at	this	image,	you	manifestly	do	not	get	popout;	you	can	only	spot	the	2s	through	item-by-item	inspection.	And	you	can’t	easily	discern	the	global	shape	–	the	big	triangle	–	by	mentally	grouping	the	2s;	they	simply	don’t	segregate	from	the	 background...	 	 Now,	 what	 if	 you	 were	 to	 show	 Figure	 3.4	 to	 a	synaesthete	who	claims	to	experience	2s	as	red	and	5s	as	green?	If	she	were	merely	thinking	of	red	(and	green)	then,	just	like	you	and	me,	she	wouldn’t	instantly	 see	 the	 triangle.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 if	 synaesthesia	 were	 a	genuinely	low-level	sensory	effect,	she	might	literally	see	the	triangle...	The	 surprise	 came	 when	 we	 showed	 the	 black	 and	 white	 displays	 to	Mirabelle.	 Unlike	 the	 nonsynesthetes,	 she	 was	 able	 to	 identify	 the	 shape	correctly	on	80	to	90	percent	of	trials	–	just	as	if	the	numbers	were	actually	coloured	 differently!	 The	 synaesthetically	 induced	 colours	 were	 just	 as	
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effective	 as	 real	 colours	 in	 allowing	her	 to	 discover	 and	 report	 the	 global	shape.	(Ramachandran,	2011,	p.	91-93)				Fig.	1:	Ramachandran	and	Hubbard’s	Experiment	[omitted	in	digital	version].	Source:	<https://neuroanthropology.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/synesthesia.gif>		Because	 synaesthesia	 is	 an	 involuntary	 association,	 one	 would	 expect	 that	 a	synaesthete	 with	 grapheme-colour	 would	 experience	 colour	 just	 as	 readily	 in	scanning	 a	 page	 of	 text	 as	 they	 would	 scanning	 the	 field	 of	 numbers	 in	Ramachandran	 and	 Hubbard’s	 experiment.	 Here	 is	 what	 Cytowic	 and	 Eagleman	say	on	the	matter:		 An	open	question	is	whether	a	grapheme	needs	to	be	attended	to	in	order	to	evoke	synaesthetic	colour.	The	question	is	harder	to	answer	than	it	appears.	Saying	 that	 synaesthesia	 is	 automatic	 and	 involuntary	 suggests	 it	 just	passively	 ‘happens’	without	the	need	to	pay	any	attention	at	all	 to	stimuli.	When	 reading,	 for	 example,	 synesthetes	 attend	 to	 word	 meaning	 and	phrases	just	like	the	rest	of	us	do	rather	than	seeing	individual	characters.	(2009,	p.	73-4)		
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This	makes	 sense,	 as	 if	 the	 immediate	 reaction	 upon	 seeing	 any	 page	 of	writing	was	 to	 attend	 to	 every	 individual	 colour	 in	 each	 letter,	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	perform	a	 task	as	 simple	as	 reading	a	newspaper.	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	synaesthesia	cannot	perform	a	useful	role:		 Yet	Carol	Steen	and	Megan	Timberlake	speak	of	seeing	“Technicolour	on	the	page”	even	though	they	see	the	printing	in	black	ink,	whereas	Jean	Milogav	likens	 her	 colour	 experience	 to	 a	 ticker-tape	 speeding	 through	 her	 head.	“When	I	read	or	listen	to	conversation,”	she	says,	“colour	just	flows	through	me.	If	she	wants	she	can	“stop	at	a	certain	word	and	look	at	it,”	examining	the	colors	in	detail.	(2009,	p.	74)		Thus,	it	becomes	possible	for	a	synaesthete	to	selectively	focus	their	attention	on	colour	 if	 needed.	 If	 we	 also	 recall	 the	 earlier	 observation	 where	 for	 some	synaesthetes	 the	 first	 letter	 of	 the	word	 influences	 the	 colour	 of	 the	 rest,	 or	 the	colour	of	the	whole	word	is	influenced	by	colours	around	it.	Now	we	can	begin	to	imagine	 a	 situation	 where	 a	 reader	 with	 grapheme-colour	 or	 phoneme-colour	synaesthesia	might	attend	to	colour	 in	a	 literary	 text:	where	 there	 is	a	particular	amount	of	wordplay	on	display	–	as	frequently	there	is	in	Nabokov’s	writing.		As	 an	 example,	 here	 is	 how	 the	 opening	 lines	 of	 Lolita	 may	 have	 appeared	 to	Nabokov.	 It	 must	 be	 stressed	 that	 this	 is	 a	 speculative	 reproduction	 based	 on	Nabokov’s	 own	 description	 of	 his	 synaesthesia,	 but	 one	 that	 will	 hopefully	demonstrate	 the	point.	First,	here	 it	 is	with	his	 colour	associations	colouring	 the	letters:	
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	Lolita,	light	of	my	life,	fire	of	my	loins.	My	sin,	my	soul.	Lo	–	lee	-	ta.	
	In	 this	 instance,	 the	 page	 appears	 to	 be	 a	mess	 of	 colour,	with	 some	 patterning	observed	but	a	largely	forgettable	colour	relationship.	Now	observe	the	difference	when	we	allow	the	 first	grapheme	 to	colour	 the	rest	of	 the	 letters,	except	where	there	is	an	instance	of	phonetic	repetition:		Lolita,	light	of	my	life,	fire	of	my	loins.	My	sin,	my	soul.	Lo	-	lee	–	ta.	
	Suddenly	 we	 have	 a	 pattern	 that	 is	 much	 easier	 to	 follow.	 Instead	 of	 multiple	colours	that	make	the	writing	almost	unintelligible,	we	find	that	just	a	few	colours	emerge	as	dominant,	those	for	l,	o,	t,	f,	m	and	s.		Of	course,	for	a	non-synaesthete,	or	even	someone	with	a	form	of	synaesthesia	that	is	 insensitive	 to	graphemes	and	phonemes,	 it	 is	unlikely	 that	 these	reactions	will	take	place	at	all.	This	suggests	one	compelling	explanation	as	to	why	a	writing	style	replete	with	wordplay	may	delight	some	readers	but	repel	others.	It	could	be	more	than	just	a	question	of	literary	taste:	it	could	be	that	for	some	the	mere	repetitions	of	 language	 provoke	 additional	 perceptive	 responses	 that	 reinforce	 the	 sense	 of	
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enjoyment	in	the	work,	while	for	others	no	such	feedback	exists,	and	they	may	find	the	effect	of	the	‘purple	patch’	off-putting.		
Hyper-Aesthesia		From	this	idea	that	synaesthesia	has	the	potential	to	allow	heightened	memory,	as	evidenced	by	Nabokov’s	 astute	 attention	 to	detail	 in	Speak,	Memory,	we	 can	also	question	whether	this	accompanies	a	tendency	to	revel	in	this	sensory	detail,	and	to	find	it	as	some	source	of	aesthetic	pleasure.			As	 an	 interesting	 example,	 recall	 that	Dmitri	Nabokov	 also	 exhibited	 his	 father’s	synaesthesia,	even	though	their	associations	were	different.	Dmitri	translated	one	of	his	father’s	earliest	short	stories,	called	‘Sounds’.	Originally	written	in	Russian	in	1923,	 Dmitri’s	 English	 translation	 certainly	 appears	 to	 have	 done	 justice	 to	 his	father’s	attention	to	detail:	note	all	the	underlined	instances	of	phonetic	repetition.		 It	was	necessary	to	shut	the	window:	rain	was	striking	the	sill	and	splashing	the	parquet	 and	 armchairs.	With	 a	 fresh,	 slippery	 sound,	 enormous	 silver	specters	 sped	 through	 the	 garden,	 through	 the	 foliage,	 along	 the	 orange	sand.	The	drainpipe	rattled	and	choked.	You	were	playing	Bach.	The	piano	had	raised	its	lacquered	wing,	under	the	wing	lay	a	lyre,	and	little	hammers	were	 rippling	 across	 the	 strings.	 The	 brocade	 rug,	 crumpling	 into	 coarse	folds,	had	 slid	partway	off	 the	piano's	 tail,	dropping	an	opened	opus	onto	the	 floor.	 Every	now	and	 then,	 through	 the	 frenzy	 of	 the	 fugue,	 your	 ring	would	 clink	 on	 the	 keys	 as,	 incessantly,	 magnificently,	 the	 June	 shower	
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slashed	the	windowpanes.	And	you,	without	interrupting	your	playing,	and	slightly	tilting	your	head,	were	exclaiming,	in	time	to	the	beat,	"The	rain,	the	rain.	.	.	I	am	go-ing	to	drown	it	out.	.	.	."	(1995,	p.	74)		Perhaps	inheriting	his	father’s	synaesthesia	made	Dmitri	more	sensitive	and	aware	of	 phonemic	 repetition,	 and	 this	 kind	 of	 attention	 to	 rhyme	 was	 an	 almost	involuntary	part	of	the	composition.	What’s	more,	the	actual	substance	of	the	short	story	 seems	 to	 reflect	 this	 obsession	with	 sensory	 perceptions,	 as	 the	 title	 itself	implies.	 The	 protagonist	 tells	 us	 the	 colour	 of	 the	 sand;	 the	 sound,	 colour	 and	physical	impact	of	the	rain;	the	details	of	the	piano	and	the	brocade	rug	over	it.	It	continues	like	this	in	the	next	paragraph:		 I	 had	 a	 feeling	 of	 enraptured	 equilibrium	 as	 I	 sensed	 the	 musical	relationship	 between	 the	 silvery	 specters	 of	 rain	 and	 your	 inclined	shoulders,	which	would	give	a	shudder	when	you	pressed	your	fingers	into	the	rippling	luster.	And	when	I	withdrew	deep	into	myself	the	whole	world	seemed	like	that—homogeneous,	congruent,	bound	by	the	laws	of	harmony.	I	myself,	 you,	 the	 carnations,	 at	 that	 instant	all	became	vertical	 chords	on	musical	staves.	 I	 realized	 that	everything	 in	 the	world	was	an	 interplay	of	identical	particles	comprising	different	kinds	of	consonance:	 the	trees,	 the	water,	 you...	 All	was	 unified,	 equivalent,	 divine.	 You	 got	 up.	 Rain	was	 still	mowing	down	the	sunlight.	The	puddles	looked	like	holes	in	the	dark	sand,	apertures	 onto	 some	 other	 heavens	 that	 were	 gliding	 past	 underground.	(1995,	p.	74)		
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This	 passage	 continues	 in	 the	 same	 vein	 as	 the	 first,	 with	multiple	 instances	 of	phonetic	 repetition:	 ‘enraptured	 equilibrium’,	 ‘silvery	 specters’,	 ‘shudder/luster’,	‘interplay	of	identical	particles’,	providing	phonetic	texture	to	the	short	story	that	gives	 the	 reader	 a	 sensory	 experience	 of	 ‘Sounds’.	 The	 observations	 of	 the	protagonist	 take	 on	 synaesthetic	 imagery	 as	 he	 details	 the	 ‘musical	 relationship’	between	 the	 rain	 and	 his	 lover’s	 shoulders,	 using	 multiple	 terms	 from	 music	theory:	‘harmony’,	‘chords’	and	‘staves’.	He	becomes	increasingly	caught	up	in	this	multi-sensory	experience	where	individual	stimuli	start	to	form	together	in	a	kind	of	‘consonance’.	He	takes	more	joy	in	the	act	of	being	simultaneously	stimulated	by	sight	of	the	rain	falling	and	the	sound	of	the	piano	than	in	being	present	with	his	lover,	which	gives	rise	to	an	ominous	sign	for	their	relationship	almost	at	once.		 On	 that	 happy	 day	 when	 the	 rain	 was	 lashing	 and	 you	 played	 so	unexpectedly	well	came	the	resolution	of	the	nebulous	something	that	had	imperceptibly	arisen	between	us	after	our	first	weeks	of	love.	I	realized	that	you	had	no	power	over	me,	that	it	was	not	you	alone	who	were	my	lover	but	the	 entire	 earth.	 It	 was	 as	 if	 my	 soul	 had	 extended	 countless	 sensitive	feelers,	 and	 I	 lived	 within	 everything,	 perceiving	 simultaneously	 Niagara	Falls	 thundering	 far	beyond	 the	ocean	and	 the	 long	golden	drops	 rustling	and	pattering	in	the	lane.	I	glanced	at	a	birch	tree's	shiny	bark	and	suddenly	felt	that,	in	place	of	arms,	I	possessed	inclined	branches	covered	with	little	wet	 leaves	and,	 instead	of	 legs,	a	 thousand	slender	roots,	 twining	 into	 the	earth,	 imbibing	 it.	 I	wanted	 to	 transfuse	myself	 thus	 into	 all	 of	 nature,	 to	experience	what	it	was	like	to	be	an	old	boletus	mushroom	with	its	spongy	yellow	underside,	or	a	dragonfly,	or	the	solar	sphere.	(1995,	p.	74)	
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	We	 see	 first	 hand	how	 the	protagonist	 realises	 that	 his	 attraction	 to	 his	 lover	 is	nothing	but	an	extension	of	his	obsession	with	sensory	experience:	in	his	imagery	of	 possessing	 a	 soul	 that	 “extended	 countless	 sensitive	 feelers”	 and	 “a	 thousand	slender	 roots,	 twining	 into	 the	 earth”	 he	 exalts	 the	 ability	 to	 feel	 and	 sense	everything	at	once,	being	able	to	see	Niagara	falls	at	the	same	time	as	the	drops	of	rain	falling	in	front	of	them.	He	displays	a	kind	of	‘hyper-aesthesia’	in	his	attention	to	sensory	detail	that	renders	him	paradoxically	unable	to	properly	communicate	with	 those	 around	 him.	 In	 this	 way	 he	 is	 somewhat	 reminiscent	 of	 Nabokov	himself	 in	 the	 description	 of	 the	 birthday	 party	 in	 Speak,	 Memory:	 he	 can	remember	 all	 the	 minute	 details	 of	 the	 scene	 but	 gives	 barely	 any	 information	about	the	people	at	the	party,	and	seems	not	to	have	cared	at	all	for	their	presence.		Indeed,	 the	 protagonist	 is	 so	 caught	 up	 in	 the	 minute	 details	 of	 his	 sensory	experience	that	when	his	married	lover	tells	him	she	cannot	 live	without	him,	he	seems	to	be	un-attuned	to	their	conversation:			 I	 interrupted	you	with	my	silence.	A	spot	of	sunlight	slid	from	your	skirt	onto	the	sand	as	you	moved	slightly	away.	What	could	I	say	to	you?	Could	I	invoke	freedom,	captivity,	say	I	did	not	love	you	enough?	No,	that	was	all	wrong.	An	 instant	 passed.	 During	 that	 instant,	 much	 happened	 in	 the	 world:	somewhere	 a	 giant	 steamship	went	 to	 the	 bottom,	 a	war	was	 declared,	 a	genius	was	born.	The	instant	was	gone.	“Here’s	your	cigarette	holder,”	I	said.	(1995,	p.	78)	
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	Again,	although	he	is	being	spoken	to,	he	notices	the	movement	of	sunlight	on	her	skirt	 more	 than	 he	 does	 her	 presence	 and	 feelings.	 He	 perceives	 the	 events	 of	history	around	the	world	in	the	very	instant	he	cannot	tell	her	anything	truthful,	so	he	casually	remarks	‘Here’s	your	cigarette	holder’	and	their	relationship	comes	to	an	end.	The	downside	of	displaying	this	kind	of	hyper-aesthesia	 is	an	 inability	 to	act	 in	 moments	 of	 personal	 crisis,	 paralysed	 in	 perceiving	 the	 minute	 details	available	to	sensory	experience.		A	similar	moment	occurs	at	the	end	of	another	of	Nabokov’s	short	stories,	‘Spring	in	Fialta’,	at	a	moment	where	the	narrator	questions	his	relationship	with	his	lover	Nina:		 ‘Look	 here	 –	 what	 if	 I	 love	 you?’	 Nina	 glanced	 at	 me,	 I	 repeated	 those	words...	‘Never	mind,	I	was	only	joking,’	I	hastened	to	say,	lightly	encircling	her	 waist.	 From	 somewhere	 a	 firm	 bouquet	 of	 small,	 dark,	 unselfishly	smelling	 violets	 appeared	 in	 her	 hands,	 and	 before	 she	 returned	 to	 her	husband	and	car,	we	stood	for	a	little	while	longer	by	the	stone	parapet,	and	our	romance	was	even	more	hopeless	than	it	had	ever	been.	But	the	stone	was	 as	 warm	 as	 flesh,	 and	 suddenly	 I	 understood	 something	 I	 had	 been	seeing	without	 understanding	 –	why	 a	piece	 of	 tinfoil	 had	 sparkled	 so	 on	the	pavement,	why	the	gleam	of	a	glass	had	trembled	on	a	tablecloth,	why	the	sea	was	ashimmer:	somehow,	by	 imperceptible	degrees,	 the	white	sky	above	Fialta	had	got	saturated	with	sunshine,	and	now	it	was	sun-pervaded	
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throughout,	and	this	brimming	white	radiance	grew	broader	and	broader,	all	dissolved	in	it,	all	vanished,	all	passed…	(2011,	p.	48)		Again,	there	is	an	attention	to	visual	and	tactile	details	that	are	absolutely	trivial	to	the	actual	direction	of	the	story	–	which	ends	shortly	afterwards	with	the	narrator	discovering	the	news	of	Nina’s	death.	Yet	the	narrator	is	completely	engrossed	in	the	seeming	importance	of	these	details,	and	there	is	an	echo	of	the	 ‘consonance’	that	 engulfs	 the	 narrator	 of	 ‘Sounds’	 when	 at	 the	 end	 of	 this	 passage	 the	 sun	‘dissolves’	all	within	it.		This	motif	 of	 obsession	with	 sensory	 aesthetics	 to	 the	 point	 of	 overload	 can	 be	observed	in	Lolita	as	well,	with	Humbert’s	final	moments	in	the	narrative	being	a	strange,	 almost	 out	 of	 body	 experience.	 Having	 murdered	 Quilty	 and	 been	intercepted	by	the	police,	Humbert	brings	his	car	to	a	stop	in	a	field	and	waits	to	be	taken	 away,	 in	 acceptance	 of	 his	 fate.	 At	 this	 moment	 he	 displays	 a	 similar	obsession	with	the	consonance	of	the	senses	as	the	protagonist	of	‘Sounds’:		 Small	 grasshoppers	 spurted	 out	 of	 the	 withered	 roadside	 weeds.	 A	 very	light	 cloud	 was	 opening	 its	 arms	 and	 moving	 toward	 a	 slightly	 more	substantial	one	belonging	to	another,	more	sluggish,	heavenlogged	system.	As	 I	 approached	 the	 friendly	 abyss,	 I	 grew	aware	 of	 a	melodious	 unity	 of	sounds	rising	like	vapor	from	a	small	mining	town	that	lay	at	my	feet,	in	a	fold	of	the	valley.	One	could	make	out	the	geometry	of	the	streets	between	blocks	 of	 red	 and	 gray	 roofs,	 and	 green	 puffs	 of	 trees,	 and	 a	 serpentine	stream,	and	the	rich,	ore-like	glitter	of	the	city	dump,	and	beyond	the	town,	
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roads	crisscrossing	the	crazy	quilt	of	dark	and	pale	fields,	and	behind	it	all,	great	 timbered	mountains.	 	But	 even	brighter	 than	 those	quietly	 rejoicing	colors	–	 for	 there	are	 colors	and	shades	 that	 seem	 to	enjoy	 themselves	 in	good	company	—	both	brighter	and	dreamier	to	the	ear	than	they	were	to	the	eye,	was	that	vapory	vibration	of	accumulated	sounds	that	never	ceased	for	a	moment,	as	it	rose	to	the	lip	of	granite	where	I	stood	wiping	my	foul	mouth.	And	soon	I	realized	that	all	these	sounds	were	of	one	nature,	that	no	other	sounds	but	these	came	from	the	streets	of	the	transparent	town,	with	the	women	at	home	and	the	men	away.	(AL,	p.	307-8)		The	 resemblance	 between	 Humbert’s	 display	 of	 hyper-aesthesia	 and	 that	 of	‘Sounds’	is	almost	uncanny.	In	both	texts,	the	protagonist	notices	the	movement	of	natural	 forms	 such	 as	 rain	 or	 grasshoppers.	 Both	 protagonists	 invoke	 musical	terminology	to	describe	their	experience	of	this	sensory	unity;	in	Humbert’s	case	it	is	a	‘melodious	unity	of	sounds’.	Humbert	makes	note	of	all	the	details	in	the	town	before	him;	both	those	visual	stimuli	such	as	the	geometric	design	of	the	streets	or	the	colour	of	roofs,	and	aural	stimuli	such	as	the	‘vapory	vibration	of	accumulated	sounds’	coming	from	the	town	below	him.	Notably,	this	is	not	so	much	Humbert’s	direct	perception	at	this	moment,	but	his	recollection	of	a	moment	from	the	past,	not	long	after	Lolita	has	disappeared.			These	recurrent	moments	of	eidetic	recall	and	hyper-aesthetic	attention	to	detail	occur	 frequently	 enough	 in	 Nabokov’s	 fiction	 to	 be	 significant.	 In	 each	 case	Nabokov	creates	a	sense	accompanying	this	hyper-aesthesia	of	being	so	struck	by	
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the	 connections	 between	 the	 different	 sense-impressions	 that	 the	 character	 is	unable	to	function	in	some	vital	social	way.		
Cross-modal	Perception	
	One	of	the	research	agendas	driving	Ramachandran	is	the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	general	population	experiences	synaesthesia	in	some	meaningful	way.	His	evidence	for	traces	of	synaesthetic	behaviour	in	the	ordinary	brain	comes	from	an	experiment	where	participants	were	 shown	 two	shapes	and	asked	 to	assign	 two	made-up	words	to	these	shapes.	There	was	an	overwhelming	tendency	to	associate	the	word	‘bouba’	with	the	shape	with	smooth,	rounded	edges	and	curved	lines,	and	the	word	‘kiki’	with	the	shape	made	of	straight	edges	intersecting	at	acute	angles.	This	is	congruent	across	languages	where	the	writing	systems	are	not	based	on	the	Latin	 alphabet,	 so	 a	mere	 association	 between	 the	 shapes	 of	 the	 letters	 and	 the	sample	shapes	is	not	the	sole	explanation.	Ramachandran	contends	that	this	is	an	everyday	example	of	cross-modality	(2011,	p.108-9)					Figure	 2:	 ‘Kiki’	 and	 ‘Bouba’	 [omitted	 in	 digital	 version].	 Source:	<http://www.synesthesiatest.org/blog/bouba-kiki-effect>	
	We	noted	at	the	start	of	the	chapter	that	terms	such	as	‘sharp	cheese’	or	‘loud	shirt’	or	 ‘warm	 colour’	 are	 part	 of	 our	 everyday	 lexicon.	 While	 we	 consider	 these	
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completely	normal	and	parse	their	meaning	without	hesitation,	as	noted	by	Lakoff	and	 Johnson	 (1980);	 in	 rare	 cases	 of	 neurological	 damage	 the	 metaphorical	relation	 is	 not	 picked	 up	 at	 all,	 and	 the	 patient	 with	 this	 condition	 instead	interprets	this	comment	literally.	Ramachandran	gives	an	example:		 For	 instance,	 in	 addition	 to	 experiencing	 difficulty	 using	 words	 and	numbers,	 there	 are	 hints	 that	 people	 with	 damage	 to	 the	 left	 inferior	parietal	 lobule	 (IPL)	 often	 lose	 the	 ability	 to	 interpret	 metaphors	 and	become	 extremely	 literal	 minded...	 If	 asked	 “What	 does	 ‘a	 stitch	 in	 time	saves	 nine’	 mean?”	 a	 patient	 with	 an	 IPL	 stroke	 might	 say,	 “It’s	 good	 to	stitch	up	a	hole	in	your	shirt	before	it	gets	too	large.”	(2011,	p.	105)		Having	examined	the	phenomenon	of	multisensory	perception	primarily	using	the	term	 ‘synaesthesia’,	 it	 is	 important	now	to	acknowledge	a	 fairly	recent	argument	that	synaesthesia	has	to	be	considered	a	distinct	phenomenon	from	more	common	examples	 of	 matching	 perceptions	 across	 different	 sensory	 modalities.	 In	 this	system	of	delineation,	a	commonplace	 term	such	as	 ‘sharp	cheese’	would	merely	be	considered	a	cross-modal	correspondence;	 the	term	 ‘synaesthesia’	 is	reserved	for	cases	like	those	exhibited	by	Nabokov.	Deroy	and	Spence	(2013)	make	the	case	that	 what	 has	 previously	 been	 termed	 ‘weak	 synaesthesia’	 (Martino	 and	Marks,	2001,	p.	61)	is	not	synaesthesia	at	all:		 Since	what	is	observed	in	these	cases	is	a	tendency	for	a	sensory	feature,	or	attribute,	in	one	modality	–	either	physically	present	or	merely	imagined	–	to	 be	matched	with	 a	 sensory	media	 in	 another	modality,	 it	 can,	 at	 first,	
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seem	 odd	 to	 assimilate	 them	 into	 synaesthesia.	 These	 cases	 are	 not	 only	typically	devoid	of	any	conscious	perceptual	concurrent,	but	also	 frequent	(and	perhaps	universal)	 in	the	population,	whereas	synaesthesia	has	been	defined	 as	 “a	 conscious	 experience	 of	 systematically	 induced	 sensory	attributes	 that	 are	 not	 experienced	 by	 most	 people	 under	 comparable	conditions.”	(2013,	p.		644)		This	seems	to	be	a	fairly	important	distinction	to	make.	Given	how	this	thesis	has	been	keen	to	stress	the	difference	between	aesthetic	experiences	of	literature	that	are	conscious	and	those	that	are	generally	not	available	to	consciousness,	this	view	that	‘cross-modal’	perceptions	are	distinct	from	synaesthesia	by	virtue	of	not	being	conscious	 perceptions	 seems	 relevant	 and	 valid.	 It	 would	 also	 go	 some	 way	 to	explaining	 why	 those	 examples	 of	 everyday	 expressions	 with	 cross-sensory	mappings,	 like	 sharp	 cheese	 or	 loud	 shirt,	 are	 parsed	 so	 frequently	without	 this	counter-intuitive	 aspect	 of	 their	 construction	becoming	 immediately	 apparent	 to	consciousness.		The	 non-conscious	 nature	 of	 these	 cross-modal	 perceptions	 is	 not	 the	 only	significant	 feature	 that	 Deroy	 and	 Spence	 argue	 gives	 them	 reason	 to	 be	considered	separately	from	synaesthesia:	they	also	contend	that	that	synaesthesia	is	 comparatively	 rare	 (considering	 that	 a	 4.3%	 chance	 still	 lies	 outside	 the	statistical	 norm	 of	 experience),	 while	 cross-modal	 perceptions	 are	 far	 more	frequent:		 Accepting	crossmodal	correspondences	as	constituting	(or	residing	at)	the	
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weak	end	of	a	 synesthetic	 continuum	 forces	one	 to	abandon	 the	 idea	 that	synesthesia	 is,	 overall,	 constitutively	 rare.	 Again,	 this	 progressive	abandonment	 highlights,	 as	 some	 have	 recently	 started	 to	 argue,	 that	certain	forms	of	synesthesia	(i.e.,	the	induction	of	tastes	or	flavor	attributes	by	smell)	may	be	universal.	(2013,	p.	652)	
This	 distinction	 too	 is	 extremely	 important.	 As	 this	 examination	 of	 the	 links	between	 synaesthesia	 and	 literature	 has	 made	 clear,	 while	 synaesthesia	 is	compelling	as	a	means	of	understanding	 the	general	mechanisms	of	 the	mind,	as	well	as	how	a	neurological	condition	likely	influenced	Nabokov’s	style	of	writing;	its	 rate	 of	 occurrence	 and	 the	 inconsistency	 of	 perceptual	 mappings	 from	 one	person	to	another	make	it	difficult	to	apply	these	principles	in	the	objective	fashion	typically	expected	of	literary	study.	On	the	other	hand,	if	cross-modal	perceptions	are	more	 frequent	 and	 consistent	 across	different	 readerss,	 it	makes	 them	more	suited	to	an	objective	analysis	of	a	novel.		Where	a	synaesthete’s	reading	of	a	novel	may	well	be	highly	subjective,	influenced	by	 their	 unique	 sensory	 mappings,	 those	 perceptions	 that	 are	 characterized	 as	cross-modal	 by	 Deroy	 and	 Spence	 suggest	 at	 some	more	 general	 principles	 that	govern	 our	 aesthetic	 appreciation	 of	 a	 text.	 Consider	 the	 following	 analogy:	 as	 a	general	principle,	emphasising	different	colours	when	presenting	a	meal	increases	the	 aesthetic	 impact	 of	 the	 dish	 on	 the	 diner,	 but	 for	 a	 synaesthete	 with	 taste-colour	 mappings,	 if	 these	 food	 colours	 do	 not	 match	 the	 specific	 colours	 they	associate	with	the	taste	of	that	food,	the	result	can	be	‘most	disagreeable’	(Downey,	1911,	 p.	 528-539).	 The	 former	 is	 a	 general	 aesthetic	 principle	 that,	 while	 still	
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inherently	subjective,	is	relatively	consistent	across	the	population;	the	latter	is	a	particular	 aesthetic	 preference	 that	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	 individual	 with	synaesthesia.		The	field	of	cross-modal	research	is	relatively	young,	but	some	recent	discoveries	are	immediately	relevant	to	literature	and	the	investigation	of	aesthetics.	Recall	in	earlier	chapters	how	Tsur	developed	a	theoretical	explanation	for	the	tendency	to	map	certain	qualities	 to	certain	phonetic	sounds.	 Intuitive	support	 for	 the	notion	that	these	kind	of	mappings	are	stable	and	frequently	occurring	perceptions	comes	from	 a	 summary	 by	 Deroy	 and	 Spence	 (2013,	 p.	 655)	 of	 the	mappings	 that	 are	attributed	 to	 high-pitched	 sounds.	 These	 are	 consistently	 correlated	with	 higher	elevation,	 higher	 brightness,	 higher	 spatial	 frequency,	 upward	 movement	 and	angular	 shape.	This	 last	 association	 is	 very	 instructive	 if	 one	 recalls	 the	bouba	 –	kiki	effect.	If	more	research	can	be	done	on	these	general	tendencies,	it	could	open	up	 new	 avenues	 for	 literary	 study	 to	 confidently	 articulate	 the	 non-conscious	effects	associated	with	literature’s	aural	properties.		One	 area	 of	 research	 that	 highlights	 the	 wide-reaching	 effects	 of	 multisensory	perception	is	in	the	perception	of	‘flavour’.	Here	is	what	Spence	has	to	say	on	the	topic:		 People	often	confuse	tastes	with	flavours.	Strictly	speaking,	taste	perception	refers	 to	 those	 sensations	 that	 are	 elicited	 by	 the	 stimulation	 of	 the	gustatory	receptors	on	the	tongue	—	sweet,	sour,	salty,	bitter	and	umami.	Quite	 how	 many	 basic	 tastes	 we	 are	 sensitive	 to,	 and	 whether	 they	 are	
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really	 ‘basic’,	 are	 hotly-debated	 questions	 in	 the	 field…	 It	 is	 important	 to	note,	however,	that	we	virtually	never	experience	pure	tastants	in	isolation.	Rather,	we	mostly	 experience	 flavours,	 resulting	 from	 the	 combination	 of	taste,	 retronasal	 olfaction	 (sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘mouth	 smell’,	 in	contrast	to	orthonasal	olfaction	or	‘sniffing’)	and	trigeminal	inputs.	‘Fruity’,	‘meaty’,	‘floral’	and	‘burnt’	are	all	flavour	descriptors.	Although	it	is	difficult	to	 arrive	 at	 a	 precise	 estimate	 of	 the	 relative	 contributions	 of	 taste	 and	retronasal	smell	to	flavour	perception,	a	figure	that	one	often	sees	quoted	in	the	literature	is	that	~80%	of	what	we	commonly	think	of	as	flavour	comes	from	 the	 information	 transduced	 by	 the	 olfactory	 receptors	 in	 the	 nose.	(2013,	p.	365)	
The	fact	that	taste	and	smell	are	actually	joint	components	of	what	we	call	‘flavour’	is	 also	 noted	 by	 Cytowic	 and	 Eagleman	 (2009,	 p.	 127-8).	 For	 Spence	 it	 is	considered	 an	 ordinary	 instance	 of	 cross-modality,	 one	 that	 fits	 the	 categorical	requirements	mentioned	earlier,	being	common	amongst	the	population	and	being	relatively	non-conscious	(insofar	as	the	sensory	dimensions	of	eating	besides	taste	are	 not	 consciously	 apparent	 when	 taking	 a	 bite	 of	 food,	 as	 opposed	 to	 simply	smelling	it).		Nabokov’s	 biographer	 Brian	Boyd,	 in	 a	 recent	 essay	 ‘Psychology	 and	 Literature’,	makes	 the	 following	 point	 which	 goes	 some	 way	 to	 illustrating	 why	 all	 this	research	could	be	extremely	important	for	literary	study:		
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Research	in	grounded	cognition	in	recent	neuroscience	shows	that	thought	is	not	primarily	linguistic,	as	many	had	supposed,	but	multimodal,	partially	reactivating	relevant	multimodal	experiences	in	our	past,	involving	multiple	senses,	emotions	and	associations.	Just	as	seeing	someone	grasp	something	activates	 mirror	 neurons,	 even	 hearing	 the	 word	 “grasp”	 activates	 the	appropriate	 area	 of	 the	 motor	 cortex.	 Our	 brains	 encode	 multimodal	memories	 of	 objects	 and	 actions,	 and	 these	 are	 partially	 reactivated	 as	percepts	or	concepts	come	into	consciousness.	(2014,	p.	21)		From	 this,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 literary	 texts	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 activate	 these	different	 modalities	 by	 suggesting,	 imitating	 or	 directly	 conveying	 sensory	perception	 to	 the	 reader.	 Think	back	 to	 the	previous	 chapters	 and	how	Kerouac	uses	 rhythmic	 patterns	 in	 the	 text	 to	 convey	 a	 sense	 of	 motion,	 or	 how	Woolf	imitates	 the	 qualities	 of	 visual	 Impressionism	with	 her	 stream	 of	 consciousness	prose.	And	as	we	have	seen	in	this	chapter,	sensory	information	is	replete	in	Lolita	thanks	in	part	to	Nabokov’s	synaesthetic	sensitivity	and	eidetic	recall.		What	can	be	gleaned	from	the	studies	on	flavour	as	a	multi-sensory	percept	is	that	the	 more	 sensory	 information	 of	 different	 modalities	 becomes	 available,	 the	overall	perception	is	enhanced.	We	can	use	this	principle	to	propose	a	hypothetical	analogous	process	that	influences	our	opinion	of	literature’s	aesthetic	quality:	the	more	sensory	modes	a	text	 incorporates	into	the	descriptive	information	or	style	of	 writing,	 the	 more	 it	 stimulates	 percepts	 across	 different	 modalities	 and	 fully	involves	the	brain	in	reading,	creating	a	sense	of	pleasure.		
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Let	us	return	to	Nabokov’s	story	‘Sounds’	at	this	point.	To	help	us	understand	how	cross-modal	 perceptions	 may	 function	 in	 the	 text,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 recall	 the	distinction	between	conscious	and	non-conscious	perceptions.	This	may	easily	be	extended	 to	 the	 semantic	 expressions	 governing	 different	 sensory	 domains.	 The	everyday	metaphor	 ‘sharp	cheese’,	which	we	have	 regularly	used	as	an	example,	would	normally	have	its	semantic	effect	processed	without	entering	consciousness.	But	 if	we	change	 the	metaphor	 to	 ‘loud	cheese’,	we	become	acutely	aware	of	 the	modalities	we	are	being	expected	to	map	onto	one	another	–	sound	and	taste	–	and	their	apparently	incongruent	nature.	Essentially	there	is	a	threshold	at	which	the	cross-modal	referent	can	remain	a	non-conscious	percept,	and	that	can	be	drawn	out	for	aesthetic	effect.	Consider	this	passage	from	‘Sounds’	again:		 It	was	necessary	to	shut	the	window:	rain	was	striking	the	sill	and	splashing	the	parquet	 and	 armchairs.	With	 a	 fresh,	 slippery	 sound,	 enormous	 silver	specters	 sped	 through	 the	 garden,	 through	 the	 foliage,	 along	 the	 orange	sand.	(1995,	p.	47)		First,	note	the	use	of	the	term	‘slippery	sound’.	This	term	occupies	a	relatively	low-key	cross-modal	map	in	that	‘slippery’	is	most	commonly	a	tactile	property,	but	it	is	being	used	to	describe	a	sound	instead.	Because	of	the	minor	mismatch	between	sensory	 domains,	 this	 line	 slows	 down	 the	 automatic	 perception	 of	 the	 text,	allowing	 Nabokov	 to	 draw	 the	 reader’s	 attention	 to	 the	 phonetic	 repetition.	 A	similar	example	occurs	further	down,	with	the	line:	“A	feeling	of	freshness	welled	in	me	like	the	fragrance	of	wet	carnations…”	(1995,	p.	47).	Here	again,	although	the	term	 is	 entirely	 semantically	 correct,	 there	 is	 just	 enough	 of	 a	 sensory	 overlap	
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between	the	smell	and	tactile	domains	with	‘fragrance	of	wet	carnations’	to	make	it	stand	out	 for	the	reader.	Never	enough	to	enter	direct	consciousness	as	being	an	absurd	or	grotesque	metaphor,	these	gentle	cross-modal	mappings	are	enough	to	grab	the	reader’s	attention.	They	have	a	conscious	stage	of	awareness	of	something	being	significant,	but	the	sensory	mappings	remain	non-conscious,	and	the	reader	is	 instead	drawn	 to	 the	 other	 features	 of	 the	 text,	 paying	 attention	 to	 important	details	that	they	might	otherwise	have	skimmed	over.		To	make	a	distinction	then	between	‘literary	synaesthesia’	and	‘cross-modality’,	we	might	 recall	 that	 Tsur	 suggested	 that	 there	 was	 an	 air	 of	 ‘heightened	 mystery’	(2008,	p.	283)	associated	with	literary	synaesthesia,	while	Cuddon	(1998,	p.	283)	argued	that	we	use	a	form	of	synaesthesia	in	everyday	language,	with	expressions	such	as	‘soft	wind’	or	‘black	look’.	These	latter	forms	are	better	described	as	cross-modal	 perceptions,	 in	 that	 they	 belong	 to	 everyday	 language	 and	widely	 shared	perceptions,	while	the	kind	of	effect	Tsur	alludes	to	belongs	to	the	more	restricted	domain	 of	 literary	 synaesthesia.	 The	 same	 distinction	made	 in	 cognitive	 science	applies	here:	cross-modal	perceptions	are	common	and	consistent	across	readers,	whereas	 literary	 synaesthesia	 is	 an	 idiosyncratic	 example	 of	 a	 relationship	between	 two	 terms	 from	 different	 sensory	 domains.	 Having	 said	 this,	 there	 is	something	of	 a	 continuum	between	 them	depending	upon	 the	 level	of	 ambiguity	that	is	conferred	either	by	their	context	or	by	the	choice	of	terms,	as	a	phrase	that	has	a	normal	cross-modal	understanding	may	be	used	so	as	to	suggest	a	different	and	attention-grabbing	modal	mapping	 that	approaches	 literary	 synaesthesia.	As	we	 shall	 see	 in	 this	 next	 section,	 this	 is	 something	 Nabokov	 exploits	 for	 artistic	purposes.	
 265 
	
Sensory	Manipulation		For	 Lolita,	 the	 ideas	 of	 cross	 modality	 and	 hyper-aesthesia	 can	 inform	 an	interesting	reading	of	how	Nabokov	creates	tension	around	Humbert’s	actions.	By	stimulating	 different	 sensory	 impressions	 that	 draw	 upon	 the	 reader’s	 own	associations,	 Nabokov	 creates	 the	 opportunity	 for	 the	 reader	 to	 experience	 a	tension	between	 the	 cognitive	pleasures	 elicited	by	 these	 low-level	 aestheticized	reactions	and	the	transgressive	subject	matter	that	he	is	dealing	with.		In	our	discussion	of	Lolita,	we	have	already	seen	how	Nabokov	uses	 the	opening	lines	 to	 convey	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 referential	 power	 the	 name	 and	 its	 sensory	components	have	over	Humbert.	This	manipulation	of	sensory	information	is	also	employed	by	Nabokov	in	the	pursuit	of	other	literary	effects.	Earlier	we	discussed	the	novel’s	ending	and	how	the	sensory	detail	comes	to	overwhelm	Humbert	as	he	is	waiting	to	be	taken	away	for	his	crimes.	Brand	(1987)	discusses	how	Humbert	breaks	 down	 the	 objects	 representing	 the	 culture	 of	 American	 advertising	 into	sensory	components,	so	as	to	nullify	their	potential	influence:		 In	Lolita,	 Humbert	 strips	 advertising,	mass	 culture,	 and	psychoanalysis	 of	any	power	 they	might	have	had	over	him	by	denying	 them	the	referential	nature	 they	 claim	 for	 themselves.	 He	 turns	 them,	 in	 other	 words,	 from	advertisements	 into	 art.	 He	 accomplishes	 this	 by	 separating	 images	 from	their	referents.	Once	they	have	been	abstracted,	Humbert	can	either	impose	
 266
a	personal	form	on	the	images	(creating	his	own	“pure	classics	in	style”)	or	he	can	appropriate	them	poetically.	(1987,	p.	16)		‘Separating	 images	 from	 their	 referents’,	 as	 Brand	 puts	 it,	 is	 important	 to	appreciating	 Lolita.	 In	 the	 example	 she	 gives,	 Humbert	 ignores	 the	 capitalist	properties	of	 the	 town	he	and	Lolita	 stop	 in,	which	Brand	argues	gives	Humbert	the	power	to	influence	Lolita,	to	make	her	in	the	image	of	the	liberated	European	nymph	who	is	no	 longer	bound	to	behave	in	the	manner	demanded	by	American	culture.		A	notable	moment	 that	demonstrates	 this	process	occurs	when	Humbert	decides	to	marry	Charlotte	in	order	to	retain	his	access	to	Lolita.	In	his	description	of	her	in	that	moment,	he	lists	her	physical	attributes	as	thus:		 She	was	well	groomed	and	shapely,	this	I	could	say	for	her,	and	she	was	my	Lolita’s	 big	 sister-	 this	 notion,	 perhaps,	 I	 could	 only	 keep	 up	 if	 I	 did	 not	visualise	too	realistically	her	heavy	hips,	round	knees,	ripe	bust,	the	coarse	pink	skin	of	her	neck	(“coarse”	by	comparison	with	silk	and	honey),	and	all	the	rest	of	that	sorry	and	dull	thing:	a	handsome	woman.	(AL,	p.	72)		The	way	this	line	begins	is	complimentary	of	Charlotte,	but	the	way	Humbert	tells	the	reader	that	he	can	‘only	keep	the	notion	up’	if	he	ignores	her	physical	features	quickly	 subverts	 this	 idea.	 The	 terms	 that	 Humbert	 uses	 to	 describe	 Charlotte	deserves	 some	unpacking.	He	uses	 ‘heavy	hips’	 and	 ‘coarse	pink	 skin’	 to	 suggest	negative	 visual	 referents,	 but	 then	 in	 the	 brackets	 he	notes	 that	 her	 skin	 is	 only	
 267 
‘coarse’	when	compared	with	silk	and	honey.	At	this	point,	a	cross-modal	reference	has	been	established	with	the	introduction	of	‘honey’,	which	has	both	a	tactile	and	a	 taste	 referent	 readily	 associated	with	 it.	The	 latter	 is	more	 likely	 to	be	primed	because	the	line	above	refers	to	Charlotte’s	‘ripe	bust’,	with	the	term	‘ripe’	having	connotations	with	 taste.	 As	 the	 reader	 reaches	 the	 end	 of	 the	 passage,	 the	 term	‘handsome	woman’	 once	 again	 subverts	 the	 direction	 Humbert	 has	 been	 taking.	Nabokov	 constructs	 an	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 physical	 appearance	 of	Charlotte	 in	 that	while	Humbert	 clearly	detests	her,	 the	 reader	 is	 inclined	 to	 see	her	as	attractive	–	particularly	when	the	cross-modal	language	suggests	that	‘ripe’	be	interpreted	as	a	taste	rather	than	as	an	expression	of	her	having	aged.	Humbert	‘strips’	 the	 referential	 qualities	 associated	 with	 these	 terms	 and,	 using	 a	 cross-modal	 mapping,	 he	 repurposes	 them	 to	 indulge	 in	 his	 own	 perverted	 sense	 of	aesthetics	where	he	can	only	be	attracted	 to	a	 ‘handsome	woman’	 if	he	 imagines	her	to	be	like	her	prepubescent	daughter.		By	contrast,	when	Humbert	describes	his	first	vision	of	Lolita	and	the	feelings	that	accompanied	 that	moment,	Nabokov	uses	 language	with	more	recourse	 to	sound	patterns,	with	some	similarity	to	the	way	it	is	used	in	‘Sounds’.	Note	once	again	the	underlined	phonetic	repetition:		 I	find	it	most	difficult	to	express	with	adequate	force	that	flash,	that	shiver,	that	impact	of	passionate	recognition.	In	the	course	of	the	sun-shot	moment	that	 my	 glance	 slithered	 over	 the	 kneeling	 child	 (her	 eyes	 blinking	 over	those	stern	dark	spectacles	–	the	little	Herr	Doktor	who	was	about	to	cure	me	of	all	my	aches)	while	I	passed	her	by	in	my	adult	disguise	(a	great	big	
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handsome	hunk	of	movieland	manhood),	 the	vacuum	of	my	soul	managed	to	suck	in	every	detail	of	her	bright	beauty,	and	these	I	checked	against	the	features	of	my	dead	bride.	(AL,	p.	39)		Alongside	some	of	 the	more	obvious	 instances	of	 immediate	alliteration	–	 ‘bright	beauty’,	 ‘movieland	manhood’	and	 ‘handsome	hunk’	–	the	first	 line	 in	this	extract	repeats	 the	 post-alveolar	 fricative	 in	 ‘flash’	 and	 ‘shiver’.	 In	 the	 subsequent	 lines	Nabokov	uses	s	as	an	alliterative	device:	Tsur’s	analysis	notes	that	these	sibilants	can	 have	 a	 ‘double-edged’	 quality	 (1992,	 p.	 43-7),	 being	 either	 indicative	 of	 a	tender	emotion	or	imitating	a	natural	noise.	Nabokov	develops	a	different	kind	of	ambiguity:	one	where	 the	aestheticized	 reaction	created	by	 the	pleasurable	non-conscious	 sensation	 of	 the	 words	 rhyming	 initially	 masks	 the	 more	 sinister	overtones	 they	 carry	 with	 them.	 Rexamining	 the	 passage,	 the	 words	 ‘slithered’,	‘disguise’	 and	 ‘suck’	 all	 conjure	 up	 more	 disturbing	 imagery	 in	 line	 with	 the	transgressive	nature	of	Humbert’s	actions	here,	as	he	becomes	aroused	by	Lolita.	Yet	each	of	these	words	is	placed	after	another	word	with	an	s	sound	that	creates	alliteration:	 ‘glance	 slithered’,	 ‘passed…	disguise’	 and	 ‘soul…	 suck’,	 aestheticizing	the	very	terms	that	hint	at	his	depravity.	When	the	reader	becomes	aware	of	their	darker	 connotation,	 it	 creates	 a	 sense	 of	 tension	 between	 this	 low-level	aestheticized	 response	 to	 Humbert	 and	 the	 higher-level	 consciousness	 of	 his	sordid	nature	in	this	instant.		This	kind	of	tension	also	occurs	when	Humber	invokes	multiple	sensory	domains	in	a	short	extract,	and	in	doing	so	approaches	the	boundaries	of	cross-modality.	An	example	occurs	in	Humbert’s	diary	he	compiles	shortly	after	meeting	Lolita:	
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Wednesday.	 “Look,	 make	 Mother	 take	 me	 and	 you	 to	 Our	 Glass	 Lake	tomorrow.”	These	were	the	textual	words	said	to	me	by	my	twelve-year-old	flame	in	a	voluptuous	whisper,	as	we	happened	to	bump	into	one	another	on	 the	 front	 porch,	 I	 out,	 she	 in.	 The	 reflection	 of	 the	 afternoon	 sun,	 a	dazzling	 white	 diamond	 with	 innumerable	 iridescent	 spikes	 quivered	 on	the	round	back	of	a	parked	car.	The	leafage	of	a	voluminous	elm	played	its	mellow	shadows	on	the	clapboard	wall	of	the	house.	Two	poplars	shivered	and	shook.	(AL,	p.	45)		Consider	here	how	there	are	some	links	to	the	novel’s	opening	description	of	the	name	‘Lolita’	and	its	sensory	transferences.	He	refers	to	her	as	his	‘twelve-year-old	flame’,	 again	 invoking	 the	 twin	 domains	 of	 temperature	 and	 vision.	 The	 phrase	‘voluptuous	 whisper’	 describes	 a	 sound	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 is	 most	 commonly	understood	 as	 a	 physical	 quality	 of	 being	 curvaceous,	 creating	 a	 sense-sight	mapping.	 The	 personification	 of	 the	 landscape	 around	 him	 that	 follows	 –	 the	‘shivering’	 poplars	 and	 the	 ‘quivering’	 sun	 –	 approaches	 another	 moment	 of	sensory	blending	with	“the	leafage	of	a	voluminous	elm	played	its	mellow	shadows	on	 the	 clapboard	 wall”.	 Here	 the	 sight	 of	 the	 leaf	 shadows	 moving	 around	 is	described	as	having	‘played’,	which	could	also	be	read	as	personification,	but	more	interestingly	as	another	sight-sound	mapping.	The	term	‘mellow’	can	often	be	used	to	 describe	 a	 sound,	 and	 in	 conjunction	 with	 ‘played’	 it	 suggests	 some	 musical	connotations.	Because	of	the	ambiguity	as	to	which	sensory	domain	he	is	referring	to,	this	passage	does	not	qualify	directly	as	an	example	of	literary	synaesthesia,	but	the	 hinted	 potential	 of	 the	 cross-modal	 mapping	 creates	 some	 tension	 for	 the	
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reader.	 This	 tension	 then	 again	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 transgressive	 material,	where	Humbert	has	 just	described	a	 twelve	year	old	girl	as	having	a	 ‘voluptuous	whisper’.		This	ambiguity	between	the	sensory	domains	that	Nabokov	builds	into	Lolita	acts	as	 an	 additional	 source	 of	 tension	 that	 keeps	 the	 reader	 re-examining	 and	questioning	their	initial	interpretations,	being	unsure	whether	to	take	Humbert	at	face	 value	 yet	 still	 being	 intrigued	 by	 his	 aestheticized	 descriptions.	 It	 is	 worth	noting	that	in	his	Lectures	on	Literature,	Nabokov	extolled	the	value	of	re-reading,	suggesting	that	this	kind	of	process	of	re-examining	the	text	in	an	effort	to	resolve	this	tension	was	something	he	purposefully	cultivated:		 Curiously	enough,	one	cannot	read	 a	book:	one	can	only	reread	 it.	A	good	reader,	 a	major	 reader,	 an	 active	 and	 creative	 reader	 is	 a	 rereader.	And	 I	shall	tell	you	why.	When	we	read	a	book	for	the	first	time	the	very	process	of	moving	 our	 eyes	 from	 left	 to	 right,	 line	 after	 line,	 page	 after	 page,	 this	complicated	physical	work	upon	 the	book,	 the	very	process	of	 learning	 in	time	and	space	what	this	book	is	about,	this	stands	between	us	and	artistic	appreciation.	(LL,	p.	3)		This	kind	of	re-reading,	along	with	sensory	manipulation	and	stripping	images	of	their	referents	are	also	used	by	Humbert	to	mask	the	horror	of	his	other	crimes,	to	imbue	 them	 too	 with	 something	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 pleasure.	 In	 the	 opening	 of	 the	novel,	he	says	‘You	can	always	count	on	a	murderer	for	a	fancy	prose	style’	(AL,	p.	
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9).	His	‘fancy	prose	style’,	as	he	puts	it,	helps	take	the	edge	off	his	killing	of	Quilty	in	the	final	pages	of	the	novel:		 …all		the	while	dreadfully	twitching,	shivering,	smirking,	but	withal	talking	in	 a	 curiously	 detached	 and	 even	 amiable	manner:	 	 "Ah,	 	 that	 	 hurts,	 sir,	enough!	Ah,	 that	hurts	atrociously,	my	dear	 fellow.	 I	pray	you,	desist.	Ah--very	 painful,	 very	 painful,	 indeed	 .	 .	 .	 God!	 Hah!	 This	 is	 abominable,	 you	should	 really	 not-"	His	 voice	 trailed	 off	 as	 he	 reached	 the	 landing,	 but	 he	steadily	walked	on	despite	all	the	lead	I	had	lodged	in	his	bloated	body--and	in	distress,	in	dismay,	I	understood	that	far	from	killing	him	I	was	injecting	spurts	 of	 energy	 into	 the	 poor	 fellow,	 as	 if	 the	 bullets	 had	 been	 capsules	wherein	a	heady	elixir	danced.	(AL,	p.	303)		Here	there	is	ambiguous	tension	created	by	Nabokov:	the	reader	knows	Humbert	is	killing	Quilty	with	his	shots,	but	he	describes	the	scene	in	such	a	manner	that	he	could	easily	be	 tickling	him	 instead.	Quilty	 is	becoming	 increasingly	animated	by	the	shots,	even	at	one	point	being	described	by	Humbert	as	demonstrating	‘spurts	of	energy’	in	this	passage.	The	sensory	detail	describing	his	perception	of	Quilty’s	movements	–	twitching,	shivering,	smirking	–	in	spite	of	being	shot	makes	it	seem	as	if	he	is	doing	him	no	harm,	perhaps	he	is	even	doing	him	a	kindness	by	injecting	this	energy	into	Quilty.	He	occasionally	uses	the	word	 ‘hit’	or	 ‘caught’	to	describe	the	 impact	 of	 his	 bullets,	 and	 at	 one	 point	 he	 replaces	 the	 word	 ‘fire’	 with	 its	French	equivalent	feu.	“Feu.	This	time	I	hit	something	hard.”	This	separation	of	the	image	from	its	referent,	in	this	case	taking	away	the	English	word	and	replacing	it	with	a	word	from	another	language,	and	referring	to	the	impact	of	a	bullet	simply	
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as	 “This	 time	 I	 hit	 something	 hard”	 helps	 Nabokov	 to	 blunt	 this	 impact	 of	Humbert’s	crimes.		If	 Humbert	 attempts	 to	 persuade	 the	 reader	 to	 accept	 Quilty’s	 murder	 by	aestheticizing	it,	he	performs	a	similar	trick	when	he	comes	to	the	moment	he	and	Lolita	first	consummate	their	illicit	relationship.	He	calls	upon	his	hyper-aesthesia	to	 offer	 the	 reader	 an	 analogous	 account	 of	 how	 it	 would	 appear	 represented	symbolically	in	the	form	of	visual	art:			 There	would	have	been	a	 lake.	There	would	have	been	an	arbor	 in	 flame-flower.	 There	would	 have	 been	 nature	 studies--a	 tiger	 pursuing	 a	 bird	 of	paradise,	 a	 choking	 snake	 sheathing	 whole	 the	 flayed	 trunk	 of	 a	 shoat.	There	would	have	been	a	sultan,	his	face	expressing	great	agony	(belied,	as	it	were,	by	his	molding	caress),	helping	a	callypygean	slave	child	to	climb	a	column	of	onyx.	There	would	have	been	those	luminous	globules	of	gonadal	glow	 that	 travel	 up	 the	 opalescent	 sides	 of	 juke	 boxes.	 There	would	have	been	 all	 kinds	 of	 camp	 activities	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 intermediate	 group,	Canoeing,	 	 Coranting,	 	 Combing	 	 Curls	 	 in	 the	 lakeside	 sun.	 There	 would	have	 been	 poplars,	 apples,	 a	 suburban	 Sunday.	 There	would	 have	 been	 a	fire	 opal	 dissolving	within	 a	 ripple-ringed	pool,	 a	 last	 throb,	 a	 last	 dab	 of	color,	stinging	red,	smearing	pink,	a	sigh,	a	wincing	child.	(AL,	p.	134-5)		Consider	the	visual	images	that	race	before	the	reader’s	mind:	the	natural	images	of	the	lake,	the	tiger,	the	bird	of	paradise,	the	snake;	before	the	human	images	of	a	sultan,	a	slave	child	and	of	technical	items	such	as	juke	boxes	take	over.	Nabokov	
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describes	 the	 scene	 in	 such	 elaborate	 visual	 detail	 that	 it	 temporarily	 forces	 the	reality	of	the	sexual	congress	taking	place	out	of	the	reader’s	mind:	it	only	returns	at	the	very	end	where	the	imagery	becomes	so	much	less	specific	as	to	be	opaquely	suggestive	once	again:	“stinging	red,	smearing	pink,	a	sigh,	a	wincing	child”	are	all	overt	references	to	his	consummation	with	Lolita.	But	by	describing	this	action	in	such	aestheticized	terms,	coupled	with	the	use	of	past	conditional	tense,	Humbert	again	distances	himself	 from	the	reality	of	his	actions,	and	protects	himself	 from	having	to	confess	to	the	reader	the	truly	sordid	nature	of	his	deeds.					
Reader’s	Mind,	Author’s	Mind		To	conclude	this	chapter,	let	us	go	back	to	Nabokov’s	Lectures	on	Literature	and	re-examine	his	 ideas	on	 literature,	 as	well	 as	 the	 relationship	between	authors	 and	readers.		 A	book,	no	matter	what	 it	 is	 –	 a	work	of	 fiction	or	a	work	of	 science	 (the	boundary	line	between	the	two	is	not	as	clear	as	is	generally	believed)	–	a	book	of	fiction	appeals	first	of	all	to	the	mind.	The	mind,	the	brain,	the	top	of	the	 tingling	 spine	 is,	or	 should	be,	 the	only	 instrument	used	upon	a	book.	(LL,	p.	3-4)		
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As	 Nabokov	makes	 clear	 here,	 the	 brain	 is	 the	 locus	wherein	 all	 the	 perceptual	effects	that	have	the	ability	to	captivate	the	reader	can	take	place.	While	Nabokov	was	in	some	respects	using	this	line	to	ward	his	students	away	from	historical	or	socio-economic	 criticism	 (LL,	p.	 3),	 his	 emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	mind	draws	attention	also	the	to	essentiality	of	the	cognitive	and	perceptual	processes	in	 being	 able	 to	 appreciate	 his	 fiction.	 In	 this	 lecture,	 Nabokov	 rejects	 socio-economic	 readings	 of	 a	 text	 in	 favour	 of	 individual	 imagination,	 and	 he	 also	cautions	 against	 emotional	 engagement	with	 a	 character	 –	 preferring	 instead	 to	establish	 an	 ‘artistic	 harmonious	 balance’	 between	 the	 reader’s	 mind	 and	 the	author’s	mind	(LL,	p.3-4).	One	can	see	how	this	becomes	relevant	to	Lolita,	as	the	novel	seeks	not	so	much	to	encourage	direct	emotional	sympathy	for	Humbert	as	to	establish	an	artistic	connection	between	his	mind	and	the	reader’s	mind.	This	is	a	 subtle	 but	 important	 distinction:	 Nabokov	 sees	 emotional	 engagement	 as	 a	“comparatively	 lowly	kind”	of	 imagination	 (LL,	p.	4).	On	 the	other	hand,	drawing	the	 reader	 into	 Humbert’s	 aestheticism	 –	 his	wordplay,	 his	 attention	 to	 sensory	detail	and	traces	of	eidetic	memory	–	allows	the	reader	to	indulge	Humbert,	to	be	entertained	by	him,	and	consequently	to	potentially	temper	their	rush	to	judge	him	on	the	deeds	for	which	he	is	facing	trial.	These	processes	of	the	mind	that	we	have	been	 following	 throughout	 the	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis,	 including	 the	 recourse	 to	using	 phonetics	 for	 aesthetic	 effect,	 are	 the	 tools	 that	 Nabokov	 uses	 to	 create	 a	sense	 of	 tension	 for	 his	 reader.	 So	 it	 becomes	 apparent	why	 he	 placed	 so	much	emphasis	 on	 encouraging	 the	 reader	 to	 adhere	 to	 their	 individual	 perception	rather	 than	 to	 seek	 external	 referents	 that	might	 draw	 attention	 away	 from	 the	aesthetic	 impact	 of	 stepping	 out	 the	 phonetic	 elements	 in	 the	 name	 ‘Lolita’,	 for	instance.	
 275 
	In	 this	chapter,	we	have	 followed	Nabokov	through	his	own	fiction	by	examining	the	 question	 of	 how	 the	 unique	 nature	 of	 his	 own	mind	 influenced	 his	work.	 Of	course	there	is	a	strong	biographical	element	to	this	approach,	but	in	undertaking	this	study	of	synaesthesia	and	cross	modality	we	have	had	the	opportunity	to	learn	more	about	 the	mind,	and	 to	understand	more	deeply	how	 the	different	 sensory	domains	 can	 blend	 together.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 because	 it	 flows	 on	from	 and	 reconfirms	 the	work	 done	 in	 the	 other	 case	 studies	 to	 show	 the	 links	between	literature	and	media	that	stem	from	a	different	sensory	domain.		Of	 course,	 unlike	 music	 or	 Impressionism,	 synaesthesia	 itself	 is	 not	 a	 strong	thematic	 link	 to	Nabokov’s	works,	 due	 to	 its	highly	 idiosyncratic	nature.	What	 it	does	 provide	 us	 with	 is	 a	 clearer	 understanding	 of	 the	 many	 techniques	 that	Nabokov	 employs	 in	 these	 texts:	 semantically	 rich	names,	 cross	modal	 relations,	hyper-aesthesia	 and	 sensory	manipulation.	 Being	 able	 to	 understand	 these	 as	 a	literary	effect	with	a	perceptual	basis	is	helpful	when	articulating	the	impact	of	his	writing.	 But	 more	 interestingly	 it	 also	 provides	 a	 window	 into	 the	 nature	 of	Nabokov’s	own	mind,	and	shows	that	what	we	might	potentially	dismiss	normally	as	an	example	of	over-indulgent	writing	was	most	 likely	an	everyday	perception	for	him.	We	may	not	devote	such	attention	to	the	aesthetic	effect	of	remembering	or	pronouncing	names,	 but	perhaps	Nabokov	did.	We	might	be	 inclined	 to	 think	that	 the	perfect	 recall	of	minute	details	 in	a	memory	 that	seems	 to	 take	place	so	long	ago	is	unrealistic,	but	perhaps	he	did	have	such	a	gift.	If	this	seems	far-fetched,	consider	how	a	description	of	‘synaesthesia’	and	its	effects	might	have	sounded	to	
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a	 sceptic	 before	 science	was	 able	 to	 verify	 its	 existence.	 Yet	now	 synaesthesia	 is	taken	to	be	a	serious	and	well-studied	phenomenon.		Reading	 ‘Sounds’	 in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 Nabokov	 and	 his	 translator-son	experienced	synaesthesia,	the	central	narrative	of	a	protagonist	who	is	unoccupied	with	the	signs	of	his	 faltering	relationship	but	 instead	enraptured	by	the	sensory	detail	 of	 the	world	 around	him	becomes	a	point	of	distinction.	As	we	have	 seen,	this	 moment	 of	 unified	 perception	 has	 echoes	 throughout	 Nabokov’s	 fiction.	 To	close	 this	 chapter,	 it	 is	 worth	 speculating	 on	 the	 possibility	 that	 this	 constant,	overwhelming	attention	to	multisensory	aspects	of	the	external	world	is	a	stylised	representation	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 living	 with	 synaesthesia	 as	 strong	 as	 Nabokov’s.	Dmitri’s	 translation	 draws	 the	 reader	 into	 this	 world	 by	 emphasising	 phonetic	repetition,	 to	draw	attention	at	 least	 to	 the	 interference	of	sound	with	 the	visual	world.	As	a	potential	clue,	consider	the	line	“I	realised	that	everything	in	the	world	was	 interplay	 of	 identical	 particles	 comprising	 different	 kinds	 of	 consonance”	(1995,	p.	74),	where	there	 is	perhaps	a	 faint	pun	on	 ‘consonants’,	many	of	which	are	recurrently	forming	the	basis	of	alliteration	or	assonance	in	the	passage	(most	notably	s,	p	and	 l).	This	brings	us	back	once	again	to	the	 idea	that	what	Nabokov	wanted	was	to	bring	the	reader’s	mind	closer	to	the	author’s	mind.			Tsur	 refers	 to	 literary	 synaesthesia	 in	 nineteenth	 century	 romantic	 poetry	 as	having	“vague,	dreamy	or	uncanny	hallucinatory	moods”	(2008,	p.	283).	Although	what	 is	 technically	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘literary	 synaesthesia’,	 does	 not	 dominate	Nabokov’s	fiction,	we	can	see	how	these	kind	of	unrealistic,	dreamlike	perceptions	of	the	sensory	domains	coming	together	provide	a	more	unique	contribution	to	the	
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intersection	 of	 synaesthesia	 and	 literature.	 They	 create	 a	 sense	 of	 heightened	aesthetic	 engagement	with	 the	 text,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 external	 intrusions	 on	 the	narrative.	The	reader,	caught	up	in	the	sensory	detail	of	the	phonetic	repetition,	is	drawn	into	the	narrative	and	in	establishing	the	connection	between	reader’s	mind	and	author’s	mind	that	Nabokov	so	prizes,	comes	perhaps	as	close	as	possible	 to	approximating	what	his	‘gift’	is	like.		 	
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Conclusion:	The	Telltale	Tingle			At	 the	 outset	 of	 this	 thesis	 I	 set	 out	 to	 explore	 the	 potential	 to	 connect	 the	discipline	 of	 literary	 criticism	 with	 the	 techniques,	 insights	 and	 theories	 of	cognitive	science.	There	were	three	key	aims	to	this	research,	which	I	would	now	like	to	draw	back	together	as	we	reach	a	conclusion.		The	 first	aim	was	 to	demonstrate	where	cognitive	 science	might	 truly	be	able	 to	add	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 literature	 by	 “extending	 the	 critic’s	 toolbox.”	 This	particular	 ambition	 was	 demarcated	 on	 one	 side	 by	 examples	 of	 critical	approaches	to	certain	texts,	most	notably	On	the	Road,	that	were	lacking	the	means	to	 articulate	 a	 novel’s	 perceptual	 effects	 in	 clear	 terms.	On	 the	 other	 side	 it	was	bounded	 by	 examples	 taken	 from	 the	 existing	 schools	 of	 cognitive	 poetics	 and	neuroaesthetics	 that	 have	 not	 provided	 this	 much-sought	 articulation,	 but	 have	instead	 come	 up	 with	 either	 reductionist	 theory	 or	 mere	 re-categorisations	 of	existing	literary	terms.		What	 has	 been	 shown	 is	 that	 cognitive	 science	 can	 indeed	 extend	 the	 range	 of	critical	 tools.	 Crucial	 to	 this	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 identify	 a	 perceptual	 process	 or	phenomenon	 relevant	 to	 a	 particular	 effect	 that	 can	 expand	 on	 the	 existing	understanding	in	a	meaningful	way.	Stockwell’s	inconclusive	discussion	of	feeling	in	 literature	 and	 Ramachrandran’s	 simplistic	 argument	 about	 the	 relevance	 of	‘peak	shift’	to	abstract	art	demonstrate	that	a	potential	tool	needs	to	do	more	than	just	 connect	 two	 ideas	 together.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 Tsur	 uses	 the	 periodicity	 of	
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speech	 sounds	 to	 articulate	 perceptual	 effects	 associated	 with	 them	 is	 more	productive,	as	is	Barry’s	discussion	of	the	interaction	between	different	regions	of	the	brain	in	the	production	of	perceptual	tension.		Through	 our	 investigation	 of	 the	 cognitive	mechanisms	 that	 are	 responsible	 for	musical	tension,	a	framework	has	emerged	whereby	tension	can	be	articulated	as	a	significant	factor	in	the	appreciation	of	literature.	Semantic	tension	is	a	device	that	Nabokov	 uses	 to	 manipulate	 the	 reader	 during	 the	 presentation	 of	 scandalous	material	 in	Lolita,	playing	with	the	different	properties	that	his	descriptive	terms	can	connote	in	a	way	that	masks	their	more	undesirable	realities	behind	a	veil	of	aestheticism.	In	Kerouac’s	novels,	as	epitomised	by	On	the	Road,	tension	functions	through	 the	 creation	of	 expectations	 for	 the	 reader	 that	Kerouac	 then	withholds	for	artistic	effect:	both	on	a	macro	level	in	terms	of	how	the	novel’s	character	arcs	unfold,	 and	 on	 a	micro	 level	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 his	 literary	 style	 turns	 traditional	punctuation	 into	 a	 rhythmic	 device	 that	 can	 imitate	 the	 cadences	 of	 music.	Understanding	 the	 perceptual	 basis	 of	 tension	 allows	 us	 to	 discuss	 the	 idea	 of	‘feeling’	 in	 literature	 with	 a	 more	 precise	 model	 of	 how	 certain	 effects	 are	achieved.	 It	also	keeps	us	mindful	of	how	these	kinds	of	aesthetic	effects	are	not	‘universal’	to	all	readers,	in	spite	of	what	Ramachrandran	claims	can	be	offered	by	neuroscience.	It	 is	in	fact	quite	the	contrary:	as	a	largely	perceptual	phenomenon	that	 is	 localised	 within	 the	 individual	 mind,	 tension	 explains	 why	 there	 is	 such	scope	for	varied	reader	response	to	texts	such	as	On	the	Road.		The	 second	 aim	was	 to	 show	 how	 cognitive	 science	 could	 clarify	 key	 intuitions	about	 the	nature	of	 literary	 texts.	Chief	among	these	were	 the	notion	that	On	the	
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Road	was	 ‘like	 jazz’	and	that	Mrs	Dalloway	was	 impressionistic.	 Jackson	(2002,	p.	165)	spoke	of	how	the	ideal	model	for	cognitive	criticism	was	to	demonstrate	how	a	psychological	 or	 cultural	 artefact	 functioned	 in	 an	 analogous	way	 to	mental	 or	neurological	 functions.	This	 is	essentially	 the	route	taken	 in	these	case	studies	of	Kerouac	 and	 Woolf:	 to	 show	 how	 the	 artistic	 form	 that	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	comparison	 to	 literature	 functions	 as	 presently	 understood	 by	 cognitive	 science,	and	 then	 to	 show	 how	 analogous	 processes	 take	 place	 in	 literature,	 or	 more	specifically	in	the	structural	elements	of	those	texts	that	give	rise	to	the	intuition	of	an	analogy	with	music	or	art.		As	 noted	 above,	 the	 exploration	 of	 timbre,	 rhythm	 and	 tension	 as	 structural	elements	common	to	both	music	and	language	formed	the	basis	for	explaining	the	idea	that	On	the	Road	is	‘musical’	in	some	way.	In	regards	to	Woolf,	by	articulating	the	perceptual	effects	associated	with	Impressionism	in	terms	of	their	neurological	mechanisms,	 it	 is	 likewise	 possible	 to	 broaden	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 an	analogous	 function	 arises	 in	 literature.	 This	 then	 can	 be	 used	 to	 extend	 the	discussions	 of	 Woolf’s	 Impressionism	 to	Mrs	 Dalloway,	 showing	 how	 it	 exploits	similar	perceptual	quirks	as	Monet	did	when	depicting	a	field	of	poppies	that	seem	to	shimmer	due	to	the	equiluminance	of	the	painting’s	colours.		When	we	talk	about	these	kinds	of	analogies	between	two	different	artistic	media	by	using	‘intuitions’,	we	are	touching	upon	an	important	point	that	emerges	from	the	 interdisciplinary	 collaboration	 between	 cognitive	 science	 and	 the	 arts.	Intuition	 refers	 to	 an	 instinctual	 or	 non-conscious	 process	 of	 arriving	 at	 a	judgement,	 and	 articulating	 its	 effect	 allows	 us	 to	 discuss	 both	 the	 creative	
 282
philosophies	and	the	resultant	expressive	effects	of	an	author	without	necessarily	specifying	 conscious	 authorial	 control	 or	 intent.	 As	 Zeki	 touches	 upon	 when	 he	suggests	 that	 artists	 are	 “neurologists	 who	 unknowingly	 study	 the	 brain	 with	techniques	 unique	 to	 them”	 (2001,	 p.	 99),	 specific	 awareness	 of	 how	 these	techniques	 actually	 functioned	was	 not	 necessary	 for	 the	 artists	 to	make	 use	 of	them.	 For	 instance,	 Kerouac	 never	wrote	with	 any	 explicit	 understanding	 of	 the	neurological	 mechanisms	 behind	 both	 jazz	 and	 literature,	 but	 he	 trusted	 his	intuition	enough	to	sense	the	potential	for	literature	to	borrow	from	jazz.		This	brings	us	to	the	final	aim	of	the	thesis,	which	was	to	examine	how	we	might	broaden	 our	 approach	 to	 the	 topic	 of	 ‘aesthetics’	 by	 seeking	 new	 insights	 from	cognitive	science	that	might	explain	the	significance	of	neurological	processes	that	are	not	immediately	accessible	to	our	own,	direct	consciousness.	There	have	been	two	facets	to	this	final	investigation:	the	first	was	the	continual	study	of	phonetic	and	rhythmic	effects	in	Kerouac,	Woolf	and	Nabokov.	Here	it	was	shown	that	while	the	 effect	 associated	 with	 these	 devices	 has	 a	 distinct	 perceptual	 presence,	 the	neurological	process	that	produces	it	 is	not	ordinarily	available	to	consciousness.	As	such,	there	is	only	intuitive	recourse	to	the	source	of	the	effect,	and	it	 is	often	attributed	to	other	subjective	processes	that	are	more	accessible,	such	as	emotion.	As	 we	 have	 seen,	 literary	 critics	 often	 paper	 over	 these	 cracks	 by	 resorting	 to	symbolic	readings	of	these	connections:	such	as	Malcolm’s	symbolic	interpretation	of	the	jazz	connection	in	On	the	Road	or	McKluskey’s	idea	of	‘word	knots’	echoing	throughout	 Mrs	 Dalloway.	 Bringing	 the	 perspective	 of	 cognitive	 science	 to	 the	debate	allows	literary	criticism	more	freedom	to	discuss	aesthetic	effects	without	needing	to	resort	to	explanations	that	ignore	the	source	of	the	effect.	
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	The	 other	 facet	 to	 this	 investigation	 lies	 in	 our	 exploration	 of	 Nabokov’s	synaesthesia	and	the	general	idea	of	cross-modality.	As	we	have	seen,	synaesthesia	is	 a	highly	 idiosyncratic	phenomenon.	At	 face	value	 this	might	 seem	 to	 render	 it	unhelpful	to	literary	criticism,	but	our	exploration	of	synaesthesia’s	processes	has	given	 us	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 particular	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 Nabokov’s	 mind.	Synaesthesia	 itself	might	 once	 have	 been	 brushed	 aside	 as	 a	 fanciful	 product	 of	imagination,	but	only	because	at	the	time	the	tools	were	not	available	to	validate	the	 cognitive	 processes	 in	 the	mind	 of	 a	 synaesthete	 that	 give	 rise	 to	 cross	 talk	between	sensory	domains.	In	the	same	way,	what	might	once	have	been	dismissed	simply	as	Nabokov	having	a	flair	for	extravagant	prose	can	now	be	understood	as	conforming	 to	 the	 patterns	 associated	 with	 synaesthesia	 in	 individuals:	 these	include	 finding	 aesthetic	 considerations	 in	 the	 very	 names	 of	 his	 characters,	displaying	eidetic	memory	and	thematically	alluding	across	his	fiction	to	a	state	of	hyper-aesthesia	 or	 being	 aware	 of	 a	multitude	 of	 connections	 between	 different	domains.	 This	 goes	 some	 way	 towards	 establishing	 the	 “harmonious	 balance	between	the	reader’s	mind	and	the	author’s	mind”	that	Nabokov	spoke	about	in	his	literary	 lectures	 (LL,	 p.	 4).	 We	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 fully	 experience	 Nabokov’s	synaesthesia,	but	being	aware	of	its	effects	gives	a	heightened	understanding	of	his	fiction.		But	where	synaesthesia	is	idiosyncratic	and	distinct,	cross-modality	is	more	stable	across	populations,	and	gives	rise	to	perceptions	that	are	widely	accepted	without	individuals	 being	 conscious	 of	 their	 cross-sensory	 nature.	 We	 have	 seen	 the	principles	 of	 cross-modality	 at	 work	 throughout	 this	 thesis:	 in	 the	 way	 that	
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recourse	to	aural	language	creates	artistic	potential	to	invoke	sound	properties	in	a	novel,	even	when	being	read	through	a	different	domain	(the	visual	system	that	receives	 the	 letters	 on	 the	 page).	 In	 our	 investigations	 of	 how	Woolf	 appears	 to	follow	principles	associated	with	visual	art,	as	for	Kerouac	with	jazz,	we	have	seen	just	 how	many	 connections	 run	between	different	 artistic	media.	 Cross-modality	shows	us	that	the	sensory	domains	interact	with	one	another	far	more	frequently	than	we	might	suspect.		What	I	hope	all	this	material	shows	is	that	much	future	potential	for	the	study	of	aesthetics	 lies	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 understand	 how	 this	 interaction	 between	 the	different	sensory	domains	affects	our	perception	of	artistic	works.	As	Grace	noted,	aesthetics	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 “a	 disciplinary	 field…	 directed	 towards	 the	understanding	of	the	sensual	in	order	perhaps	to	capture	this	field	for	logic”	(1996,	p.	 1),	 and	 this	 allows	 us	 to	 unify	 the	 concerns	 of	 different	 artistic	 media	 to	communicate	 using	 the	 realm	 of	 sensory	 information.	 Recalling	 what	 Barry	suggested	about	imagery	functioning	as	a	kind	of	‘euro	currency’	between	sensory	input	and	memory,	we	may	be	able	to	broaden	our	understanding	of	the	different	‘aesthetics’	associated	with	particular	eras,	where	in	this	case	‘aesthetic’	signifies	a	conscious	categorisation	of	a	cultural	artefact	that	is	derived	from	any	number	of	pre-conscious,	cross-modal	experiences.	The	‘Impressionist’	aesthetic,	for	example,	spanned	visual	art,	music	and	literature,	and	while	in	some	cases	the	connections	between	these	different	media	may	have	been	overt,	 in	other	examples	they	may	have	been	drawn	at	a	non-conscious	level.		
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This	then	forms	the	most	profitable	avenue	for	cognitive	science	to	be	applied	to	the	 arts.	 Any	 future	 ‘neuroaesthetics’	 should	 not	 preoccupy	 itself	 with	 trying	 to	distil	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 aesthetics	 into	 reductionist	 neurological	 explanations	 that	aim	to	account	for	every	experience,	but	to	help	articulate	to	the	reader	what	lies	beyond	the	realm	of	conscious	perception.	When	Nabokov	spoke	of	“merging	the	precision	of	poetry	with	the	intuition	of	science”	(LL,	p.	6)	in	the	study	of	the	novel,	he	 also	 alluded	 to	 an	 ideal	 reading	 that	 adopted	 both	 conscious,	 rational	perceptions	 and	 pre-conscious	 sensations	 as	 valid	material	 to	 engage	with,	 in	 a	quote	that	appeared	in	the	introduction	of	this	thesis:		 “In	order	to	bask	in	that	magic	a	wise	reader	reads	the	book	of	genius	not	with	his	heart,	not	so	much	with	his	brain,	but	with	his	spine.	It	is	there	that	occurs	 the	 telltale	 tingle	 even	 though	we	must	 keep	 a	 little	 aloof,	 a	 little	detached	 when	 reading.	 Then	 with	 a	 pleasure	 that	 is	 both	 sensual	 and	intellectual	we	shall	watch	the	artist	build	his	castle	of	cards	and	watch	the	castle	of	cards	become	a	castle	of	steel	and	glass.”	(LL,	p.	6)		As	we	have	seen	throughout	this	thesis,	the	idea	of	cognitive	science	being	allowed	to	mediate	 in	 the	 arts	 has	made	 some	 literary	 critics	wary	 of	what	 the	 outcome	might	be.	We	have	seen	 the	potential	 for	 redundant	explanations	or	 reductionist	readings,	but	we	have	equally	been	entertained	with	the	prospect	of	being	able	to	account	for	the	aesthetic	effects	that	have	until	now	lain	just	beyond	our	grasp.	So	I	conclude	 that	 we	 should	 approach	 this	 coming	 age	 of	 cognitive	 literary	 studies	with	a	nervous	aesthetic	and	critical	excitement.	We	should	be,	as	Nabokov	writes	“a	little	aloof,	a	little	detached,”	so	that	we	might	spot	the	pitfalls	of	this	approach	
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as	they	emerge;	but	so	too	should	we	be	attuned	to	the	possibility	that	the	“telltale	tingle”	of	aesthetic	engagement	as	explained	by	cognitive	science	will	be	the	next	great	literary	frontier.		 	
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Glossary:		
Amygdala:	A	small	region	of	the	brain	located	below	the	thalamus,	with	one	lobe	on	either	side.	Considered	to	be	part	of	the	brain’s	 limbic	system	and	involved	in	emotional	processing.		
Axon:	 A	 long	 fibre	 attached	 to	 the	 cell	 body	 of	 a	 neuron	 that	 is	 responsible	 for	delivering	output	or	signal,	enabling	communication	between	neurons.		
Cerebral	 Cortex:	The	folded	outer	 layer	of	the	brain	that	 is	divided	into	 left	and	right	 hemispheres	 and	 also	 into	 lobes.	 It	 is	 responsible	 for	 cognitive	 tasks	including	memory,	perception,	 rationalisation,	 language	and	attention.	Compared	to	the	areas	in	the	limbic	system	it	handles	more	of	the	‘higher’	thought	processes	that	result	in	rationalised	perception.		
Circadian	Rhythm:	An	internal	twenty-four	hour	cycle	found	in	many	organisms,	including	 humans,	 that	 responds	 to	 light	 or	 darkness	 levels	 and	 influences	behaviour.		
Cognitive	 Poetics:	 A	 term	 used	 by	 some	 literary	 scholars	 to	 delineate	 literary	criticism	 that	 seeks	 to	 apply	 the	 principles	 of	 cognitive	 science	 to	 some	interdisciplinary	end.	See	Chapter	2.		
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Cognitive	 Science:	 A	 collective	 term	 for	 scientific	 studies	 of	 the	 human	 mind.	Neuroscience,	cognitive	psychology	and	linguistics	can	all	be	considered	examples	of	cognitive	science.	See	Introduction.		
Dopamine:	 	 A	 chemical	 released	 by	 specific	 neurons	 that	 transmits	 signals	 to	other	brain	areas.	It	has	important	functions	associated	with	the	motor	system,	but	more	notably	it	facilitates	the	brain’s	reward	systems.			
fMRI:	Functional	Magnetic	Resonance	Imaging.	A	form	of	imaging	that	captures	the	fluctuations	 in	 blood	 oxygenation	 associated	with	 neurological	 activity,	 showing	areas	of	peak	activation.		
Intuition:	 In	 this	 thesis	 ‘intuition’	 refers	 to	mental	associations	or	 ideas	 that	are	strongly	felt	but	lack	a	conscious	or	fully	rationalised	explanation.			
Hippocampus:	 A	 brain	 region	 located	 below	 the	 cerebral	 cortex	 that	 plays	 an	essential	role	in	forming	memories.		
Hypothalamus:	A	brain	region	located	below	the	thalamus	that	controls	circadian	rhythm,	hunger,	body	temperature	and	fatigue.		
Limbic	System:	A	group	of	brain	areas	including	the	hippocampus,	amygdala	and	hypothalamus	 that	 collectively	are	 involved	 in	emotion,	motivation	and	memory.	Although	 the	 term	 ‘limbic	 system’	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 debate	 as	 to	 whether	 it	
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accurately	 categorises	 the	 function	 of	 the	 regions	within	 it,	 the	 limbic	 areas	 are	more	directly	involved	in	emotion	than	the	cerebral	cortex.		
Mesolimbic	 System:	 A	dopamine	 pathway	 that	 is	most	 notably	 associated	with	addictive	behaviour.		
Mirror	Neurons:	Neurons	associated	with	a	particular	action	that	also	fire	when	observing	that	same	action	performed	by	someone	else.		
Neuroaesthetics:	A	 term	used	 to	 describe	 theories	 of	 cognitive	 science	 that	 are	applied	to	the	arts,	usually	with	the	aim	being	to	articulate	their	aesthetic	impact	in	scientific	terms.	See	Chapter	2.	
	
Neuron:	The	basic	cellular	components	of	the	brain	that	release	nerve	inputs	via	axons	for	communication	between	different	areas	of	the	brain.		
Parietal	Lobe:	Part	of	the	cerebral	cortex,	the	parietal	lobe	is	responsible	for	our	perception	 of	 space	 and	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 external	 world.	 It	 receives	sensory	 information	 from	 different	 domains,	 particularly	 the	 sense	 of	proprioception.			
Perception:	In	terms	of	cognitive	science,	perception	is	how	sensory	information	is	 organised	 and	 interpreted	 by	 the	 brain.	 Perception	 governs	 how	 the	 external	world	 is	understood	by	 the	mind,	and	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	used	 to	refer	 to	 the	way	a	
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text	 and	 any	 aesthetic	 response	 to	 it	 are	 represented	 and	 understood	 by	 an	individual.		
Plasticity:	 Plasticity	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	of	 the	brain	 to	 change	neural	pathways	over	time.	These	include	responses	to	learning	and	behaviour,	but	also	responses	to	injury.		
Proprioception:	The	sense	of	the	position	of	various	parts	of	the	body	and	of	the	effort	that	accompanies	moving	those	parts.			
Sensation:	 In	 scientific	 terms,	 sensation	 refers	 to	 the	 reception	 of	 sensory	information	by	sense	regions	prior	to	interpretation	and	organisation.			
Suprachiasmatic	 Nucleus:	 A	 region	 within	 the	 hypothalamus	 that	 receives	information	about	light	from	the	retina	and	sends	signals	to	the	rest	of	the	brain,	governing	the	body’s	circadian	rhythm.		
Thalamus:	 A	 brain	 region	 that	 sits	 on	 top	 of	 the	 brain	 stem	 and	 facilitates	 the	relaying	of	sensory	information	to	the	cortex.		 	
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